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Summary
The various constructions of rights of pre-emption encountered in South African case
law all have some merit. This is confirmed by the multiplicity of types of preference
contracts encountered in German law especially. The tendency of South African courts
and writers to portray one approach as the only correct one to the exclusion of all other
views, results in tension and confusion, all the more because of the failure to investigate
the relevant policy considerations comprehensively. The confusion is compounded by
what amounts to a breakdown of the system of precedents with judgments being based
on incorrect interpretations of previous decisions and with scant regard for contrary
decisions.
No certainty exists regarding the construction of the contractual right of pre-emption in
Roman and Roman-Dutch law, nor is it clear what figure or figures were received into
South African law. The Germanic concept of tiered ownership that forms the historical
basis for the Oryx remedy, does not form part of our law. This accounts for the
difficulty that courts and writers have in explaining this remedy in terms of Romanist
terminology, and the resort to the language of fiction.
German law and English law, relied upon in South African case law, do not support a
uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an enforceable duty to
make an offer upon manifestation of a desire to sell. The almost unanimous support of
US courts for a remedy by which the holder can ultimately obtain performance of the
main contract upon conclusion of a contract with a third party, challenges the
hypothesis suggested by German law that the default construction of preference
contracts should be the bare preference contract which only creates a negative
obligation.
The very cryptic way in which rights of pre-emption are normally drafted, makes it
difficult to even identify the main purpose of the parties. It is therefore not easy to
classify preference contracts into the different types identified in this study as notional
possibilities. A default regime is therefore highly desirable in the interest of legal
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certainty. The choice of a default regime should be made on the basis of recognised
policy considerations, particularly on the basis of an equitable balancing of typical
parties' interests and in view of communal interests balanced against the demand for
legal certainty. The choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical
authority or precedent (which is in any event unclear in the present context) or
unsubstantiated claims that one model is more logical or commercially useful than
another. When rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as
possible, be reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law to prevent
contradictions and inconsistencies.
A policy analysis reveals that three default types of preference contract should be
recognised, each with a clearly delineated field of application. Firstly, where the
agreement allows the grantor to contract with a third party, the holder has the right to
contract with the grantor at the terms agreed with the third party. Such a preference
contract can therefore be regarded as an option conditional upon conclusion of a
contract with a third party. Such contracts are rare in South Africa. In other cases, the
default rule should be that the grantor must first give the holder an opportunity to
contract before he contracts with a third party. The default construction of this latter
type of preference contracts depends on whether the preference contract itself
predetermines the main contract price. If so, the holder has a right or option to
contract at that price upon any manifestation of a desire to conclude the relevant type of
contract. However, where the preference contract does not predetermine the price, or
refers to a price that the grantor would accept from third parties, any manifestation of a
desire to sell should not be sufficient to trigger the holder's right. The grantor and
society have an interest in having her freedom to negotiate with third parties to obtain
the best possible price curtailed as little as possible. In such cases, the default rule
should be that the holder is only entitled to conclusion of the main contract upon breach
in the form of a contract with or offer to a third party. The default rule should also be
that such preference contracts - which will be treated as ordinary preference contracts -
only terminate upon the grantor actually contracting with and performing to a third
party within a reasonable time after the holder declined the opportunity to match those
terms, and provided the identity of the third party was disclosed to the holder on
request. The holder therefore cannot lose his preferential right by a rejection of an
outrageously high offer by the grantor.
IV
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Options and preference contracts are closely related and overlapping concepts. The
type of preference contract that grants a conditional right to contract can often be
understood as a conditional option (or at least as a conditional option subject to a
resolutive condition that the grantor does not want to contract anymore). The
traditional distinction between options and rights of first refusal can only be maintained
in respect of some types of preference contracts. These are negative or bare preference
contracts which only give rise to remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante the
breach, as well as those preference contracts creating conditional rights to contract
which courts refuse to treat as conditional options because their wording implies a duty
to make or accept an offer, or because the requirement of certainty precludes them from
being options.
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Opsomming
Die verskillende konstruksies van voorkoopsregte aanvaar III Suid-Afrikaanse
beslissings het almal meriete. Dit word bevestig deur die verskillende tipes
voorkoopskontrakte wat veral in die Duitse reg erken word. Die neiging van Suid-
Afrikaanse howe en skrywers om een benadering as die enigste korrekte een te tipeer
veroorsaak spanning en onsekerheid, des te meer weens die versuim om die relevante
beleidsoorwegings deeglik te ondersoek. Boonop is die presedentestelsel telkens
verontagsaam deur verkeerde interpretasies van vorige uitsprake en deurdat
teenstrydige uitsprake bloot geïgnoreer is.
Geen sekerheid bestaan oor die konstruksie van die kontraktuele voorkoopsreg in die
Romeinse of Romeins-Hollandse Reg nie. Dit is ook nie duidelik watter figuur of
figure in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geresipieer is nie. Die Germaanse konsep van
gesplitste eiendomsreg wat die historiese basis van die Oryx-meganisme daarstel, vorm
nie deel van ons reg nie. Dit verduidelik hoekom howe en skrywers sukkel om dié
remedie te verduidelik aan die hand van Romanistiese verbintenisreg-terminologie, en
die gevolglike gebruikmaking van fiksie-taal.
Die Duitse en Engelse reg waarop gesteun is in Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak, steun nie 'n
uniforme konstruksie van alle voorkoopsregte as behelsende 'n afdwingbare plig om 'n
aanbod te maak by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te verkoop nie. Die byna
eenparige steun van Noord-Amerikaanse howe vir 'n remedie waarmee die
voorkoopsreghouer uiteindelik prestasie van die substantiewe kontrak kan kry by
sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde, is 'n teenvoeter vir die hipotese gesuggereer deur
die Duitse reg dat die verstekkonstruksie van voorkeurkontrakte behoort te wees dat
slegs 'n negatiewe verpligting geskep word.
Die kriptiese wyse waarop voorkeurkontrakte normaalweg opgestel word, maak dit
moeilik om selfs die hoofdoelstelling van die partye te identifiseer. Dit is daarom nie
maklik om voorkeurkontrakte te klassifisieer in die verskillende tipes wat in hierdie
studie geïdentifiseer is nie. 'n Verstekregime is daarom wenslik in die belang van
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regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime behoort gemaak te word op die basis van
erkende beleidsoorwegings, spesifiek op die basis van 'n billike balansering van tipiese
partybelange en in die lig van gemeenskapsbelange gebalanseer teen die vereiste van
regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime kan nie gebaseer word bloot op historiese
gesag en vorige beslissings nie (wat in elk geval in die huidige konteks onduidelik is).
Dit kan ook nie gebaseer word op ongemotiveerde aansprake dat een model meer logies
of kommersieël bruikbaar as 'n ander is nie. Wanneer verstekreëls gekies word moet
dit, sover moontlik, versoen word met die bestaande begrippe-struktuur van ons reg om
teenstrydighede in die sisteem te vermy.
'n Beleidsanalise laat blyk dat drie verstektipes voorkeurkontrakte erken behoort te
word, elk met 'n duidelik afgebakende toepassingsveld. Eerstens, waar die ooreenkoms
toelaat dat die voorkeurreggewer eers met 'n derde party kontrakteer, het die
voorkeurreghouer 'n opsie om te kontrakteer op die terme ooreengekom met die derde.
Die voorkeurkontrak kan daarom beskou word as 'n opsie onderhewig aan die
voorwaarde van sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde. Sulke kontrakte is raar in Suid-
Afrika. In ander gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die voorkeurreggewer eers
die houer 'n geleentheid moet gee om te kontrakteer voordat sy met 'n derde 'n kontrak
aangaan. Die verstekkonstruksie van hierdie laasgenoemde tipe voorkeurkontrak hang
daarvan af of die voorkeurkontrak self die substantiewe kontraksprys vasstel. Indien
wel het die houer die reg of opsie om te kontrakteer teen daardie prys by enige
manifestasie van 'n begeerte om die spesifieke soort kontrak te sluit. Maar waar die
voorkeurkontrak nie die prys vasstel nie, of verwys na 'n prys wat die gewer sou
aanvaar van 'n derde, behoort enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te kontrakteer nie
genoeg te wees om die houer se reg afdwingbaar te maak nie. Die voorkeurreggewer
en die gemeenskap het 'n belang daarby dat die gewer se vryheid om met derdes te
onderhandel so min as moontlik beperk word sodat sy die beste moontlike prys kan kry.
In sulke gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die houer slegs geregtig is op die
voordeel van die substantiewe kontrak by kontrakbreuk in die vorm van 'n kontrak met
of aanbod aan 'n derde. Die verstekreël behoort ook te wees dat sulke
voorkeurkontrakte in beginsel slegs beëindig word wanneer die voorkeurreggewer
inderdaad kontrakteer met en presteer aan 'n derde binne 'n redelike tyd nadat die
voorkeurreghouer die geleentheid gegee is om daardie terme te ewenaar. Dit behoort
ook vereis te word dat die identiteit van die derde aan die houer geopenbaar word op sy
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versoek. Die houer kan dus nie sy voorkeurreg verloor deur nie-aanvaarding van 'n
belaglik hoë aanbod deur die voorkeurreggewer nie.
Opsies en voorkeurkontrakte is oorvleulende konsepte. Die tipe voorkeurkontrak wat
'n voorwaardelike reg om te kontrakteer verleen kan dikwels verstaan word as 'n
voorwaardelike opsie (of minstens as 'n voorwaardelike opsie onderhewig aan 'n
ontbindende voorwaarde dat die gewer glad nie meer wil kontrakteer nie). Die
tradisionele onderskeid tussen opsies en voorkeurregte kan slegs behou word tov
sommige voorkeurkontrakte. Hulle is die "negatiewe" voorkeurkontrakte, wat slegs
aanleiding gee tot remedies gemik op herstel van die status quo ante kontrakbreuk
sowel as daarde voorkeurkontrakte wat voorwaardelike regte om te kontrakteer skep
wat howe weier om as voorwaardelike opsies te behandelomdat hulle bewoording wys
op 'n plig om 'n aanbod te maak of te aanvaar, of omdat die vereiste van sekerheid
hulle verhoed om opsies te wees.
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1 Introduction
Lease contracts often contain a clause providing that if the lessor should decide to sell the
leased premises, the tenant will first be given the opportunity to buy the premises, before
it may be sold to an outsider.' Such a clause allows the lessee the freedom of exiting the
lease relationship after the initial period, and therefore maintains flexibility, whilst
preventing opportunism on the part of the lessor. It may often be more desirable than a
long-term or short-term contract. One benefit for the lessor is that it creates an incentive
for the lessee to invest in the property.' Similar arrangements are encountered in other
contracts concerning immovable property. Occasionally a seller will insist on a choice to
buy back the land should the buyer decide to sell.' Her purpose may be, for example, to
keep the land in the family or to control the use of the sold land to prevent interference
with her activities on neighbouring land. Sometimes the seller of a portion of his
property agrees that the buyer be given the first opportunity to buy the remainder of the
land." A person interested in acquiring land adjoining his may conclude a similar
agreement with his neighbour.' The function of such restraints on alienation in the
context of sales of land is to prevent bargaining breakdown between the grantor and the
holder who is supposed to be the person who values the property most, whilst
I See regarding business or industrial premises: Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967
3 SA 310 (A); Crossroads Properties (Priv) Ltd v AI Taxi Service Co (Priv) Ltd 19544 SA 514 (SR); cf
Ramburan v Minister of Housing (House of Delegates) 1995 1 SA 353 (D&C). In respect of agricultural
land see: Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299; Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137; Hattingh v Van Rensburg
1964 1 SA 578 (T); Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T); Krauze v Van
Wyk 1986 1 SA 158 (A); Hirschowitz v Moolman 19853 SA 729 (A); Rogers v Phillips 19853 SA 183 (E)
and Stewart v Breytenbach 19863 SA 47 (A).
2 Mitchell "Can a Right of First Refusal be Assigned?" 2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985989.
3 For example in Malan v Schalkwyk & Odendaal1852 1 S 225; Meyer, Smuts Executrix v Meyer 1858 2 S
75; Smith & Os v Momberg 1895 SC 295; Le Roux v Odendaal & Os 19544 SA 432 (N); Crous NO v
Utilitas Bellville 1994 3 SA 720 (K).
4 Joseph's Executor v Peacock 1868 Buch 247.
5 Cf Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester Racecourse Company [1901] 2 Ch 37 (CA).
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simultaneously retaining flexibility." Former co-owners are likely to include an
analogous clause in favour of one another in their agreement of partition.' Joint operation
(or partnership) contracts also often contain similar restraints."
Another important application of agreements entitling a class of persons to be preferred
as buyer pertains to company shares. A private company is obliged by the Companies
Act to limit the rights of its shareholders to freely transfer their shares." For this reason
company statutes often provide for an arrangement identical or akin to rules 21-24 of
Table B of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, in terms of which other shareholders will be
given the first chance to buy the shares of a member intending to sell his shares." A
purported transfer of shares to any outsider in contravention of these rules is void ab
initio. II Occasionally a shareholder agrees to prefer a non-shareholder in a like manner. 12
Partnership contracts may also contain such an obligation to prefer the other partners on
sale of an interest in the partnership. I3
6 Mitche112001 University of Chicago Law Review 985990.
7 Wissekerke v Wissekerke 19702 SA 550 (A). A right of pre-emption was granted to a mortgage holder in
McGregor v Jordaan 1921 CPD 30l. The mortgagee's real right does of course limit the owner's capacity
to alienate the property without the bondholder's consent. (Van der Merwe Sakereg 2nd edition (1989)
624). See generally Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox 1891 4 SAR 116 and Minter v
Robinson D.M. Co Ltd 1897 CLl 205.
8 Cross "The ties that bind: preemptive rights and restraints on alienation that commonly burden oil and gas
properties" 1999 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 193.
9 Section 20 (1) of The Companies Act 61 of 1973.
10 As sanctioned by s 59 (2). See also Basson "Beware of those pre-emptive rights" Finance Week 2001-
06-01 43; Irish & Co Inc (Now Irish & Menel/ Rosenberg Inc) v Kritzas 1992 2 SA 623 (W); Smuts v
Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA). Such an arrangement may
also be created by a shareholders' agreement as in Bel/airs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A). Cf also
Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 893 (A)
and Coetzee "Total demp Sasol/Engen-transaksie" Finansies & Tegniek 1995-07-21 13.
II Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA).
12 Skinner v Goldberg 1943 WLD 42; Cohen v Behr 1946 CPD 942; Oryx case supra.
I3 Savage & Pugh v Knox 19553 SA 149 (N).
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Clauses that grant a publisher the first opportunity of publishing a possible future work of
the author are widely used." A publisher agreeing to publish an author's first work takes
the risk that the immense cost of publishing and marketing the work of an unknown
author will not be covered by the proceeds thereof. By obtaining a preference to publish
future works, the publisher is in a position to spread the risk of the initial investment over
a range of potential works. For similar reasons, a music recording company might insist
on a comparable clause when concluding an agreement to record and market an artist's
work. The opportunity of acquiring possible future rights to designs or products
developed by a struggling or start up developer of computer software would likewise
make it worthwhile for an investor in this field to infuse funds into the development and
marketing of a concept or product. 15 Such an arrangement might also enable the company
to restrain their employees or independent contractors, in whom they might have invested
significantly, from developing products that compete with those of the company, without
the need to resort to a typical restraint of trade. 16
Some employment contracts give the employer an opportunity to match any offer from
another company, for example for a certain period after the expiration of the original
employment contract."
14 See for example, Schricker Bappert & Maunz: Verlagsrecht 3rd edition (2001) 132; Bappert & Wagner
Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 2nd edition (1958) 155, par 20.4; Haberstumpf & Hintermeier Einfiihrung
in das Verlagsrecht (1985) 115-120 (§ 1 RdNr 44); Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag:
Urheberrechtliche Abhandlung des MP!, Heft 6 (1967). No such clause has apparently been considered by
our courts.
15 Rosenoer "Acquiring rights in tomorrow's software: first refusal and fust negotiation rights under
Californian law" 1990 (7) The Computer Lawyer 13.
16 Ibid.
17 See for example, American Broadcasting Companies Inc v Wolf76 AD2d 162,430 NYS2d 275, 277
(1980), cited by Mitchell 2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985 at n 4. See also Wonnell CT "The
Contractual Disempowerment of Employees" 1993 Stanford Law Review 87, 108. Such terms are often
inserted in employment contracts in the sports sector. See, for example, Golden Lions Rugby Union v AJ
Venter & Others, an unreported judgment by Swart J in the TPD dated 11 February 2000 (case number
2007/2001) at p 28. Cf also Milner "Ajax spreads its wings" Mail & Guardian 1999-01-15 54 on the
3
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The licensor of a patent may insist in the patent licensing agreement that it be granted a
right to match a third party offer to obtain the licensee's business, if the licensor is
dependent on the licensee for manufacturing or commercialization." A distributorship
agreement may also contain a similar right for the distributor to be preferred above third
parties in respect of the distribution of any new product which the manufacturer may
produce."
In some franchise agreements the franchisee agrees not to sell the business without
allowing the franchisor the chance to purchase. This also places a restraint on the
franchisee's freedom to trade." Such a term appears to serve as a catch-all clause should
the customary "no sale without the consent of the franchisor" clause be unenforceable as
an unreasonable restraint of trade. It also entrenches the franchisor's control over the
identity of a future purchaser, if a court should hold that its consent to a sale was
unreasonably withheld." The franchisor could then buy and operate the business until an
acceptable buyer is found. The franchisor might, however, also agree to give the
franchisee the first opportunity to purchase any future franchises that might be developed
in a certain area." A right of first refusal to renew a short-term franchise contract is
regarded as an incentive to invest as the franchisee is not in danger of losing the benefits
of his investments, but still maintains his exit-option."
agreement between the Dutch soccer club Ajax and a South African club requiring Ajax to invest in the
South African club in return for the preferential opportunity to "buy" the South African club's players.
18 Chambers GW & Consalvi MS "Patent and High Technology Licensing" Practising Law Institute PLI
Order No. GO-OOSGSan Francisco 2001-05-16, New York City 2001-06-11 Patent & High Technology
Licensing 652 PUIPat 457.
19 Siviglia "Helpful Practice Hints: Rights of first refusal" 1994 New York State Bar Journal 56.
20 Longhorn Group (Pty) Ltd v The Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd 1995 3 SA 836 (W); Mitchell 2001 University
of Chicago Law Review 985.
21 Cfthe wording of the agreement in the Longhorn case at 838C-G.
22 See for example the agreement considered in Schupack v McDonald's System Inc 200 Neb 485, 264
NW2d 827,828 (1978) discussed by Mitche1l2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985 1000 et seq.
23 Mitche1l2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985 1000 et seq.
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A holder of mineral rights may agree to an analogous restriction on its ability to freely
alienate or lease the rights." The parties' primary purpose may be to preclude a
competitor from getting hold of these rights."
An agreement binding a trader to purchase its total requirement of a specific commodity
from a certain supplier means that the supplier must be preferred above all others when
the buyer wishes to buy."
The traditional terminology applied to all these types of arrangements have been that they
give rise to "rights of pre-emption," connoting preferential rights to buy, or "rights of first
refusal," which suggests a wider concept - a right to be given the first opportunity to
decide whether to enter into a specific transaction or not. 27
Such agreements to prefer a specific person when transacting are indeed not only directed
at contracts of sale. Some lease agreements, for example, oblige the lessor, on
termination of the lease, to first give the tenant the opportunity to conclude another lease
contract before agreeing to lease the premises to a third party."
24 Dithaba Platinum vErconovaal 1985 4 SA 615 (T); Mitchell 2001 University of Chicago Law Review
985; Cross 1999 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 193.
25 Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal1985 4 SA 615 (T). Evidence was lead that the holder did not wish to
acquire the mineral rights, but desired the power to prevent the rights from falling into the hands of a
specific competitor (621C-D).
26 Kimberley Waterworks Co v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 1897 AC 515; Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v
Corbitt & Another 19864 SA 523 (C); Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey of South African Law 141-143; Tew
"Rights of First Refusal: The 'Options' That Are Not Options, But May Become Options" 1989 Eastern
Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-10.
27 The term "right of first refusal" has also been used interchangeably with "right of pre-emption", for
example in the Dithaba Platinum case.
2S Soteriou v Retco Poyntons 1985 2 SA 922 (A); Aronson v Sternberg (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 597 (A).
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Therefore a broader or more general term than "pre-emption contracts" is needed to
describe these transactions. As an alternative to "first refusal contracts," a number of
writers have appositely termed these transactions "contracts of preference" or
"voorkeurkontrakte" .29
However, arrangements granting a preferential right to contract are not only created
contractually. The same phenomenon is often encountered in wills, where a testator
provides that a beneficiary may not sell the inherited object without giving another person
a chance to buy it first. Adiation of such an inheritance brings about the same obligation
for the heir or legatee as a contract of preference would have."
29 Reinecke & Otto "Voorkope en ander voorkeurkontrakte" 1986 TSAR 18 21; Van der Merwe et al
Contract: General Principles (1993) 62. Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 suggests the term "voorkeurreg"
for the general concept which they state is usually termed a "right of first refusal" in English. See also Kerr
The Law of Sale and Lease 2nd edition (1996) 338 ("preferent conditional right"), Van der Merwe et al
Contract 62 ("preferential right", "preferential right to buy", "preferential right to lease"). As various other
rights are described as "voorkeurregte" or "preferential rights", it is submitted that such terms are not apt
to describe the preference holder's claim in the present context. See for example Van der Merwe Sakereg
82 n151 ("voorkeurreg" created by s 20 of the Alienation of Land Act), Van Zyl NO v Look Good Clothing
CC 1996 3 SA 523 (SEC) ("voorkeurreg" to payment out of the proceeds of a claim ceded in securitatem
debiti), Trisilindo v DeVries 19944514 (0) ("preferential right" of a mortgagee), Land- & Landboubank
van SA v Cogmanskloof Besproeiingsraad 1992 1 SA 217 (A) ("voorkeurregte" created by legislation in
favour of both parties), Poolman J Emmissie van genoteerde, gewone aandele met voorkeursreg in Suid-
Afrika gedurende die tydperk 1950 tot 1964 M Com dissertation (Pretoria 1966). The term "preferential
right to transact" ("voorkeurreg om te kontrakteer") would exclude such other meanings. "Right of first
refusal" is also not objectionable, but is perhaps not wide enough to encompass all forms of preferential
rights to transact, and has been said to automatically encompass a duty to make an offer. This is disputable,
however, and this loaded term will therefore not be generally used in this thesis.
30 Van Wyk v Posemann & Another 1915 CPD 672; Fick v Fourie 1934 EDL 152; Engelbrecht v Mundell's
Trustee 1934 CPD 111; Ex parte Zunckel1937 NPD 295; Bodasing v Christie NO 1961 3 SA 553 (A). Cf
Schoeman v Rossouw & Others 1915 CPD 446.
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Legislation has also been used to create a such preferential rights to contract, often in
favour of the state or one of its organs." Such a statutory preference may also be created
to protect certain classes of private persons."
The focus here will be on preference contracts.
Rights of pre-emption are traditionally discussed in conjunction with a related concept -
options." An option contract is an agreement restricting the offeror's capacity to revoke
an offer." A right of pre-emption is said to differ from an option in the sense that an
option holder has an immediate power to bring the substantive contract into existence on
accepting the offer entrenched by the option contract, without any further action being
required from the grantor of the option. In the case of a right of pre-emption, the holder
might never get the opportunity to buy the property, even if she declares herself willing to
do so. If the person obliged to give the preference never manifests a desire to contract,
the holder will never have the power to conclude the main contract.
31 For example, the now repealed Community Development Act 3 of 1966, considered in Ah Ling v
Community Development Board & Os 1972 4 SA 35 (E). Statutory rights of pre-emption are widely used
in certain overseas jurisdictions to enable the state or local authorities to obtain land for the furtherance of
projects relating to land development, redistribution or conservation. See for example § § 24-26
Baugesetzbuch (Germany).
32 Section 100fthe Share Titles Act 95 of 1986 (which obliges the developer ofa sectional title scheme in
respect of an existing building to give the lessees the first chance to buy the unit they occupy). In Germany
and Switzerland, for example, legislation creates a preference in favour of co-heirs to buy property which a
heir intends to sell. See § 2034 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). Cf also the English Landlord and Tenant
Act 1987 which grants certain tenants of flats a preferential right to buy the premises if the landlord intends
to sell.
33 See, for example, Van der Merwe et al Contract 55 et seq; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale of Goods in
South Africa 5th edition (1984) 275, 44; Belcher Norman's Purchase and Sale in South Africa 4th edition
(1972) 95 et seq; cfKerr Sale and Lease (1996) 408 et seq; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th
edition (2001) 59 et seq.
34 In the words of Van der Merwe et al Contract 56-57. See also, for example, Hirschowitz v Moolman
supra and Stewart v Breytenbach supra; Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 5th edition (1998) 77;
Christie Contract 59.
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Preference contracts and options are traditionally classed together under the umbrella
concept of pacta de contrahendo. 35 A pactum de contrahendo has been defined as "an
agreement to make a contract in the future.':" and more widely, as "a contract aimed at
the conclusion of another contract.'?" and "agreements which may lead to a future
contract. "38 Options and preference contracts could be described as "unilaterally binding"
pacta de contrahendo as they only limit the grantor's freedom to contract with others, but
leave the holder totally free to decide whether to contract. This label distinguishes them
from agreements that bind both parties to contract in the future, which also qualify as
enforceable pacta de contrahendo in some foreign legal systems." On the other hand, as
the holder of an option or right of first refusal sometimes undertakes a counter-
performance in return for his right, obligations may be created for both parties, which
35 Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 765-766; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 33; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 58.
36 Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 765-766; Nienaber "Formaliteite by Koop en Sessie tov Grond: die
Jongste Beslissings" 1964 THRHR 44; De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en
Handelsreg vol I 5th edition (1992) 34 ("an agreement to conclude an agreement in the future").
37 Van der Merwe et al Contract 56. CfDu Plessis Die spesifieke nakoming van voorkoopsregte en ander
verwante regte in die Suid-Afrikaanse en Franse Reg unpublished LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch
(1997) 10.
38 Lotz "Purchase and Sale" in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in
South Africa (1996) 358.
39 The (bilaterally binding) Vorvertrag of German law is an example of such an "agreement to agree". On
Vorvertráge generally, see Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 84 et seq. Such
"agreements to agree" are not unknown in our law, but, as Van der Merwe et al Contract 58 point out,
"their applicability is limited by the requirement of certainty as interpreted by the courts, and by the
unwillingness of the courts to enforce an oral agreement to conclude a substantive contract, which is
required by law to be in writing." I use the term pacta de contrahendo in a wide sense to also include
agreements which merely prohibit the grantor from concluding the specific contract with a third party,
although they do not grant the holder an enforceable right to conclude the contract. For a similar wide
definition see Lotz "Purchase and Sale" 358 ("agreements which may lead to contracts"). If a pactum de
contrahendo is defined as an agreement to conclude an agreement or if Reinecke & Otto is correct in
stating that a pactum de contrahendo necessarily implies the existence of a "substantive offer", I submit
and will show that this term is not wide enough to include all types of preference contracts.
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then contradicts the "unilaterally binding" label. Whether all preference contracts are
indeed pacta de contrahendo under both the narrow and wide definitions of that concept,
will be considered in a later chapter.
11 Problematic aspects
As the traditional labels of "rights of pre-emption" or "rights of first refusal", appear to
refer to personal rights ex contractu, one would expect the normal remedy of specific
performance to be available to the preference holder. Specific performance in this
context has traditionally been understood by commentators to encompass an order to
make an offer when the grantor has manifested a desire to transact." Our courts have
however been loath to grant such an order, as appears from a line of cases in which
specific performance in this form was not granted, and mostly not even asked for."
The matter came to a head in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd42
where the minority of the Appellate Division was prepared to grant an order for specific
performance. The minority thereby confirmed the view that a contract of preference
creates a positive duty to make an offer. However, the majority, per Botha JA, confirmed
the traditional view that only an order for damages may be obtained." The majority
regarded the duty on the grantor as merely a negative one - the grantor may not sell to an
40 Floyd "Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253 257 et seq and authorities there cited; Flack "The Pre-
emption Agreement: Is it a viable option?" 2001 SAU 842; Eiseien "Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd
1958 2 SA 922 (A)" 1986 THRHR 95 99. CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 68; Reinecke & Otto 1986
TSAR 18 21, 22. This view is based on the notion that the grantor has a duty to make an offer once she
decides to conclude the main contract.
41 Joseph's Executor v Peacock 1868 Buch 247; Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs; Le Grange & Fox 1891 4
SAR 116; Van Pletsen v Henning 1913 AD 82; McGregor v Jordaan 1921 CPD 301; Sher v Allen 1929
OPD 137.
4219673 SA 310 (A).
43 Wessels and Potgieter JJA concurred with Botha JA.
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outsider. 44 In a further decision of the Appellate Division on this matter, Associated
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd,45it was again
questioned whether specific performance in the form of an order to make an offer could
be made. Instead, the court granted the holder a more drastic remedy. It held that the
holder of a right of pre-emption may by unilateral declaration of will bring a contract of
sale into existence once the grantor of the preference had concluded a contract of sale
with a third party without first giving the holder the opportunity to buy. In effect, a direct
claim to delivery of the merx is available on breach. This remedy came to be known as
the Oryx mechanism - an indication that it is considered a novelty in our law."
The position is not in fact crystal clear after the Oryx case. Thus the judges deciding the
case of Crundall Brothers (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus NO and Another" confessed that they
"have some difficulty in understanding the effect of the order made in the Bakeries case -
a difficulty apparently shared by the two Judges of Appeal who dissented in that case,
and by Professor Kerr .... "48 The cogency of the reasons for the decision in Oryx has
been questioned." The court's failure to spell out the basis of the Oryx mechanism has
left an impression that a fiction is at work with all the dangers flowing therefrom. 50 One
44These constructions of preference contracts will be discussed in depth the next chapter.
4519823 SA 893 (A), which was the next decision of the Appellate Division on this matter but for Bellairs
v Hodnett supra.
46See Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 136 139; Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway's Contract: Cases,
Materials and Commentary 3,d edition (1988) 93 n 5, Du Plessis "Die remedies van die huurder by
omskepping van huurgeboue in deeltitelskemas" 1996 Stell LR 329 337; Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming
29. CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 66.
4719922 SA 423 (ZSC).
48429D.
49Eiseien 1986 THRHR 9599.
50Radesich "Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Ply) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Landlord and tenant -lease - right of
first refusal" 1985 De Jure 407 409. See also Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 7631-J where the court states
that a difficulty with the Oryx mechanism is that the formalities legislation requires a written offer "in fact
(and not merely notionally)." The Oryx court's words '''n Koopkontrak word dan geag aangegaan te
gewees het ... " (907F) is pure fiction language. See Olivier Legal Fictions: an analysis and evaluation
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commentator has even declared that the precise nature, effect and basis of the so-called
Oryx mechanism cannot be ascertained with certainty."
The court in Oryx also expressly left open certain important questions affecting the
operation of preference contracts, inter alia whether not only a contract of sale would
trigger the Oryx mechanism, but also an offer to sell to a third party, and whether the
preference contract must conform with the formalities prescribed for the eventual
substantive contract. 52 The Oryx mechanism as formulated by the court, appears
inappropriate in some situations, for example where the terms agreed with the third party
differ from those to which the holder is entitled in terms of the contract of preference. 53
These shortcomings place a question mark behind the court's rejection of the alternative
constructions advocated in Owsianick. 54
The cases following upon the Oryx case have not satisfactorily resolved the controversial
issues either. In Hirschowitz v Moolman" the Appellate Division assumed for the
purposes of the case, without deciding the question, that the Oryx mechanism is also
triggered by the grant of an option, and that an order for specific performance in the form
of an order to make an offer is still available as an alternative remedy to the Oryx
mechanism. 56 The court did decide one question left open in the Oryx case, in holding that
(1973), especially at 96-98 and Lubbe & Murray Contract 442 n 6 on the dangers of using fictions to solve
legal problems. Cf Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 280.
51Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 329 337. CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 66; Lubbe & Murray Contract 93-
94.
52908F-G.
53Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1824. See also Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 141 and 1982 Annual Survey
130 and Floyd 1986 THRHR 253266.
54 I use the word "construction" to refer to a view or explanation of the rules relating to a specific type of
contract, which include the reserve rules or natura lia , but also the criteria for classifying a transaction
under that type.
5519853 SA 729 (A).
56.At 763F-G and 764G-H respectively. This assumption may have been made as the application was
launched before the decision in Oryx. See Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 139.
11
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
a contract of pre-emption In respect of land must comply with the formalities
legislation. 57
The confusion has been exacerbated by statements in other cases which conflict with the
Oryx case. Rogers v Phillips" holds, in conflict with the Oryx case, that a right of pre-
emption merely gives the holder a personal right to an offer by the owner. The court
effectively held that the holder cannot become a purchaser unless an offer is actually
made to the holder. 59 In Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaaf'° the court never referred to the
Oryx mechanism, but surprisingly held that the Oryx case confirmed that specific
performance can be granted to enforce a pre-emptive right and that a court has a
discretion to refuse this remedy."
Thus the exact construction of preference arrangements remains uncertain. The contrary
views in the case law on the enforceability of the primary duty of the person obliged to
give the preference, place the nature of the preference holder's claim in question.
12 Academic views
Various writers have pointed out the uncertainty surrounding contracts of preference,
especially after the decision in OryX.62
57767G_H.
5819853 SA 183 (E) 187D.
59 188C-D.
6019854 SA 615 (T).
61627D_E.
62 Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 128; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1921; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253; Lambiris
Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 78; Van der
Merwe et al Contract 64-66. Cf Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 100; Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 329 336; Du
Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 24,31; Janisch "Maintaining the distinction between options and pre-emption
agreements" 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 441; Flack 2001 SAL! 842831.
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Their views on the remedies available to the preference holder diverge. Various writers
insist that logically an order for specific performance in the traditional sense (that is in the
form of an order to make an offer) must be available to the holder of a right of pre-
emption." Some consider that the Oryx mechanism negates the discretion of the court to
grant or refuse specific performance of contracts." Thus they either reject the Oryx
mechanism and advocate a remedy of specific performance in the traditional sense only,"
or insist that the Oryx mechanism should be recognised as a form of specific
performance, so that the court's sanction must be sought for the contract of sale to be
created."
However, many writers welcome the new direction taken in Oryx, especially the practical
consequences for a holder who wants to acquire the property on breach." Some of these
writers still foresee a need for an order of specific performance in the traditional sense in
circumstances where the Oryx mechanism cannot be available."
A number of writers have recognised the underlying problem with the decision in Oryx to
be the court's failure to spell out the precise construction of the contract of preference,
and thus the legal explanation of the holder's ability to unilaterally conjure up a contract
of sale." Alternative legal explanations have been proposed," none of which have so far
63 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 9599; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253268; Flack 2001 SAL.! 842842.
64 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 9599, Floyd 1986 THRHR 253267. Cfthe minority in the Oryx case supra.
65 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 99
66 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 267. Cf also Van der Merwe et al Contract 68 in fine; Du Plessis Spesifieke
nakoming 57.
67 Kerr Sale & Lease 410; Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant (1994) 144-146;
Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 21; Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 31. CfVan Rensburg & Treisman The
Practitioner's Guide to the Alienation of Land Act (1984) 70-71 and Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 128 130.
68 See the text at n 53 above. Floyd 1986 THRHR 253267 n 145 and n 268 advises a holder who does not
know the terms agreed with the third party, to opt for a prayer for specific performance in the traditional
sense. See also Kerr Sale & Lease 410.
69 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 21, 24; Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 99; Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 128
130. CfRadesich 1985 De Jure 407 409; Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 329; Du Plessis Spesifieke Nakoming 31.
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received the approval of the courts." Some of these explanations or constructions have in
tum been described as problematical by other writers or are simply ignored in their
discussion."
The writers' opinions on the construction advocated by the majority in Owsianick (per
Botha JA) also diverge. A few, especially those writing before the decision in the Oryx
case, support the negative construction advocated by Botha JA and the court in
Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk:" Those who reject the negative
On the other hand, some appear to be content with the fact that, if not a fiction, something very close to it,
has been introduced into our law. See Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 444 (who expressly regards
the creation of a legal fiction as the preferable explanation). Cf Cooper Landlord and Tenant 146 (the
holder's right of pre-emption is converted into an option); Van Rensburg & Treisman The Practitioner's
Guide 71 (the offer to the third party constitutes an offer to the holder).
70 Reinecke & Otto 24 et seq; Lambiris Specific Performance 82-85; Van der Merwe et al Contract 68;
Floyd 1986 THRHR 253258 & 267. Flack 2001 SAU 842 suggests, on the one hand, that rights of pre-
emption should be treated as conditional options (832), but then ultimately argues that the court should,
subject to its general discretion in the context of specific performance, compel the grantor to make a bona
fide offer to the grantee (843).
71 Cf Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra 932E and Hirschowitz vMoolman supra 765F-G where the
Supreme Court of Appeal in effect rejected the conditional offer construction proposed by Reinecke & Otto
1986 TSAR 18.
72 See Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 28 130; Van der Merwe et al Contract 67 in fine - 68; Floyd 1986
THRHR 253267; Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 444.
73 1964 3 SA 702 (T). These constructions will be discussed in depth in the following chapter. See Joubert
General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 54, who does not refer to either Owsianick or Oryx, and
Mostert et al Die Koopkontrak (1972) 277-278. Neither De Jager Vervreemding van Grond = Alienation of
Land (1982) 125, nor the writers of Mackeurtan 's Sale of Goods (1 st to 5th editions), nor the writers of the
first three editions of Norman's Purchase and Sale in South Africa discuss the availability of an order for
specific performance or of the Oryx mechanism. This is so despite some references to a positive duty to
give the holder the opportunity of refusing the land. (See for example Norman's Purchase and Sale in
South Africa 1st edition (1919) 59-60, 2nd edition (1939) 106 & 3rd edition (1961) 84.) In the fourth edition
of Norman's Purchase and Sale (1972) 95 et seq, Botha lA's construction is rejected, but still no mention
is made of specific performance or of a remedy like the Oryx mechanism. Van Rensburg & Treisman The
Practitioner's Guide 70-71 consider the Oryx mechanism to be available only once a contract of sale has
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construction do so on very vague grounds, merely calling on commercial efficacy,"
principle," practical utility," reasonableness" and 10gic.78 Such construction has also
been called "erroneous" and "a misleading simplification", without any explanation."
These writers merely assume that a preference contract creates a directly enforceable
obligation on the grantor to make an offer, or at least a right to contract for the holder."
On the other hand, certain writers are prepared to concede that the parties may expressly
agree a procedure for the exercise of the right so that the results are the same as the rules
set out in the Hartsrivier Boerderye case." This concession somewhat undermines the
been concluded with an outsider. In the case of a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell, they advocate an
approach which boils down to that advocated in the Hartsrivier case.
74 Cooper Landlord and Tenant 144; cf Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 14. The latter relies on the
inadequacy of damages where the grantor has contracted with and delivered to a mala fide third party.
However, in such a case damages is not the only remedy anyway - the transfer may be set aside by reason
of the doctrine of notice. See also Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 20014
SA 15 (SCA).
75 Cooper Landlord and Tenant 144.
76 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1820.
77 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 97 ("dat dit [refusal imports an offer] vanuit 'n praktiese oogpunt die enigste
redelike benadering is, is duidelik.").
78 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 21 n 26. See also Flack 2001 SALf 842 833 who says of the Hartsrivier
approach that it is "the least realistic", and that "it is unclear how the right affords anything more than
nominal preference."
79 In the words of Cooper Landlord and Tenant 143.
80 Cfthe writers mentioned in n 74 - n 78, for example Cooper (the existence of an enforceable positive
duty on the grantor "is in accordance with principle"). See also Kerr The Law of Lease (1969) 146, Sale
and Lease l " edition (1984) 165; Sale and Lease 2nd edition (1996) 408; Belcher Norman's Purchase and
Sale in South Africa 4th edition (1972) 97; Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 14-16. Lubbe 1985 Annual
Survey 139; Lubbe & Murray Contract 92 n 3 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 63 reject Botha lA's
approach by implication, by their view that the operation of a right of pre-emption is conditional in the
sense that its exercise is linked to the trigger event. This premises that the holder is entitled to become a
purchaser at that point. Lambiris Specific Performance 82-85 also rejects the negative construction by
implication, as he gives only two possibilities for the construction of a contract of pre-emption, namely a
conditional future contract of sale or a conditional option.
81 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 9597; Lubbe & Murray Contract 92; Van der Merwe et al Contract 62-63; Floyd
1986 THRHR 253261; Flack 2001 SALf 842833; Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 144-145. Lubbe in this last
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argument that such a construction never makes practical or commercial sense. The same
honour does not befall Botha JA's approach.
One is left with the impression that the writers' diverging opinions on the nature of
contracts of preference have contributed to the complexity of the subject.
There thus remains a need to arrive at a clear exposition of the parties' primary rights and
duties and corresponding remedies.
Apart from the basic construction of preference arrangements, less fundamental, but
practically important, issues also need to be resolved. For example, if the grantor of a
preference should make an offer to the holder when not considering a sale to a third party,
would the holder lose his preference on rejection of such offer? What if the holder in
such a case alleges that the offer was not bona fide? Must a contract of preference in
respect of land always comply with the formalities prescribed by the Alienation of Land
Act 68 of 1981? What transactions or actions by the grantor or third parties would trigger
the availability of the Oryx mechanism or an order for specific performance? What, for
example, would be the effect of a sale in execution? What if the terms agreed in a
contract of sale with a third party cannot be applicable to the holder? What if the grantor
only sells a portion of the property, or sells it as part of a larger parcel? What precisely
must the grantor who wishes to sell to an outsider disclose to the holder about the
article states, correctly in my view, that there are various ways in which parties may contract in order to
afford one of them a preference should the other decide to sell an asset of his. However, he does not give
any clear guidelines on which construction should apply in which situation, and which should be the default
one if the preference contract only speaks of a right of pre-emption or right of first refusal. His proposal
that grants specifying the pre-emptive price or, expressly or tacitly, incorporating the price at which the
grantor is prepared to sell to a third party, will have to be recognized as more akin to option contracts than
previously thought, is not very clear. Most rights of pre-emption that do not specify a price, and where
there is no usual or market price, could arguably be construed as incorporating the price at which the
grantor is prepared to sell to a third party. Does this mean that he proposes a conditional option
construction as the default construction where the preference contract does not specify a price clearly or
where there is no usual or market price?
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intended transaction? How, if at all, may the grantor's duty in this regard be enforced?
Should rights of pre-emption be cedable?
Many of the consequences that the law would imply into preference arrangements in the
absence of express provisions by the parties are thus uncertain. This problem is
exacerbated by the very terse formulations generally resorted to by drafters of preference
arrangements in South Africa, which do not provide any guidance on the parties'
intention with respect to these questions .82
It is submitted that such questions that relate to the implied terms or naturalia of a certain
type of contract should not be answered without simultaneously considering the basic
legal construction of the contract. 83 This does not mean that once the "legal nature" of a
contract type is established, the naturalia can be simply deduced from it as a mere matter
of logic. The typical interests of parties to such contracts and any relevant public policy
considerations must still be considered in respect of each specific issue. A coherent,
consistent and therefore predictable construction of the entire contract type requires that
the primary rights and duties of the parties should be clearly delineated."
The basic construction of preference arrangements will be examined by way of an
investigation into the case law, the historical development of our law and the position in
certain overseas jurisdictions. Further motivation for this research strategy will be
supplied in the relevant chapters. Conclusions will be coupled with an examination of the
methodological place of these arrangements among related concepts, such as options and
pacta de contrahendo. Methodological models for identifying specific contract types,
such as the traditional essentialia-naturalia model will also be investigated. My proposal
82 For example, "Should the grantor wish to sell the property, he shall first offer it to the holder." (as in
Smith & Os v Momberg & Os 1895 SC 295). See par 2 1 1 at n 5 infra for a further example. A number of
typical formulations is also considered in par 7 3 infra.
83 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 19; Joubert "Die regsaard van die finansiële huurkontrak" 1989 TSAR
568.
84 See further chapter 6 where such methodological considerations are investigated.
17
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
will also address some of the more specific questions relating to rights of first refusal
mentioned above, although I will focus on the basic rights and remedies of the parties.
The traditional terms "right of pre-emption" or "right of first refusal" as well as the term
"preferential right to transact" will be used to describe the claim of the person to whom
the preference has been given. The preference holder will be referred to as "the holder"
and the person who must prefer the holder will be referred to as "the grantor"." The
object or property at which the preference arrangement is directed, will be referred to as
"the object" or "the property". Many writers and decisions describe the right of pre-
emption as a preferential right to transact, conditional upon the event described in the
contract of pre-emption, usually the manifestation of the grantor's desire to sell." When
discussing this view, the term "trigger event" will be used to refer to such event." I use
the verb "construct" to refer to the formulation of rules surrounding a specific contract
type. It encompasses the process of incorporating a specific contract type, identified in
practice, into the legal system, which enables comparisons with other provisions. ss A
category of contracts is therefore described and coherent rules developed for it, which
category is then added to the pantheon of separately regulated specific contract types.
85 This term is of course incorrect in the case of preference arrangements created by will or statute, or if it is
accepted that a preferential right to buy land could in some circumstances operate against successors in title
of the grantor.
86 Breytenbach v Stewart 1985 1 SA 167 (T) 176; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 258; Reinecke & Otto 1986
TSAR 18 24; Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 329 333. CfLubbe 1982 Annual Survey 136; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 63.
87 Snellergebeurlikheid" according to Kriegler J in Breytenbach v Stewart supra 176. See also Lubbe 1985
Annual Survey 138.
ss Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 268. The definition of "construct" as
verb in the Concise Oxford Dictionary reads as follows: "fit together, frame, build (lit. or fig.); (Gram.)
combine (words) syntactically; draw, delineate,esp. According to given conditions ... ". As a noun it is
defmed as "thing constructed, esp. by the mind ... " (Pearsall (ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition
(2001».
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2 Divergent views in the case law
Although courts sometimes acknowledge that the rights and duties of the parties to a
preference contract are a matter of interpretation, they tend to deal with preference
arrangements as if they belong to a contract type with an invariable, uniform set of
default rules.' A court encountering a view on the parties' rights, duties and remedies
inconsistent with its own, might very well reject that construction rather than to recognize
it as based upon the interpretation of a specific, differently worded clause encountered in
a different context. Thus the general pronouncements on the right of first refusal in
Hartsrivier Boerderye v Van Niekerk, belie the statement of the court that "Die
verskyningsvorme kan wissel," especially since the clause in question simply provided
that if the grantor should decide to sell the land, the holder shall possess the first right of
refusal to purchase.'
Those decisions that deal with the right of first refusal as a uniform concept reveal two
contrasting views. Firstly, some judges espouse the view that a right of first refusal
merely places a negative obligation on the grantor not to transact with a third party. This
negative obligation terminates if the holder is given an opportunity to transact, but turns it
down. The holder does not acquire a right to obtain the subject matter of the right, other
than through the acceptance of a voluntary offer made by the grantor.
A second view is that the duty of the grantor is merely initially a negative one, but that on
the occurrence of the trigger event she has a duty to act positively to enable the holder to
become the purchaser of the property. Adherents of this view can in tum be divided into
two camps. There are decisions holding that enforcement of the duty would imply an
order against the grantor to make an offer. Secondly, there are decisions which deny the
I CfBotha JA in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 310 (A) who stated that
his decision depended upon the true construction of the clause but then pronounced upon rights of pre-
emption in general.
2 1964 3 SA 702 (T).
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need for such an order, and which simply grant the holder a power to bring about a
contract extra-judicially on the occurrence of the trigger event. A further possible
variation holds the right of first refusal to be specifically enforceable by means of a
"short-circuited" order. Thus on breach, a court will refrain from an order that an offer
be made and simply order the grantor to transfer the property to the holder.'
This chapter considers the plurality of constructions of the case law in order to assess
whether all these constructions merit further consideration. To this end some brief
comments will be made on possible policy considerations supporting each construction.'
The origin of each construction will be examined briefly to establish which construction,
if any, is the authoritative one in our law.
2 1 A negative duty
2 1 1 Botha JA in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty)
Ltd
The most overt and forceful argument that the grantor bears no directly enforceable duty
to act positively was made on behalf of the majority of the court by Botha JA in
Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd?
3 In the case of a right of pre-emption. In a right of first refusal to conclude a lease, the order would be for
the lessee to be given possession of the property.
4 The relevant policy considerations will be investigated more fully in chapters five, six and seven below.
5 Supra. The clause considered provided that "if [the grantor/lessor]. .. should desire to sell ... , she shall,
before concluding any sale, offer the leased premises" to the holder/tenant "at the same price and upon the
same terms and conditions as she is prepared to sell the leased premises to any bona fide purchaser." The
statements of the court relating to the construction of the right of pre-emption were obiter, as the decision
turned on the fact that the grantor could not be said to have manifested a desire to sell during the currency
of the lease. This was also pointed out in Hirschowitz v Moo/man 19853 SA 729 (A) 760G-H.
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Quoting Van Pletsen v Henning." Botha JA held that a right of pre-emption does not
normally impose any enforceable obligation upon the grantor of the right, but merely
restrains the grantor from selling to a third party, save under the conditions prescribed in
the agreement. 7 The obligation imposed to offer to the holder under certain
circumstances is not an enforceable one, but merely refers to the means or method
whereby the property may be freely sold." Botha JA concluded that before a sale by the
grantor, the holder may not compel a sale to himself" He held that no procedure is
known to our law whereby the holder could in the event of a sale in conflict with his
rights, demand that he be allowed to step into the buyer's place."
Botha JA did not specifically pronounce on whether a grantor could be ordered to make
an offer once he did conclude a sale with a third party. He unfortunately also did not
state specifically whether the grantor would after a sale be under threat of an interdict or a
claim for damages only. His statement that the obligation imposed under certain
circumstances to make an offer is merely a means whereby the property can be freely
sold, would, however, appear to cover the situation where the grantor sells the property to
a third party. I I
61913 AD 82.
7321F-G.
8323G-H.
9322H-J.
10323E.
II This is how Van Heerden AJA in Oryx (at 905A) and Corbett JA in Hirschowitz v Moolman supra (at
760A) interpreted his view. Itmay perhaps be argued that Botha JA did not exclude the possibility that the
holder would have a positive remedy upon the grantor actually contracting with a third party, although this
is how the majority decision is generally understood. In his discussion of the ius commune texts on
naastingsrechte, Botha JA emphasised that none of these texts grants the holder the right to obtain the
object before conclusion of a contract with a third party. This suggests that Botha JA does not totally
exclude the possibility of a positive remedy upon a sale in breach of the preference contract. On the other
hand, his statement that Van Zutphen wrongly imported, in relation to a conventional voorkoopsreg, the
legal position under the Dutch law of naesting or the legal ius retractus, suggests that he disagrees with the
view that the holder might ever be entitled to performance on the terms agreed with the third party.
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This viewpoint may be interpreted to mean that an order for specific performance, in the
form of an order that the grantor must make an offer, can never be obtained." This
would be so simply because there never is an enforceable obligation upon the grantor to
make an offer. Once a contract is concluded with a third party, the holder may only
interdict the grantor and third party from giving and taking transfer. The grantor does not
then have to make an offer to the holder. Even if he transfers to a mala fide third party,
the holder may be able to have the transfer set aside, but not to oblige the grantor to make
an offer. The grantor may thereafter simply retain the property. In this manner, the
grantor may come to realize that the only means of escaping the restriction on his
capacity to alienate is to make an offer to the holder. The holder can never become a
purchaser through his own declaration or through an order of court directing the grantor
to make an offer or to deliver the object. Only if the grantor voluntarily makes an offer to
the holder can the holder become a purchaser by its acceptance. The right of first refusal
merely confers on the holder "a weapon which mayor may not ... persuade the grantor to
offer to sell to him.?" In other words, according to the majority view in Owsianick, the
grantor only ever has a negative obligation, an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii,"
This obligation is subject to a resolutive condition, namely that the holder should reject
an offer to contract by the grantor. The grantor can therefore not be forced to make the
offer by the court, but making the offer is the only way in which he would be released
from the obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii,"
This interpretation of Botha lA's view implies that he would not regard the holder's right
as subject to the condition that the grantor should wish to sell. The nature of the right
does not change before or after the grantor decides to sell: it remains an entitlement to a
non facere and nothing more. The occurrence of "the trigger event," if it amounts to a
12 See also Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 129; Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 12.
13 In the words of advocate O'Donovan, Bel/airs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A) 1113.
14 An obligation not to contract with third parties.
15 This point is laboured here as Botha lA's statement that the making of an offer is merely intended as a
means whereby the property concerned may be freely sold, has been described as "so obscure, with respect,
that it is not clear what the learned judge intended to convey .... " (Cooper Landlord and Tenant 144).
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breach, merely gives rise to the normal remedies for enforcing a negative duty, that is, a
prohibitory interdict or damages.
It is submitted that Botha lA's construction is not meaningless from a practical or
commercial perspective. The balance of bargaining power in a particular case could very
well result in the grantor agreeing only to be subject to an interdict or damages claim in
case of breach (or the setting aside of a transfer to a mala fide third party)." The holder
might also be satisfied with such an arrangement. In any event, regardless of the
construction followed, there is always a danger that the grantor may sell and transfer to a
bona fide third party, so that only damages may be claimed. No one contends that to
restrict relief to a claim for damages in such a situation makes no commercial sense. If
the holder discovers in time that the grantor has concluded a sale and intends to transfer,
or has transferred to a mala fide third party, an interdict (and an order setting aside the
transfer) will adequately restore the status quo, a solution that makes practical sense.
The negative construction does not make of the holder's right something other than a
"right of first refusal" or a "right of pre-emption". Although not enjoying a conditional
right to purchase, the holder still has a preferential right: he must be preferred above any
other potential purchaser by the grantor. A "preference" implies a negative: the non-
selection of others, but does not necessarily indicate when and how a selection must take
place. The construction is therefore not "illogical". Neither does logic dictate that
"'refusa1' imports an offer"," from which a duty to make an offer is to be inferred. As
was stated by Botha JA in Soteriou v Retco Poynions," "a right of first refusal" could
16 Or a third party who did not know about a right of pre-emption in company statutes (Smuts v Booyens;
Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 20014 SA 15 (SCA)).
17 As was held in Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester Race Course Company [1901] 2 Ch 37
(CA). This statement was relied on by the majority in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons 19852 SA 922 (A) 932G.
The court in Cohen v Behr 1946 CPD 942 was also influenced by this reasoning as appears from 946-948.
See also Flack 2001 SAL.! 842 834 and Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 17, who accept this statement as a
truism.
18 Supra.
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also refer to the first chance to refuse any voluntary offer which the grantor may, but is
not obliged to make."
The construction of a right of pre-emption would be very simple and not give rise to
theoretical problems if the view of Botha JA should be accepted as the only correct one."
It also accords with the policy consideration that restraints on alienation must be
narrowly construed, as too many restrictions on an owner's capacity to alienate are not in
the interest of commerce."
However, the cases relied upon by Botha JA arguably do not support his position. In
Sher v Allen." for instance, the court specifically stated that the holder was entitled to an
offer by the grantor." The decision in Van Pletsen v Henning" turned on the fact that the
grantor had not attempted to sell to anyone else. Therefore, the nature of the duty on the
grantor could not have changed in any event from a mere negative one as no trigger event
had occurred. The court did state obiter that it is for the holder to make an offer, which
19See the minority judgment of Botha JA at 936B-C, approved of by Radesich 1985 De Jure 407408-410.
Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 17 therefore incorrectly states that no objection had been made against the
conclusion reached by the majority in Soteriou that "refusal imports an offer." In the Manchester case, the
holder was in any event merely granted an interdict to protect his right. CfSiviglia's comment on the term
"right of first refusal": "Some agreements merely state that one party will have a 'right of first refusal', but
standing alone, that term has little, if any, meaning. Certainly, in this spare form, it is an invitation to
dispute. If an agreement must contain a right of first refusal, the mechanics of the right should be clearly
stated." ("Helpful Practice Hints: Rights of first refusal" 1994 New York State Bar Journal 56).
20 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1820.
21As confirmed at 321E of the judgment, relying on Voet 18 3 9 - 18 3 10 and Robinson v Randfontein
Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 188. See also Mostert et al Die Koopkontrak 277. CfVan der
Merwe Sakereg 70 and 80.
2219290PD 137, referred to by Botha JA at 321F-G.
23143. The court in Sher v Allen supra primarily relied on Manchester Ship Canal Company vManchester
Racecourse Company supra in favour of its view that the grantor has a duty to make an offer (142).
Whether the Manchester case provides authority for this view, will be investigated in par 42 infra.
24 Supra, referred to by Botha JA at 321F-G.
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the grantor must prefer to that of any other buyer." By implication, the grantor is not
compelled to accept the holder's offer, but may just not accept a similar or lower offer by
a third party. However, the court did not pronounce on the holder's remedy if the grantor
sold without allowing the holder to submit an offer. The possibility that the holder may
then be entitled to become a purchaser was not discussed and therefore not ruled out by
the court. It does, however, appear from these cases that opposing formulations of the
nature of the grantor's right predate the Owsianick - Oryx saga.
Whether SA Breweries v Francis & Sons" constitutes authority for Botha lA's statement
that the Dutch law of naasting is not part of the modern law is also questionable. This
aspect and Botha lA's interpretation of the Roman-Dutch sources will be investigated
further in the next chapter.
2 1 2 Hertsrivier Boerderye v Van Niekerk
The court here regarded the essence of a right of first refusal to be that the grantor obliges
himself not to sell to another, unless the holder has been granted a reasonable opportunity
and nevertheless did not offer to buy." It does place a positive duty on the grantor, in the
sense of requiring her to give notice that she wants to sell." If the holder does submit an
2595.
26 27 NLR 648.
27 1964 3 SA 702 (T) 705H. At 706A De Vos J stated that, "Die verskyningsvorme kan wissel". However,
his pronouncements on the right of first refusal in general show that he regarded it as a uniform concept,
especially in the light of the general wording of the clause. Perhaps he intended to allow only for express
deviations in the rights and duties of the parties. The clause simply provided that if the grantor should
decide to sell the land, the holder shall possess the first right of refusal to purchase. The grantor had given
the holder notice of his intention to sell. At issue was whether the period fixed by the grantor in which the
holder should convey whether he wishes to buy was a reasonable one and whether an oral indication that he
wanted to buy was sufficient.
28706B.
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offer, the grantor is free to reject it, but then forfeits his right to sell to a third party." The
holder thus has a right to make an offer, not a right to buy. 3D
The offer by the holder must be a valid one, complying with any prescribed formalities."
Otherwise, the seller would be precluded from selling to another even though he is not
yet able to conclude a binding contract with the holder." The court considered this to
unfair to the grantor."
Certain aspects of this construction are unclear. The holder's remedies should the grantor
fail to give notice of his intention to sell were not mentioned." The court thus did not
rule out the possibility that the grantor may be ordered by way of an order for specific
performance to furnish such notice. The question also remains whether the grantor is
only prohibited from selling to a third party at the same or lower price than that offered
by the holder. Thus the question remains whether the grantor may immediately upon
rejection of the holder's offer sell to a third party at a higher price than that offered by the
holder, without first giving notice to the holder of her intention.
Assuming that specific performance is not available upon breach of the preference
contract, this construction does not differ drastically from that proposed by Botha JA. In
terms of both approaches, the grantor cannot be compelled to make an offer on
manifesting a desire to sell. The grantor may however be interdicted from selling and
giving transfer to a third party should he have failed to notify the holder of the intention
to sell before doing so. If the grantor makes no offer to the holder or rejects the holder's
offer the effect will be the same: the grantor may not sell to the third party.
29707C.
30 Ibid.
31706H.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 On the facts such notice was given.
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Because of the unclear aspects of Hartsrivier, it is difficult to say which approach takes
the more restrictive view of the grantor's duties. Prima facie, the Hartsrivier approach
appears to leave the grantor more freedom to deal with her property. If the grantor is set
on selling to an outsider and not to the holder, the grantor could test the holder's attitude
without binding herself. The grantor must simply give notice to the holder of her
intention to sell and may then freely reject the holder's offer and lose the chance of
selling to the third party at that price. In terms of Botha lA's approach, if the grantor is
set on selling to an outsider, she must first submit an offer reflecting the terms on which
she is prepared to sell to the holder, and in so doing, take the risk that the holder might
accept such offer. A grantor who does not wish to sell to the holder at all, would thus
rather breach the agreement of pre-emption by selling to the third party without any offer
to the holder. The Hartsrivier approach is thus perhaps preferable as it makes a breach of
the grantor's duty less tempting. However, if the court in Hartsrivier foresaw the
possibility of an order that notice of intention to sell be given on breach, the Hartsrivier
approach could be said to place a positive duty on the grantor.
Authority for the court's approach can be found in Voet 18 3 10, where he says that "if
the buyer has covenanted with a stranger for the sale of the property at a definite price, he
ought to give notice of that fact to the original seller, so that, if the latter so thinks good,
he may within two months of the notice make it clear that he wishes to hold the property
as bought for the same price.'?' In Van Pletsen v Henning." an obiter dictum of Innes JA
also suggests that a right of pre-emption compels the grantor to prefer the holder's offer
above that of any other buyer if he decided to sell. 37
35 Gane's translation (my italics). The court in Sher v Allen used "intimate" and "intimation" instead of
"notice" in its translation.
36 Supra at 95.
37 Moreover, according to Sher v Allen supra 142-143, the grantor must lay before the holder "by his
written notice something in respect of which his (so-called) option - his ... first refusal - shall operate."
(My italics.) However, the court rejected the view that the right of pre-emption means no more than that
the holder should have the first right to make an offer (at 142).
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Remarkably, the court in Hartsrivier simply ignored several preceding cases in which it
was stated that the grantor must make an offer."
22 A positive duty enforceable by an order that an offer be
made
In a minority decision in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres," Ogilvie
Thompson JA concluded that the grantor has a duty to make an offer to the holder on the
occurrence of the trigger event. This duty is, subj ect to the normal discretion of the court
in this regard, enforceable by an order for specific performance in the form of an order
that an offer be made."
In a separate minority judgment in the same case, Williamson JA pointed out that Ogilvie
Thompson lA's view is the logical result of the approach confirmed at that stage in
Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality," namely that specific performance should in
principle be available as a remedy in respect of a duty to act positively, and that this
implies an order that the defendant be ordered to carry out "precisely what he had bound
himself to do .... "42
38 See Sher v Allen supra 143 and Cohen v Behr supra 942 (both cases relying on Manchester Ship Canal
Co v Manchester Racecourse Co supra) and Le Roux v Odendaal1954 4 SA 432 (N) 441G-H. However,
specific performance of the duty to make an offer was not ordered in any of these cases.
39 Supra.
4°320H-321A.
4119512 SA 371 (A).
42 Owsianick case at 327B-E. This principle was subsequently affirmed in cases like Benson v SA Mutual
Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A) 783. Ogilvie Thompson JA therefore implicitly views the
absence of orders for specific performance in earlier cases not as confirmation of Botha lA's contrary
construction, but rather as the reflection of the influence on our law at that time of the English view on the
availability of this remedy.
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The climax of Ogilvie Thompson lA's argument was the decision in Le Roux v
Odendaal, 43 but his view that specific performance of the right of pre-emption had been
granted in that case, is incorrect. The plaintiff in Le Roux's case had in fact accepted a
voluntary offer by the grantor and obtained specific performance of the contract of sale. 44
Ogilvie Thompson JA thus took out of context the statement in Le Roux that "the holder
is by due exercise of his right entitled to become a purchaser.'?" It is submitted that on
the facts the "due exercise of the right" referred to the scenario that the grantor had duly
(and therefore voluntarily) made an offer to the holder who had thereafter exercised his
right by accepting it. It cannot be concluded from this statement that the court was of the
view that the holder would be automatically entitled to make himself a purchaser
(whether by court order or unilateral declaration) in the absence of a voluntary offer by
the grantor.
The apparently forgotten case of Engelbrecht v Mundell's Trustee" does, however,
provide support for Ogilvie Thompson lA's approach. The court in Engelbrecht
accepted that it could grant specific performance of a right of pre-emption in the form of
an order "to sell", although such an order was eventually not granted." In Lindner v
National Bakery (Pty) Lt~8 the court stated obiter that a holder may compel a grantor
who has concluded a sale with a third party to submit to him the offer so accepted."
Neither of these decisions was apparently referred to in subsequent cases.
43 Supra, quoted and applied by Ogilvie Thompson JA at 320D-G.
44320G.
45442F.
461934 CPD Ill.
47119. The court declined to order specific performance in the absence of the bondholders with an interest
in the property.
481961 1 SA 372 (0).
49381F. The grantor was not in fact ordered to make an offer: a prayer that the grantor must furnish a
notice setting out the terms of any offer received was not granted. The reason for refusing this order was
merely that the offer would amount to the disposal of the whole or greater part of the assets of the grantor
company, which required approval of the "company in general meeting" (s 70 of the Companies Act 46 of
1926). The court held that the company had a duty to seek to obtain such a resolution from its
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By confirming the possibility of an enforceable duty to make an offer, Ogilvie Thompson
JA recognises that a party might stipulate for a right of pre-emption precisely in order to
acquire the property in question as soon as the grantor is willing to sell. For example, a
person who wishes to obtain the land adjoining hers, but who is only able to obtain a right
of pre-emption from the neighbour, has an interest in acquiring the property when the
neighbour concludes a contract of sale with an outsider in breach of his duty. It can be
argued that such an interest would not be served adequately by an interdict or claim for
damages alone.
2 3 A positive duty enforceable by the Oryx mechanism
Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd50
was the first reported decision in more than a hundred years in which a holder was
actually declared to be entitled to obtain the property on exercising his right of pre-
emption."
The language used to describe the holder's remedy is couched in the terms of the
Germanic naastingsreg: the holder may, upon a sale in breach of his right, step into the
place of the third party by a unilateral declaration of will. 52 To avoid the impression that
it was the intention to deprive the third party of the benefits of a valid contract of sale,
shareholders. Until it obtained such a resolution it could not be compelled to submit an offer to the holder,
but it also could not sell its assets to another. Counsel for the grantor apparently did not argue the
construction of a right of pre-emption. The court's only authority for its "positive" construction was D 18 1
75, D 19 1 21 5 and Holmes Mackeurtan on Sale (3rd edition) 83. As pointed out in n 73 of par 1 2 supra,
the latter work does not discuss the availability of a remedy of specific performance if the grantor does not
in fact offer to contract with the holder before selling to a third party. Accordingly, it does not provide
support for the court's construction. Whether the two Digest texts support the construction will be
investigated in the next chapter.
501982 3 SA 893 (A).
51 See the discussion of Malan v Schalkwyk & Odendaal 1 S 225 (decided in 1852) at n 59 below.
52907F. See further the discussion of the historical development of our law in the next chapter.
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Van Heerden AJA (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment, expressed
grave doubts as to whether a court could order a seller who acted in breach of a right of
pre-emption to make an offer to the holder; that is, to grant an order of specific
performance of the holder's right in the traditional sense. 54 He also questioned whether a
court has a discretion in respect of what has come to be known as the Oryx mechanism."
Unfortunately, no reasons were given for these reservations.
namely a claim for damages, the court later clarified its description of the remedy. The
holder's unilateral declaration brings an independent contract into existence between
herself and the grantor on the same terms as agreed with the third party."
The remedy proposed by the court plus specific performance of the contract of sale
created by the holder, provide a speedy, effective remedy for the holder who wishes to
acquire the property.
Although it thus appears that Van Heerden AJA did not consider the court's sanction to
be necessary for the creation of the contract of sale by the holder, the Oryx mechanism as
an extra-judicial remedy does not, as some believe, deprive courts of all power to deny
the holder the ability to acquire the property in the interests of justice." Once the holder
has extra-judicially created a contract of sale by way of the Oryx mechanism, a refusal by
the grantor to transfer or deliver the property may result in a claim for specific
performance of the contract. The court then has a discretion to refuse the order for
transfer. If the court should in addition have a discretion to decide whether a contract of
53919D.
54919H.
55913E_G. The minority (per Botha AJA, Hoexter JA concurring) disagreed with him on this point. See n
46 in par 1 1 supra on the term "Oryx mechanism."
56See Eiselen's criticism of the case at 1986 THRHR 95 99 and Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 57-58. Cf
Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 267. What Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 proposes at 265 as "'n verkorte vorm van
spesifieke nakoming" appears to refer to the Oryx mechanism itself, thus a unilateral declaration by the
holder that he wishes to be bound, but exercised under supervision of the court. See also the last paragraph
on 267. This also appears to be what Van der Merwe et al proposes at 68 in fine.
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sale should come into existence in the first place, it may have to exercise essentially the
same discretion twice over. The practical effect of the court refusing to grant specific
performance at either of the two stages would be the same. Damages would be granted
on the basis of what the holder's position would have been had he obtained delivery of
the property.
However, Van Heerden AJA's approach is problematic, as the authorities he relied upon
do not provide clear support for the existence of the remedy. The Roman-Dutch and
Roman law sources considered by Botha JA in Owsianick were understood in a different
sense, and no attempt was made to counter Botha lA's statement that the Dutch law of
naasting, relied upon by Van Heerden AJA, is not part of the modem law. These aspects
will be examined in the next chapter (on the historical development of our law). The
court also wrongly relied on the minority judgment of Ogilvie Thompson JA in
Owsianick in support of the Oryx mechanism. 57
Whether German and US law indeed supports Van Heerden AJA's interpretation of
preference contracts will be investigated later. 58
2 4 A positive duty enforceable by a short-circuited order for
specific performance?
In Malan v Schalkwyk & Odendaal." apparently never referred to in subsequent
decisions, the court held the contract between the grantor and the third party was null and
57 More specifically, insofar as it is suggested (at 904A-B) that Ogilvie Thompson JA had been of the
opinion that the holder obtains a claim over the merx as soon as the condition, which lends only latent
operation to the right of pre-emption was fulfilled. See also the discussion in par 1 1 and Reinecke & Otto
1986 TSAR 1820 n 17.
58 Chapter 4 infra.
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void and ordered that the holder "become entitled to and become possessed [of the land];
he ... paying [to the third party] the original purchase price and the value of the
improvements, if any."
It appears that the court disregarded an order that an offer be made on breach, and
immediately granted an order for the performance of the contract of sale which would
have existed had the land been duly offered to the holder. An order that the grantor be
ordered what he had agreed to do, to make an offer, was therefore bypassed or short-
circuited.
Similarly, in Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaai" the court immediately granted an order for
the transfer of the mineral rights to the holder on a sale thereof to a third party. The court
did this after stating that the main feature of a right of first refusal is that the grantor must
make an offer to the holder," and thereafter holding that the Oryx case confirmed that
specific performance of a right of pre-emption can be ordered." If the order actually
made is what the court intended by specific performance of the duty to make an offer
under the pre-emptive right, it was a short-circuited order as well.
Such a short-circuited order makes practical sense in cases where the grantor clearly does
have a duty to make an offer: the court is aware of the grantor's refusal to make an offer,
and also knows that the holder is desirous of acquiring the property; otherwise the parties
would not be in court. To leave it at that appears unfair, as the grantor had at the
conclusion of the agreement promised to make an offer. To order him to make one now
would just waste time. The grantor might still refuse to do so, forcing the holder to
approach the court again to obtain another, equally ineffective order that he does so. To
59 1 S 225 (decided in 1852). The clause provided that should the grantor (the buyer) incline to part with
the land, he would "give" it to the holder (the seller) for the original purchase price plus the value of the
improvements.
60 19854 SA 615 (T).
61623E_F.
62627D_E.
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rather authorise an official such as the sheriff to make an offer would make as much
sense as the judge (also a public official) making such an offer. Practically the court may
therefore just as well enforce the agreement of pre-emption by immediately ordering
transfer.
The "verkorte vorm van spesifieke nakoming" referred to by Floyd" appears to differ
from what is here termed a "short-circuited" order aimed directly at transfer. Floyd does
not expressly state that what he is referring to is designed not only to enable the holder to
establish a substantive contract, but is also directed at an order that the grantor must
transfer or deliver the property. Moreover, he appears to limit this "shortened form" of
specific performance to situations in which the holder is entitled, willing and able to
agree to the exact terms agreed with the third party. He does not regard the "shortened"
specific performance as a substitute for specific performance in the traditional sense: he
clearly foresees situations in which a remedy of "shortened" specific performance would
not be available, for example when the contract of pre-emption also entitles the holder to
buy should the grantor exchange or donate the property." The short-circuited specific
performance identified here rather envisages the holder being able to approach the court
directly on breach, the court determining in one step the terms of the offer which the
grantor should have made to the holder and then ordering that transfer should take place
provided the holder tenders performance according to those terms. It makes no
difference whether the contract of pre-emption entitles the holder to obtain the property
on the same terms agreed with the third party or on different terms. Availability of such a
remedy therefore precludes the need for an order for specific performance in the ordinary
63 1986 THRHR 253265 et seq. See n 56 above.
64268 at n 155, which refers back to n 145. In another situation referred to in n 145, namely when personal
terms form a substantial part of the contract with the third party, the holder would arguably not be entitled
to any form of specific performance unless the pre-emption contract specifically provided for the terms on
which the holder may buy in such a situation. Floyd's interpretation of Bel/airs v Hodnett supra in the
same footnote, namely that the grantor may freely determine the terms of the offer to the holder, is
problematic: the decision in that case was ultimately based on the interpretation that in such a case the
parties intend that the offer to the holder should be in similar terms as that agreed with the third party. A
short-circuited order for specific performance as described here would then be apposite.
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sense." The holder does not first have to bring a contract into existence by a unilateral,
extra-judicial declaration before approaching the court, nor is the court's order directed
merely at sanctioning a declaration by the holder that he wishes to be bound by the terms
agreed with the third party.
Practically the effect of such a short-circuited approach is the same as that followed in the
Oryx case, resulting in an order for performance of the contract of sale, not of the contract
of pre-emption. Under the Oryx mechanism, however, the court need not skip or short-
circuit a step; the holder has a power to bring a contract of sale into existence extra-
judicially, before the court is approached. If, in terms of either of the two approaches, an
order for specific performance is refused, the holder would be granted damages on the
same basis, namely the position he would have been in had he obtained transfer
compared with the position he is in now.
There appears to be very little authority for a short-circuited approach. No reasons for the
decision in the Malan case were reported," and the order in Dithaba Platinum v
Erconovaal was apparently based on a wrong interpretation of the Oryx case." An
interesting aspect of the Malan case is that the holder as original seller had not yet given
transfer under the contract of sale. Perhaps it could therefore be argued that the court's
order amounts to cancellation of the contract of sale and restoration of the status quo ante
65 However for this short-circuited remedy to be of value to a holder who does not know the terms of the
agreement with the third party, it should be coupled with an enforceable duty on the grantor to give notice
of the terms of any agreement entered into with a third party. See Voet 18 310 discussed at n 35 above.
66 It can perhaps be argued that the order in Malan's case simply follows the pattern of the remedy which
the holder of a naastingsreg had: the holder stepped into the third party's contract but had to pay the
purchase price to the third party. However that does not explain the court's order that the contract with the
third party is null and void.
67 Compare the text at n 62 with that at n 54 supra. However, the court in Oryx did give some indication
that it might consider the Oryx mechanism to be "specific performance in the wide sense". At 919A the
court stated that "indien ek 'n wye diskresie sou hê om nie 'n bevel gemik op spesifieke nakoming, in die
breë sin, te verleen nie, ek ... dit nie ten gunste van die respondente sou uitoefen nie."
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as a result of the breach of the contract of sale containing the term of pre-emption, instead
of specific performance of the agreement of pre-emption
If the effect of Malan and Dithaba is in fact that a holder can obtain specific performance
of his right of first refusal by way of a short-circuited order to transfer, this is in conflict
with Van der Hoven v Cutting." where the court stated that if the holder were able to
obtain specific performance of his contract of first refusal, he would obtain not the land,
but merely the first refusal or right to purchase."
2 5 Conclusion
An overview of the vanous constructions of rights of pre-emption reveals that each
approach has some merit. The tendency to portray one approach as the only correct one
to the exclusion of all other views results in tension and confusion, all the more because
of the failure to investigate the relevant policy considerations comprehensively.
The breakdown of the system of precedents which occurred time and again as wrong
interpretations of previous decisions were relied upon and contrary decisions were
disregarded, adds to the confusion. Moreover, pronouncements on the nature and
enforceability of the grantor's duty in the two leading decisions, Owsianick and Oryx,
may be argued to constitute obiter dicta." In neither case was full argument heard on
these issues."
681903 TS 299.
69315.
70 This is undisputedly true in the case of Owsianick. See n 5 supra. Williamson lA's criticism that the
court should never have considered the question of enforcement of the grantor's duty was probably a
cogent one. He pointed out that this matter was raised only on appeal, with argument heard from one side
only, which argument did not cover all the Roman-Dutch authorities. In the Oryx case both counsel
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As the controversy regarding the holder's remedies turns to some extent upon the
interpretation of the Roman and Roman-Dutch sources and the question whether certain
rules expounded by the old authorities were received into our law, the historical sources
of our law will be examined next. The study will also seek to establish whether the
plurality of approaches in our case law can be explained by the historical development of
the law on rights of pre-emption.
agreed that the holder may lay claim to the merx after a sale in breach of his right, as Van Heerden AlA
pointed out at 904D.
71 Ibid.
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3 Historical perspective
3 1 Introduction
The construction of preference arrangements in Roman law will be investigated to
evaluate Van Heerden AJA's reliance on Roman law texts in support of the Oryx
mechanism' and to establish what rules of Roman law were received in Roman-Dutch
law.
Because the concept of naasting (or naesting), or ex lege rights of retraction, which crops
up in the two leading cases, is of Germanic origin, the position in Germanic law before
the reception will also be considered.' The majority of the court in Owsianick maintained
(per Botha JA) that the Roman-Dutch construction of contractual preference
arrangements differed from that of the Germanic ex lege right of retraction,' whereas in
Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd'
the self-same texts were read as favouring the opposite view.' Ogilvie Thompson JA in
Owsianick also relied on historical sources to support his view that specific performance
may be granted.
The deference to the old sources in the two leading cases assumes that the Roman-Dutch
position on preference contracts is of decisive importance for the law of today. The
, Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd & Andere 19823
SA 893 (A) 905E-G. See paras 1 1 and 23 supra.
2 See generally, Zimmermann "Kaufvertrag" in Feenstra & Zimmermann (eds) Das rëmisch-hollándische
Recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 144 191 et seq; De Blécourt &
Fischer Kort Begrip van het Oud-Vaderlands Burgerlijke Reg 7th edition (1967) 97 et seq; Moorman van
Kappen Met open buydel en in baren gelde (1973) 39; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht -
Geschichte, Dogmatik, ausgewiihlte Fragen (1975) 37 et seq.
3 Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 310 (A) 32IH-322F.
4 Supra.
5907B-D.
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consideration of ius commune authorities outside Holland in the two leading cases is in
conflict with the narrow historical method that claims that our common law is the law
applied in Holland at the height of its development." According to this view, a court
faced with conflicting possible interpretations of a legal rule should endeavour to
establish what the correct legal position was in Holland with reference to the broader ius
commune.'
There is support for the view that our courts take a broader European perspective not
merely as indirect evidence to establish the law of Holland, but more directly because the
legal tradition transplanted was a supra-national one, a ius commune.'
Moreover, our courts do not consistently lay down that the opinions of old authorities
from the province of Holland should necessarily outweigh those from other Dutch
provinces and other countries." Indeed, courts have sometimes been willing to accept
rules formulated by writers from other countries in the face of acknowledged opposition
to those rules by writers of Holland, often on the basis of "faimess" and "sound reason.?"
6 See, for example, the concurring judgment of Corbett JA in Du Plessis v Strauss 1988 2 SA 105 (A) 149
et seq. Cfthe comments of Van Heerden JA in the same case at 133. See also the judgment of Van den
Heever JA in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 865 and his judgment in Gerber v
Wolson 1955 1 SA 158 (A) 170 et seq. See also Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid Afrikaanse Yster en Staal
Industriële Korporasie Bpk 1987 2 SA 932 (A) 950E. CfFagan "Roman-Dutch Law in its South African
Historical Context" in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South
Africa (1996) 33 41 et seq.
7 Ibid.
8 Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 562 et seq; Zimmermann
"Synthesis in South African Private Law: Civil Law, Common Law and Usus Hodiernus Pandectarum"
1986 SAU 103 268; Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 45; Van der Merwe "The Roman-Dutch law: From
Virtual Reality to Constitutional Resource" 1998 TSAR 1 7.
9 Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 41 et seq; Lubbe 1997 Zeitschriftfi1r Europáisches Privatrecht 428429-430
and cases there cited. Cf Zimmermann "Roman Law in a Mixed Legal System: The South African
Experience" in Evans-Jones (ed) The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (1995) 41 et seq, 62 et seq.
lO See eg Kroonstad Westelike Boere Koop v Botha 1964 3 SA 216 (K) and Gerber v Wolson 1955 1 SA
158 (A), especially at 183A-184B per Fagan JA.
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In fact, a number of decisions show that South African courts do not consider themselves
immutably bound to follow the opinions of the old authorities. II Decisions often display
a willingness to adapt common law institutions in the face of changing circumstances or
views on public policy considerations and the dictates of equity." The oft-quoted dicta
of Sir James Rose Innes in Blower v Van Noorden" and Lord Tomlin in Pearl Assurance
Co v Union Government" immediately springs to mind. Sir Rose Innes stated that:
"There come times in the growth of every living system of law when old practice and ancient
formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and to keep
pace with the requirements of changing conditions. And it is for the courts to decide when the
modifications, which time has proved to be desirable, are of a nature to be effected by judicial
decision, and when they are so important or so radical that they should be left to the Legislature."
To that, Lord Tomlin added that our Roman-Dutch common law "is a virile, living
system of law, ever seeking, as every such system must, to adapt itself consistently with
its inherent basic principles to deal effectively with the increasing complexities of
modem organised society.':"
This provides support for the view that courts should not simply state a rule of law on the
strength of historical authority, without considering whether the result accords with
II Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 43-44; Lubbe "Legal History in South Africa: Reflections of a Non-
Historian" 1997 Zeitschrift for Europiiisches Privatrecht 428 429-430 and cases there cited. Cf Meyer v
The Master 1935 SWA 39.
12 Lubbe 1997 Zeitschrift for Europiiisches Privatrecht 428 429-430.
131909 TS 890905.
141934 AD 560 563.
15 See also Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 at 542; Phame v Paizes 418H - 419C; Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk
v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A) 749D-E; Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank-v Saayman NO 19974
SA 302 (A) 319 et seq; Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 19942 SA 464 (W) 475H et seq;
Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust 20001 SA 315 (C) 323 et seq. Cf Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993
3 SA 131 (A) 157; Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 1992 4 SA 202 (A)
220D - 221; S v Graham 19753 SA 569 (A) 576F.
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modem needs and the values that modem law seeks to advance." I agree that, in the face
of judicial conflict on the construction of a legal figure or institution in the historical
sources, historical research should not be aimed at speaking the final word on what the
law was in the province of Holland at a certain time so as to dictate what the South
African law is today.
Historical argument should be regarded rather as an avenue of approach to the legal
problem, which may ultimately be solved differently to the historical position."
" ... [H]istorical argument involves a methodology in which texts are revitalised by means
of a productive reinterpretation to produce results adequate to the needs of the times.''"
In fact, the reception in Holland itself amounts to a selective, as opposed to a wholesale,
adoption of rules from Roman law adapted to suit the requirements of the day."
A thorough historical study of a legal institution or rule is also necessary to understand
the reasons for its development and its underlying premises. Such understanding serves
to test the rule's compatibility with modem values or policy considerations and other
established legal principles.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore not an exhaustive sociological-historical study in
order to make a final pronouncement on how preference arrangements were understood
16 Ex parte De Winnaar 1959 1 SA 837 (N) 839. Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal
Science" in Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) 32 59; Lubbe 1997 Zeitschrift fUr
Europiiisches Privatrecht 428-435 and authorities there cited.
17 Van der Merwe 1998 TSAR 1 14: "the function of Rornan-Dutch law - it's only function - is to provide
lawyers with historically located arrangements and historically located conversations within a particular
expression of the civilian tradition, that would enable them to indulge in a 'sustained conversation about
our arrangements. ", See also Visser "The legal historian as subversive or: Killing the Capitoline Geese" in
Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) 1 2 et seq; Lubbe 1997 Zeitschrift fiir Europoisehes
Privatrecht 428 434. CfThornas "Fin de siêcle of funksionele Romeinse Reg" 1997 THRHR 202 212;
Van der Merwe "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" 59.
18 Lubbe 1997 Zeitschrift fiir Europáisches Privatrecht 428432-3.
19 CfSchurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 37.
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in Roman-Dutch law and the ius commune and what rules were received into our law.
The emphasis will rather be on examining whether the texts selected by the judges in the
two leading cases do indeed provide authority for their conflicting propositions according
to traditional understandings of the theory of sources as well as to establish the reasons
for the development of different constructions. This would serve to determine their
compatibility with modem legal principles and policy considerations.
To these ends, the known Roman and Roman-Dutch texts on contractual preference
arrangements and those of the ius commune writers relied upon in the leading cases will
be considered. The old authorities from Holland will be considered separately from those
from other areas to render the study more acceptable to proponents of the narrow
definition of Roman-Dutch law." Where relevant, reference will be made to modem
writers on Roman law and the ius commune.
The historical researcher should be prepared to accept that there might very well not be
any clear historical position. In such a case all the different possible interpretations must
be treated as potential solutions or avenues of approach, to be evaluated in the light of
modem policy considerations.
32 Roman Law
Two fragments in the Digest of Justinian, D 18 1 75 and D 19 1 21 5, deal with sales of
land on condition that the buyer should not sell to anybody but the seller." The latter text
was relied upon in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) LtJ22 and Associated
20 As law is, at least to some extent, a "discourse of persuasion", it seems sensible to use a strategy more
likely to also persuade the traditionalists. (The terminology is that of Hutchinson, quoted by Van der
Merwe "Roman-Dutch Law" 15). CfLubbe 1997 Zeitschrift fiir Europiiisches Privatrecht 428435 and
Fagan "Roman-Dutch Law" 45 for indications that some kind of hierarchy of authorities may be useful.
21 D 18 1 75 (Hermogenianus) and D 19 1 21 5 (Paulus). See n 32 and n 33 below for the full text.
22 Supra 320A.
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Such preferential opportunities to buy were not only created by agreement. At the
venditio bonorum, or sale in execution of a judgment debtor's estate, certain persons had
the preferential opportunity to better the highest bid obtained." In Justinian's time, the
emphyteuta (quitrent holder) wishing to sell his emphyteusis (quitrent right) had to notify
the owner of the terms of the proposed contract of sale. The owner could then declare his
wish that the quitrent right be sold to him at the same price within two months." Where a
sale was concluded subject to the seller not receiving a better offer within a specified
period, the buyer had the preferential opportunity to obtain the merx on the same terms as
any better offer received in the absence of contrary agreement."
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd.23 Another
text mentions an agreement between co-heirs that, if one of them should sell his part, it
would be sold only to his co-heirs at a fixed price."
23 Supra 905E-G.
24 D 45 1 122 3 (Scaevola): "Coheredes cum praedia hereditaria diviserant, unum praedium commune
reliquerunt sub hoc pacto, ut, si quis eorum partem suam alienare voluisset, earn vel coheredi suo vel eius
successori venderet centum viginti quinque: quod si quis aliter fecisset, poenam centum invicem stipulati
sunt: quaero, cum coheres mulier coheredis liberorum tutores saepius testato convenerit et desideraverit, ut
secundum conventionem aut emant aut vendant, hique nihil tale fecerint, an, si mulier extero vendiderit,
poena ab ea centum exigi possit. Respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur obstaturam doli mali
exceptionem. "
25 D 42 5 16 (Gaius): "Cum bona veneunt debitoris, in comparatione extranei et eius, qui creditor
cognatusve sit, potior habetur creditor cognatusve, magis tarnen creditor quam cognatus, et inter ereditores
potior is, cui maior pecuia debebitur." See also D 4 4 35 (Hermogenianus) which gives a minor who lost to
a higher bid at an auction, the possibility of restitutio if he can show that the thing belonged to his
ancestors, provided he is willing to pay the seller the difference between his own and the higher bid. ("Si
in emptionem penes se collatam minor adiectione ab alio superetur, implorans in integrum restitutionem
audietur, si eius interesse emptam ab eo rem fuisse adprobetur, veluti quod maiorum eius fuisset: ita tarnen
ut id, quod ex licitatione accessit, ipse offerat venditori").
26 C 4 66 3. See Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1956) 15 for Baldus's gloss on
this text.
27 D 18 2 7 (Paulus): "Licet autem venditori, meliore allata conditione, addicere posteriori: nisi prior
paratus sit plus adicere." D 18 2 8 (Paulus): "Necesse autem habebit venditor meliore condieione allata
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These texts do not label such arrangements. The term pactum protimeseos, generally
used by Romanists to describe an agreement granting a seller a preferential right to buy,"
was apparently first used in a post-Justinian Greek novella." For convenience' sake this
term will be used to refer to such agreements.
Not much is known about the construction of the pactum protimeseos and the exact
remedy available to the seller on breach. 3D The pactum protimeseos was not widely used
as it did not form part of the numerus clausus of actionable agreements (contractus). If it
was concluded ancillary to and simultaneously with a contractus bonae fidei, like emptio
venditio (sale), it could be indirectly enforced by the action on the main contract -
usually with the actio venditi (action on sale). It was thus recognised as a pactum
adiectum, or ancillary pact."
D 19 1 21 5 (Paulus) simply refers to the actio vendui being available on a sale to a third
party, without stating precisely what may be claimed." D 18 1 75 (Hermogenianus)
priorem emptorem certiorem facere, ut, si quid alius adieit, ipse quoque adieere possit." This type of pact
is known as an in diem addictio. Cf Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 22. See also Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 16 and Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und Kaufsrecht nach dem
schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuche (1918) 6-7 who state that the buyer had the right to "step into" the better
offer made by the third party.
28 See eg ZimmErman The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 570;
Kaser Das Rëmische Privatrecht 2nd edition (1971) 561 n 68.
29 Peters Die Riicktrittsvorbehalte des Rëmischen Kaufrechts (1973) 282-283 at n 3 - n 4.
30 See Floyd "Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253 254, 255 and 261.
31 The formula of the actio venditi ordered the iudex to take bona fides into account when reaching his
verdict. If the parties to a sale concluded ancillary agreements relating to the main agreement, good faith
demanded that these agreements be honoured. Only pacta adiecta entered into simultaneously with the
main contract could in themselves give rise to the action on sale. If such a pactum was entered into later, it
could only give rise to a defence. D 2 14 7 5 (Ulpianus), Zimmermann Obligations 510.
32 D 19 1 21 5: "Sed et ita fundum tibi vendidero, ut nulli alii eum quam rnihi venderes, actio eo nomine ex
vendito est, si alii vendideris."
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grants the seller the action on sale (actio venditi) "ad complendum id quod pepigerunt.?"
This phrase has been translated as "to enforce execution of the bargain,'?' "for the
honoring of such obligation'?' and "om die beding af te dwing. "36 However, the text does
not clarify what relief exactly the actio venditi would be directed at.
Many writers treat this subject rather cursorily and do not discuss the exact remedy
available to the preference holder."
A German Romanist, Peters, identifies four possible outcomes that could arguably be
obtained with the actio venditi in this context:
1. The actio vendui could be directed at restoration of the merx, on the basis that the sale
to an outsider gives the seller the right to cancel the original sale causing the merx to
fall back into the hands of the seller. On this construction the pactum protimeseos
operates like a lex commissoria.
33 D 18 1 75: "Qui fundum vendidit, ut eum certa mereede conductum ipse habeat vel, si vendat, non alii,
sed sibi distrahat vel simile aliquid paciscatur: ad complendum id quod pepigerunt ex vendito agere
poterit."
34 Mackintosh The Roman Law of Sale (with modern illustrations): Digest XVII!. I and XIX translated with
notes and references to cases and the 'Sale of Goods Bill' (1892) 127, relied upon by Ogilvie Thompson
JA in Owsianick 320A.
35 Watson's translation in Mommsen et al The Digest of Justininian II (1985).
36Van Heerden AJA in the Oryx case 905E-F.
37 See, for example, Zimmermann Obligations 570; Kaser Das Romische Privatrecht 561. CfSchurig Das
Vorkaufsrecht 25 who states without reference to authority that the pactum protimeseos obliges the buyer to
sell the thing to the seller on the same terms as agreed with a third party interested in buying the thing. Cf
also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253255 n 23 who concludes that the discussion by De Zulueta The Roman Law of
Sale: introduction and selected texts (1945) 57, Moyle The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law (1892) 176,
and Buckland A Text-book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3rd edition (1963) 495 rests on mere
speculation.
45
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2. The actio venditi could be directed at delivery of the thing to the seller, on the basis
that the sale to an outsider brings about a second contract of sale with the erstwhile
buyer as seller.
3. The actio venditi could be directed at a contractual penalty.
4. The actio venditi could be directed at the payment of damages.
According to Peters, only the fourth possibility holds water."
His reason for rejecting the first possibility is that, if the pactum protimeseos had the
effect of a lex commissoria, there would have been no need for the usual agreement
requiring the buyer to sell to the seller, when the buyer wants to alienate. However, that
argument wrongly presumes that the texts mention a duty on the buyer to sell to the
seller. The emphasis in the texts is rather on the negative obligation: the buyer may not
sell to anyone else than the seller."
The second possibility, supported by vanous writers," is based especially on
Hermogenianus's formulation "ad complendum id quod pepigerunt.?" Thus Peters
admits that complendum ("fulfilment") could be directed at the seller's desire to obtain
the land."
38283-284.
39 See n 32 and n 33. Peters Die Rucktrittsvorbehalte agrees that the primary purpose of the pactum
protimeseos was to prevent the thing from falling into the hands of a third party rather than to give the
seller a claim to the thing (282). See also Laue Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts nach BGB (1905) 9
who states that the texts dealing with contractual pacta protimeseos show that they function rather as pacta
de non contrahendo or pacta et nulli alii quam mihi venderes. The negative obligation is in the forefront.
40 See Peters Die Riicktrittsvorbehalte 284 n 8.
41 For the full text see n 33 supra.
42 That admission presupposes the existence of such a desire, whereas the seller could merely have a desire
to ward off unwanted buyers of the land formerly belonging to him (Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 26 at n 66-
67).
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The main reason why Peters rejects an order to deliver as possible relief is the absence of
any indication in D 18 1 75 and D 19 1 21 5 as to the terms of the contract of repurchase.
The texts do not state that the seller would be entitled to buy on the terms which the
buyer is prepared to accept from a third party or on the terms of the original contract of
sale." Another argument militating against enforced delivery of the goods to the seller, is
that, during the classical period, all judgments would have had to sound in money in
accordance with the rule omnis condemnatio peeuniaria est. Even in Justinian's time, it
cannot be concluded with certainty that a buyer would be entitled to specific performance
of the seller's obligation to deliver the merx:"
Although Peters admits that a contractual penalty would be an effective remedy in this
context, the fragments by Hermogenianus and Paulus do not mention such an agreement.
By contrast, D 45 1 122 3 specifically mentions an undertaking to pay a penalty on
breach.45
43 By contrast, D 45 1 122 3, specifically refers to a price having been fixed by the parties. C 4 66 3
(dealing with the ex lege preferential right to transact) specifically refers to the owner being entitled to
indicate that he would buy on the same terms as can be obtained from a third party. Peters' second
argument for rejecting this second construction is less convincing. The prohibition in the texts of a sale to a
third party leads Peters to conclude that the pactum protimeseos cannot function like the Vorkaufsrecht
created by the German civil code, the BGB, whereunder nothing less than the sale to an outsider triggers a
remedy which ultimately enables the holder to enforce delivery of the thing by the grantor (285). (See
further par 4 1 1 infra.) Thus, as a sale to a third party is prohibited, Peters argues that nothing can trigger
availability of the remedy of enforcement of delivery. Hermogenianus could, however, have meant that a
lesser manifestation of a desire to sell, such as an offer to sell to an outsider, would trigger the remedy
contemplated by him. Peters argues that, if this was so, an indication in the text of the terms of such an
offer would be expected.
44 ZimmErman Obligations 772 and authorities cited there. Cf D 19 1 1 pr (Ulpianus): "Si res vendita non
tradatur, in id quod interest agitur, hoc est quod rem habere interest emptoris." CfKaser Das Romische
Privatrecht 561-562.
45 For the full text see n 24 supra.
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Accordingly, for Peters, only the last possibility remains, namely that the actio venditi
was directed at damages upon a sale in breach to a third party." In my view, however,
Peters has not clearly ruled out the possibility of the pactum protimeseos having
functioned like a lex commissoria.
An overview of the position in Roman law reveals uncertainty regarding the construction
of the pactum protimeseos," The suggestion in the Oryx case that the holder of a pactum
protimeseos had the same rights as an ordinary buyer in Roman law, including
entitlement to delivery of the merx upon breach, is therefore open to doubt. The court
appears to have placed much weight on its mistaken reading of D 18 1 75 as granting the
original seller the actio empti - the action of a buyer - on breach." The court implied that
the holder of the pactum protimeseos would thereby be entitled to enforce the grantor's
duty to deliver just as a buyer could against his seller. The text however grants the seller
the actio venditi - the action of a seller - simply because that is the only action with
which the pactum protimeseos , as a pactum adiectum to a sales contract, could be
enforced. The name of the action has no bearing on the relief that could be obtained in
this instance.
3 3 Germanic Law
As has been indicated above, different conclusions were reached in the two leading cases
on whether the feudal or Germanic law figure of contractual naastingsrechte displaced
46 Peters Die Riicktrittsvorbehalte 285. He suggests that a seller who sold at a lesser price than he
otherwise would, because he believed that he would be able to buy back the thing could then claim the
difference in price as damages. Cf also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 261-262; Du Plessis Die spesifieke
nakoming van voorkoopregte en ander verwante regte in die Suid-Afrikaanse en Franse Reg unpublished
LLM dissertation, University of Stellenbosch (1997) 1-2.
47 See also Laue Begriff und Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts 9; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 261-262; Du Plessis
Spesifieke nakoming 10.
48905E_G.
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the Roman law pactum protimeseos in Roman-Dutch law." To understand the
construction of the naastingsrecht or ius retractus of the Roman-Dutch sources, and to
evaluate the reasons for its development, a brief investigation of Germanic law is
required.
The term "Germanic law" refers to the legal rules of the Germanic tribes who lived in
Western Europe after the fall of the Roman empire in the West prior to the reception of
Roman law. Although these rules varied territorially, some common characteristics may
be identified, such as the absence of the concept of ownership of land as an abstract,
absolute right vesting in a specific person. Classical Germanic feudalism, applied in the
Frankish areas, including the "Low Countries," from the eighth century, denies the
possibility that land could be owned - it could only be held in tenure. 50 The concept of
tenure again, comprises a number of different juridical relationships with regard to land."
Around the thirteenth century, as a compromise between feudal and Roman principles,
the concept of tiered ownership (superior and inferior ownership) came to be used to
describe these different relationships." Tenure thus came to be regarded as one of the
different possible tiers of ownership. 53 "Ownership" was therefore more of a
conglomerate of various rights or powers to use and exploit the thing than an abstract
concept. 54
According to some writers, the existence of preferential rights to buy in Germanic or
feudal law confirms the theory that in ancient times ownership of land was not merely
tiered, but collective. 55 After the development of individual ownership, relicts of the
49 Supra at 38.
50 Gretton "Feudal System" in Reid The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) 50-62.
51 Van der Merwe Sakereg 2nd edition (1989) 171-172.
52 Gretton "Feudal System" 50-62.
53 Ibid; De Blécourt & Fischer Kart Begrip 93.
54 Schurig Das Vorkauftrecht 27.
55 Schurig Das Vorkauftrecht 27 at n 75 and writers cited there. See Moorman van Kappen Met open
buydel 13-14 and De Blécourt & Fischer Kart Begrip 97-98 for criticism and evaluation of this view.
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ancient collective ownership manifested itself in vanous limitations on ownership in
favour of certain classes of people, who may be identified with the co-owners of former
times. 56 The rights of retraction existing in Germanic law are examples of such
limitations. Known in German as Niiherrechte and in Dutch as naastingsrechte" they
entitle those who are "closer" to a thing, for example by reason of family ties, to retract
or "draw to themselves" the thing in the event of its sale to an outsider. Retraction may
take place on payment of the agreed purchase price." For the purpose of this discussion
the term rights of retraction will be used.
The idea that family land should remam preserved for future family members was
strengthened by the consideration that family farming was the most important income
56 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 28; De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 101 et seq
57 Naestingsrechte in Old Dutch.
58 Laue Begriff und Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts defmes the right of retraction as the right created by statute
or custom for a certain class of persons, to appropriate sold land against performance of the obligations
undertaken by the buyer (11). Note that no reference to the grantor is found in his defmition. The right is
directed at the land itself. There were various kinds of ex lege rights of retraction in Germanic law. Some
were created or sanctioned by statute. See Gail Practicarum Observationum (1626) 19. Examples of rights
of retraction (some developing after the reception) were those in favour of co-members of a knightage, in
favour of members of the aristocracy on the sale to a non-aristocrat, in favour of Christians on the sale to a
Jew, in favour of co-heirs or other co-owners, as well as in favour of neighbours. (Schurig Das
Vorkaufsrecht 32-34; Gail Practicarum Observationum 19). Where ownership was divided into superior
and inferior ownership, the feudal lord had a right of retraction upon the vassal alienating his rights in the
land, as did the co-vassals (Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 33). All these types of rights were based on the
holder of the right of retraction being "closer" to the land than outsiders. The construction of these rights of
retraction were similar to that of relatives: it could be exercised even against third parties on payment of the
purchase price (Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 34). Similar rights were also known in other early cultures.
For example, in Judea of Biblical times, relatives were entitled in the order of their degree of relatedness to
an owner of land to "redeem" the land on the sale thereof to an outsider by buying back the land (Ruth
3:12-13 and Ruth 4:1-11). See also Leviticus 25:25, 47-55, Numbers 35 and Deuteronomy 19:6 which
suggest that such rights were regarded as endorsing a relative's wider moral obligation to protect other
family members and see to it that none was left destitute. Cf Guthrie et al New Bible Commentary 3rd
edition (1970) 278, 282. See also Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel 13 at n 121. Rights of
retraction are still widespread in Islamic countries (see Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 18).
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This ex lege right probably developed from an outright prohibition to alienate land
without the consent of the nearest heirs." Heirs were regarded as having incomplete
ownership of the land which they would inherit on the death of the owner. If the owner
sold to an outsider, the heirs' incomplete ownership immediately waxed to full
ownership." On breach of this prohibition, the heirs as owners could have the alienation
set aside and, as owners, obtain the land as if the seller had died; thus even against
outsiders and without paying the purchase price." However, an exception arose in terms
of which an owner could, in the case of real necessity, alienate the land on condition that
he first offered it to his nearest heirs. This exception became the general rule: the
prerequisite of necessity disappeared. However the remedy of the heir in the case of
breach was retained: he could claim the land, even from the third party, but now against
source for the rural population and that voting rights depended on land possession. 59 An
owner could thus only alienate his land if he first offered it for sale to his heirs who
declined to buy. If he failed to offer, they could claim the land from the buyer against
payment of the purchase price."
59 Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel14; De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 97 et seq
60 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 31; De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 97 ff; Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs-
und Kaufsrecht 4.
61 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 31-32. Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel 14; De B1écourt & Fischer
Kort Begrip 99.
62 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 31-32. De Groot calls this real right of the heirs eigendomsverwacht, a type
of gebrekkelijke eiendom (Inl2 3 10-2 3 11 & 2 47 6). Schurig refers to an Erbenwartrecht 29 & 30. See
also Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel14 who refers to the terms Anwartschaftsrecht in German and
droiture in French. Cfhowever De B1écourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 99-100 who say that in the Frankish-
Germanic period (±500-900) the family's consent was necessary to alienate immovables. Ifno consent was
given, the alienation could be declared void by judicial decree. They makes no mention of an automatic
right of relatives to claim the land for themselves on alienation.
63 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 31-32; Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und Kaufsrecht 9.
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payment of the purchase price." As owner, the holder could thus simply ask for an order
that the transfer to the third party be set aside.
The significance of this development is that the proprietary remedy" ascribed to the ex
lege right of retraction, which allows the holder of the right of retraction to lay claim to
the land, preceded the later construction of the ex lege right of retraction, which places a
duty on the owner to make an offer to contract before selling. That explains why the
remedy for breach of the right in its later form was not, as should be expected, an order to
make an offer, but was directed at delivery of the land. This remedy cannot be equated
with specific performance of the right of retraction. Rather, the idea that the holder's
incomplete ownership waxed to full ownership accounts for the remedy of laying claim
to the land.
Rights of retraction therefore differed from Roman iura protimeseos in a number of
ways. The first was a real right, the latter not." The source of rights of retraction was
legislation or custom whereas pacta protimeseos were consensual agreements (although
some ex lege rights of pre-emption did exist in Roman times)." Rights of retraction
existed in favour of a group (for example, neighbours or family members) whereas the
ius protimeseos vested in an individual. The object of a ius protimeseos could be
movable or immobable. Rights of retraction only existed over land."
64 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 42 calls the right of retraction a verdingliches obligatorisches recht. The
owner's duty to make an offer to contract stemmed from the heir's real right in the land. If this duty was
breached the heir still had a real right to claim the land, but then incurred an obligation to fulfill the
obligation that existed between the owner and third party. See also Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und
Kaufsrecht 9.
65 See also Laue Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts 10.
66 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 36, 49. Some writers speculate that the ex lege right of pre-emption of
Roman law could have had real effect (De Zulueta 58 n 2, Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 261 n 84).
67 See at n 25-26 supra.
68 Laue Begriff und Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts 10-11. Laue (at 11) also considers that the event which
triggered the right of retraction was the conclusion of a contract with a third party, whereas the Roman
figure only required the desire to contract. (H ... das rëmische ... Vorkaufsrecht nach [heutige Meinung] nur
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Rights of retraction created by juristic act were also recognised in feudal times before the
reception." Modelled on ex lege rights of retraction, they were created simultaneously
with the transfer of the land in favour of the seller or a third party." The buyer thus did
not obtain unrestricted ownership. His ownership was regarded as limited by the
agreement of retraction, and the right of retraction created a similar real right enforceable
against everyone." As these rights of retention apparently always applied to land, the
element of publicity essential in modem law for real rights or the operation of the
doctrine of notice did exist due to the formalities accompanying transfer of land.
The Germanic remedy described here immediately brings to mind the Oryx mechanism."
Both make an order to submit an offer superfluous, as they allow the holder to lay claim
to the thing on a mere declaration of intention to exercise her right after the grantor's
breach. The two figures differ in that the Oryx mechanism is no longer regarded as
enforcement of a real right. The significance of the development described here is the
recognition that the formulation of the Oryx remedy may be described as an accident of
history. lts Germanic predecessor was not formulated in an attempt to strengthen the
protection of the holder's interests, but rather as an attempt to water down the holder's
limited ownership. The rejection of the concept of tiered ownership that provides the
historical basis for the Oryx mechanism accounts for the difficulty which courts and
commentators have in explaining the Oryx mechanism in terms of Romanist
terminology."
Kaufvertragswillen zur Voraussetzung. ") He admits, correctly, that the Roman law figure was not well
defmed (9, 11). What remedy the "desire to contract" gave rise to, is unclear.
69 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 34-35. Cf Gail Practicarum Observationum 19 (who merely refers to
limitations on land which can be imposed by agreement as justification for rights of retraction flowing from
statute).
70 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 35, 46.
71 Ibid; Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und Kaufsrecht 12.
72 See eh 1 supra on the meaning of "Oryx mechanism."
73 CfSchurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 60. See also Van der Walt & Kleyn "Duplex Dominium: The History
and Significance of the Concept of Divided Ownership" in Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989)
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3 4 Roman-Dutch Law
Rights of retraction did not disappear as a result of the reception of Roman law in the
Germanic territories - in fact some new forms developed."
The family naastingsrecht was described as the ex lege right of blood relatives of a seller
of land" to place themselves in the position of the buyer within a specified time period, if
the buyer was not also a blood relative of the seller. 76 If the thing was already delivered
to the buyer and if he had paid the purchase price, then the buyer had to deliver the thing
to the naaster against compensation of the purchase price. If the thing had not yet been
213 216 who conclude that, although the similarity between the modem concept of ownership and its
Roman counterpart has been exaggerated, South African law conceives of ownership as a right which is in
principle unrestricted and therefore absolute. See also Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 338. See, for
example, Van der Merwe Sakereg 171-173, Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 20, 27 for the view that Roman
ownership was in principle unrestricted and absolute. CfKaser Das Rëmische Privatrecht 400-403; Birks
"The Roman Law concept of Dominium and the idea of absolute ownership" 1985 Acta Juridica 1.
74 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 36. Schurig shows that after the fall of the Western Roman Empire (in AD
476), and before the reception in Western Europe, the Germanic concept of rights of retraction had already
penetrated Roman law. In the West, landowners resisted the Romanisation of land law after the reception
(Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel 4-5). See also De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 102-3 for
examples of types of rights of retraction which existed in the Netherlands. That the family right of
retraction is sanctioned by the Bible appears to have contributed to its survival (Gail Practicarum
Observationum 19).
75 Or "incoporeal things" regarded as immovable like quitrent (erfpacht), or long leases. Moorman van
Kappen Met open buydel6; De Groot Inl3 165.
76 De Groot Inl 3 162: "een reg iemand toe-behoorende over eenig ontilbaer goed, als oock op den koper
ende verkooper wanneer 't zelve goed verkocht werd, om te treden in des koopers plaetze." (The phrase
oock op den koper ende verkooper means that the right could be enforced against the third party buyer and
the seller. CfVan der Keessel Praelectiones on Gr 3 162.)
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delivered the seller had the duty to deliver to the naaster. A court could also order
delivery by the seller or third party."
Details as to who exactly may retract or naasten and when and how this could be done,
varied territorially." In some areas the procedure of retraction (naasting) could take the
form of a pre-emption (or voorkoop) procedure, in order to protect the buyer from the
possibility of losing the thing at any time after the sale through naasting. This involved
that the seller first had to publicly declare his intention to sell, whereupon the relatives
had a certain period within which to buy, failing which the right of retraction was lost."
However, the seller could still sell without first publicizing his intention, in which case he
had to publicize the sale giving his relatives the chance to retract the thing (thus through a
nakoop-procedure).80
Some ius commune writers grappled with the nature of naastingsrechte. Gail for
example, concludes that the action granted to the holder of a naastingsrecht is not a
purely personal action, but is "written on the thing itself' (in rem scriptam ) and thus
follows the possessor wherever the goods gO.81 He notes that some writers dispute the
real operation of such a personal action." De Groot clearly sees naastingsrechte as real
rights which may be enforced against the seller and the third party buyer. 83
77 Van der Keessel Praelectiones on Gr 3 16 11.
78 Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel 5; De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 101; Zimmermann
"Kaufvertrag" 192. Many rights of retraction were introduced by legislation or created by local custom,
which therefore differed from one area to the next (De Blécourt & Fischer Kart Begrip 101-102).
79 Gail Practicarum Observation urn 19; De Groot Inl3 165. Cf3 166.
80 Moorman van Kappen Met open buydel 8. De Groot Inl 3 16 1 mentions nakoop as a synonym for
naasting. So also De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 101.
81Practicarum Observationurn 19.
82 Ibid.
83 Inl3 165 and 3 16 16. See also Van der Keessel Praelectiones on Gr 3 1616.
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The important question is whether contractual arrangements creating preferential rights to
transact also operated like the Germanic ex lege right of retraction. Four possibilities
exist:
1. All contractual arrangements creating preferential rights to transact operated like
Germanic rights of retraction and the Roman law pactum protimeseos
disappeared.
2. All contractual arrangements creating preferential rights to transact were assigned
the construction of the Roman law figure.
3. Contractual naastingsrechte and Roman law pacta protimeseos were available as
alternative constructions.
4. The constructions influenced each other so that a mixed figure evolved.
In De Groot's time, naastingsrechte did not exist throughout the province of Holland.84
A relative wishing to exercise a naastingsrecht had to allege and prove that such a right
existed in the area where the immovable property was situated." The variation in
influence and operation of ex lege naastingsrechte might have resulted in a variation in
the construction of contractual preference arrangements. As ex lege naastingsrechte did
not exist throughout the province of Holland, it is more likely that the construction of
such rights had a lesser influence on contractual arrangements creating preferential rights
to transact there, than in areas where ex lege naastingsrechte were more prevalent.
84 De Groot Inl3 163-3 165,3 16 18. See also Van der Keessel Th 3 163 and Van Zurk Codex Batavus
(1738) sv Nakoop, Naesting, A. Pontgeld par 2 and 3B. De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 382 point out
that naasting existed in all territories where the intestate succession system known as Skependomsreg
existed, but not where the system of aasdomsreg existed. In North-Holland the system of Aasdomsreg
applied initially. After an attempt to replace it with skependomsreg, the aasdomsreg was reintroduced in
1599 (De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip 382; Van der Merwe & Rowland Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg 6th
edition (1990) 22-23).
85 De Groot Inl3 165; Moorman van Kappen Met open buydellO.
56
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 4 1 Writers from Holland
De Groot only considers ex lege naastingsrechte in his discussion van naesting" The
omission of the contractual figure might indicate that, in Holland, the construction of the
contractual right of pre-emption differed from that of the ex lege right of retraction.
Voet, on the other hand, does discuss the contractual right of retraction (which he also
calls a ius retractus) in conjunction with the family right of retraction." However, he
distinguishes the construction of the ex lege right of retraction from the contractual
figure." He specifically mentions that in the case of the family right of retraction the
retracting party steps as completely into the place of the purchaser as if he and not the
purchaser has bought the property, with the result that the tie between the vendor and the
first purchaser is broken." Thus he says, the exercise of the ex lege right of retraction is
considered as one sale and one contract which the retracting party is considered to have
himself entered into by ousting the purchaser and stepping into his place and transferring
to himself the whole effect of the contract, so that fines and charges relating to alienation
do not have to be paid again." He distinguishes this construction from that applying to
the contractual right of retraction. Perhaps this implies that the exercise of the
contractual right of retraction brings about a second, separate contract, so that the holder
may also have to pay fines and charges on alienation." If this is what Voet means it
86 Inl 3 16 1 - 3 16 18.
87 Commentarius ad Pandectas 1839 et seq.
88 18 3 27 - 18 3 29.
89 18327.
90 Ibid.
91 18329. Gane translates the last paragraph of this text as follows: "For the rest however it appears to be
agreed by everyone that a retractor is not put under obligation for fresh laudimia or other like burdens
whenever the retraction springs not from an agreement to sell back but from law or custom. That is
because there is understood to be not a double but a single purchase only, and a single contract into which
the retractor himself is deemed to have entered when he displaces the purchaser and steps into his place as
such, transferring to himself the whole effect of the contract." (Gane The Selective Voet being the
Commentaries on the Pandects (1956».
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remains unclear when the separate contract comes into existence - would that be only on
the acceptance of a subsequent offer by the grantor, or would a sale in breach and a
unilateral act by the holder cause the contract to come into existence? In any event, Voet
confines the remedy of "stepping into the place of the purchaser" to the ex lege right of
retraction.
The method Voet prescribes for the exercise of the right of retraction rmrrors that
prescribed in the Codex where the quitrent holder wants to sell his quitrent right, namely
that notice should be given of the intended sale, whereafter the holder (the owner in the
case of the Roman ex lege right) has two months to declare his intention to buy."
The only other comment Voet makes on the construction of the contractual right of
retraction is that the grantor
"can in no way be compelled under that agreement to sell the thing, either by Roman law or by
modern custom; but if he afterwards sells it to another party I have an action in respect of the
damage which his breach of agreement has caused to me.,,93
It is not certain whether his statement that the grantor cannot be compelled to sell the
thing refers also to the situation after breach by the grantor or merely to the situation
before the occurrence of the trigger event. As he does not limit the statement, both
meanings are possible. Some judges have interpreted his statement that damages may be
claimed after a sale to a third party, as only applicable when transfer to a bona fide third
party had taken place." There is no compelling reason to interpret the text in this way
and the possibility that Voet means to disallow the holder the remedy of specific
performance or an order that the grantor deliver the thing even before transfer cannot be
excluded.
92C 4663 and Voet 183 10. See also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 256.
93My translation of Voet 18 1 2.
94Ogilvie Thompson JA in Owsianick supra 319D-E and Van Heerden AJA in the Oryx case supra 907A.
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Van Heerden AJA also relied on Van Leeuwen in support of his contention that the
contractual right of retraction operated like the ex lege naastingsrecht" Van Leeuwen
does not discuss the remedies of the holder of a contractual right of retraction in detail.
His definition of the contractual right of retraction includes an agreement that the
purchaser is bound to resell at the option of the seller, as well as an agreement that, if the
thing is sold to another, the original seller "on offering the same price, is preferred and
retracts the sale.?" Elsewhere he defines a "naastingsrecht" by way of agreement as
entailing that the purchaser shall return the property sold at the option of the vendor or
within a certain time, at the same price; or that, in sale the vendor "must always be the
nearest, should he so wish"."
The implications of these definitions for the remedies of the holder are not explained.
Van Leeuwen says it is doubtful whether handing back the merx to the seller constitutes a
new sale, so that transfer duties must be paid again." He reasons that the original sale
from the holder to the grantor is rather confirmed when the merx is handed back as this is
done in accordance with the original sale. He then states that "upon such retraction or
giving back of the thing, the buyer is not liable to pay the duty; except that he must
95 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Btickereien (Pty) Ltd & Andere supra
906C.
96 Van Leeuwen CF 20 4: "Retractus conventionalis, de quo hic proprie, est pactum quo convenit, ut si
venditor emptori pretium restituat, emptor venditori rem emptam revendere cogatur, vel si quando res
empta iterum alteri vendatur, primus offerendo idem pretium praeferatur, venditionemque retrahat." See
also Van Leeuwen RHR 18 3.
97 My literal translation of Van Leeuwen RHR 19 1: "Het regt van Naasting wt beding [sic], is daar by men
bedingt, dat den Koper het verkofte goed, tot believen van den Verkoper, of ook wel binnen sekren tijd,
voor den selven prijs, aan den verkoper wedrom sal moeten overdoen, of in het verkopen, den Verkoper
altijd wedrom de naaste moet zijn, so hy wil." As authority he refers to the Digest of Justinian. The second
part of the sentence has been translated as "if the purchaser sell the property, the vendor shall have the
option of repurchase" by Kotzé in Decker (ed) Commentaries of Roman-Dutch Law 2nd edition (1923). The
implication that the contractual naastingsrecht is a type of option is not justified by the text.
98 RHR 192.
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reimburse the purchaser the original expenses incurred on that account.':" Van
Leeuwen's argument allows for the acceptance of a remedy like the Oryx mechanism, but
his view on the holder's remedies is unclear. That the holder may be entitled to delivery
of the thing itself is perhaps implicit in the statement that "he is preferred and retracts the
sale".'?" Whether this means the same as in the case of an ex lege right of retraction,
namely that the holder is to institute proper proceedings, after which the third party is
bound to restore the thing to the holder,'?' or whether it simply means that the sale to the
third party buyer may be cancelled so that the thing is restored to the grantor, is not clear.
Accordingly Van Leeuwen does not provide clear authority for the view that the holder is
entitled to stronger relief than restoration of the status quo ante by setting aside the
transfer to a third party purchaser with notice.
Van der Keessel focuses his discussion on ex lege rights of retraction. He merely
mentions the conventional retractus appended to a sale and does not discuss the remedies
available to the holder.!" His reference to the Digest of Justinian in this context suggests
that he would construe the conventional retractus like the Romans did. Elsewhere, he
emphasises that Grotius's definition of the ius retractus as a right in respect of
immovable property entailing that the holder is preferred upon a sale and steps into the
place of the buyer, is limited to ex lege rights of retraction. 103
It can therefore be deduced, especially from Voet, that the holder of a contractual right of
retraction probably could not step into the shoes of a third party buyer on a sale in breach
of his right. That was a remedy confined by Voet to ex lege rights of retraction. It is not
99 Ibid.
100 CF 20 3 and RHR 19 2, where he speaks of naasting.
101 CF 20 27. CfVan der Keessel Th 3 16 11.
102 Van der Keessel Th 3 16 1.
103 Van der Keessel Praelectiones on Gr 3 16 2. See his discussion of the remedies of the ex lege naaster
in 3 16 11. (The naaster steps into the place of the third party buyer. Before transfer to the buyer had taken
place, the naaster may sue the seller for transfer. Had transfer taken place, a new transfer to the naaster
must take place).
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clear whether the holder could enforce delivery on breach either. Van Leeuwen appears
to treat the contractual right of retraction as analogous to the one arising ex lege. What is
undisputed is that the holder could claim damages. Thus the writers of Holland do not
provide clear authority for an Oryx mechanism type remedy, nor for a remedy of specific
performance in the form of an order to sell or make an offer, nor do they unanimously
and clearly exclude such remedies. 104
3 4 2 Other Dutch writers
All three judges in the two leading South African cases referred to Van Zutphen of
Utrecht and Schrassert, who wrote on the law of Gelderland.!" Botha JA also referred to
the Frisian writer, Sande.!"
The opinions of Sande'" were treated with great respect by the writers of Holland and
still carry much weight in South Africa.!" Sande states that if an agreement has been
made by a pact appended to a contract that the one party will not sell or lease the property
to anyone but the other, a personal action for damages would arise out of such a pact on
breach by the owner provided the other party had some interest why the owner should not
alienate.!" Damages are also payable where an owner had on transfer of his property
104Cfalso Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 263; Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 4-5. In his discussion of D 18 1
75, Groenewegen De Legibus Abrogatis merely refers one to his remarks on C 463, where he emphasises
that immovables cannot be subjected to a real burden by contracting parties unless a written document of
the transaction is executed before a magistrate. He makes no comment on D 45 1 1223 or D 19 1 21 5.
Van Bynkershoek Quaestionum Juris Privati 313 only discusses ex lege rights of retraction.
105Owsianick supra 320A-C, 321H-323D and Oryx supra 905H-906D.
106323C_D.
1071586-1638.
108De Wet Die Ou Skrywers in Perspektief 144.
109Sande Traetatus de Prohibita Rerum Alienatione 4 2 2. Sande appears to discuss the Roman law
position stating that such a pact must by appended to a bona fide contract or strengthened by stipulation.
However in the rest of his discussion he refers to sixteenth century writers.
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Van Zutphen, who practised in Utrecht, wrote a chapter on voorcoop in his book on
Dutch law. III He does not mention ex lege naastingsrechte in favour of relatives. He
does refer to the question whether a co-owner has a reg van voorcoop (right of pre-
emption) in respect of the other co-owners' share, but denies this unless local legislation
has created such a right of pre-emption. The rest of his discussion is on rights of pre-
emption created by agreement.
made it a condition of the sale that the purchaser shall not alienate or sell to anyone but
him.!" Sande makes no mention of a contractual naastingsrecht or a remedy aimed at
delivery or transfer to the holder. The arrangement discussed by him is constructed rather
like the Roman law pactum protimeseos.
Like Voet, Van Zutphen holds that the grantor must give notice to the holder ifhe intends
to sell the thing, upon which the holder has two months to declare whether he wants to
buy the thing. If the holder fails to make a declaration within those two months, the right
of pre-emption terminates. But he goes further than Voet and says that, if the seller
(grantor) sells to a third party without any notice, the holder may attack timmiteren'Fï the
contract of sale and retract (retraheren 113) "the same". 114 It is not entirely clear whether
"the same" (het selve) in this sentence is meant to refer to the preceding noun, namely the
1104211 (referring to D 181 75 and D 19 1 21 5). He apparently contemplates the interest of the owner to
ward off unwanted third parties as near neighbours (4 2 12).
III Van Zutphen Practycke der Nederlandsche Rechten van de Daghelijcksche soo Civile Is Criminele
questien (1645).
112 From the Latin verb immittere meaning alternatively (1) to send in, cause or allow to go in, (2) to let
loose, let go free and (3) to let go against, launch against, to attack, to incite against (Simpson Cassell's
Latin-English English-Latin Dictionary 5th edition (1968) 287).
113 From the Latin verb retrahere meaning, literally, to draw back and figuratively, to hold back or
withdraw, to draw on again and to induce (Simpson Cassell's Latin-English English-Latin Dictionary 521).
114 Van Zutphen Pracktycke sv voorcoop par 4. The original phrase reads that" ...alsdan mach den ghene
die de voorcoop competeert sijn selven het contract van vercoopinghe immitteren ende het selve voor de
ghedane leveringe retraheren." Van Zutphen refers to the German writers, Berlichius, Carpzovius and
Fabricius as authority.
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contract of sale, or whether it refers to the merx. Grammatically, a reference to the
contract of sale makes more sense. Presumably "retraction" therefore only means that the
contract in breach of the holder's right of pre-emption may be set aside. However, in
later paragraphs the verb "retract" has as its object the sold goods.!" If it means the same
here, there is scope for an interpretation that the holder may claim delivery of the goods
from the seller upon a sale to a third party. Alternatively it could mean that, like the
infringing contract, the transfer to the third party may simply be set aside so that the
goods revert to the grantor.
Van Zutphen does say that, had the goods been delivered to the purchaser, without notice
to the holder, the sale cannot be rescinded. His reason is that the holder only has a
personal action against the seller to sue the seller for damages and interesse. He does not
limit this reasoning to the situation at hand, and the statement is open to the interpretation
that the holder may only claim damages on breach.!" However, he adds that, if the goods
had been delivered to a buyer with knowledge of the right of pre-emption, the holder
may retract and "revoke" (revocerenii?) the goods.!"
The critical question is the meaning of "retraction" and "revoke" in this context. Van
Zutphen does not spell out whether this means the same thing as in the ex lege right of
retraction, namely that the holder may step into the place of the purchaser and demand
delivery to himself, on having taken certain prescribed steps. Neither does he say
whether a new contract of sale comes into existence upon retraction. His statement that
the buyer only has a personal right for damages may perhaps be reconciled with the
statement that the buyer may retract the goods, by interpreting the latter to mean that the
holder may have the transfer to the third party set aside, without being able to enforce
115 See paragraphs 6, 9,11,14 and 15.
116 He cites Berlichius 2 40 56-57, Boër, Alexander, Carpzovius 2 32 8-10 and Fabricius 4 36 2 as
authority.
II? From the Latin verb revocere meaning to call back or to recall, recover or bring back something.
us Van Zutphen Pracktycke sv voorcoop 785-786 par 6. He refers to Berlichius Conclusiones
Practicabiles 2 40 64 as authority.
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delivery to himself. In that way the goods are in fact "recalled" or "drawn back" at the
instance of the holder, but to the grantor. On the other hand he does use the verb naesten
as a synonym for retraheren, which possibly implies that delivery to the holder may be
enforced, as may be done by the holder of an ex lege naastingsrecht. 119
Schrassert, writing on the law of Gelderland, discusses the question whether a provision
in a partition agreement that the former co-owners will be preferred if the land be
alienated, entitles a son of a party to the agreement to retract the thing with force on
alienation.!" The use of the verb retraheren in this context again raises the issue whether
delivery of the thing may be claimed by the holder on a sale to an outsider.
He says that the agreement does not create a real right but a personal right for the
interesse (damages) if the thing had been transferred to the third party buyer. But if
transfer had not taken place so that the grantor still has possession, the holder may
institute action for the fulfilment of the grantor's promise to him, and for the sale to
himself, and on a refusal, to vouch for the purchase price.!" This text does not
necessarily support the view that the holder could step into the shoes of the third party
buyer on the sale. It may in fact provide support for the construction that an agreement of
sale can be brought into being upon judicial action. Certainly, it conflicts with the view
that only damages may be claimed upon a sale to a third party.
To summanse, Sande provides no authority for any other remedy than a claim for
damages. It cannot be said with certainty whether Van Zutphen's work provides support
for the construction espoused in the Oryx case, as the learned judge argued. Neither is it
totally clear what remedy exactly Van Zutphen has in mind. Schrassert, on the other
119Paragraphs 11, 14& 15.
120Schrassert Praetieae Observationes (1736) 92.
121Obs 92 4: "Si vero traditio nondum secuta, sed possessio adhuc sit penes eum, agitur ad complementurn
promissionibus, adeoque ad venditionem sibi faciendam, oblato et in casu denegationis consignatio pretio."
He refers to Carpzovius (Diet Const De! 10 note 8 and 9) and to Christin (Ad legum Meehlin 11 2 5 et seq)
for authority.
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3 4 3 Other writers of the ius commune
hand, clearly indicates that the holder may institute legal action for fulfilment of the
promise to sell to him.
Van Zutphen relies heavily on the German writer, Berlichius, as authority for his
discussion of the holder's remedies. Both Berlichius and Van Zutphen rely on the
German writer Gai1.122 Berlichius is also referred to in the two leading cases.!"
Accordingly the writings ofBerlichius and Gail will be examined.!"
Berlichius clearly distinguishes the contractual right of retraction from the ex lege
figure.!" Regarding the remedies of the holder of the contractual right he says that, if the
seller (grantor) does in fact sell the goods without notice to the holder, the holder may
attack (immittere) the contract of sale, and may retract (retraheren) the thing before
delivery.!" Had delivery taken place to a mala fide buyer, the holder can retract the sold
goods "with force" from a pact of such a kind, and revoke the alienation.!" However, if a
122 Van Zutphen Practycke sv voorcoop par 4, Berlichius Conclusiones Practicabiles (1670) 4055.
123 Owsianick supra 320A, 322D-H and the Oryx case supra at 906C.
124 Pothier's discussion of promises to conclude a sale in the future seems to relate not to rights of pre-
emption but rather to agreements to contract recognised in modern European but not South African law
(Pothier Treatise on the Contract of Sale 6 1 1-6 1 3). Interestingly he states that the act which is the
fulfilment of an obligation to conclude a contract of sale may be supplied by a judgment decreeing that, in
default of the debtor's being willing to agree to a contract of sale, the judgment itself shall be equivalent to
one. He prefers this view above the view that only damages may be obtained in the case of breach of a
duty quae in faciendo consistunt, as the first view appears to be the one adopted in practice as more
conformable to the integrity that ought to govern men in the performance of their promises.
125 Conclusiones Practicabiles 4053.
126 Ibid 40 54.
127 Ibid 40 64.
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penalty was stipulated for on breach, the holder may not have the sale rescinded and
retract the goods, but is limited to the stipulated penalty.!"
Unfortunately, Berlichius does not spell out what retraction of the goods involves, that is,
whether it refers merely to the holder being able to set aside the transfer so that the merx
reverts to the grantor or whether it means claiming the goods for himself.
Gail does not discuss the remedies of the holder of a contractual right of retraction. He
therefore provides no authority for Berlichius and Van Zutphen.:" To this extent Botha
JA may perhaps be right in saying that Van Zutphen wrongly imported the legal position
applicable to the ex lege naastingsrecht to the contractual right of retraction
(voorcoopsregs.'"
Thus these writers do not clearly indicate what the exact remedy of the holder of a
contractual right of retraction would be.
3 4 4 Modern legal historians
The construction of the contractual naastingsrecht in Roman-Dutch law or the ius
commune has apparently not received as much attention as the ex lege naastingsrecht
from modem legal historians,"! but the conclusion in the previous section that no
128 Ibid 40 58.
129 Van Zutphen Pracktycke sv voorcoop 4, Berlichius Conclusiones Practicabiles 4055.
130323C.
131 See eg Zimmermann "Kaufvertrag"; De Blécourt & Fischer Kort Begrip; Moorman van Kappen Met
open buydel and "Voorkeurs- of voorkoopsrecht" 1976 NJB 831; Fockerna Andreae & Van Appeldoom
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid beschreven bij Hugo de Groot met Aantekeningen vol 1I3rd
edition (1926) on Gr 3 16, who all focus on ex lege naastingsrechte.
66
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
certainty exists as to the remedies of the holder of a contractual right of retraction in
Roman-Dutch law, is supported by Floyd.!"
Another writer who has investigated the historical development of preference contracts is
the German writer, Schurig, who wrote a thesis on rights of pre-emption.':" Schurig is
more concerned with the historical reasons for the eventual formulation of the BGB
Vorkaufsrecht and does not investigate the precise operation of the contractual right of
retraction in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His discussion focuses
instead on the attempt, especially in the nineteenth century, to distinguish the pactum
protimeseos from the Germanic institution and to adapt the latter to the system of Roman
law.134
Schurig is nevertheless of the view that there is no reason to believe that the pactum
protimeseos of Roman law did not exist in the earlier period. It could then be used as an
independent contract as there was no longer a numerus clausus of contracts. However,
the stronger, more effective right of retraction appears to have been more widely used in
Germany.!" That both existed followed not from juristic or economic need, but was the
fortuitous result of historical events.!" Schurig accepts that the Roman figure only gave
rise to a claim to the preferential conclusion of a contract of sale, thus to a preferential
offer to contract and not to a real right. 137 The Germanic right of retraction gave rise to a
real right. He accepts that on the exercise of this right by unilateral declaration of the
holder, a contract of sale (or relationship governed by the rules relating to sale) came into
132 1986 THRHR 253 262-263,256. His statement that there was a great degree of similarity between the
ex lege naastingsrecht and the contractual right of retraction (255) is not justified by his later conclusions
on the uncertainty surrounding the contractual figure (at 256 and 262-263).
133 See n 27 supra.
134 Das Vorkaufsrecht 38-45.
135 41.
13659.
13745,49.
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existence as if an offer to sell had been accepted.!" He accepts that in the case of the
Roman figure, an actual offer by the owner (to which the holder was entitled) and the
acceptance thereof by the holder were necessary to bring a contract of sale into
existence.!"
3 4 5 Overview of the position in Roman-Dutch law and the ius
commune
The investigation into the position after the reception reveals that the construction of
contractual preference arrangements in Roman-Dutch law and the ius commune is not
entirely clear. The possibility cannot be excluded that the Roman pactum protimeseos
figure, which may have only given rise to a claim for damages, and possibly an order
setting aside a sale to a third party, or of a transfer to a malafide buyer, survived into this
era. The "retraction" terminology used by some writers in the context of preference
contracts, opens the possibility that the holder could also enforce delivery to himself on a
sale to a third party, just like the holder of an ex lege right of retraction.
3 5 Early South African Law
As no clarity exists on the construction of preference contracts in Roman-Dutch law, it is
difficult to say what rules were received into South African law.
Botha JA in Owsianick decided that the Dutch law of naasting is not part of our law, and
that there is no procedure known to our law whereby the holder may, on a sale in breach
13849, with no reference to authority at that page. He describes the conflicting arguments by nineteenth
century historians on the legal nature of rights of retraction at 38-40.
13945 at n 176,49.
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with his rights, demand that he be allowed to step into the buyer's place.!" As was
shown in chapter two, he was of the opinion that the holder of a contractual right of first
refusal was only entitled to an interdict or damages on breach."!
Some of the early South African cases decided in the previous century, provide oblique
support for Botha lA's contention by virtue of the courts' refusal to order the grantors to
sell or transfer to the holders. Instead, damages or orders that the contract between the
grantor and third party be declared void were mostly granted.'? Of course, this may be
the result of a reluctance to grant specific performance under English influence, and not
necessarily reflect their understanding of the holder's rights.'?
As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, in one case decided in the previous
century, Malan v Schalkwyk and Odendaall" the court was prepared to order that the
contract with the third party was void and that the holder (the erstwhile seller) 'become
140323D_E. This conclusion is supported by Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 255 who relies on the same authority
as Botha JA for his statement that neither the ex lege nor the contractual naastingsrecht was received into
our law. Cfalso Wessels History of the Roman Dutch Law (1908) 606.
141Par 2 1 1 supra.
142See, for example, Joseph's Executor v Peacock 1868 Buch 247, where the holder prayed for delivery
and transfer of the thing tendering to pay the purchase price, which prayer the court a quo refused; instead
ordering the payment of damages (which was claimed in the alternative). Unfortunately, the only issue
which the court dealt with on appeal was the passive transmissibility of the right. In Transvaal Silver
Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox 1891 5 SAR, the holders merely prayed for an order that the breaching
contract to the mala fide third party be set aside, which was then ordered by the court. Cf also Van Pletsen v
Henning 1913 AD 82; McGregor v Jordaan 1921 CPD 301; Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137.
143In Haynes v King William's Town Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A) the tide began to tum away from this
reluctance to grant specific performance towards the reaffirmation that a party is in principle entitled
thereto, and that the court's discretion in this regard is a judicial one unfettered by rigid rules. This was
confirmed in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A) 783. See generally Van der
Merwe et al Contract 276; Lubbe & Murray Contract 542 et seq; Joubert Contract 224 et seq; Christie
Contract 606; Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law
125 et seq.
1441S 225 (decided in 1852).
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entitled to and become possessed of the land' on payment of the original purchase price,
as agreed in the preferential arrangement. This order is arguably analogous to the remedy
applicable to the ex lege right of retraction, which Botha JA regarded as not part of our
law.'?
Moreover, it is submitted that SA Breweries v Francis & Sons,146which Botha JA relied
upon for his conclusion that naasting is not part of modem law, does not exclude the
possibility that the contractual Germanic ius retractus forms part of our law.
That case did not deal with a right of first refusal. A lease provided that the tenant would
not mortgage any of the movables on the premises without the Breweries' (the lessor's)
consent. 147 Another clause provided that whenever the lease shall terminate, the Breweries
shall be entitled to purchase the movables at a price, failing agreement, to be determined
by certain third parties. This clause was preceded by a lex commissoria in favour of the
brewery, which also authorised the Brewery "to enter upon the premises and take
possession of the whole. "148 The tenant purported to pass a notarial bond over the
movables. The Breweries argued that the tenant's ownership of the movables was
qualified by the conditions imposed.!" The decision turned upon the fact that the
bondholders did not know ofthis limitation. Bale CJ did however, during argument, state
to counsel that the ius retractus was obsolete.!" referring only to Seaville v Colley. lSI He
did not answer counsel's contention that the comments in the Seaville case could only
apply to a ius retractus ex lege and not to the conventional (contractual) ius retractus. 152
145 See the discussion of this case in par 2 4 supra.
146SA Breweries v Francis & Sons 27 NLR 648 (decided in 1906).
147 The lessor had sold the movables on the premises to the tenant.
148650.
149 At the time of the sale.
150658.
1519 Juta 39.
152658.
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Bale CJ's statement was clearly obiter. In the reasons for the court's decision he stated
that, even if the ius retractus had not become obsolete, it did not apply in this case. I53
The case of Seaville v Colley'" referred to by Bale CJ, concerned the rule of Dutch law
that a debtor sued by a cessionary of his creditor could discharge the debt by paying the
cessionary the (lesser) sum for which the cessionary had obtained the claim.
The court, per De Villiers CJ, referred to this rule as the debtor's right of retraction. 155 It
then referred to the ius retractus that existed in "the greater portion of Holland", entitling
the nearest relatives of the seller of land, to step into the purchaser's place and demand a
completion of the sale in their favour.!" The court quoted Van Bynkershoek's statement
that "every form of retraction, which is nowadays in use, ... savours of the utmost
unfairness, inasmuch as it robs the purchaser of his honestly acquired right in order to
prop up a policy which is of far less importance than the enforcement of contracts."!" De
Villiers CJ then stated, that the law of retraction as applied to immovable property was
not general throughout Holland and that he takes it for granted that it was never
introduced in this country.!"
From his example of such a ius retractus and the last part of the quotation from Van
Bynkershoek, the judge clearly only meant to refer to the ius retractus ex lege as being
obsolete. Van Bynkershoek would not have referred to a conventional ius retractus as
reprehensible: such a ius retractus is also obtained "honestly". To deny its force would
also deny the important policy of "the enforcement of contracts". Clearly, the case
therefore does not concern contractual rights of retraction.
153659.
154 Supra.
155 41. He stated that Voet also treated it as a branch of the law relating to retractus in 18 4 18.
15641.
15741, quoting from Van Bynkershoek Quaestionum Juris Privati 3 13.
15842.
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The court in Seaville v Colley furthermore referred to the presumption that every "law"
introduced from Holland is still in force, unless it is inconsistent with South African
usages, the best proof of which is found in unoverruled decisions.!" In Transvaal Silver
Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox,160 decided five months before Seaville and not
referred to in that case, the court held that the plaintiffs had "the right of pre-emption, i.e.
a species of retractusï''" However, the construction of a right of pre-emption or of a ius
retractus was not considered. Apparently it was merely taken for granted that the kind of
ius retractus under consideration was received into South African law."?
3 6 Conclusion
An overview of the position in the Roman law reveals that no certainty exists regarding
the construction of the pactum protimeseos. Van Heerden AJA's suggestion in the Oryx
case that the holder of a pactum protimeseos had the same rights as an ordinary buyer in
Roman law, including entitlement to delivery of the merx upon breach, is doubtful at
best.
The possibility cannot be ruled out with certainty that Roman-Dutch contractual
preference arrangements gave rise only to a claim for damages or the setting aside of the
sale to the third party. On the other hand, they could possibly have operated like the ex
lege right of retraction. Neither can the possibility of both constructions being received
into early South African law be excluded. The absence of a clearly defined, unified
15944.
1601891 5 SAR.
161 116.
162 119. In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 188 the court stated that a
contract not to sell to a third party without giving the other contracting party an opportunity to purchase is
analogous to ajus retractus or contractual right of naasting. In Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137 141 the court
also quoted Voet on the ius retractus arising from convention, indicating that the law relating to iura
retractus may have been received into our law.
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The Oryx mechanism has its roots in the Germanic (feudal) ex lege right of retraction,
which allowed the holder to lay claim to the land on a sale in breach of his right. This
was a proprietary remedy that developed from the view that the holder had incomplete
ownership that automatically waxed to full ownership on breach. This concept of tiered
ownership that forms the historical basis for the Oryx remedy, does not form part of our
law. This accounts for the difficulty that courts and writers have in explaining and
formulating this remedy in terms of Romanist obligation terminology, and the resultant
resort to the language of fiction.
default regime for preference contracts in Roman-Dutch law may account for the
plurality of constructions in South African law.
In view of the uncertainty in Roman, Roman-Dutch and South African law, courts should
not, when considering the basic default rules of preference contracts, resort merely to
argument based on historical authority and precedent. These can provide no ready made
authoritative solutions, but only the raw materials from which solutions may be
developed.
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4 Comparative Perspective
The purpose of this comparative study is to establish whether a multiplicity of
constructions I of preference contracts is also found in other jurisdictions. If such a
multiplicity is recognised the field of application of each construction, that is, the
prerequisites that must exist before a specific construction applies, will be considered. If
one construction is portrayed as the only correct one to the exclusion of all others, or at
least as the default construction which applies in the absence of a clear contrary intention,
the reasons for doing so will be considered.
Three jurisdictions will form the focus of this study, namely Germany, England and the
United States of America. One justification for this choice is that all three have been
relied on in South African case law.'
South African courts have often quoted the English case, Manchester Ship Canal
Company vManchester Racecourse Company? to support the proposition that the grantor
has a duty to make an offer upon occurrence of the trigger event." This has been used to
counter the construction of the majority in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres
I See chapter 1 supra for a working definition of the terms "construction" and "construct".
2 Language constraints also played a role in this choice, as did preliminary research to ascertain which
jurisdictions present sufficient material to study on the basic construction of preference contracts. I will
also refer to Austrian, Swiss, Scots and Canadian law at times.
3 [1900] 2 Ch 352; [1901] 2 Ch 37.
4 See Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299; Sher v Allan 1929 OPD 137 142; Cohen v Behr 1947 CPD
942 946; Hattingh v Van Rensburg 1964 1 SA 578 (T); Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 3 SA 739 (A);
Breytenbach v Stewart 1985 1 SA 167 (T); Soteriou v Retco Poyntons 1985 2 SA 922 (A) 932; Dithaba
Platinum vErconovaal 1985 4 SA 615 (T). Cfthe minority judgment by Botha JA in Soteriou at 936B
where he distinguishes the Manchester case from the facts under consideration. In the latter case, the
Appellate Division also relied on the English case of Smith vMorgan [1971] 2 All ER 1500.
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(Pty) Ltd? in terms of which preference rights creates merely a negative duty (obligatio
non faciendi), so that no order to make an offer is available."
German law was relied upon in support of the controversial Oryx mechanism.' As was
pointed out above, many South African writers have criticised the court in Associated
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd8 for not
spelling out the precise construction of preference contracts and thus of the Oryx
mechanism." Several important questions affecting the operation of preference contracts
remain uncertain as a result. 10 The closest the court came to explaining the legal nature of
the Oryx mechanism was to refer to the German writer Larenz's explanation that the
Vorkaufsrecht of the German civil code (BGB) I I is a Gestaltungsrecht:" This, said the
court, is a right to create a contract with the same contents as the contract concluded with
the third party through a unilateral declaration of will." The court left its discussion of
German law at that. Since the concept of a Gestaltungsrecht to create a contract is not
known to our case law, research into German law could be helpful to gauge whether that
5 19673 SA 310 (A) per Botha JA.
6 Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra 932 per Nicholas JA for the majority.
7 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereten (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 893 (A)
907H.
8 Supra.
9 See chapter 1 supra. The court's failure to do so leaves the impression that a fiction has been introduced
into our law, with all the resultant dangers flowing therefrom. Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 3 729 (A)
763I-J; Radesich 1985 De Jure 407409; see chapter 1 supra.
10 So, for example, it is unclear what transactions or actions by the grantor or third parties would trigger the
availability of the Oryx mechanism, and whether a contract of preference must always comply with the
formalities prescribed by the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. The court expressly left open these issues
at 908F-G.
II Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch.
12907H. See Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts 11.1 13th edition (1986) 151. (The court in Oryx referred
to the 12th edition.)
13907H.
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concept provides a sufficiently clear juridical explanation of rights of pre-emption, which
may facilitate a coherent solution to the issues surrounding contracts of pre-emption. 14
A study of American" law is also justified by the reliance in Oryxl6 and Soteriou v Retco
Poyntons (Pty) Ltd" on the American writer Corbin. The court in Oryx quoted Corbin's
statement that when the grantor accepts a third party offer without first offering to
contract with the holder, this breach also has the effect of an offer to sell to the holder on
the same terms which gives the holder a power of acceptance." The quotation from
Corbin contains no explanation why the breach suddenly conjures up an offer. Further
investigation may reveal a coherent explanation.
As the literature on the basic construction of preference contracts is more extensive in
German law than in English or American law, I will first consider German law.
4 1 German Law
German law indeed recognises a number of different types of preference contracts, or
Vorrechtsvertriige in the wide sense." The only institution regulated in the BGB is the
14 For example those set out in n 10 supra.
15 As in "from the United States of America."
16 Supra.
17 Supra.
18 Corbin Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law VoIlA
Sections 152-274 (1963) § 261 (hereafter cited as Corbin Corbin on Contracts VoIlA) p 473-4, quoted at
907H-908B: "When 0 [grantor] receives an offer from C [a third party], his acceptance of that offer
without first offering it to B [holder] on the same terms is a breach for which B can recover damages, but it
also has the effect of an offer to sell to B, giving him a power of acceptance. O's promise to make that offer
is specifically enforceable, and if B gives notice of acceptance he consummates a contract to sell on the
terms offered by C and accepted by O. He can get a decree for specific performance against both 0 and C,
unless C has already received conveyance and is protected as an innocent purchaser for value."
19 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 296; Wagner "Gestaltungen im Vorfeld
des endgiiltigen Vertragsabschluss" 2000 NotBZ 69 76-77. Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte beim Vertragabschluss"
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Vorkaufsrecht. 20 The other types are recognised because of the principle of freedom of
contract. 21
In a manner of speaking, the Vorkaufsrecht entitles the holder to "step into the shoes" of
a third party with whom the grantor has contacted, albeit by causing a second contract to
come into existence upon the holder's declaration exercising the Vorkaufsrecht:"
Preference rights aimed at other types of contract than sale, for example lease, are also
sometimes constructed analogously to the Vorkaufsrecht. The term Eintrittsrechte" has
been used to describe a wide category of preference rights including Vorkaufsrechte and
such similarly constructed rights, such as the Vormietrecht and Vorpachtrecht" A sub-
in FS Dolle Vom deutschen zum europiiischen Recht I (1963) 103 uses the term Vorzugsrechte for the
overarching category of preferential rights to transact.
20 In §§ 463-473 BGB (previously §§ 504-514) and §§ 1094-1104 BGB. Several statutes create
Vorkaufsrechte, for example in favour of lessees or communities. The primary rights and duties of the
parties in these other forms of Vorkaufsrechte are the same as that of the contractual Vorkaufsrecht (Hahn
"Rechtsgeschaftliche Vorkaufsrechte im Rahmen von Grundstuckskaufvertragen" 1994 Mitteilungen der
Rheinischen Notarkammer 193 194).
21 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" in Paulus et al (eds) Festschrift for Karl Larenz (1973)
749752.
22 See § 464 BGB (previously § 505) and commentaries thereon, such as Grunewald in Westermann (ed)
Erman Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch io" edition (2000) (herafter cited as Erman (Grunewald)) § 505;
Westermann in Westermann (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 3.1 Schuldrecht
Besonderer Teil (§§ 433-606), VerbrKG, HausTWG, MHG 3rd edition (1995) (hereafter cited as Miinchener
Kommentar (Westermann)) § 505 RdNr 1; Huber in Mertens (ed) Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch mit
Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen Kohlhammer-Kommentar begriindet von Hs Th Soergel & W Siebert
3: Schuldrecht JJ (§§ 433-515) AGB-Gesetz, AbzG, EAG, EKG, UN-KaufAbk 12th edition (1991) (hereafter
cited as Soergel & Siebert (Huber)) § 505 RdNr 3. See also Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht
(1975) 19 and Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 III. In this respect, the Vorkaufsrecht is similar to
the Oryx mechanism.
23 Literally, "step-in rights."
24 Roser Ankaufsrecht, Vorhand, Einlësungsrecht und Option: Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von den gesetzlich
nicht geregelten Anrechten zum Kauf(1938) 23. These rights are not specifically regulated in the BGB but
contract drafters and commentators have tended to construe them like the Vorkaufsrecht. See Nipperdey
"Uber Vorhand, Vorkaufsrecht und Einlësungsrecht" 1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 302ff; Roser
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Apart from Eintrittsrechte in the above sense, German law also knows contracts that
create a Vorhand" for the holder. Any agreement that obliges the grantor to first give the
holder an opportunity to contract before the grantor contracts with a third party falls into
this group of contracts. This is of course the way in which preference agreements are
usually worded in South Africa." In Germany, such wording, which prohibits the grantor
from first contracting with a third party, excludes the application of the Vorkaufsrecht:"
type of Eintrittsrechte which are wider than Vorkaufsrechte, are the Einlosungsrechte"
which are triggered by the conclusion of any type of contract aimed at alienation of the
objeet, such as sale, exchange and donation."
Ankaufsrecht 23; BGH decision of25.11.1987 reported in 1988 Wertpapier Mitteilungen 92 (in respect of a
Vorpachtrecht). So for example, a Vormietrecht is understood as the right of the holder to unilaterally
create a lease contract upon the owner concluding a contract of lease with a third party (Henrich
Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 297; Michalski "Der Mietvorvertrag" 1999 Zeitschrift for
Miet- und Raumrecht 141 146). However, this term is sometimes used to denote the rights to take over a
contract between the grantor and the third party, such as a long-term contract for the supply of energy or
goods. See for example Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 18 (now § 463); Bassenge et al (eds)
Palandt Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch so" edition (2001) (hereafter cited as Palandt) Vorbem § 504 RdNr 12
(now § 463).
25 Literally, "rights to redeem".
26 See, for example, Soergel & Siebert (Huber) § Vor 504 RdNr 19 (now § 463); Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt
for Handelsrecht 300302; Roser Ankaufsrecht 21. It has also been used in an even wider sense to refer to
any conditional right to create a contract or obligation by unilateral declaration, where the condition need
not necessarily be the conclusion of a contract with a third party (Roser 21-22). See however Miinchener
Kommentar (Westermann)§ 504 RdNr 6 (now § 463) who uses the term Einlësungsrechte to include
Vormiet- and Vorpachtrechte as well.
27 Literally, "forehand", figuratively, "preference".
28 See par 2 1 1 supra and par 7 3 infra where some typical formulations encountered in the case law are set
out.
29 RG SeuffA 74, 232 (30.5.1919) 284 and RG SeuffA 81, 360 (17.9.1929) 361 which emphasise that the
contract with a third party is a necessary prerequisite (precondition) for a Vorkaufsrecht. See also RG 169,
65 (30.03.1942) 69 where the court refused to treat an agreement that if the grantor wants to sell, the holder
shall have a Wiederkaufsrecht, as a Vorkaufsrecht as the "exercise of the right is not made dependant on the
prior conclusion of a contract with a third party" (my translation); Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752;
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Why this is so will appear from the closer investigation of each institution hereunder.
That the customary wording of South African preference contracts would indeed put
them into the scope of Vorhand and not Vorkaufsrecht contracts means that the different
types of Vorhand contracts of German law must be carefully considered. A key outcome
to be pursued is a verdict on which sub-type of Vorhand contract is to be regarded as the
default construction, that is, the construction which should apply where the contract
contains a cryptic formulation which does not exhaustively regulate the parties' primary
rights, duties and remedies. As has been pointed out above, such very cryptic drafting is
apparently common practice in South Africa.
The discussion hereunder will focus on the normal constructions of the various types of
preference contracts. German law recognises that the parties may deviate from the
normal construction, including the BGB rules on the Vorkaufsrecht.
4 1 1 The Vorkaufsrecht
4 1 1 1 Basic construction
The Vorkaufsrecht is a deliberate creation of the drafters of the BGB. It does not
correspond to either the Roman law ius protimeseos or the Germanic ius retractus,
although it certainly bears a marked resemblance to the latter institution."
One distinctive characteristic is that the right can only be exercised upon a completed
valid contract with a third party." Three major practical reasons swayed the drafters of
Michalski 1999 Zeitschrift fur Miet- und Raumrecht 141 146; Weber "Der Optionsvertrag" 1990
Juristische Schulung 249 251. See also Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 2nd edition
(1958) 155, par 20.4 who specifically distinguish the Vorrechtsvertrag generally used in the publishing
industry (which amounts to a Vorhand) from the Vorkaufsrecht on this basis.
30 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 59-60.
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the BGB to limit the trigger event to a contract of sale with a third party. Firstly, it was
felt that before conclusion of a contract with a third party, there is no certain basis for the
decision of the holder whether to exercise the right." In other words, the terms on which
the holder may acquire the object was considered to be too unclear if anything short of
conclusion of a contract triggers the right. 33 The drafting commission accordingly
rejected proposals that the grantor should be obliged to make an offer to the holder before
he has contracted with a third party." Secondly, as long as no binding contract with the
third party has been concluded, the holder is not in danger of losing her Vorkaufsrecht
(through transfer to a bona fide third party) and should therefore not be forced to decide
about the exercise of her right before that point." Thirdly, if some circumstance short of
a binding contract could force the holder to decide about the exercise of her right, there is
a danger of the grantor faking an offer which the grantor knows the holder would not
accept. This would force the holder either to buy the property at such exorbitant terms or
to waive the Vorkaufsrecht by failing to exercise it."
Accordingly, the grantor is not obliged to refrain from contracting with a third party until
he has first offered to contract with the holder. In other words, there is no obligatio non
faciendi, which is seen as characteristic of rights of pre-emption in South African law.
31 § 463 BGB (previously § 504 BGB). See also Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 8 (now § 463) and the
authorities in n 29 supra.
32 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 16; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 56 with reference
to BGB Motive II 345 et seq.
33 That is, if a "manifestation of a desire to sell" would trigger the right, which does not amount to a
contract with or offer to a third party, it would be disputable on what terms the holder would be entitled to
contract with the grantor. Some vague standard such as "reasonable terms" would then be required, which
would invariably lead to disputes.
34 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 16-17; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 56; Soergel &
Siebert (Huber) § 504 RdNr 17 (now § 463) with reference to Protokolle II 96 et seq. See also BGHZ 115,
355 (decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of 11.10.1991) 338 in fine; Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752, 755;
Michalski 1999 Zeitschriflfiir Miet- und Raumrecht 141 146.
35 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 19, with reference to Protokolle II 96 et seq.
36 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 19; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 56; Weber 1990
Juristische Schulung 249 251.
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Contracting with a third party without first having given the holder the opportunity to do
so is not breach of a Vorkaufsrecht. Instead, it is a neutral trigger event or condition for
the holder's right to become operative." Any agreement worded to the effect that there is
a duty to refrain from selling to a third party unless the holder has first been given a
chance to contract, therefore excludes the Vorkaufsrecht."
Because of this distinctive characteristic, the term Vorkaufsrecht is somewhat of a
misnomer. As the holder's right arises, or becomes operative, only after the sale to a third
party, it is rather like the nacoopsrecht discussed in the previous chapter, which could be
translated as Nachkaufsrecht.
A second distinctive characteristic of the Vorkaufsrecht is that the holder may bring a
contract into existence by unilateral declaration without any further declaration of will by
the grantor being required." It thus gives the holder a conditional power to create a
37 Although the Austrian Civil Code (art 1072 ABGB) seems to suggest the existence of an obligatio non
contrahendo cum tertii, a number of Austrian writers and some courts have also accepted that there is no
breach if the grantor only offers to the holder after conclusion of the third party contract. Their view results
from influence from the BGB Vorkaufsrecht and has been described as contra legem by Schurig Das
Vorkaufsrecht 53. See for example 1964 Evidenzblatt 239 240 where Austria's highest court followed
Klang and Ehrenzweig's opinion that the offer to the holder can be made before or after conclusion of the
contract with the third party. The court's statement is based on the view that making the offer after
conclusion of the third party contract is not breach. (The statement in the text should not be taken to mean
that no binding contract can exist pending fulfilment of a suspensive condition to which the contract is
subject. Contracts are valid and binding even before fulfilment of the condition. See Westerrnann in
Sacker (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1 Allgemeiner Teil (§§ 1-240) ABG-
Gesetz 4th edition (2001) (hereafter cited as Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) § 158 RdNr 39)).
38 RG Seuff A 81, 360; RGZ 154, 355; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 300,302.
39 § 464 BGB (previously § 505). In Oryx, the court focused on this second characteristic, which came to
be known as the Oryx mechanism, but equated it to a remedy for breach of the right of pre-emption, which
it is not in the case of a Vorkaufsrecht, as there is no question of breach until after the holder has exercised
the Vorkaufsrecht in response to the contract concluded with the third party.
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contract." This contract will have the same terms as those agreed with the third party,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise in the preference contract." If the grantor
refuses to transfer the object of the right to the holder, the holder can pray directly for
performance in terms of the contract of sale that was created by unilateral declaration.
4 I I 2 Explanation of legal nature
The legal nature of the Vorkaufsrecht is not determined by the BGB and has always been
controversial. 42
A tempting juridical explanation is that the agreement granting the Vorkaufsrecht is in
fact a conditional offer or conditional option, where the condition is the conclusion of a
contract with a third party." The terms of the offer are the terms on which the grantor
agrees to contract with a third party. These terms become fixed upon the fulfilment of
the condition. The unilateral declaration of the holder that brings a contract of sale into
existence, is simply the acceptance of the offer."
However, the BGB contains some rules on the Vorkaufsrecht which are arguably
inconsistent with a conditional option construction. One is an express provision that
whereas an agreement granting a Vorkaufsrecht in respect of land must comply with the
formalities prescribed for a sale of land, the holder's unilateral declaration may be form-
40 RG SeuffA 81, 360 361 (" ... Das Vorkaufsrecht im Sinne des BGB [gibt] dem Berechtigen eine durch
Verkaufbedingte Befugnis ... ").
41 § 464 BGB.
42 See all the major commentaries on §§ 504 et seq BGB (now §§ 463 et seq).
43 As a conditional option, the operation of the option is postponed until fulfilment of the condition, but the
option contract binds the parties thereto in the interim. See §§ 158-160 BGB; Miinchener Kommentar
(Westermann) § 158.
44 This is supported by inter alia Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 89ff and Weber 1990 Juristische Schulung 249
250. Cf Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 5 (now § 463) ("The Vorkaufsrecht is an option" (my
translation)).
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free." As acceptance of an offer must also comply with formalities, a number of writers
and courts have rejected the view that the holder's unilateral declaration is an acceptance
of an offer embedded in the initial agreement." Instead of merely accepting that the
legislator has chosen to deviate from the normal formalities requirements set by itself,"
they have come up with all sorts of other theories as to the legal nature (a coherent
explanation of the construction) of the Vorkaufsrecht.
One rather contrived explanation is that the initial agreement is in fact a doubly
conditional contract of sale that already complies with the formalities requirements."
The first condition is the conclusion of a contract with a third party and the second the
holder's unilateral declaration that it wants to buy on the terms agreed with the third
party. As the holder's declaration is therefore not the acceptance of an offer, it need not
comply with the formalities legislation. Opponents of the "doubly conditional sale"
45 § 464(1) BGB (previously § 505 (1».
46 Cf Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 7 (now § 463).
47 This would be a sensible deviation as the purpose of the formalities requirements is met if the preference
contract and contract with the third party are in writing as the terms on which the holder would contract
with the grantor are then clear and both parties are warned about these terms. The relevance for South
African lawyers of this debate is that where a specific clause can amount to a Vorkaufsrecht type
preferential right, there are arguments both ways as to whether the holder's declaration must be in writing
or not. What is true is that any construction which includes the second distinctive element of the
Vorkaufsrecht (the contractual power or Oryx mechanism) should accept that the initial preference
agreement must comply with the formalities, as no further expression of consent to contract with the holder
is required from the grantor before the contract of sale comes into existence.
48 This is the predominant view of the courts (Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504 RdNr 7; Mader
in Honsell (ed) J von Staundinger's Kommentar zum Burgertiches Gesetzbuch mit Einfiihrungsgesetz und
Nebengesetzen 2: Recht der Schuldverhiiltnisse §§ 433-534 13th edition (1995) (hereafter cited as
Staudinger (Mader» Vorbem zu §§ 504 ff RdNr 25; Erman (Grunewald) § 504. This construction is
preferred by writers such as Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 7-9 (now § 463). The doubly
conditional sale construction is especially contrived as it ignores the express provision of § 464 according
to which the sale between the grantor and holder comes into existence upon the exercise of the
Vorkaufsrecht by the holder (and not at an earlier stage). For further criticism see Medicus Schuldrecht II
Besonderer Teil: Ein Studienbuch 9th edition (1999) § 83 P 79ff; Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44
III.
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
construction argue that the second condition is a clear admission that the essentialia of a
contract of sale do not exist at all at conclusion of the preference contract. The holder
does not necessarily want to buy from the grantor at all at that stage. The holder of a right
of pre-emption often has an interest in remaining free to decide whether she wants to
contract or not at the time the grantor decides to contract. This "choice" or "option" to
contract is of the essence of an option and not of a contract of sale. This criticism
suggests a further objection against the conditional option construction. Just as the holder
does not want to buy at the conclusion of the preference contract, so the grantor does not
want to sell at that stage, which is the essence of an offer." A reply that in any
conditional option the grantor does not want to sell until the condition occurs is
unconvincing. Where the condition is an uncertain future event not dependent on the
cooperation or will of the grantor, the grantor must perforce now intend to sell in the
knowledge that she will have no control over the fulfilment of the condition. On the
other hand, commercial reality knows and needs options subject to conditions over the
fulfilment of which the grantor has some control. An example would be an agreement
that if the owner of a piece of land should ever start using a piece of land for dock
purposes, which was previously used for racecourse purposes, his neighbour would have
an option to buy it at R200 000.50 German writers point out that the economic need to
recognise contracts subject to at least partly potestative conditions ("mixed conditions"),
means that a blanket objection to potestative conditions as inconsistent with a serious
intention to be bound (an essentiale for any contract) is redolent of a formalistic
Begriffsjurisprudenz approach." A more functional approach is to consider the reasons
for the unacceptability of potestative conditions and test any specific potestative
condition against such reasons before rejecting it as inconsistent with an intention to be
contractually bound. Only potestative conditions which cause liability to be dependent
on the mere ipse dixit of a party are objectionable simply because such a contract could
49 Laue Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts nach BGB (1905) 20.
50 Cf the facts of Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester Racecourse Company supra. Another
example would be an option of purchasing any premises that might be designated for the purposes of a
dairy on the south side of a certain road (cf Ryan v Thomas (1911) 55 Sol Jo 364.)
51 CfSoergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 10; Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 158 RdNr 60.
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never be enforced by a court against that party as long as he insists that he does not want
to be bound. Therefore the condition that the grantor concludes a contract with a third
party is not an objectionable potestative condition. 52 A court could enforce it against a
grantor who insists that he does not want to be bound by simply pointing to the fact that a
contract with a third party has been concluded. The same applies even where the
condition is agreed to be an "overt act manifesting a serious desire to sell." The
declaration of exercise by the holder is not an objectionable suspensive condition for the
same reason. 53
If the contract creating a Vorkaufsrecht is a conditional option or doubly conditional sales
contract, it is a sui generis one as the BGB implies certain terms into such a contract
which are specific to the Vorkaufsrecht contract (hereinafter Vorkaufsvertrag). One
example is the grantor's duty to notify the holder that the condition has been fulfilled,
after which the holder has two months in the case of immovables and one week in respect
of other things to exercise the right. 54 Another example is the provision that the holder
may exercise the Vorkaufsrecht as long as he is able to perform all the main obligations
of the third party and as long as a money value can be placed on any subsidiary duties
undertaken by the third party which the holder cannot perform. 55
Perhaps this sui generis nature that negates a simple subsumption of the Vorkaufsrecht
under the genus "option" or "sales contract", explains why Larenz and others are satisfied
with the explanation that the Vorkaufsvertrag simply creates a Gestaltungsrecht for the
52 In BGHZ 72, 385, the court described such a condition as a mixed condition. Cf Miinchener Kommentar
(Westermann) § 158 RdNr 60.
53 In any event, even if the second condition under the conditional sale construction is regarded as a purely
potestative condition in the form of the holder being willing to buy, it does not prejudice anybody, as it
would normally be the holder who seeks enforcement of the Vorkaufsrecht contract and not the grantor.
Therefore there is no prospect of a denial by the holder that he wishes to buy.
54 § 469 BGB (previously § 510).
55 § 466 BGB (previously § 507).
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holder to establish a contract by unilateral declaration. 56 Gestaltungsrechte are all those
rights that allow a party by unilateral declaration to establish, alter or terminate bilateral
juristic relationships like contracts. 57 An example of another type of Gestaltungsrecht is
the right to terminate an existing contract by unilateral declaration, whether upon notice
or after breach. The Vorkaufsrecht, as the right to create a bilateral juristic relationship
by unilateral act, is said to be analogous to a declaration to terminate a contract upon
breach. Such a declaration of cancellation not only terminates an existing obligation, but
also gives rise to a bilateral juristic relationship with bilateral rights and duties, or at least
changes the existing obligation. 58
The main criticism against this theory is that nothing is gained by the categorisation of a
Vorkaufsrecht as a Gestaltungsrecht, as it does not explain where the Gestaltungsrecht
comes from. 59 The Gestaltungsrecht theory is said to be abstract, vague and
meaningless." The obvious response to this criticism is that the Gestaltungsrecht is
simply the result of an implied term in the preference contract, which arises ex lege on
the basis of statutory interpretation of the BGB. Alternatively, it can be explained as the
result of an implied term derived from the normal grounds for implying such term, for
example consensus and efficiency." No other explanation of the origin of other types of
56 BGHZ 102, 240; BGHZ 32, 375 383; Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 III; Larenz & Canaris
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 268.
57 See Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 III; BGHZ 102,240; Medicus Schuldrecht II § 83; Dietl et al
Wërterbucn for Recht, Wirtschaft und Politik II (1983) sv Gestaltungsrecht. Seeker's article "Lehre von
Gestaltungsrechte" in Festschrift for R Koch (1903) 23 et seq is the locus classicus.
58 Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 III. For example, it gives rise to the duty of mutual restitution.
59 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 66-67 agrees that it can be a Gestaltungsrecht, but prefers the conditional
option construction as it explains that the Gestaltungsrecht is a power of acceptance arising from the offer
embedded in the preference agreement. CfRoser Ankaufsrecht 24-25. See also Laue Begriff und Wesen
des Vorkaufsrechts 22-23, who states that merely supplying more examples of analogous rights does not
explain the creation of a contract by unilateral declaration.
60 Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 9.
61 See further par 6 2 on the determinants of ex lege implied terms. The preference contract itself is also the
source of the subsidiary obligations of the grantor, such as the duty to inform the holder of a contract
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Gestaltungsrechte exists anyway and it is all that is needed. Therefore the
Vorkaufsvertrag can be seen as a special type of contract which gives rise to a
Gestaltungsrecht for the holder."
South African law does not know the concept of a Gestaltungsrecht, but the concept of a
contractual power is similar." The Supreme Court of Appeal has recognised that parties
may agree that one may have the power to (unilaterally) amend the contents of the
concluded with a third party. Roser's criticism that the Gestaltungsrecht theory does not deal with these
subsidiary obligations is therefore unfounded (Ankaufsrecht 25).
62 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht's rebuttal to this defence of the Gestaltungsrecht construction (at 72-73) is
that contractual freedom grants parties the power to establish (only) obligations between parties within the
system of the law of obligations. He states that the contractual establishment of an "abstract
Gestaltungsrecht" which has nothing to do with the underlying contract conflicts with this system .
. However, this criticism can be met by the reminder that the preference contract is indeed the "underlying
contract" in which the parties can be taken to have agreed on a Gestaltungsrecht. Therefore the
Gestaltungsrecht has something to do with the underlying contract. Neither can it be said that no present
obligation is established by the "underlying contract" (Vorkaufsvertrag): the duty to inform the holder of
the conclusion of a third party contract exists from conclusion of the Vorkaufsvertrag. Neither is it true to
suggest that the system of the law of obligations only allows the creation of obligations. Contractual
freedom also allows the creation of Gestaltungsrechte, such as the right to accept an offer that must be left
open due to the existence of an option contract, even where the grantor purports to retract the offer.
(Although offers are generally irrevocable in German law anyway, the concept of an option contract is
known as well. See generally Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 227 et seq; Linnebom
Das Optionsrecht (1936)). If Schurig means to say that such a Gestaltungsrecht has to be agreed on
expressly in the underlying contract before it can be said to have "anything to do with" the underlying
contract, consistency would require that he also expects parties to a preference contract to agree expressly
that an option is granted. This last point perhaps shows up the fact that the Vorkaufsrecht is a deliberate
construction of the legislator, and perhaps not one which parties would naturally agree upon were it not for
lawyers educated about the existence and construction of the Vorkaufsrecht. (Parties would normally rather
agree on the Vorhand where they intend that the grantor must prefer the holder).
63 See especially Cockrell "Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds" 1997
Acta Juridica 27; Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 81-82.
Cockrell defines a "power" in Hohfeldian terms as the ability to alter the existing legal condition of another
for better or worse.
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contract. 64 Of course, it is also recognised that a party may be granted a right to
unilaterally cancel a contract. The remedy of cancellation upon breach, which is
exercised extra-judicially, is such a power. An offeree has the power to accept an offer.
Perhaps it has conceptual value to recognise a concept that encompasses all such powers
for South African law. Gestaltungsrecht is not easily translatable. It has been translated
as dispositive right." The use of the term right in this context may be misleading, as it
appears to refer to a personal right, which entitles one to a performance and implies a
corresponding duty to perform. If one must identify a corresponding duty to perform for
the grantor of the Gestaltungsrecht it is simply to allow the holder of the right to exercise
the Gestaltungsrecht, that is to establish, vary or terminate the contract between the
parties. Accordingly, the term contractual power is preferable.
I agree that the Gestaltungsrecht theory is a sufficient explanation of the Vorkaufsrecht.
However, no cogent criticism can be brought against the conditional option theory
either." It is probably helpful to regard the Vorkaufsvertrag as a conditional option
contract with special subsidiary rules. It provides a coherent understandable explanation
of the holder's power as a power of acceptance of an offer, a concept well known to
contract law. 67
64 NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC 1999 4 SA 928 (SeA). See also Lubbe "Kontraktuele
diskresies, potestatiewe voorwaardes en die bepaaldheidsvereiste" 1989 TSAR 159.
65 Romain et al Wërterbuch der Rechts- und Wirtschaftssprache Teil II Deutsch-Englisch 3rd edition (1994)
364.
66 Admittedly, it does not explain the statutory Vorkaufsrechte (Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 III;
Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504). They are indeed only Gestaltungsrechte. However, it is a
coherent explanation of contractual Vorkaufsrechte, apart from the fact that the detailed default rules
relating to the Vorkaufsrecht were chosen as a matter of policy by the legislator and do not flow from the
legal nature of the Vorkaufsrecht. See at n 54 and 55.
67 Two other theories with only marginal support, namely the Vorvertrag and Ermáchtigung theories will
not be discussed in depth here. According to Laue, the only proponent of the Ermiichtigung theory, the
holder is granted the power or authority to contract with himself on the grantor's behalf on the conclusion
ofa third party contract (Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrecht 15 ff). Accordingly, it does not add much to
the Gestaltungsrecht theory. According to the Vorvertrag theory the grantor undertakes a duty to contract
with the holder in future. When the grantor contracts with a third party, it has the effect of an offer by the
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grantor (cfSchurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 62-63; Laue Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts 18-19). Both
theories amount to fictions and are not coherent explanations of the holder's power to create a contract by
unilateral declaration. See also Staudinger (Mader) Vorbem zu § § 504 ff RdNr 29. A number of
commentators like Staudinger (Mader) Vorbem zu § § 504 ff RdNr 28-30, Munchener Kommentar
(Westermann) § 504 RdNr 7 and Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 7 and Medicus Schuldrecht JJ
§ 83 P 79-80 downplay the importance of the effort to seek a coherent juristic explanation of the
Vorkaufsrecht construction. They imply that the juristic construction should not be seen as influencing the
practical consequences of the Vorkaufsrecht, but is merely a way to order the Vorkaufsrecht as simply and
logically as possible into contract law doctrine. They emphasise that the specific questions surrounding the
Vorkaufsrecht should not be decided on the basis of any theory or terminological categories, but rather on
the basis of the ratio legis and the balance of interests (see especially Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504
RdNr 9 and OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 90, 935). However, some writers like Larenz Lehrbuch des
Schuldrechts § 44 III maintain that a coherent explanation has practical consequences, such as the
prevention of wrong decisions, and that the legal order cannot be fully and correctly understood in the
absence of such systematic components. The fact that the system should be open to change does not mean
that the systematic ordering of the legal system becomes worthless. See also Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht
16.
68 Can the interpretation that the Vorkaufsrecht is excluded simply because the contract speaks of a duty to
offer before contracting with a third party be questioned as a literalistic approach? Should the agreement
not be construed like a Vorkaufsrecht in any event? In 1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 3766 the
Reichsgericht had to construe the following clause: "At the termination of this contract the publisher may
only grant the right to collect subscriptions to another firm, if the holder rejects the takeover of such
collection at the terms offered by the other firm or if the holder has not declared itself willing to take over
the collection at such terms within 8 days of being informed of such terms." (My translation.) On the face
of it this intends that before the grantor may contract with a third party it would first grant the holder the
opportunity to do so, a classical Vorhand situation. The Landesgericht interpreted the clause as a negative
duty, namely that the grantor has no enforceable duty to inform the holder of terms offered by a third party
firm, but that the grantor may simply not contract with a third party firm if the grantor had not so informed
4 I I 3 Field of application
As has been stated earlier the Vorkaufsrecht does not apply where the agreement is
worded in such a way that the grantor must first allow the holder an opportunity of
contracting before the grantor contracts with a third party."
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As the Vorkaufsrecht is the only preferential right to transact governed in the BGB, it
applies as the default construction where an agreement, will or statute simply states that
one party will have the Vorkaufsrecht in respect of a certain property.
One variation to the BGB implied terms, which still cause the agreement to retain the two
distinctive characteristics of Vorkaufsrechte, is an agreement that the holder will have the
Vorkaufsrecht to buy the property at a specified price. In that case, the grantor will still
have no duty to refrain from contracting with a third party until the holder has been given
an opportunity to contract. The holder will also still have the power to bring the contract
of sale into existence at conclusion of a third party contract.
Another possible variation of the BGB Vorkaufsrecht is an agreement that the holder will
already have a Vorkaufsrecht upon the grantor manifesting a desire to sell. In such a case
an interpretation that no obligatio non faciendi is intended is still possible. In other
words it could still be intended to be a Vorkaufsrecht in the sense that the manifestation
of a desire to sell is not a breach, but merely a neutral trigger event which entitles the
holder to bring the contract of sale into existence by unilateral declaration. Only if the
the holder or where the holder declared itself willing to contract on the terms of which it was informed
(3767). Thus the holder's remedy was limited to damages and the continuation of the present relationship,
but not an order that the grantor inform it of the terms offered by a third party. On appeal the Reichsgericht
called this negative construction "impossible" and "contrary to the true will of the parties". In this the court
was influenced by its presupposition that the parties intend that the holder should have the right to step into
a contract with a third party. Accordingly, said the court, the parties must have intended according to good
faith to also give the holder the means by which he could exercise this right. Therefore he must be
informed of a third party offer. Accordingly the court read in a Vorkaufsrecht construction. The problem
with the court's reasoning is that it never justifies its presupposition that the parties intend the holder to step
into the shoes of a third party. This presupposition is clearly based on the court's view that the
Vorkaufsrecht is the only possible construction. It never mentions the Vorhand construction. The court
simply decided that the provisions of the Vorkaufsrecht should be applied to the present case. The court
simply ignored the wording of the agreement and found that the parties intend that the holder should have
the right to step into a contract concluded with a third party.
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4 1 2 The Vorhand
grantor thereafter fails to perform the contract of sale, can breach be spoken of. In terms
of the option construction, the condition would be the manifestation of a desire to sell. If
the parties did not agree on the price at which the holder may create a contract, the BGB
default rules dealing with any contract where no price is mentioned, will apply."
The holder is granted a Vorhand when the grantor agrees to grve the holder the
preference above other interested parties in respect of an intended transaction."
69 The terms which a third party offers and which the grantor is willing to accept is the starting point.
However, where he just plans to sell and no third party offer exists, one should first enquire whether a
market value exists, which could be applied on the basis of a tacit term. See § 453 BGB and § 269 BGB
according to which it should be the market price at the debtor's, that is, the holder's place of business or
residence. If no tacit agreement exists as to the price, the grantor has the power to set a reasonable price.
This is the implication of § 315 and § 316 BGB. If the price set by the grantor is unfair, the holder may
apply to have it substituted by the court's determination (§ 315(3) BGB).
70 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 296; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 93; Nipperdey
1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 310; Raser Ankaufsrecht 18 et seq; Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" 118,
Staudinger (Mader) 515-516; Larenz "Die rechtliche Bedeutung von Optionsvereinbarungen" 1955 Der
Betrieb 209-211; Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 IV (p 156-157); Medicus Schuldrecht II § 83
RdNr 164; Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 14 (now § 463); Miinchener Kommentar
(Westermann) § 504 RdNr 4 (now § 463); Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 159 RdNr 59; Pa/andt
Vorbem zu § 504 RdNr 11 (now § 463); Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 5 (now § 463); Michalski 1999
Zeitschrift for Miet- und Raumrecht 141 147 (who uses the term Anmietrecht to denote a Vorhand in
respect of a lease contract and Vormietrecht as a preferential right to lease structured like a Vorkaufsrecht
(146-147); Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 749-767; Weber 1990 Juristische Schulung 249 252-253;
Westermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" in Westermann & Rosener (eds)
Festschrift for Karlheinz Quack zum 65. Geburtstag (1991) 545 552; Wolf "Rechtsgeschaften im Vorfeld
von Gnindstucksubertragungen und ihre eingeschranckte Berkundungsbedurftigkeit" 1995 DNotZ 179 192;
RG SeuffA 74, 282 (decision of the Reichsgericht of 30.05.1919); RG SeuffA 81, 360 (decision of the
Reichsgericht of 17.09.1927) 362; 1942 Hëchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 345 (decision of the OLG
Munchen of 07.07.1941); 1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 3766 (decision of the Reichsgericht of
05.11.1929). See also LG Offenburg 1989 Die AG 134 and OLG Karlsruhe 1990 Wertpapier Mitteilungen
725 (discussed by Westermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht", especially at 556,
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Although Vorhand contracts can take a number of different forms," the common
denominator in most Vorhand contracts is an agreement that the grantor should not
contract with a third party before giving the holder a chance to do SO.72 This group of
preference contracts has also been called Vorrechtsvertriige in the narrow sense." As is
the case in South Africa, the terminology used by parties, courts and writers are
sometimes misleading and inconsistent." For convenience's sake, I will refer to Vorhand
contracts.
from which it appears that the shares were subject to an Ankaufsrecht); BGHZ 83, 313-319 (31.03.1982).
In the publishing industry the Vorhandvertrag is often called an Optionsvertrag. See for example, Bappert
& Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 155, par 20.4; Haberstumpf & Hintermeier Einfiihrung in das
Verlagsrecht (1985) 115-120 (§ 1 RdNr 44); Schricker Bappert & Maunz: Verlagsrecht 3,d edition (2001)
(hereafter cited as Bappert & Maunz (Schricker) Verlagsrecht) 132; Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche
Optionsvertrag: Urheberrechtliche Abhandlung des MP!, Heft 6 (1967). Apart from the Vorkaufsrecht,
Austrian writers also identify Vorrechtsvertiige which have been interpreted as creating an obligation to
make an offer when the grantor desires to sell, as opposed to when there is a third party involved
(Faistenberger et al Gschnitzer: Osterreichisches Schuldrecht: Besonderer Teil und Schadenersatz 2nd
edition (1988) 61).
7l Allerkamp "Vorvertrag, Option und Vorhand" 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 62
says the term Vorhand is extremely vague as a number of very different agreements are understood thereby.
See also Michalski 1999 Zeitschrift fur Miet- und Raumrecht 141 147 who states that it could mean a
number of things from a mere duty to inform the holder of the offers of third parties, or the grantor's
intention to alienate, to a duty to make an offer. See also Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 14
(now § 463); Staudinger (Mader) Vorbem zu §§ 504 et seq (now § 463). In its decision of 15.02.1991, the
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg confirmed that there are various types of Vorhand, including the duty to
refrain from contracting with third parties without an undertaking to make an offer should he decide to sell
(as discussed by Kramer "Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Vorvertrag, Festofferte and Optionsvertrag -
Formbediirftigkeit" 1991 Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht 547-548).
72 This is the common denominator in all Vorhand contracts except for the Verhandlungsvorhand which
prohibits the grantor from contracting with a third party unless she has first given the holder a chance to
negotiate (not necessarily to contract) with her.
73 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 298. Vorrechtsvertriige in the wide sense would
include Vorkaufsrechte.
74 In the following cases a Vorhand was clearly intended yet the court used different terminology (as
indicated between brackets after each case): BGHZ 9, 237 (17.04.1953) ("an option contract which creates
a preference (Vorrecht) to conclusion of a publishing contract" (my translation»; BGHZ 126, 226-245
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Vorhand clauses take different forms, but are often formulated as follows where they give
a preference in respect of a sale: If the grantor wishes or plans to sell a specified object,
he shall first offer it for sale to the holder." The exact duty of the grantor may be
expressed or understood in various ways. The grantor can undertake a duty to make an
(Vorkaufsrecht). As only the unlawfulness of the price agreed upon and not the construction was in issue,
the terminology did not make a difference on the facts.); 1942 Háchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 345
(decision of the Oberlandesgericht Miinchen of 07.07.1941) (Ankaufsrecht). Parties have called a
preference contract creating a Vorhand a Wiederkaufsrecht, for example in RG 169, 65, where it was
agreed that if the grantor wants to alienate the land, the holder shall have a Wiederkaufsrecht. The term
Vorrecht (preference) is wide enough to include Vorkaufsrechte in the sense used in the BGB and is
therefore unsuitable to refer to Vorhand arrangements only. There is some uncertainty about the precise
meaning of the term Ankaufsrecht (see especially Roser Ankaufsrecht 15-19; Hense "Anmerkung zur
Entscheidung des OGHBrZ betreffende Ankaufsrecht" 1951 Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 124-129).
Although some writers use it to denote a Vorhand (see for example Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504
RdNr 15 (now § 463)), it mostly refers to an arrangement which South African law would call an option
(Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209 211; Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752; Weber 1990 Juristische Schulung 249
250; cf Westermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" 552; Staudinger (Mader)
Vorbem zu §§ 504ffRdNr 35 et seq (now § 463)). Roser regards it as a right to an offer or acceptance of
an offer by the other party (15-16) which he distinguishes from an option. He sees the Vorhand as an
Ankaufsrecht conditional upon the grantor wishing to sell (Ankaufsrecht 18-19). Due to this uncertainty
the term Ankaufsrecht will not be used to denote the Vorhand. Parties also sometimes use the term
Vorkaufsrecht when it is clear that they do not mean the BGB Vorkaufsrecht but rather the Vorhand
(Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" 104; Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag,
Vorrechtsvertrag 335). The term Erwerbsvorrecht is wide enough to encompass Vorkaufsrechte and other
preferential rights aimed at obtaining an object (used in this sense by Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 755). In
the publishing industry, preference contracts are mostly called Optionsvertriige in the wide sense even
though they are not constructed like an option or conditional option at all. See the authorities cited in n 70
supra in fine. Although Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag 13 also uses the term "option
contract in the wide sense", he does refer to the granting of a Vorhand in its definition. The term
Vorerwerbsrecht is used as a synonym for Vorhand (and distinguished from the Vorkaufsrecht) in
Heidenhain & Meister (eds) Munchener Vertragshandbuch Band I: Gesellschaftsrecht 5th edition (2000)
876, § V.1I2.
75 Some authors incorrectly defme Vorhand exclusively in respect of sales contracts, for example
Nipperdey "Vorhand, Vorkaufsrecht und Einlësungsrecht" 1930 Zentralblatt for Handelsrecht 300.
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offer to the holder upon the occurrence of the trigger event, mostly formulated as the
grantor's wish to contract." (This form of Vorhand will hereinafter be referred to as an
Angebotsvorhand.i" This could for example be formulated as a duty to inform the holder
of any third party offer to allow the holder to decide whether he wants to contract on the
same terms." Alternatively, the grantor has no duty to offer, but instead has a duty to
inform the holder of his intention to contract and then to accept the holder's offer if that
is the highest offer available (hereinafter Annahmevorhandy." Alternatively, the holder
could merely be entitled to a non facere. In terms of this construction the grantor has no
duty to offer or to accept the holder's offer on the occurrence of a stipulated event, but
must refrain from contracting with a third party ifhe had not first offered to contract with
the holder." The weakest form of Vorhand is the so-called Verhandlungsvorhand, which
only obliges the grantor to give the holder the chance to negotiate with the grantor before
contracting with a third party." These four types are the main constructions found in the
case law.
A number of commentators do not discuss all these forms of preference contract. Many
only speak of one form." A number discuss only two forms, the Verhandlungsvorhand
76 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 300; Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht
300 300; Roser Ankaufsrecht 19.
77 Angebotsvorhand literally means "offer preference (Vorhand)". As an example of the use of this
terminology see Wagner 2000 NotBZ 69 77; "Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand;
Beurkundungsbediirftigkeit" 1999 DNotl-Report 25-26
78 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752.
79 Roser Ankaufsrecht 19; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 303; Delp Der
Verlagsvertrag 6th edition (1994) 64. Annahmevorhand literally means "acceptance preference (Vorhand)".
This term is not known to the case law and literature but has been created by analogy to the known term of
Angebotsvorhand to distinguish it from the latter institution.
80 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 304.
81 See for example 1993 Betriebsberater 2222. (decision of the Bundesfinanzgericht of 18.10.1993);
Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 5562; Wagner 2000 NotBZ 6977; "Vorhand:
Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand; Beurkundungsbediirftigkeit" 1999 D Notl-Report 25-26.
82 Palandt § 504 RdNr Il (now § 463). Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 IV P 157; Larenz 1955 Der
Betrieb 209 210; Hertel "Rechtsgeschafte im Vorfeld eines Projektes" 1983 Betriebs-Berater 1824 1825.
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and the Angebotsvorhand," Some mention the Annahmevorhand as well. 84 Many do not
mention the construction in terms of which the holder is merely entitled to a non facere. 85
However, many do, especially in works on publishing and copyright law."
All these constructions differ from the Vorkaufsrecht in that a completed contract
concluded with a third party is not necessarily required for the holder's claim to arise."
In fact, conclusion of a third party contract without granting the holder the chance to
contract or at least to negotiate with the grantor beforehand is a breach of the Vorhand,
whereas it would be perfectly legitimate in the case of a Vorkaufsrecht" Neither does
breach of the Vorhand entitle the holder to create a contract extra-judicially by unilateral
declaration." No contract between the grantor and holder exists in the absence of an
offer and acceptance to each other," although in some types of Vorhand courts are
Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 300 specifically denies that the Vorhand can also be an
obligation to inform the holder of the intention to alienate and to invite him to negotiations. He recognises
only the Angebotsvorhand construction.
83 Wagner 2000 NotBZ 69 77; "Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand;
Beurkundungsbedurftigkeit" 1999 D Notl-Report 25-26; Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 14 &
15 (now § 463); Staudinger (Mader) Vorbem zu §§ 504ff RdNr 40 (now § 463). Milnehener Kommentar
(Westermann) § 504 RdNr 4 (now § 463) regards the Verhandlungsvorhand as the default construction and
recognises that parties could intend an Angebotsvorhand as well. Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der
Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 62 mentions these two possibilities plus the fact that a Vorhand sometimes
refer to an option. However, he refers to no example of the latter case, nor any other authority.
84 Roser Ankaufsrecht 19; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 303.
85 Roser Ankaufsrecht 18 et seq who defmes the Vorhand as the right to the creation of an obligation
conditional upon the intention of the grantor to create a similar obligation with a third party. See also the
authorities in notes 81 - 83.
86 For example Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 156 par 20.5; Brandi-Dohrn Der
urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag 1; Schack Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht 2nd edition (2001) 434 par
973. Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag recognises all four types.
87 Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt fiir Handelsrecht 300 300; Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44IV P 157.
88 Ibid.
89 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 765; Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 5 (now § 463).
90 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 765.
95
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
willing to order the grantor to make an offer or to accept the holder's offer if that is the
highest offer available.
As the Vorhand is not mentioned in the BGB, it is not surprising that the Vorkaufsrecht is
by far the more familiar institution." However, Vorhand agreements are still used in
practice." Vorhand clauses are found inter alia in publishing contracts, contracts dealing
with sale or lease of land, as well as in company statutes and agreements between
shareholders." The question arises why parties would rather use language excluding the
91 No German student to whom I have spoken (including doctoral and Habilitation students who have
written both state exams) knows about the existence of the Vorhand. Most student textbooks that provide
an overview of the whole of German private law, such as Medicus Grundwissen zum Biirgerlichen Recht
(2000) contain no reference thereto. As the Vorhand is not well known and discussed in depth in
commentaries on the BGB, it is not too surprising that a notary like Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der
Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 62 recommends the use of a Vorvertrag or option rather than a Vorhand, due
to the vagueness (Unbestimmtkeit) surrounding the Vorhand (apart from the fact that he feels that it
generally does not bind the grantor sufficiently). The numerous statutory Vorkaufsrechte are also
constructed like the BGB Vorkaufsrecht which would likely influence lawyers and to an extent non-lawyers
acquainted with these statutory rights to think of all preferential rights to transact along the lines of the
Vorkaufsrecht construction. CfHahn 1994 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 193 194.
92 In respect of case law since 1990, see 1994 GRUR 53-57 (decision of the Landesgericht Dusseldorf of
26.06.1990); 1993 Betriebs-Berater 2367-2370 (decision of the Oberverwaltungsgericht, Nordrhein-
Westphalen of23.04.1993). Cf. EFG 1999,619-621 (decision of the Finanzgericht Berlin of04.02.1999);
OLGR-Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig 1997, 66-68 (decision of the Oberlandesgericht Schleswig of
18.10.1996); EFG 1991, 103 (decision of the Finanzgericht, Saarland 05.10.1990); 1997 OLGR-Miinchen
l34 (decision of the Oberlandesgeright Munchen of04.12.1996); 1993 Betriebs-Berater 2222 (decision of
the Bundesfinanzhofof 18.08.1993). In respect of articles and commentaries since 1990 see Weber 1990
Juristische Schulung 249; "Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand;
Beurkundungsbedurftigkeit" 1999 D Notl-Report 25-26; Westermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im
Gesellschaftsrecht" 552. All the major commentaries on the BGB contain a short paragraph on Vorhand.
See for example Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 5 (now § 463); Palandt § 504 RdNr Il (now § 463);
Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504 (now § 463).
93 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 335; Roser
Ankaufsrecht 19. They are found mostly in GmbH statutes (Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung -
company with limited liability) (Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752), but also in KG statutes
(Kommanditgesellschaft) (Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 753). Often preferential rights to buy shares are
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However, it has been argued that there are also substantive reasons why parties would
sometimes knowingly prefer to oblige the grantor to offer to contract with the holder
before contracting with a third party instead of formulating their agreement in the
Vorkaufsrecht mould. One reason to prefer the Vorhand construction is that the costs
and effort of negotiating and drafting a valid contract between the grantor and third party
becomes wasted if the holder of a Vorkaufsrecht does in fact exercise his right." In the
case of land, for example, a written and signed contract must be presented to the holder to
force a decision on the exercise of the Vorkaufsrecht. As a rule, every buyer wants to be
BGB Vorkaufsrecht and so create a Vorhand contract? This could simply be due to
ignorance of the limited field of application of the Vorkaufsrecht, coupled with the fact
that it is naturally expected by most non-lawyers that the holder of a preferential right to
transact must have the chance of contracting before a sale to a third party."
linked to a consent requirement. That is, a shareholder requires consent to transfer her shares, but the
consent cannot be withheld if none of the holders are prepared to buy the shares at the price at which the
grantor is able to sell to another (Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752-753).
94 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 18. CfRoser Ankauftrecht 13 and Schurig Das
Vorkauftrecht 56. The Vorhand construction has also been described as the one parties would most
naturally intend in a decision reported in 1942 Hëchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 345 346. The court said
it may be assumed that the parties intended that the holder would be given the preference (Vorhand) if the
grantor decides to sell, without conclusion of a prior contract between the grantor and a third party. The
Vorhand construction existed in German law before promulgation of the BGB (Schurig Das Vorkauftrecht
59).
95 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 18; Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 752. To solve the
problem of costs, the contract with the third party could provide that the seller would initially pay the costs
connected with the drafting of the contract (and valuation fees where applicable) but that the buyer must
refund the seller in respect thereof on demand. In that case, the buyer would probably trust that the seller
would only demand a refund upon the holder of the Vorkauftrecht having failed to exercise his right, and
the drafter would be happy to receive payment from the seller. The holder is of course bound to this
obligation of the buyer on the exercise of his Vorkauftrecht. CfBGHZ 131, 348 where the court held that
the holder who exercised his Vorkaufsrecht also incurs the obligation to pay the agent's fee, where the
contract with the third party provided that such fee is payable by the buyer. Of course, this solution might
still not please a grantor who does not want to incur any costs in connection with the sale.
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assured of a binding waiver of another's preferential right to sale before concluding a
contract with the owner." It is of course possible for the holder to waive his
Vorkaufsrecht before conclusion of a sale. However, the holder of a Vorkaufsrecht may
refuse to do so before seeing the concluded contract, for example out of fear that the
grantor would in the end contract with the third party on better terms than the offer
submitted to the holder. Apart from the effort and costs of concluding a legally valid
contract, the buyer who has concluded the contract must then wait for two months for the
holder's decision, knowing that she might lose the opportunity to buy other suitable
properties which might come up for sale in the meantime. Some buyers might be scared
off by this prospect." An owner who realises this in advance, would perhaps rather want
to formulate the preferential right in such a way that he could force the holder to decide
whether to exercise her right before a sale with a third party is concluded. Then the
holder need merely be informed of the material terms on which the owner is prepared to
contract. In such a case, the Vorhand formulation would suit the grantor better.
Publishing contracts invariably contain a Vorhand rather than a Vorkaufsrecht," This is
because the publisher as holder of the preference wants to be the first to see the author's
next work and wants to have the first opportunity to negotiate with the holder. Because
96 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 18; Roser Ankaufsrecht 34; Schurig Das
Vorkaufsrecht 56.
97 See also Tew "Rights of First Refusal: The 'Options' That Are Not Options, But May Become Options"
1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-17. The Vorkaufsrecht also creates a risk for the
third party of offering more than is necessary to entice the Vorkaufsrecht holder not to exercise his right.
98 See Bappert & Maunz (Schricker) Verlagsrecht § 1 RdNr 40; Schack Urheber- und
Urhebervertragsrecht § 29 RdNr 973; Haberstumpf & Hintermeier Verlagsrecht 116 § 13; Delp Der
Verlagsvertrag 64-66; Schmitt Die Schaffensfreiheit der Kunstiers in Vertragen uber kunftige Geisteswerke
(1978) § 32 P 181; Rehbinder Urheberrecht: Ein Studienbuch 10th edition (1998) § 47 RdNr 344; Bappert
& Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 154-155; Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag
13. In the publishing industry, Vorhand agreements are rather referred to as options in the wide sense in
order to distinguish them from options in the narrow sense. The latter refers to an actual option to conclude
a publishing contract in respect of a future work. It could therefore be seen as an option conditional upon
the creation of and decision to publish a new work.
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publishing contracts require agreement on a number of material terms apart from the
author's remuneration, for example the print-run (amount of copies to be published), it is
economically inefficient to require a third party contract to be concluded before the
holder's preferential right comes into being. No third party publisher would be prepared
to negotiate all such details in the knowledge that another, the holder of the preferential
right, could exercise a preferential right to publish the work."
Interestingly, one sometimes finds both a Vorhand clause and a Vorkaufsrecht in a
contract. The effect of such a combined formulation is that the Vorhand obliges the
grantor to first offer to the holder before contracting with a third party. If the grantor fails
to do so, the Vorkaufsrecht clause grants the holder the right to create a contract by
unilateral declaration.!"
In the absence of such a combined clause, the question remains what the primary rights
and duties of the parties to Vorhand contracts are. As was pointed out above, German
law recognises that the juristic construction of Vorhand contracts is not always the same.
The exact construction depends on the concrete organisation of the contract by the parties
and is therefore rather a matter of interpretation. As was mentioned, four main types of
Vorhand agreements can be identified. In the order of the most restrictive to least
restrictive on the grantor's freedom to deal with her property or other resources, they are:
99 The existence of a preemptive right may deter potential publishers from making offers because it reduces
their expected return from the costs they incur in negotiating and making an offer.
100 See for example, the contract considered by the Finanzgericht des Saarlandes on 05.10.1990. reported in
1990 Steuerentscheidungen 441. See also Soerge/ & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 15 (now § 463);
Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504 RdNr 4 (now § 463). See clauses 16 and 17 of the suggested
lease contract in Hoffmann-Becking and Schippel (eds) Beck'sches Formu/arbuch zum Biirgerlichen,
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 5th edition (1991) 181 § III.D.2 and clause 8 of the suggested pool contract in
Heidenhain & Meister (eds) Milnehener Vertragshandbuch Band I: Gesellschaftsrecht 5th edition (2000)
872-873 § V.1I2, discussed at 876.
99
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1. The Angebotsvorhand, which entitles the holder to an offer by the grantor when the
grantor wishes to conclude the main contract (for example, when the grantor wishes to
sell). In other words it creates an enforceable conditional duty to make an offer.
2. The Annahmevorhand, which entitles the holder to acceptance of his offer by the
grantor when the grantor wishes to conclude the main contract. In other words it creates
an enforceable conditional duty to accept the holder's offer if that is the highest offer
available.
3. Preference contracts that only place a negative duty on the grantor not to contract with
a third party as long as the holder is prepared to contract on the same terms as the third
party.
4. Preference contracts that oblige the grantor to give the holder a chance to negotiate
before finally contracting with a third party.
The discussion hereunder will focus on the basic rights, duties and remedies of the parties
as well as the juristic construction of each type (that is the explanation of the legal nature
of each type). The field of application of each type will also be considered. Finally, I
will consider whether one type is regarded as the default type where the wording of the
agreement is cryptic and vague enough to encompass more than one type.
4 I 2 I A duty to make an offer (Angebotsvorhand)
This form of Vorhand applies where the contract shows an intention to place an
enforceable duty on the grantor to offer to contract with the holder, when the grantor
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wishes to contract at all. 101 It could therefore be described loosely as a conditional duty to
make an offer, the condition being the grantor's wish to contract.
4 1 2 lIThe trigger event
In the majority of Vorhand clauses, the condition, or trigger event, is not precisely
defined. A number of writers formulate the default trigger event as an expression of a
desire to alienate. However, most say that in the case of a Vorhand to buy a mere
expression of a desire to sell is not enough.!" Something more is required, such as the
commencement of serious negotiations with a third party."? That which precedes such
negotiations, for example a valuation of the object by an expert or a general sounding out
whether there would be any interested parties at all, should not be a trigger event. Larenz
attempts to narrow down the trigger event by stating that the expression of desire to
contract can appear either from a declaration to the holder or from an action which can be
regarded as "the initiation of the accomplishment of the decision to alienate."!" Henrich
suggests that one must ask whether an independent person would interpret the grantor's
actions as showing a willingness, here and now, to contract with a specific person. If so,
the grantor cannot say that he did not want to bind himself. 105 Although this is probably
the most precise definition to be found in the literature, it is still bound to lead to
disputes, as will the attempt to distinguish between "serious negotiations" and "non-
serious negotiations."
101 RGZ (1886) 16, 155, 158; Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt fur Handelsrecht 300300-301; Wagner 2000 NotBZ
6977.
102 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 339; Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209 210;
Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt fiir Handelsrecht 300301; Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts 157 § 44 IV.
103 Ibid.
104 In the words of Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209 210 (my translation). See also Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt
fur Handelsrecht 300 301.
105 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 340.
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4 1 2 1 2 Duties of grantor at trigger event
In German law, the grantor cannot wipe out the trigger event by declaring that she has
now decided not to contract at all. 106
If the grantor manifests the necessary intention, a duty to make an offer arises. What must
be in the offer? At least the material terms on which the grantor is prepared to contract. It
has been argued that the grantor should also be forced to inform the holder of the name of
the interested third party.!" The most important reason is that it protects the holder who
has an interest in warding off unwanted third parties.!" At what price must the grantor
offer to contract with the holder, if this was not agreed in the preference contract? Some
writers say that the offer must be reasonable.!"
106 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 340.
107 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 349; decision of the Reichsgericht reported in
1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 3766.
108 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 349. This is termed an Abwehrinteresse by
German writers as opposed to an Erwerbsinteresse, an interest in obtaining the object of the right. The
holder's primary interest could be to ward off unwanted third parties (as is often the case in shareholder
preference contracts, franchise agreements and contracts between neighbours and relatives). Another
argument is that "preference" is said to mean priority under equal terms. A realisation of such priority is
only possible when the holder knows that he has competition who is offering the same terms as the grantor.
Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 349-350; decision of the Reichsgericht reported in
1930 Juristische Wochenschrift 3766. An analysis of certain consequences of preference contracts
according to whether the holder's interest is an Abwehr- or Erwerbsinteresse has been suggested by Burkert
"Die Reichweite des § 506 BGB" 1987 NJW 3157.
109 Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts 157 § 44 IV; Erman (Grunewald) § 504 (now § 463) states that it
depends upon the interpretation of each agreement whether this is required. Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 348 at n 348 states that § 315 BGB requires the grantor to make a fair
offer.
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Where the preference contract provides that the holder may take over the highest offer
made by a third party, the grantor also has an enforceable duty to inform the holder of the
offers received from third parties."?
4 1 2 1 3 Exercise of the right by the holder
The questions which arise here are:
1. must the holder's declaration that he exercises the preference right comply 'with
formalities legislation set for the main contract,
2. within what time period must the holder make the declaration, and
3. must the holder prove a willingness and ability to perform all the terms of the
contract?
If the grantor indeed offers to contract with the holder, the normal rules for acceptance
applies. III Where the grantor is in breach of the obligation to make an offer, the holder
need not make a formal declaration of intention to exercise the preferential right. 112
However, a failure to demand performance of the grantor's duty within a reasonable time
may be taken as a waiver of the preferential right. 113
110 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 348, 355.
III The preference contract or grantor's offer may specify a time limit. (Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 350 - 350). If not, the holder must exercise the right within a reasonable
time. Roser Ankaufsrecht suggests an analogous application of § 469 BGB (previously § 510) relating to
the Vorkaufsrecht, that is two months for land and one week for other objects. The formalities legislation
must also be complied with (Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 321,347,354; Hueck
"Erwerbsvorrechte" 766; Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209; Roser Ankaufsrecht 53).
112 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 353.
113 Ibid.
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To validly exercise and enforce the right, the holder must show that she is willing and
able to perform all the terms offered by the grantor or agreed with the third party.!"
except a term included by mala fide collusion to avoid the preferential right. liS An
inference of such mala fide collusion can only be made where the grantor has no personal
or economic interest in the inclusion of such a term.!"
4 1 2 1 4 Remedies for breach
What remedies are available on breach of the grantor's duty to make an offer on
fulfilment of the condition?
Firstly, the holder may pray for an interdict upon the threatened sale to a third party."?
Per definition, the Angebotsvorhand creates an enforceable duty to make an offer. The
holder can therefore claim an order that an offer be made.'" This is an effective prayer
due to § 894 Zivilprozessordnung which creates a fiction that a declaration of will prayed
for is regarded as made upon the judgment granting the prayer. For this reason, the
holder may in the same action claim an order that an offer be made, and an order that the
grantor perform the main contract. The contract comes into existence on the first prayer
114 Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte" 367.
ns 1988 Wertpapier Mitteilungen 92 (decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of 25.11.1987).
116 Ibid.
117 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 355.
118 Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts § 44 IV. CfHenrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag
356. Floyd "Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253269 n 164 wrongly states that an order to make an offer
is not known to German law. He relies on Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 356 n 60
who does state that Italian writers generally do not recognise such an order. However, in the same footnote
Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag also cites some German authorities in favour of his
statement in the text that the holder can claim either the making or acceptance of an offer.
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and the holder's confirmation that she accepts that offer.!" The duty to make an offer
does not become impossible to perform after the grantor has contracted with a third party.
Although the intention is that the grantor must make an offer before contracting with a
third party, the offer can still be made thereafter."? Of course, where the grantor has
transferred the object of an Angebotsvorhand to a bona fide third party, a claim for
specific performance makes no sense as performance of the main contract has become
impossible.!" In the case of an Angebotsvorhand to sell, performance of this contract and
the main contract does not become impossible where the grantor has already bought from
a third party in breach of the preference contract. 122 The grantor could therefore be
ordered to conclude a further contract with the holder and once again take delivery of the
goods.!"
The holder may also claim for damages upon breach by the grantor.!" The quantum
would be assessed according to the holder's interest in obtaining performance of the main
contract!" However, the holder may not claim damages if the grantor can show that the
holder would not have exercised his right even if the grantor had made an offer to the
holder timeously.!"
4 1 2 1 5 Extinction of preference
119 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 356-357 and 186-187; Staudinger (Mader)
Vorbem zu §145ff RdNr 67; BGHZ 98, 130 134; BGH 1986 NJW 28202821. Contra Nipperdey 1930
Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 301 who states that the holder need only pray for performance of the main
contract.
120 CfHemich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 356.
121 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 365.
122 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 366.
123 Ibid.
124 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 365 et seq.
125 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 367.
126 Ibid.
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If a proper offer is made and the holder rejects it or fails to accept it within the time stated
in the offer, or within a reasonable time, the grantor is free to contract with a third party
on those terms. Some writers argue persuasively that the Vorhand should not terminate
through mere non-exercise thereof, but only once the grantor actually contracts with a
third party at the terms offered to the holder. 127 The purpose of this rule is to prevent the
grantor from ridding himself of his duty through a fake offer which he knows the holder
would not accept, and thereafter selling to a third party at terms more beneficial to the
holder. Itwould be difficult to prove such collusion between the grantor and a friend.!"
The normal rules on termination of obligations apply to the Vorhand, so that it also
terminates by, for example, waiver.!"
4 1 2 1 6 Legal nature
Many authors regard the Angebotsvorhand as a conditional Vorvertrag, that is a contract
which obliges one or both of the parties to enter into another (the main) contract.!" More
127 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 363. Cf also Haberstumpf & Hintermeier
Verlagsrecht 117 § 13; Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag 62 et seq; Bappert & Maunz
(Schricker) Verlagsrecht § 01 RdNr 43 who argue that the holder's failure to buy from the grantor at the
terms offered only terminates the right if he intimates an intention not to exercise the right at all, regardless
of the terms offered. If the refusal was instead motivated by the specific terms offered, the grantor who has
not in fact sold after the first offer, must offer again before she may contract with a third party on better
terms.
128 Ibid.
129 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 363 et seq.
130 Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209 210; Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 62f;
Michalski 1999 Zeitschrifi fiir Miet- und Raumrecht 141 147; Wagner 2000 NotBZ 6977. On Vorvertriige,
see generally Weber 1990 Juristische Schulung 249252. Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" grudgingly accepts the
description of a Vorhand as a unilateral Vorvertrag as correct but not very helpful (105, 112). Cf BGH
EWiR 565-566 which distinguishes the Vorvertrag from the Vorrechtsvertrag on the basis that the latter
obliges the grantor to offer the object for sale if he should decide to sell, whereas a Vorvertrag obliges one
or both parties to conclude another contract. According to Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag,
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specifically, it is a (potestatively) conditional, unilaterally binding Vorvertrag.:" Most
writers accept that as a Vorvertrag, the preference contract should also comply with the
formalities set for the main contract. 132 However others advocate that the applicability of
formalities legislation should depend on the purpose of each piece of legislation involved,
although it is accepted that in respect of land the formalities legislation should apply.'"
4 1 2 2 A duty to accept the holder's offer (Annahmevorhand)
Vorrechtsvertrag, the legal nature of preference contracts structured like the Vorhand is controversial in
most jurisdictions. Preference contracts have been regarded as Vorvertriige by some Italian and Swiss
commentators (Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 57, 68; Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte"
115), although they are there also often regarded as contracts sui generis (Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 58). Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" maintains that the theory of Vorvertriige
plays no role in Swiss law (115; cf Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und Kaufsrecht nach dem
schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuche (1918) 27). Their legal nature in France is also disputed (Henrich
Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 37-38). The view that it is a conditional unilateral promise to
contract, similar to a conditional option, is widely held but criticised on the basis that the will to contract is
an essential element of a promise to contract and therefore cannot be a condition (Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 37). Therefore they are often held to be contracts sui generis (Henrich
Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 37). French law does not recognise the Vorvertrag concept
in the sense in which this term is used in Germany (Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" 121, Henrich Vorvertrag,
Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 22 et seq). The Vorvertriige of German law include what South African
law would call pacta de contrahendo as well as bilaterally binding agreements to agree, provided the latter
are sufficiently certain to enforce them. On Vorvertriige generally, see Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag,
Vorrechtsvertrag 1 et seq.
131 Larenz 1955 Der Betrieb 209 210; Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 5562 et
seq; Michalski 1999 Zeitschrift fiir Miet- und Raumrecht 141 147; Wagner 2000 NotBZ 69 77; Lorenz
"Vorzugsrechte" 105.
132 See the authorities cited by Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 321; Roser
Ankaufsrecht 39; Wolf" 1995 DNotZ 179193; Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 505 RdNr 14 (now § 464);
Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 62; "Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand,
Angebotsvorhand; Beurkundungsbediirftigkeit" 1999 DNotl-Report 25-26.
133 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 322.
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A preference contract could also oblige the grantor to notify the holder of the intention to
sell or, in addition, of the terms on which the grantor is prepared to contract with a third
party and to accept the holder's offer if that is the best offer available when the holder
makes the offer.!"
The following clause is an example of a preference agreement that has been construed as
an Annahmevorhand by a German court:
If the lessor terminates the contract by notice, and a third party offers a higher rent than the rent
agreed in this contract, the lessee will have a preference to lease (Mietsvorrecht) in respect of this
new offer, which right the lessee must exercise within 10 days of receipt of notice of the better
offer. 135
The court held that the contract only gives the lessee the right to be informed of a better
offer. The grantor is not obliged to make an offer to the lessee on the same terms. If the
lessee does make a similar or better offer than the third party the grantor has a duty to
accept the lessee's offer.
This type of Vorhand obviously benefits the grantor in that the notice to the holder does
not bind the grantor. If the owner receives a higher offer from a third party after such
notice to the holder, the grantor may answer the holder's offer on the same terms with a
notice of the higher offer. As the holder's offer is not the best offer available, the owner
is not obliged to accept it.136 The grantor's freedom to contract is thus not impaired to the
same extent as under an Angebotsvorhand. The grantor's interest in obtaining the best
possible terms when dealing with her property is served better by the Annahmevorhand
than by the Angebotsvorhand.
134 H . h T.T 0 . h Ienne Vorvertrag, 'ptionsvertrag, Vorrec tsvertrag 303. See De p Der Verlagsvertrag 64 for a
drafting suggestion for such a contract.
1350LG 17,26 (my translation).
136 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 304.
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In German law it is generally accepted that the Annahmevorhand is a potestatively
conditional unilaterally binding Vorvertrag, as it creates a duty for the grantor to enter
into a future contract. 137 The condition is the grantor's wish to contract and the fact that
the holder's offer is the best available offer when made.
Apart from the mam construction of the Annahmevorhand the rules relating to the
Angebotsvorhand discussed in the previous section, apply mutatis mutandis to the
Annahmevorhand as well.!"
4 1 2 3 A duty not to contract with a third party if the holder is prepared to contract on
the same terms ("bare preference Vorhand")
This form of Vorhand only imposes an obligatio non faciendi on the grantor. The grantor
may not contract with a third party unless the holder has first been given a chance to
contract and has failed to accept this opportunity.!" It could accordingly be described as
a pactum de non contrahendo cum tertiil" The grantor is neither obliged to make an
offer to nor to accept an offer by the holder under any circumstances. It can be described
as a mere duty to prefer the holder above third parties, without a duty to contract with the
holder being added to that preference. A "preference" implies a negative: the non-
selection of others, but does not necessarily intimate when and how a selection must take
place. Accordingly, this form of Vorhand grants the holder merely a preference without
adding a duty to contract!" As such it can be described as a "bare preference Vorhand"
137 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 304.
138 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 303, 309 et seq.
139 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 304 et seq.
140 See Michalski 1999 Zeitschrift fur Miet- und Raumrecht 141 144 at n 89 and 143 n 30.
141 BGH 22, 347 (decision of 14.12.1956); Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 304-305.
Most writers on publishing law understand the Vorhand (generally known as Optionsvertrag, but
sometimes referred to as a Vorrechtsvertrag) as such. See for example Ulmer Urheber- und Verlagsrecht
3rd edition (1980) 397 § 94; Rehbinder Urheberrecht 270 par 344. Some realize that this is the default
construction, whereas parties can agree on a different construction (eg Brandi-Dohm Der urheberrechtliche
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Accordingly this type of preference contract has two distinct characteristics. Firstly,
nothing short of contracting with a third party amounts to breach by the grantor.
Secondly, the holder cannot enforce transfer of the object of the preferential right.
in order to distinguish it from the other forms. Upon breach of the preference, the holder
is not entitled to the conclusion of a contract, but only to damages and an interdict
prohibiting conclusion of a contract with a third party unless the holder has first been
granted an opportunity to contract (Unterlassungsanspruchr'"
This type of preference agreement is used extensively in publishing contracts. The default
construction of preference agreements in publishing contracts is that the author as grantor
is not obliged to make an offer to the publisher as holder upon the author's decision that
Optionsvertrag 13). For the (unmotivated and shortly stated) view that the BGB provisions on the
Vorkaufsrecht should apply to the Optionsvertrag generally found in publishing contracts, see Bappert &
Maunz Verlagsrecht: Kommentar zum Gesetz iiber das Verlagsrecht vom 19.6.1901 (1952).
142 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 350. There is some authority on publishing
contracts to the effect that the holder may claim either damages or Naturalrestitution (restitution) against
the third party, that is, that the contract with a third party be set aside. Some writers state that the publisher
as holder can then also require conclusion of such a contract, but that this remedy is meaningless as
normally the third party would have obtained the intellectual property rights to the artistic work by that
stage. See Bappert & Maunz Verlagsrecht (1952) § 1 RdNr 45 with reference to BGH NJW 1962,1197;
RGZ 108, 58. Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag does not mention an interdict
prohibiting the performance of a contract already concluded, presumably because the maxim prior est
tempore, potior est iure does not apply to competing personal rights under German law. § 879 BGB makes
this principle applicable to real rights on the basis of the maxim that no-one can transfer more than he
himself possesses. See Baur & Sturner Sachenrecht 17th edition (1999) § 17 B II; Quack (ed) Miinchener
Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 6 Sachenrecht (§§ 854-1296), WEG, ErbbauVO, SachenRBeG,
SchuldRA'ndG 3,d edition (1997) § 879 RdNr 12; Kruger (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen
Gesetzbuch 2 Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil (§§ 241-432) 4th edition (2001) 13-14 (Einleitung RdNr 19);
Palandt § 879. In South Africa, by contrast, courts apply the maxim, prior est tempore, potior est iure to
personal rights unless it is inequitable in the circumstances. See for example, Krauze v Van Wyk 1986 1 SA
158 (A); Wahloo Sand BK en Andere v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust en Andere 20022 SA 776 (HHA).
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the work is ready for publication.'? Neither is the author obliged to accept any offer
from the publisher. However, a publisher who holds a Vorhand may sue for the
submission of the author's work and for information on any third party offers. 144 Any
offer made by the publisher in response need not be accepted by the author.
The formalities requirements and the rules relating to the price at which the holder may
contract are irrelevant to this type of contract. There is also no question of a trigger event
which allows the holder to exercise her right. If the grantor in fact contracts with a third
party, it is rather a matter of breach.
4 1 2 4 A duty to negotiate with the holder before contracting with a third party
(Verhandlungsvorhand)
A grantor of a preferential right may sometimes only grant the holder the right to
negotiate before a contract is concluded with a third party. This could include the right to
"have the last word" before the seller makes his decision in order to allow the holder to
make or increase an offer. Normally the expression das letzte Wort geben (to give the
last word) would be interpreted in this way, that is, the grantor is free to sell to whomever
she pleases at whatever terms she pleases as long as the holder had the last opportunity to
negotiate.!" Such a Vorhand is termed a Verhandlungsvorhand ("negotiation Vorhandïï
by some commentators.!"
143 Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 157; Ulmer Urheber- und Verlagsrecht 3rd edition
(1980) 397 § 94.
144 Bappert & Maunz (Schricker) Verlagsrecht § 1 RdNr 44. See also Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des
Buchhandels 157.
145 RG HRR 933, 913.
146 "Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand; Beurkundungsbedurftigkeit" 1999 D Notl-Report
25-26; Wagner 2000 NotBZ 69 77; Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 14 (now § 463);
Staudinger (Mader) Vorbem zu §§ 504ff RdNr 40 (now § 463); Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) §
504 RdNr 4 (now § 463); Wolf 1995 DNotZ 179 192.
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This is the weakest form of Vorhand and obviously does not have much commercial value
for the holder, as the holder's only remedy is an interdict (Unterlassungsanspruch), which
would very likely sway the grantor not to contract with the holder in any event. 147
4 1 25 Which type ofVorhand is the default construction in German law?
As was pointed out above, many writers discuss only the Angebotsvorhand and do not
even mention the Vorhand that places a mere obligatio non faciendi on the grantor.
However, Henrich (whose book remains the most comprehensive study of Vorhand
contracts) argues cogently that the bare preference contract should be regarded as the
normal or default construction where the BGB Vorkaufsrecht is excluded by the wording
of the contract, in cases where the preference contract contains no mechanism for
determination of the price upon exercise of the preferential right. In this he is supported
by a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest German court, in a decision given in
1956.148 In that case a clause in a publishing contract that "the author would first offer
new manuscripts to the publisher" was construed as merely placing a duty on the author to
first offer to contract with the publisher before contracting with anyone else. The court
decided that the grantor also complies with this duty if he does not immediately name the
terms on which he is prepared to contract, but waits upon the offer of the publisher as
holder. If the author is unhappy with the terms offered by the publisher, he is not forced
to conclude a publishing contract. He may however only offer that work to another
publisher if the latter offers him better terms than the offer made by the holder. The mere
fact that the author shows a desire to sell his work for publishing, does not, therefore,
147 As the Verhandlungsvorhand only entitles the holder to negotiate, it need not comply with formalities
legislation. See the authorities in the previous footnote.
148 BGH 22, 347. Various writers on publishing also favour this construction as the default construction in
cases where the "option clause" does not predetermine the terms of the eventual publishing contract. See
for example Brandi-Dohrn Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag 13; Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des
Buchhandels 157 par 20.6 et seq; Schack Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht (2001) 434 par 973.
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entitle the holder to an offer that it should publish the work nor to acceptance of the
publisher's offer if that is the best offer available.
The main argument for regarding this type of preference contract as the default type is that
the parties are more likely to intend such a construction as it has important advantages as
against the other two types.':"
The main advantage of this type of contract is that the grantor is left freer. He need not
fear that any negotiation with an interested party might be interpreted as a trigger event so
that he could thereupon be forced into a contract with the holder. The grantor can calmly
sound out the market and obtain the best offer. 150 A preference contract is a compromise
between being absolutely bound to sell and the freedom not to do so. lSI Therefore it is in
the interest of the grantor to construct the preference contract as loosely as possible, and
this is what he would most likely agree to.152 Therefore the grantor would generally rather
intend to conclude this type of contract than the Angebots- or Annahmevorhand.ï" The
holder of a preferential right to buy realises full well that she may never get the
opportunity of obtaining the object of the right. One could therefore expect that the
holder should be satisfied with an agreement in terms of which the grantor would remain
149 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 305. In the case of a testamentary preferential
right, the argument as to the intention of the future owner remains relevant as she must agree to accept the
disposition (adiate) subject to the preferential right before the property will be transferred to her.
150 CfWestermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" 556.
151 CfSchurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 37.
152 Cf also Roser Ankaufsrecht 52, albeit in a different context. If the holder required more of the grantor
the holder had the possibility of agreeing with the grantor on an option. See BGH 25.11.1987 1988
Wertpapier Mitteilungen 92-95 where the court construed a Vormietsrecht (that is, constructed like a
Vorkaufsrecht) to place as little a burden as possible on the grantor's freedom to deal with his property, in
casu, to agree any terms in which it has a personal or economic interest with the third party, even if this
means that the holder cannot exercise the Vormietsrecht. The court suggested that if the parties had wanted
to secure the holder's right to conclude the main contract, they would have agreed on an option contract
(95).
153 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 305.
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owner of the object, as long as it is not sold to a third party. A balancing of interests
requires that nobody be given more than his interest demands.!" Arguably the holder's
interest, even if it is primarily aimed at obtaining the object, is served sufficiently well by
the bare preference Vorhand. That the grantor of a right of pre-emption is not necessarily
obliged to enable "exercise of the right" in the sense of obtaining the property, appears
from the fact that the grantor may alter, damage or destroy the object as she pleases as
long as it has not been sold to a third party, and may also freely agree to donate or
exchange the object. 155
Moreover, the Angebotsvorhand has a number of disadvantages. The question whether
the trigger event has occurred and the terms on which the offer should be made are likely
to lead to protracted disputes.!" The negative or bare preference Vorhand eliminates
disputes on these issues. Henrich also points out that in countries like Italy and England
which accept the revocability of an offer, the grantor who has made an offer to the holder
154 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 77.
155 See RGZ 101, 101; BGHZ 49,8; BGH WM 57, 1164; Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 8 (now § 463);
Soergel & Siebert (Huber) § 504 RdNr 5 (now § 463); Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504 RdNr
18 (now § 463).
156 See supra at n 33. The solution advanced by Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 is not very
satisfying. To say that once the grantor wishes to sell, he should make an offer on the same terms as a third
party offer to him, is not very satisfying. Why should a court order the grantor to make such an offer upon
entering into serious negotiations with the third party if the grantor has not shown that this offer is
acceptable to him, that is, before a contract had been concluded between the grantor and third party? Cf
Roser Ankaufsrecht who only speaks of a duty to inform the holder of a third party offer if and when the
grantor is willing to accept that offer (52). On his construction it would be rather difficult to enforce the
grantor's "obligation to offer" to the holder, as the grantor would always be able to say that the third party
offer is not acceptable. Although Roser describes the Vorhand as a conditional duty to make an offer, his
construction is in effect closer to Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag's construction of
the default type. If no offer was made, Nipperdey 1930 Zeitblatt for Handelsrecht 300 proposes that the
parties should possibly be held to have intended that the offer must be made at the market price, especially
in the case of Wer/papiere and shares. This recommendation could be followed, but has a small field of
application. Nipperdey's fall back solution is § 315 BGB, according to which the grantor is free to set a
price according to a fair assessment (300). Of course, this also leads to uncertainty.
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is allowed to revoke the offer upon proof that she no longer wishes to sell at all.!" which
is also the accepted view in South Africa.!" This widely held view that a grantor who no
longer wishes to sell at all should not be forced to do so, is another reason to treat the
"negative Vorhand" as the normal type of preference contract in German law, as the
Angebots- or Annahmevorhand would force the grantor to make an offer or acceptance
which would be irrevocable under German law.!"
A prevalent justification in favour of the Angebotsvorhand construction as the normal
construction is that the obligation created by the preference contract is a relationship of
trust and that according to Treu und Glauben the grantor is bound to enable the holder to
exercise his right. This begs the question that the holder has a right to contract and not
just a right to be preferred above others. Moreover, if there was a duty to enable the
holder to eventually acquire the thing, this could arguably be used to argue that the
grantor should be liable for damages if the object should perish due to his fault before
occurrence of the trigger event. 160 However, the parties clearly do not intend to place such
a burden on the grantor.": The grantor should be free to deal with his property as he
pleases within the law. Only his capacity to freely alienate the object is limited by the
preference contract.
Henrich therefore dismisses the view that the parties normally intend that the grantor
could be forced to make an offer to the holder before contracting with a third party as not
properly heeding the true intention of the parties.!" He regards the root of the error as
doctrinal lines of reasoning which take the well-known institutions of Vorvertrag and
157 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 348.
158 Wissekerke v Wissekerke 1970 2 SA 550 (A).
159 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 340. This results from the principle that an offer
to contract is irrevocable for the period in which it may be accepted (Allerkamp 1981 Mitteilungen der
Rheinischen Notarkammer 55 56.)
160 As Roser Ankaufsrecht argues at 70.
161 Cfhowever Du Plessis Spesifieke Nakoming 44 who states that, according to French law, the grantor of a
pacte de préférence is not allowed to deal with the object in such a manner as to affect the holder's rights.
162 Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 306.
115
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Vorkaufsrecht as its point of departure without considering the true intention of the
parties.!" As was pointed out before, the majority of German writers who mention
Vorhand do not even mention this bare preference or obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii
construction. Therefore they do not counter Henrich's policy arguments that the latter
should be the normal default construction.!" Perhaps this omission is due to Henrich's
work being the only in depth study of Vorhand contracts that is not focused solely on
publishing law.!" as well as to the absence ofreferences to works on publishing law in the
general commentaries and articles on Vorhand contracts.
According to Henrich, the Angebotsvorhand must be the default construction In two
situations. Firstly, where the parties have fixed the terms of the future contract or
provided for a mechanism for its determination':" in the preference contract, and,
secondly, in the case of a preferential right to sell."?
In the first instance, the grantor has no interest to sound out the market for a better offer.
Therefore, the parties are likely to have intended that the holder may obtain the object on
the occurrence of the trigger event. Accordingly the grantor should have an enforceable
163 Ibid 306.
164 All the major commentaries on the BGB normally contain only a few paragraphs, if that, on Vorhand
contracts, and concentrate largely on the discussion of Vorkaufsrechte, which are more widely used.
Moreover, their discussion on Vorhand contracts do not mention the works on publishing law, perhaps
because such agreements are known as "options in the wide sense" and not as Vorhand agreements in the
publishing industry. The same applies to works on the law of obligations, such as Larenz Lehrbuch des
Schuldrechts 14th edition (1987).
165 Roser's work also studies the Vorhand contract in more depth than is usual.
166 CfSoergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 15 (now § 463) who require an ascertainable price for the
Vorhand (understood as an enforceable duty to make an offer) to apply. The price would be ascertainable
if it is determined as the estimated value or the market value or where the determination is left to a third
party or to one of the parties themselves. Where the price is left open, they construct it as a
Verhandlungsvorhand. They do not mention the possibility of the bare preference Vorhand construction.
167 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 307.
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duty to make an offer in such cases. 168 This accords with the widely espoused view that
where the terms of the eventual publishing contract are predetermined in the preference
contract to such a degree that the publisher (the holder) need only make a declaration to
create the main contract, the preference contract can be regarded as an option contract in
the narrow sense, that is, in the sense this term bears in South African law.!" In other
words, the publisher has a right to contract upon fulfilment of the condition, namely the
author's decision to have his work published."?
In the case of a preferential right to sell, the grantor is not the owner of the object of the
right. Accordingly, the argument that the grantor should be left as free as possible to deal
with her property does not apply. The owner as preferential right holder is specifically
interested in being granted the opportunity of selling to the grantor. This provides support
for classifying that type of preference contract as an Angebotsvorhand. 171 It is submitted
that there is more justification for treating this type of preferential right as an
Annahmevorhand. The holder of the right would mostly be a trader with a usual price, so
that it can be argued that by implication, the parties agree that the grantor would buy any
supplies needed at the holder's usual price which can be easily determined, unless the
grantor can show that there is a better price available from a third party supplier.
It should be noted that Henrich's policy arguments in favour of the "bare preference"
Vorhand as the default construction centre on the first characteristic element of the "bare
168 Interestingly, Lorenz "Vorzugsrechte" 120 feels that only where the preference contract fixes the terms
of the future contract may the holder's right be secured by an "endorsement" or Vormerkung in the land
register. This implies that where the terms are not "fixed" by the preference contract, the holder has no
right to obtain transfer of the land and is only entitled to a nonfacere.
169 See for example, Bappert & Wagner Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 157 par 20.6 et seq; Brandi-Dohrn
Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag 60-61.
170 German writers on publishing law distinguishes this option contract in the narrow sense from the
"option contract in a wide sense" as the "bare preference Vorhand" is called by these writers.
171 The fact that the potential buyer as grantor also has an interest in being free to sound out the market for
the best price, militates against Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag's argument that this
situation creates an Angebotsvorhand. This matter will be considered further in chapter 7 infra.
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preference" Vorhand, namely that nothing short of contracting with a third party amounts
to breach by the grantor. He does not specifically address the policy arguments in favour
of the second element, namely, that the holder does not ever have a remedy by which he
can enforce transfer of the object of the preferential right. It appears that he regards this
second element rather as a logical consequence of the first. The argument would be that
as the grantor is never obliged to make or accept an offer he can never be forced to do so
by a court. The grantor's obligatio non faciendi is, like all such obligations, enforceable
only by an order that the grantor refrain from doing something. On the other hand,
Henrich's opponents accept that the holder should be entitled to enforce transfer of the
object without discussing the policy arguments for allowing this.
4 1 3 A comparison of the various types of preference contract in
German law
The five different types of preference contract discussed above can be compared using
the following criteria:
1 Can the holder enforce performance of the main contract at any stage?
2 If so, at what stage?
3 If the holder can enforce performance of the main contract, in what manner is this to
be done?
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The answers to these questions can be tabulated as follows.
Type of contract Specific
performance
of main
contract?
At what stage? In what manner?
Vorkaufsrecht Yes Conclusion of a Unilateral declaration
contract with a third plus prayer for
party. performance of the
main contract
Angebotsvorhand Yes Manifestation of a Combined prayer that
desire to contract, the grantor make an
inter alia by entering offer and that the
into senous grantor perform the
negotiations with a mam contract (same
third party effect as Vorkaufsrecht,
one extra prayer
Annahmevorhand Yes Manifestation of a Submission of a valid
desire to contract, offer to the grantor plus
inter alia by entering a combined prayer that
into senous the grantor must accept
negotiations with a that offer and perform
third party party, the main contract.
unless there IS a
better third party
offer available.
involved)
Bare
Vorhand
preference No Not applicable Not applicable
Verhandlungsvorhand No Not applicable Not applicable
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Accordingly, the bare preference Vorhand grants less power to the holder and more
freedom to the grantor.
The Angebots- and Annahmevorhand grant the holder the most power in the sense that
the holder is able to enforce performance of the main contract even before conclusion of
a contract with a third party. The trigger event occurs at an earlier stage than under the
Vorkaufsrecht.
The Vorkaufsrecht grants a more streamlined remedy to the holder, as performance of the
main contract may be prayed for directly upon the occurrence of the trigger event. The
order to make an offer under the Angebotsvorhand appears somewhat clumsy and
laboured.!" At least it need not be prayed for in a separate action, but can be prayed for
together with an order for performance of the main contract.
The different types of preference contracts can also be compared with reference to the
reasons for the introduction of the Vorkaufsrecht and the reasons for the continued
recognition of the Vorhand in practice, to evaluate whether each institution fulfils a role
in practice which the others cannot fulfil.
It will be recalled that the BGB drafters deliberately chose to limit the trigger event to a
contract with a third party for three reasons.
Firstly, it was felt that if anything short of a valid contract would trigger the holder's right
to obtain performance of the main contract, the terms on which the holder may enforce
performance of the main contract would be too unclear. This is indeed a valid point of
criticism against the Angebots- and Annahmevorhand as was pointed out above. Where
the trigger event is anything short of an option granted to a third party, disputes are likely
172 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 53.
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to arise about the terms on which the holder may contract. However, this criticism is not
applicable against the bare preference Vorhand.
The BGB drafters could also have added that in the case of the Angebots- and
Annahmevorhand it is often uncertain whether the trigger event has occurred, again
causing a likelihood of disputes. By contrast, the conclusion of a contract with a third
party is a more definite trigger event. No such likelihood of disputes is possible in the
case of the bare preference Vorhand however.
The reasons why parties would still use the Vorhand instead of the Vorkaufsrecht have
already been discussed.!"
To conclude, we have established that
1. German law recognises a number of different constructions which may apply
according to the different contexts in which preference contracts may be used, the
relative bargaining power of the parties, the purpose of the holder and the wording
chosen for the preference clause. Each of these constructions has some
commercial justification.
2. according to Henrich, the default Vorhand construction amounts to an obligatio
non faciendi, which corresponds with the Hartsrivier construction and Botha lA's
construction. However, where the price is set in the preference contract, the
default construction is the Angebotsvorhand construction, where the grantor can
in one court action obtain specific performance of the substantive contract.
This suggests the following hypotheses for South African law. Firstly, a multiplicity of
types of preference contract should be recognised. Secondly, there are two types of
preference contract where the wording imports a duty to contract with the holder before
173 Par 4 1 2 supra.
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contracting with a third party. The first is a right to conclude the main contract on the
fulfilment of a condition, usually the wish to buy. This would be the applicable default
construction where the preference contract determines the terms of the main contract.
The second type is a mere right to be preferred above third parties if the grantor should
contract, which creates no right to contract.
These hypotheses will next be considered critically against the position in England and
the USA.
4 2 English law
The most important textbooks on English contract law contain at best only short
paragraphs on rights of pre-emption and first refusal. These textbooks define a right of
pre-emption or right of first refusal as an agreement to give the purchaser the right to buy
at a figure to be agreed should the landowner wish to sell.!" They add that it is an
undertaking to make an offer in certain specified circumstances at the price at which the
owner is in fact prepared to sell.!" Although they do not discuss the remedies of the
holder, the implication is that the normal rules on specific performance apply. This
means that a claim for damages is the primary remedy, but the court can order the grantor
to make an offer to sell in a proper case.!" It is therefore possible for the holder to obtain
an order that the grantor contract with the holder, and ultimately, an order for specific
performance of that contract. An order to transfer property subject to a right of pre-
emption upon payment of the purchase price was given in cases in such as Lord
Carrington v Wycombe Railway Col77 and Birmingham Canal Company v Cartwrighi?"
The grantor was ordered to make an offer in Banstead Urban District Council v
174Guest et al (eds) Chitty On Contracts: Volume 1 General Principles zs" edition (1999) par 2-117 (at
141); Treitel The Law of Contract 10th edition (1999) 54.
175 Ibid.
176See Castle Barnsley's Land Options 2nd edition (1992) 186 - 187.
1771868 3 Ch App 377 379, 384.
178187911 ChD 421.
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Wilkinson?" In Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees; Same v British Investment Trust Ltd'"
the grantors were declared bound to implement an article in the articles of association of
the company, which obliged shareholders desirous of selling their shares to inform the
secretary in writing of their desire, upon which other shareholders would be invited to
purchase the shares. The remedy is therefore seen either as an order to make an offer or
an order to perform the main contract, which apparently came into existence extra-
judicially. It has been said that the right of pre-emption mutates into an option at the
point where the power to compel a disposal arises."!
It is important to note that the preference contracts in all these cases indeed either specify
the essential terms of the main contract, contain a mechanism for the determination of
such terms or indicate otherwise that the holder is granted a right to contract upon the
occurrence of a certain event as opposed to a mere preference. This is in fact the case in
many decisions on rights of first refusal and rights of pre-emption decided under English
law. Accordingly, in Henrich's scheme of preference contracts they should indeed fall
under the Angebotsvorhand construction, which creates an enforceable right to contract,
and not under the bare preference Vorhand construction.!" Therefore these cases do not
exclude the application of the bare preference Vorhand construction where a contract
contains no such indication of a right to buy.
In the following cases the preference contract set a definite price for the exercise of the
holder's right: Banstead Urban District Council v Wilkinson'" (£2100), Gardner v
Coutts'" (£3000), Pritchard v Briggs'" (£3000). In the following cases, the right to
1791962Estates Gazette 155157.
1801959 AC 763.
181 Pritchard v Briggs 1980 Ch 339 (CA); Castle Barnsley's Land Options 178 ("At the point where the
power to compel a disposal arises, the right of pre-emption mutates into an option").
182Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag argues that these features communicate the
intention to grant a conditional right to contract as opposed to a mere right to be preferred above others.
See par 4 1 2 5 supra.
183 Supra.
18419681 WLR 179.
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contract was granted "at a price to be agreed" coupled with a mechanism or standard for
ascertaining the price failing agreement: Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees; Same v British
Investment Trust Ltd,186(to be fixed by auditor failing agreement), Murray v Two Strokes
Limited'" (to be fixed by a valuator failing agreement), Lord Carington v Wycombe
Railway C0188(to be fixed by arbitration according to the Land Clauses Consolidation Act
of 1845189), Fraser v Thames Television'" ("on terms to be negotiated on the
understanding that it would not be in excess of what would be deemed to be a fair fee")."!
In the following cases, the price was not predetermined, but the preference contract
contained some other indication that an enforceable conditional right to buy as opposed
to a bare preference is created. In Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse
C0192 the holder only sought (and obtained) an injunction against transfer to a third party
purchaser.!" The case therefore has no direct bearing on the question whether the holder
185Supra. In this case the court stated that the "will of the grantor turns [the right of pre-emption] into an
option by deciding to sell and thereby binding the grantor to offer it for sale to the grantee." As an option,
it then becomes an interest in land, which is a change in the nature of the right to which the court saw "no
insuperable objection in logic or in principle" (423). In effect the court sees the right of pre-emption as a
conditional option; a construction justifiable by the fact that the parties agreed on a specified price at which
the holder may buy on fulfilment of the condition.
186 1959 AC 763.
187 1973 All ER 357-368.
188Supra.
189 cf Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone Halsbury's Laws of England Vol 8(1) 4th edition (1996) 335 par
381.
190 1984 1 QB 44.
191 In Miller v Lakefield Estates Limited 1989 1 EGLR 212, the preference contract provided that if the co-
owners could not agree on the price within a certain period, the property had to be auctioned and the
proceeds divided. In this case therefore, the right of first refusal could not be enforced by way of an order
to make an offer or to transfer the property. In the absence of agreement on the price, the right of first
refusal would fall away and the property had to be auctioned. The court correctly refused an order that one
co-owner was entitled to buy the property at a reasonable price.
192 19002 Ch 352; 1901 2 Ch 37.
19319012 Ch 42,51.
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could enforce transfer to itself upon conclusion of a third party contract. In any event, no
true right of first refusal was created. The clause provided that if the land should ever
cease to be used for racecourse purposes or if it should be proposed to be used for dock
purposes, the Racecourse Co would give to the Canal Co the first refusal of the land.!"
The court a quo had difficulties with this language.!" but could not declare the agreement
void for vagueness as it formed part of an Act of Parliament. 196 Instead the court a quo
admitted that giving effect to the agreement might require a certain expansion of the
language used."" Although the appeal court did not refer to these difficulties of
construction, it confirmed that the clause could have more than one meaning!" whereas
no objection on the basis of uncertainty could be entertained as the agreement had
statutory validity.!"
The type of agreement featured in the Manchester Ship Canal Co case differs from a
right of first refusal in that the condition for the exercise of the holder's right is not
merely the wish to sell, but rather the occurrence of some other event. The duty to make
an offer would arise if the land should be used for dock purposes even if there was no
third party purchaser on the scene.i" Therefore this is not a right of first refusal or right
of pre-emption in the sense of a duty to prefer the purchaser above others, but a right to
be made a fair and reasonable offer on the stated event irrespective of whether the grantor
wishes to sell or not. In effect, the court construed the preference contract as a
conditional option.": As it was part of a statute, the court could not decide that the
absence of an agreed price or mechanism for determination thereof made the option
19419002 Ch 353; 1901 2 Ch 38.
19519002 Ch 360-363
19619002 Ch 360-361; 19002 Ch 50.
19719002 Ch 363.
19819012 Ch 46-47.
19919012 Ch 50.
20019002 Ch 47.
201See Castle Barnsley's Land Options 159 where similar agreements are constructed as conditional options
to purchase.
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contract void for vagueness.?" In view of the peculiar set of facts in the Manchester Ship
Canal Co case, it is unfortunate that this case and especially the statement that "refusal
implies an offer'?" has exercised so much influence on South African cases dealing with
totally different clauses, with no legislative power.?" The minority in Soteriou v Retco
Poyntons (Pty) Ltd'" per Botha JA realized this distinction and rejected the argument that
"refusal" necessarily imports an enforceable duty to make an offer.
The preference contract in Birmingham Canal Co v Cartwright'" in effect mirrors the
BGB Vorkaufsrecht. This explains why it was not construed like the bare preference
Vorhand of German law. Instead, the court granted an order that there must be an inquiry
as to the price at which the mines were sold to the third party and on payment of the
price, the grantor must transfer the mines to the holder's successor.?" In this case, the
"trigger event" was defined as a contract of sale with a third party. The clause provided
that if the grantor "should sell or agree to sell" the adjoining mines, the grantor should at
the same time offer the holder the mines and give the holder the first refusal for one
month at the same price as the grantor should have agreed to sell the mines.?"
Accordingly, there was no duty to refrain from contracting with a third party before
granting the holder an opportunity to contract. This was therefore clearly not a contract
to give the holder the first chance to contract, but rather a conditional option, the
202 As was the case in Ryan v Thomas 1911 55 Sol Jo 364, in which a similar agreement was declared void
for vagueness for the failure to mention a price. In that case the condition on which the holder would have
had a first option was also not the grantor's wish to contract, but rather the designation of any land for the
purpose of a dairy on the southern side of a road.
20319002 eh 364. See also 1901 2 eh 49.
204 See for example the majority judgment in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra per Nicholas JA at
932G. Cfthe attempt by Botha JA in his dissenting judgment in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra
936D to distinguish Manchester Ship Canal Co by reason of the difference in wording of the clauses.
205 Supra.
206187911 eh D 421.
207435.
208421.
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condition being a sale to a third party and the terms being the terms agreed with the third
party.
The case of Smith v Morgan'" contains a preference contract with no price, no
mechanism for determining the price, nor a condition other than the desire to sell. Neither
is it a Vorkaufsrecht. This case therefore appears to fall under the bare preference
Vorhand construction in Henrich's typology. Yet the court gave a declaration that, should
the grantor have wished to sell the land, she was legally bound to offer the land for sale
first to the holder at a price at which she was in fact willing to sell. Does this mean that
in English law, all preference contracts give rise to a duty to make an offer which is
enforceable by court order? It is submitted that Smith v Morgan does not justify that
conclusion. The court's declaratory order is not inconsistent with the mere preference or
bare preference Vorhand construction. The court did not declare anything on the holder's
remedies where the grantor manifests an intention to sell. One cannot draw the
conclusion that the court would have ordered the grantor to make an offer in such a case.
To say that the grantor is legally bound to make an offer is not inconsistent with the
negative Vorhand construction. Making an offer is the only way in which the grantor
may legally be free to sell to another in terms of the bare preference Vorhand
construction. This case is therefore not inconsistent with the constructions accepted in
the Hartsrivier and Owsianick cases"? and the similar construction of the bare preference
Vorhand of German law.":
A case which is admittedly inconsistent with these "negative covenant" constructions, is
Kling v Keston Properties Ltd. 212 The court granted specific performance of the contract
209 1971 1 WLR 803.
210 per Botha JA.
211 In any event, in his dissenting judgment in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra 936G, Botha JA
emphasised that the clause in Smith v Morgan supra differed substantially from the clause considered by
the court in that the clause in Smith v Morgan supra contained an express reference to an offer to be made
which was lacking in the latter.
212198444 peR 212.
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which it decided came into existence by the exercise of the right of pre-emption. The
right of first refusal agreement provided simply that in the event of the grantor wishing to
sell the garage on long lease [sic], the holder will have the option to buy it first on terms
no less favourable than have been available to other garage buyers or prospective garage
buyers when the grantor intend actually to sell it. Arguably this formulation on the terms
of the "option" is not as certain as in the other cases cited above, which provide for either
a specified price or appraisal or arbitration. However, the court relied heavily on a
statement in Pritchard v Briggs'" that a right of pre-emption turns into an option when
the grantor decides to sell. It is undoubtedly correct that a preference contract which
fixes a price for the main contract, such as the one considered in Pritchard v Briggs is in
fact a conditional option contract. The court did not note this distinction on the facts. It
is arguable, in any event, that the preference clause in Kling v Keston Properties Ltd
attempts to lay down a price for the main contract which could be interpreted as the
market price for any garage in that building at that time.
Accordingly, there is no case in English law which clearly excludes the bare preference
Vorhand construction in respect of preference contracts containing no arrangement as to
price or any other indication that a conditional right to contract is granted.
In fact, the author of Barnsley's Land Options, acknowledges that two species of rights of
first refusal or right of pre-emption exist, as he mentions two possible formulas for such
rights?" Firstly, the "normal formula" that the grantor must offer the land of the holder
at the stated price or other appropriate figure, should she desire to sell. Secondly, the
alternative formula, which merely obliges the grantor to notify the holder of the desire to
sell, and leaves the holder to make a suitable offer to buy, which the grantor is free to
accept or decline.?"
213 Supra.
214 Castle Barnstey's Land Options 157-158. This work apparently contains the most extensive "academic"
discussion on rights of fust refusal and rights of pre-emption to be found in English law.
215 The pre-emption clause in the Scottish case of Roebuck v Edmunds 1992 Scots Law Times 1055 was
interpreted similarly to the bare preference Vorhand of German law. It provided that "It shall not be in the
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To conclude, the English cases on rights of pre-emption referred to in South African case
law do not support a uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an
enforceable duty to make an offer upon the grantor manifesting an intention to sell.
English drafters of preference contracts generally provide for a mechanism for
determining the terms of the main contract upon the exercise of the right. Such drafting
justifies the conclusion that the parties intend the holder to be entitled to contract on those
terms. On the other hand, it is recognised that preference contracts could also be drafted
so as to free the grantor from the obligation to make an offer to the holder or to accept the
holder's offer, as long as the grantor does not contract with a third party on terms not
rejected by the holder.
The latter formula resembles the Hartsrivier construction'" and the bare preference
Vorhand construction advocated by Henrich. In effect it only creates an obligatio non
faciendi. Unlike the Annahmevorhand it does not oblige the grantor to accept the holder's
offer if it is the highest offer available.
power of our said disponees and their foresaids [sic] to sell or dispose of the subjects hereby disponed or
any part thereof to a third party until they shall first have made a written offer of the same or such part to
us ... or our successors ... at the price and on the conditions on which they may be wiling to sell or may
conditionally have sold the same ... to a third party and we shall be bound to intimate in writing
acceptance of rejection of the offer within fourteen clear days " The court refused an offer that the
holder may buy at the price agreed with a third party where the grantor acknowledged that the transfer to
the third party should be set aside. In effect, only the status quo ante was restored. The court relied on
Halliday Conveyancing Law and Practice and withdrawal of a similar claim by the holder in Matheson v
Tinney (OH) 1989 Scots Law Times 535. It argued that pre-emption clauses should be strictly construed
and that the clause does not go beyond a duty not to convey the property to another without a prior offer to
the holder. The court saw no legal basis for a positive obligation to convey the property to the holder in the
case of breach. On the other hand, Matheson v Tinney (OH) 1989 Scots Law Times 535 537 contains an
obiter statement that "A clause of pre-emption does not prohibit alienation [so as to contravene a statute of
1746] but simply gives the superior or the disponer an option to purchase if the vassal or disponee decides
to sell."
216 Recognised in Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T). See par 2 1 2
supra.
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4 3 American law
American case law on rights of first refusal and rights of pre-emption reveals several
controversies surrounding the default regime."? However, one point on which most
courts and writers agree is that such rights are enforceable by specific performance, and
grantors have frequently been ordered to convey the object of the right of pre-emption to
the holder thereof, in other words, to perform the main contract?"
217 Flannigan "The Legal Construction of Rights of First Refusal" March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review
1 (on American law). For examples, see also Stutzman and Day "Protecting the Preemptor: Real Property
Rights of First Refusal in Light of Gyurkey v Babler" 1983 Idaho Law Review 277 279 ff; Daskal "Rights
of First Refusal and the Package Deal" 1995 Fordham Urban Law Journal 461; Platt "The right of first
refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by operation of law" 1996 Baylor Law Review 1197; Siviglia
"Helpful Practice Hints: Rights of first refusal" 1994 New York State Bar Journal 56; Conine "Property
provisions of the operating agreement - interpretation, validity, and enforceability" 1988 Texas Tech Law
Review 1263; Karen et al (eds) 49 American Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant (1995) § 392 ff.;
Karen et al (eds) 47 American Jurisprudence 2d Judicial Sales (1995) § 168; Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-19 et seq, 7-65 et seq. Unfortunately, treatises on contract law do not
discuss these institutions comprehensively. Corbin on Contracts Vol lA §§ 261, 261A & 1197 and Vol3
§§ 11.3 & 11.4 contains the most extensive discussions amongst the contract law treatises, but does not
mention all the controversies discussed by Flannigan. That "rights of first refusal" do not have a clear
default regime is borne out by the following comment by Siviglia 1994 New York State Bar Journal 56
"Some agreements merely state that one party will have a 'right of first refusal,' but standing alone, that
term has little, if any, meaning. Certainly, in this sparse form, it is an invitation to dispute."
218 See inter alia Corbin Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract
Law Vol5A Sections 1122-1251 (2001 Fall Cumulative Supplement) (hereafter cited as Corbin Corbin on
Contracts Vol 5A) § 1197 P 377 and cases there cited; Holmes Corbin on Contracts: Formation of
Contracts Vol3 revised edition (1996) § 11.3 P 480 et seq & § 11.4 and cases there cited; Karen et al (eds)
71 American Jurisprudence 2d Specific Performance (1973) § 146; Karen et al (eds) 18A American
Jurisprudence 2d Corporations (1985) § 586, p 445; Restatement of American Law - Property § 395;
Barling v Horn (1956, Mo) 296 SW 2d 94; Wilson v Brown (1936) 5 Cal 2d 425; Robinson v Drew 144
A67, 83 NH 459 (1928); Mobil Exploration & Producing North America Inc v Graham Royalty Ltd 910 F
2d 504 (8th Cir 1990); Daniels v Anderson 162 I112d 47,204 III Dec 666, 642 NE 2d 128 (1994); Abraham
Investment Co v Payne Ranch Inc 968 SW 2d 518 (Tex App Amarillo 1998); Cross "The ties that bind:
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At what point has the grantor been ordered to do so? Firstly, if the grantor purports to
retract an offer made to the holder. The same applies where the grantor has given notice
to the holder of a third party offer which the grantor is willing to accept and subsequently
attempts to retract it.219 Secondly, where the grantor manifests a desire to accept a good
faith offer received from a third party, without having given the requisite notice to the
holder?" Such desire is most clearly manifested where the grantor has contracted with a
third party or has granted the third party an option. However, a lesser manifestation,
namely the listing of the property for sale, was regarded as sufficient in a case where the
preference contract predetermined the terms of the main contract?" This echoes the
Angebotsvorhand construction of German law. One legal writer states that any evidence
that the grantor is willing to contract is sufficient to justify specific enforcement of the
promise to offer the land on the terms which the grantor contemplates accepting from a
third party. 222
preemptive rights and restraints on alienation that commonly burden oil and gas properties" 1999 Texas
Wesleyan Law Review 193 211. Sometimes it is said that the grantor has a duty to make an offer. (See for
example Corbin Corbin on Contracts VoIlA § 470). However, this "duty" is not enforced by an order that
the grantor will make an offer. Rather the holder may sue directly for performance of the main contract
where the grantor has failed to make an offer on occurrence of the trigger event. Cf also the definition of a
right of first refusal by Mitchell "Can a Right of First Refusal be Assigned?" 2001 University of Chicago
Law Review 985 which implies an enforceable right to purchase triggered when the grantor decides to sell.
219 Such a notice is seen as an operative offer. At that point the right of first refusal "ripens" into an option
(Daska11995 Fordham Urban LawJournal461 467).
220 Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277 278; Corbin Corbin on Contracts Vol lA § 261 P 481
(with reference to Brenner v Duncan 27 NW 2d); Holmes Corbin on Contracts: Formation of Contracts
Vol3 § 11.4 p 488; 49 American Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant (1995) § 393; Mercer v Lemmens
230 Call App 2d 167 171. This is also the usual formulation of first refusal agreements. See for example
Sager v Rogers 1987 WL 6718 at 2 (Tenn Ct App 1987); Miller v Le Sea Broadcasting Inc 87 F3d 2241 7th
Cir 1996; Dalton v Balum 76 ALR 3d 1134 1136 and cases there cited.
221 Long v WaybIe 48 Or App 851, 618 P2d 22.
222 Holmes Corbin on Contracts: Formation of Contracts Vol3 § 11.4 p 493, with no reference to case
law. Holmes also argues that listing real property with a broker should entitle the holder to buy at the listed
price as this does not prejudice the grantor, who would normally ask more that they expect to get for the
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There are some limitations on this "right to specific performance." Firstly, some cases
emphasise that the primary remedy for breach of contract remains damages where this
sufficiently compensates the holder.i" Secondly, courts also take into account hardship to
the third party when deciding whether to grant specific performance or damages.?"
Thirdly, there is some authority that the holder cannot obtain specific performance upon a
lesser manifestation of a desire to contract than conclusion of a third party contract,
unless the first refusal agreement specified the price at which the right of first refusal may
be exercised.ê"
Unfortunately, the juridical explanation of the holder's enforceable right to obtain specific
performance upon a manifestation of a desire to contract is incoherent. The following
passage from Miller v Le Sea Broadcasting Inc226 containing the normal explanation to be
found in case law and academic literature, shows up this incoherence:
"A right of first refusal is the weakest of options; technically it is not an option at all.... It is
merely a pre-emptive right, although it becomes an option when the grantor decides to sell on the
terms offered by the third party; at that point the holder of the option has the right to buy the
property; a right that is a true option.,,227
property (§ 11.4 P 494). He admits that the grantor is inconvenienced when he wishes to "test the market"
without being bound to sell to the holder at a listed price.
223 Miller v Le Sea Broadcasting Inc supra. In this case there was evidence that the holder intended to sell
the property to a third party for a specified sum and damages was awarded to compensate for the holder's
loss of profit instead of specific performance as prayed.
224 First National Exchange Bank v Roanoke Oil Co 1938 169 VA 99, 192 SE 76.
225 49 American Jurisprudence 2d Landlord & Tenant §439, p 374, especially the discussion of Ohio Oil
Co v Yacktman (1 st Dist) 36 III App 3d 255, 343 NE 2d 544. Cf also Holmes Corbin on Contracts Vol 3
492 n 13 § 11.4.
226 Supra at 226.
227 The same explanation is to be found in inter alia Corbin Corbin on Contracts Vol5A § 1197, P 377 and
§ 261, P 474; Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277-278; Daskal 1995 Fordham Urban Law
Journal461 467; Rosenoer "Acquiring Rights in Tomorrow's Software: First Refusal and First Negotiation
Rights under Californian Law" 1990 The Computer Lawyer 13; Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute
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close.'?"
The court added later that "[a]lthough a right of first refusal is not an option, it is awfully
No understandable explanation is usually given as to why the right of pre-emption
suddenly turns into an option. Often the right of pre-emption is said to "ripen'?" or
"mature'?" into an option. These terms undoubtedly have explanatory value in the
agricultural industry, but they do not mean much in contract law. The juridical
construction of rights of first refusal therefore appears to be no more than a fiction. The
same criticism applies to an "explanation" that the third party's offer "becomes, III
essence, the seller's offer to the pre-emptor by operation of the right of first refusal. "231
That the right of first refusal is regarded as changing into an option on the occurrence of
the trigger event suggests that it should be regarded as a conditional option. One author
indeed argues that rights of first refusal are conditional options.?" Many courts have also
used "conditional option" terminology.ê" So for example in Brenner v Duncan, the court
held that the "condition of the option" did occur when the land was sold to a third
party.'?' Many courts simply use "option" terminology when referring to rights of first
Procedures 7-1, and the numerous cases cited by these authors. It is also encountered in some Louisianan
decisions. See for example Wheat "Clarifying the Nature of Louisiana's Right of First Refusal in the
Transfer of Immovables" 1987 Louisiana Law Review 899 901-902. This construction has also been
accepted in Canadian law. See Flannigan March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review 1 2.
228227.
229 See inter alia Corbin Corbin on Contracts VoIlA §§ 261, 1197; Holmes Corbin on Contracts Vol3 §
11.3; Rosenoer 1990 The Computer Lawyer 13; 77 American Jurisprudence 2d Vendor & Purhcaser § 49;
Henderson v Nitschke (Tex Civ App) 46 ALR 3d 1369 1374.
230 See inter alia Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277 278; Daskal 1995 Fordham Urban Law
Journal461 467; Sager v Rogers 1987 WL 6718 at 2 (Tenn Ct App·1987).
23149 American Jurisprudence Landlord and Tenant § 402, P 349.
232 Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Procedures 7-1 7-4 et seq.
233 Ibid.
234 Brenner v Dunc~n (1947) 318 Mich 127 NW 2d 320. A Canadian court has recognised that a right of
first refusal amounts "to an option to purchase under certain conditions" (Budget Car Rentals Toronto Ltd v
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refusal without specifically using the conditional option construction.?" What could be
the reasons for some courts' and writers' treatment of the right of first refusal as an
option after a certain point but not as a conditional option from its creation? No good
reason is stated by US writers and courts in common law states?" Louisianan academics
have mentioned three reasons why it should not be regarded as an option. The first is that
article 2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code requires all option contracts to stipulate a time
period for acceptance of the option. If this should apply to rights of first refusal, most
first refusal agreement would be invalid."? This objection should be irrelevant to other
states. Secondly, Litvinoff protests that the normal agreement as to price in a first refusal
contract, namely that the price may be named by the grantor or be the price at which the
grantor is prepared to sell to a third party, though ascertainable, lacks the kind of
Petro-Canada Inc (1989) 60 DLR (4th) 751 (Ont Ct) 756). In this case the first refusal clause was drafted
similarly to the normal formulation in the USA. See also the cases cited by Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Procedures 7-1 7-8 n 8. See also 49 American Jurisprudence Landlord and Tenant in § 397 which
states that courts mostly treat the words "first option" as imparting a "conditional option" depending on the
landlord's decision or offer to sell. See also PerelI "Options, Rights of Repurchase and Rights of First
Refusal as Contracts and as Interests in Land" March 1991 Canadian Bar Review 1 24 who states that
rights of fIrst refusal should be treated as options as they are specifically enforceable though contingent
rights to complete a sale. In effect they are essentially similar to options but for the condition.
235 Cfthe terms "fust privilege option" (71 American Jurisprudence 2d Specific Performance § 1461), "first
refusal option" and "option holder" in 47 American Jurisprudence 2 p Judicial Sales (1995) for 168 p 575
and "pre-emptive right option" as distinct from an "outright option" in Wel/more Builders v Wannier 140 A
2d 422,49 NJ Super 456 (1958) (quoted by Corbin Corbin on Contracts VoilA § 261 p 472). See also 49
American Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant (1995) § 445 p 379, where it is stated that damages for
the failure to honour a right of first refusal can be determined by the value of the "option contract" to the
"option holder." Often the preference contract itself provides that the holder should have an option to
contract if the grantor decides to contract at all, for example, in Pritchard v Wick 178 A2d 725, 406 Pa 598
(1962), quoted by Corbin Corbin on Contracts Vol lA § 261 P 473. The contract provided that the holder
would have a 30 day option in case the grantor decided to offer the business for sale.
236 In American law, conditions simply suspend the operation of a valid and binding contract. The
explanation therefore cannot be that no contract exists until fulfIlment of a condition. (See McCauliff
Corbin on Contracts Vol 8: Conditions revised edition (1999) §§ 30.9, 30.5-30.7; 17A American
Jurisprudence 2d Contracts 2nd edition (1991) §§ 465, 52.)
237 Wheat 1987 Louisiana Law Review 899 902 et seq.
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certainty necessary for a valid option.ê" For this criticism he also relies on article 2462
Louisiana Civil Code. However, that article does not in fact require a specified price, and
an ascertainable price should be sufficient. The third objection is that the grantor does
not promise to grant an option if he decides to contract, but merely to make an offer with
preference to anybody else, "an offer that may even be revocable." Therefore, only
where the parties agree that the grantor will grant the holder an option for a specified
time, can the agreement be seen as an option subject to a suspensive condition."? This
last criticism is well founded/" except in those cases where the first refusal agreement
stipulates a specified period for exercise of the right after notice had been given to the
holder. Where such a period is stipulated, the right of first refusal does in fact amount to
a conditional option. It should be remembered that Litvinoff's criticism also applies to
the usual formulation that a right of first refusal ripens into an option upon the trigger
event. To conclude, American law in effect treat rights of first refusal as conditional
options or at least as conditional offers. The condition would be notice to the holder of
an acceptable third party offer, or another manifestation of a desire to sell, namely at least
the conclusion of a contract with a third party without first granting the holder the
opportunity to transact at the same terms.
The question which arises is whether this treatment of the right of first refusal as a
conditional option leaves any room for the "bare preference" construction in American
law; that is, the equivalent of the pactum de non contrahendo cum tertii or the negative or
bare preference Vorhand construction. Is it possible, as is the case with English law, to
explain the American default position on the basis that most if not all the preference
contracts considered by the courts would fall under the Angebotsvorhand construction in
Henrich's typology? This would be the case if they either specified a contract price or
238 Litvinoff "Consent revisited: Offer Acceptance Right of First Refusal and Contracts of Adhesion in the
Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations" 1987 Louisiana Law Review 699 754.
239 Ibid.
240 InAnderson v Stewart 149 Neb 616, 32 NW 2d 140 (1948), a Nebraskan court held that the grantor was
not bound to sell to the holder where he decided no longer to transact at all. See also 49 American
Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant § 395.
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contained some other indication that the holder should have a conditional right to buy as
opposed to the mere right to be preferred, which is an entitlement to a "non facere." The
short answer to this question is "no." An agreement which simply granted a "a right of
first refusal" without any further qualifying terms was held to mean "according to general
custom and practice that the holder has the right to elect to take the property at the same
price and on the same terms and conditions as those of an offer by a third person that the
owner is willing to accept.'?" However, it could perhaps be argued that this "general
custom and practice" arose because of the many cases in which the preference contracts
did stipulate a contract price or a mechanism for its determination.i" or contained a
241 Brownies Creek Collieries Inc v Asher Coal Mining Co 417 SW 2d 249,252 (Ky 1967), quoted by
Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277 278.
242 For example Blair v Kingsley 128 So 2d 889 and New Haven Trap Rock Co v Tata 177 A 2d 798, 149
Conn 181 (1962) (price to be determined by appraisal); Schenley v Kauth 96 Ohio App 345 (1953) (an
option to purchase in the event that the grantor desires to sell the land, at $325 per acre); Old Mission
Peninsula School District v French 107 NW 2d 758,362 Mich 546 (1961) ($50); Kershner v Hurlburt 277
SW 2d 619 (Mo 1955) (at $1275 and the cost of improvements); City of East Orange v Gilchrist 125 A 2d
225,41 NJ Super 362 (1956) ($12,000) (cited by Corbin Corbin on Contracts lA § 261A). As was pointed
out above, it appears that in states where the right of first refusal is regarded as maturing into an option
upon the mere manifestation of the owner's willingness to sell, the omission in a lease granting a right of
first refusal of a specified purchase price is fatal to a request for specific performance. (49 American
Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant § 439 n 97, p 374). Accordingly it appears that specific
performance would not be granted upon a mere manifestation of a desire to sell, unless the preference
agreement specifies a contract price. However, upon the conclusion of a contract with a third party,
specific performance can be ordered at the price agreed with the third party, provided that the agreed terms
are commercially reasonable, imposed in good faith and not specifically designed to defeat the pre-emptive
right. (Sessel Holdings Inc v Fleming Companies supra 576-577. See also Corbin Corbin on Contracts lA
§ 261 P 474, 476-477). If the price does not comply with these requirements, the holder's failure to
exercise his right does not terminate the right of first refusal. These requirements are obviously designed to
protect the holder against a fraudulent evasion of his right. The simple solution to this problem supported
by Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag, namely that the preference continues until the
grantor actually concludes and performs a contract with a third party on terms which the holder refused, is
also followed by some US courts. See for example Parker vMurphy 146 SE 254,152 Va 173 (1929) cited
by Corbin Corbin on Contracts § 1197 P 378. See also Flannigan March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review
1 2 nl and 4.
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243 A preference contract which contained a different condition from the grantor's willingness to contract
was considered to be specifically enforceable in City of East Orange v Gilchrist supra ("shall no longer
desire to use and occupy said land") (cited by Corbin Corbin on Contracts lA § 261A, P 486). As to why
this should make a difference see the discussion of the Manchester Ship Canal Co case at n 192 supra et
condition other than the desire to se11243or some other positive formulation that the holder
would have the opportunity to transact on the occurrence of a certain event.ê" First
refusal agreements usually provide that, if the grantor receives a good faith offer and
desires to sell, he would give notice to the holder of such offer and the holder would have
the option to transact for a specified number of days on the terms and conditions of such
offer.?" An argument may possibly be made that this wording, especially the given time
period within which the holder may decide to transact, and the attempt to define the terms
on which she may do so, show that a conditional right to transact is intended, and not
seq.
244 See the cases cited in the next footnote. Some US first refusal agreements create a Vorkaufsrecht in that
the holder's right to buy is provided to arise on the conclusion of an agreement of sale. An example is
Brenner v Duncan (1947) 318 Mich 127 1 27 2d 320, where the holder was given a first preference to
purchase in the event that the land was to be sold and the parties could agree on a price. This wording
clearly does not prohibit the grantor from first contracting with a third party. As the conclusion of an
agreement with a third party was not prohibited it necessarily meant that the "right of first refusal" denoted
an opportunity to buy and not a mere prohibition of preferring third parties above the holder. Compare
Sessel Holdings Inc v Fleming Companies Inc 949 F Supp 572 (WD Term 1996) where the holder was
given a "right of first refusal with respect to any agreement for the sale of SRI's capital stock to a third
party." The grantor agreed to give written notice to the holder "upon the signing of a binding or non-
binding letter of intent or similar agreement of understanding providing for a sale."
245 One example is Toledo P&WRR v Brown 31 NE 2d 767,375111438 (1941) cited by Corbin Corbin on
Contracts lA § 261, P 480 (for five years the grantor would not accept an offer to purchase by a third party
company without first giving notice thereof to the holder and giving the holder an option to purchase for 15
days at the offered price). Cf Westpark Inc v Seaton Land Co 171 A 2d 756, 225 Md 433 (1961) (the
holder would have a right of first refusal on such terms as the grantor might offer to another or agree to
accept); Abdallah v Abdallah 17 ALR 3d 967 (1966) (the holder would have the "first privilege of
purchasing at the best bona fide price which the landlord could obtain"); Burch v Milner Truck Lines Inc
199 F Supp 575 (DC Colo 1961) quoted by Corbin Corbin on Contracts lA § 261 A, P 485 (if the grantor
receives a bona fide offer to purchase and desires to sell the object, the grantor will give the holder
immediate notice and the holder shall have the first option to acquire the object on the terms and conditions
of any such offer).
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merely a negative covenant or mere preference in the sense of the bare preference
Vorhand construction. Unlike the case in South Africa, preference agreements in the US
are apparently never drafted as negative covenants to the effect that the grantor shall not
contract with a third party unless she first offers to transact with the holder.ê"
It is therefore not too surprising that there is no recognition of a right of first refusal
constructed like Henrich's bare preference Vorhand or the similar construction laid down
in Hartsrivier'" and Owsianick'" per Botha JA and recognised in English law. Of
course, US writers recognise that parties could expressly structure the agreement as they
please and would not exclude the possibility of such construction if the contract makes it
clear that that is what is intended.i"
If the explanation of the absence of the "the bare preference Vorhand" construction does
not in fact lie in the normal wording of first refusal agreements, then the explanation must
be that US courts generally favour the holder's interest in obtaining performance of the
main contracr'" above the grantor's interest to remain as free as possible to deal with his
property. However, in respect of a number of controversies surrounding rights of first
refusal, many courts emphasise that, because rights of first refusal restrain the free
246 See for example the clauses in the numerous cases referred to by Corbin Corbin on Contracts JA §§ 261,
261 A, 1197.
247 Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T). See par 2 1 2.
248 Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd supra.
249 An example of a non-typical type of preference right recognized by American law is a right of first
refusal which allows the grantor to contract with a third party as long as the third party acquires the
property or other interest in it subject to the holder's right of first refusal (Corbin Corbin on Contracts JA §
261, P 474). First negotiation rights, the equivalent of the Verhandlungsvorhand of German law, are also
recognized (See Rosenoer 1990 The Computer Lawyer 13 and Corbin Corbin on Contracts JA § 261 A, P
485). Strictly speaking, first negotiation rights are not rights of first refusal because the holder is not given
a chance to refuse an offer or opportunity to contract, but only has a chance to submit an offer which need
not be accepted.
250 Whether as a purpose in itself or as a device to protect the holder against unwanted personal or
economic associations with third parties. CfFlannigan March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review 1 6.
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The majority of American courts have held that donative transfers, conveyances between
related parties, such as affiliated companies or relatives as well as involuntary judicial
sales do not trigger the preemptioner's right. 252
alienability of property, their default rules should involve a strict construction against the
holder which leaves the grantor as free as possible to deal with his property as he
pleases."!
Another example of such a controversy is the question whether a "package deal" with a
third party triggers the right of first refusal. Many US courts hold that where the grantor
sells the object of the right of first refusal as part of a bigger parcel of land, the holder is
not entitled to an order for transfer or conveyance of the object of the right of first refusal
to himself. 253 The basis of these decisions is that the grantor cannot be compelled to sell
one of the lots of land if she desires to sell the land as a whole. Therefore such a package
deal does not trigger or activate the right to buy. Some courts do not regard a "package
deal" with a third party as a breach at alF54 They argue that the grantor is only prohibited
from selling that piece of land alone.i" Others see the package deal as a violation of the
right of first refusal as opposed to a triggering event and therefore hold that the holder is
only entitled to an injunction, reconveyance where the third party knew of the right, or
damages.?" These decisions place the interest of the grantor to remain as free as possible
251 See, for example, Vogel v Melish 31 Ill2d 620, 203 NE2d 411, 412-14 (1964) discussed by Mitchell at n
49 et seq, where the court reasoned that as a restraint on alienation, the shareholder's agreement was to be
strictly construed, t~ support its finding that the right of first refusal is not assignable.
252 Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-65 et seq.
253 For details see Daskal 1995 Fordham Urban Law Journal 461; Flannigan March-June 1997 Canadian
Bar Review 1, Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277; Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute
Procedures 7-1 7-69 et seq and decisions there cited.
254 For example, Sautkulis v Conklin (1956 2d Dept) 1 App Div 2d 962.
255 For all details, see Daskal 1995 Fordham Urban Law Journal 461; Flannigan March-June 1997
Canadian Bar Review 1; Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277 and decisions there cited.
256 See especially Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-71 who holds that the
majority of courts at the time of writing followed this approach.
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above the interest of the holder to obtain the property. A number of these cases do in fact
mention that, as restraints on the free alienability of property, rights of first refusal should
be strictly construed against the holder. The opponents of this approach appeal to the
holder's purpose to be able to obtain the property as the purpose of a contract as a whole.
They argue also that remedies aimed at preventing the owner from making a sale to
someone else are "worthless and illusory" as they give no "immediate, positive benefit"
to the holder, so that the holder is unlikely to enter into litigation to obtain this "pyrrhic
result. "257
It is clear that the two sides simply focus on different concerns. The dispute whether the
default regime should involve a strict or wider interpretation of rights of first refusal boils
down to the question whether and to what extent the grantor's and society's interest in the
free alienability of property must be preferred above the holder's desire to obtain the
land?" Some of the arguments used by the "pro specific performance" camp display a
complete disregard of the grantor's interest to be as free as possible in order to obtain the
best possible price for his property. An example is Flannigan's argument that
transactions like a package deal or dissolution of the grantor company should entitle the
holder to buy the object at its market value because "this price standard is implicit in the
nature of a right of first refusal.'?" In this way, he counters the argument that there is no
way to establish the price at which the holder would be entitled to purchase the property.
Flannigan's argument assumes that all rights of first refusal are meant to give the holder
the right to buy and not the entitlement to a non facere. Secondly it unfairly limits the
grantor to the market value, whereas some third party may be prepared to pay a higher
257 Flannigan March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review 1 34.
258 The same conflict of interests is behind many other controversies mentioned by Flannigan March-June
1997 Canadian Bar Review 1 et seq and Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-65 et
seq, such as the question whether a gift, the dissolution of the grantor company, the sale of the entire share
capital of the grantor company or a sale for consideration which is partly in cash triggers the right of first
refusal. The possibility of the grantor deliberately circumventing the right of first refusal is a major
consideration for those who argue that such transactions trigger the right of first refusal.
259 Supra 31-32.
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price."? The argument focuses only on the holder's interests on the basis that "the whole
purpose of the right of first refusal is to benefit the holder." However, this ignores the
fact that the holder could benefit to various degrees and in various ways. A bare
preference still benefits the holder to some extent. Equally, the holder definitely still
benefits from a right of first refusal understood as a right to buy when the trigger event is
limited to a sale for cash of that specific object on its own.
To conclude, preference contracts are usually interpreted in American law as creating a
conditional right to contract, even where they do not predetermine the terms of the main
contract. Where the grantor has breached the preference agreement by contracting with a
third party without having granted the holder an opportunity to contract, the holder's right
is said to "ripen" into an option so that the holder can bring the main contract into
existence by a simple acceptance of that option. However, there is some authority that
the preferential right to transact does not tum into an option upon a lesser manifestation
of the grantor's desire to contract unless the preference contract predetermines the terms
of the main contract. There is some recognition in American law that any desire to sell
the preemption property on any terms triggers fixed-price or fair-market-value
preemptions, but not necessarily other types of preemption rights which gives the holder
a right to match a third party offer.": In this respect, American law is in agreement with
Henrich and the German writers on publishing law. Henrich confines the
Angebotsvorhand construction to preference contracts that predetermine the terms of the
main contract/" The German writers on publishing law confine the conditional option
("in the narrow sense"), which grants the publisher the right to contract upon the author's
decision that her next work is ready for publication, to cases where the "option clause"
predetermines the terms of the eventual publishing contract.
260 CfSoergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 Rd Nr 4 (now § 463) who recognise this legitimate interest of
the owner to obtain as high a price as possible.
261 Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-69.
262 See par 4 1 2 5 supra.
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4 4 Conclusion
The reliance on the Vorkaufsrecht in the Oryx case is problematic. The normal wording
of preference contracts in South Africa leads to the application of the Vorhand
construction and not the Vorkaufsrecht construction. The Vorkaufsrecht differs radically
from the right considered in the Oryx case as it does not prohibit a contract with a third
party, instead positing such a contract as a requirement for forcing a decision by the
holder whether she wishes to exercise her right. By contrast, the wording of the clause in
Oryx could be and was interpreted as prohibiting a sale to a third party unless a prior
offer was made to the holder.ê" The Vorkaufsrecht therefore necessarily implies that the
holder has a right to contract with the grantor on the terms agreed with the third party.
These are, however, not the only logically valid interpretations of preference contracts
creating an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii. German law recognises a number of
different types of Vorhand contracts which may apply according to the different contexts
in which preference contracts may be used, the relative bargaining power of the parties,
the purpose of the holder and the wording chosen for the preference clause. Each of
these constructions has some commercial justification.
According to Henrich, the writer of the most comprehensive exposition of Vorhand
contracts, the default Vorhand construction amounts to an obligatio non contrahendo cum
tertii that corresponds with the Hartsrivier construction'?' and Botha lA's construction in
263 In Oryx the clause was formulated as follows: The grantor is not entitled to sell the shares and claims
before he has offered the shares and claims to the holder at the same price as that at which he is willing to
sell to a third party. Any such offer must be made in writing with reference to the name of the third party
and the holder could accept such offer within thirty days of receipt thereof (900E-F). The court saw
conclusion of a contract of sale with a third party as breach (see at 904D "na sluiting van 'n koopkontrak in
stryd met sy reg ... "). In any event, the court did not limit its exposition to the specific clause under
consideration.
264 Recognised in Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk supra. See par 2 1 2 supra.
142
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd. 265 However, where the price is set
in the preference contract, the default construction is the Angebotsvorhand construction,
which allows the grantor to obtain an order that an offer be made plus specific
performance of the main contract in one action. The justification for this distinction is
that the grantor has no bona fide interest in sounding out the market upon deciding to
contract where the price was predetermined, whereas he has a legitimate interest to do so
where no price was fixed.
The English cases on rights of pre-emption referred to in South African case law also do
not support a uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an enforceable
duty to make an offer upon manifestation of a desire to sell. English drafters of
preference contracts generally provide a mechanism for determining the terms of the
main contract upon the exercise of the right, such as valuation by a third party. Such
drafting justifies the conclusion that the parties intend the holder to be entitled to contract
on those terms. These cases cannot be equated with preference contracts that do not
predetermine the price in a like manner. English law also recognises that preference
contracts could be drafted with no obligation to make or accept an offer, as long as the
grantor does not contract with a third party on terms not rejected by the holder.
In addition, the English case of Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester
Racecourse Company'" does not support the proposition for which it is widely cited in
South African case law, namely that rights of pre-emption necessarily create a duty to
make an offer on occurrence of the trigger event.
265 Supra.
266 Supra.
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The almost unanimous support of US courts for a remedy by which the holder can
ultimately obtain performance of the main contract upon conclusion of a contract with a
third party, challenges the hypothesis suggested by German law that the default
construction of preference contracts should be the bare preference contract which only
creates a negative obligation. The policy considerations in favour of each construction
should be carefully considered. The logical possibility and desirability of a construction
which combines the benefits of both the bare preference contract and the construction
which allows specific performance of the main contract only upon the grantor actually
contracting with a third party, should also be considered. In other words, it must be
asked whether a preference contract comprising an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii,
and which does not predetermine the terms of the main contract, should entitle the holder
to performance of the main contract, but then only upon the grantor in fact contracting
with a third party in breach of the preference contract (and not upon a lesser
manifestation of a desire to sell). If so, an attempt should be made to explain the basis of
this remedy in order to arrive at a coherent, understandable construction.
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5 A typology of preferential rights to contract
The previous chapters have demonstrated that parties may have very different
consequences in mind when concluding agreements granting a so-called "right of first
refusal", "right of pre-emption" or "first option."
Firstly, some courts and writers have realised that parties sometimes have in mind an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, which is only enforceable by remedies aimed at
restoring the status quo ante breach. I Understood as such, the preference contract still
grants the holder a preference above others - if the grantor decides to contract, she must
first give the holder the opportunity to do so before contracting with third parties.
On the other hand, parties to a preference agreement may also intend to grant a right to
contract enforceable upon the occurrence of a certain event.'
Unfortunately, many drafters do not state clearly what result is intended. In fact,
preference agreements often merely state that a first option or right of first refusal is
granted. Such a contract can therefore be understood in very different ways. Even those
contracts that clearly grant an enforceable conditional right to contract, mostly fail to
I See, for example, Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v VanNiekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T) discussed in par 2 1 2
supra, the "normal" (bare preference) Vorhand of German law discussed in par 4 1 2 4 supra and the
Scottish case of Roebuck v Edmunds 1992 Scots Law Times 1055 discussed in par 4 2 n 212 supra. See
also the English writer Castle Barnsley's Land Options 2nd edition (1992) 157-158, who mentions a type of
pre-emption contract which merely obliges the grantor to notify the holder of the desire to sell, and leaves
the holder to make a suitable offer to buy, which the grantor is free to accept or decline (discussed in par 4
2 supra).
2 Numerous writers and courts have recognized this. See, for example, the decisions in Associated South
African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 893 (A), Owsianick v
African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 310 (A), the discussion of the Vorkaufsrecht,
Angebotsvorhand and Annahmevorhand of German law in paras 4 1 1, 4 1 2 1 and 4 1 2 2 supra and the
discussion of the position in England and the United States of America in paras 4 2 and 4 3 respectively.
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defrne the condition or trigger event clearly and unambiguously. Accordingly, it is often
stated widely enough to include any manifestation of a desire to conclude the substantive
contract, as opposed to a stronger indication that the grantor is about to contract with a
specific third party, or only the conclusion of the substantive contract with a third party.
Apart from the multiplicity of types of preferential rights that parties may have in mind,
there are also a multiplicity of possible juridical explanations, or views on the "legal
nature" of these contracts. For example, a preference contract granting an enforceable
right to contract could be understood firstly as giving rise to a conditional option,
secondly as an enforceable conditional duty to make an offer, or, thirdly, as a conditional
duty to make an offer supplemented by a contractual power to create the substantive
contract by unilateral declaration. The choice of juridical explanation sometimes has
practical implications. For example, if the holder has the contractual power just
mentioned or if the preference contract is regarded as a conditional option contract, the
holder need only approach a court once to obtain performance of the substantive contract.
By contrast, a conditional right to an offer is arguably only enforceable by an order that
an offer be made. The holder may therefore require a further court order for specific
performance of the substantive contract against a recalcitrant grantor.
In this chapter, I will set out the different types of preference contracts that could
conceivably be intended by parties as well as the possible juridical explanations of each
type. I will therefore suggest a typology of preferential rights to contract to set the scene
for a proposal on how our courts should deal with this multiplicity. This proposal will be
set out in a later chapter.
The view that some preferential rights to transact amount to conditional options' calls for
this typology to include options in order to clarify the relationship between these
3 See, for example, Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 137; Reinecke & Otto "Voorkope en ander
voorkeurkontrakte" 1986 TSAR 1824 et seq; Janisch "Maintaining the distinction between options and pre-
emption agreements" 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 443; Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and
Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 82-85. Cf Krauze v Van Wyk 1984 2 SA 702 (NK).
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phenomena. There is clearly a close connection between options and preference
contracts. Both prohibit the grantor to contract with a third party until the holder has
declined to contract. In this sense, the option holder is to be preferred above third parties,
and has the right to first refuse the offer embedded in the option contract.' Both options
and preference contracts leave the holder totally free to decide whether to contract, but
limit the grantor's freedom to contract with others. As noted before, they can accordingly
be described as "unilaterally binding" pacta de contrahendo, to distinguish them from
bilaterally binding "agreements to contract in the future", which also qualify as
enforceable pacta de contrahendo in some foreign legal systems.' The typology will
therefore include all "unilaterally binding" pacta de contrahendo, with a caveat that this
term is not wholly correct where the holder undertakes a counter-performance for the
option or right of first refusal. In that case the pactum de contrahendo is not, strictly
speaking, unilaterally binding. However, only the grantor's freedom to contract with
whomever he pleases is restricted.
It may perhaps be argued that any attempt to systemise the different types of preference
contracts is unnecessary and dangerously dogmatic, as each contract should simply be
See also the English case of Pritchard v Briggs [1980] Ch 339 (CA) and the US case law discussed in the
previous chapter. See also Hondius (ed) Verbintenissenrecht 3 Suppl84 (Feb 2001) art 219 paras 285-286
on the position in the Netherlands.
4 Sometimes American authorities refer to the optionee's power of acceptance as a "refusal" (Tew "Rights
Of First Refusal: The "Options" That Are Not Options, But May Become Options" 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Procedures 7-1 7-6 and authorities there cited.)
5 On such "agreements to agree" which bind both parties to conclude another contract, see for example,
Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 84 et seq. I use the term pacta de
contrahendo in a wide sense to also include agreements which merely prohibit the grantor from concluding
the specific contract with a third party, although they do not grant the holder an enforceable right to
conclude the contract. For a similar wide definition see Lotz "Purchase and Sale" in Zimmermann &
Visser Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 384 ("agreements which may
lead to contracts"). For other definitions of pacta de contrahendo see chapter 1 n 36 et seq supra. If a
pactum de contrahendo is defined as an agreement to conclude an agreement, this term is not wide enough
to include all types of preference contracts.
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on the basis of precedent and historical authority.' Another important aim of this
interpreted in its specific context." However, the identification of different types of
preference contracts is meant, inter alia, as an aid to the process of interpretation, which
remains paramount in the analysis of a particular contract. The emphasis on a
multiplicity of possible constructions aims to increase awareness of the different
legitimate variations that parties may intend, so as to counter the tendency to force
preference contracts into a single mould. A number of South African decisions on
preference contracts ostensibly recognise the principle of contractual freedom and the
need to interpret each individual preference contract. In fact, their statements on the law
of preference contracts reveal an insistence on one uniform construction, followed not
because of the particular interests and likely intention of the parties involved, but rather
typology is to disabuse drafters of preference arrangements of the misconception that
hastily drafted, brief preference clause could be interpreted in only one possible way. In
reality, the default construction of preference contracts is by no means settled, and more
than one interpretation can be placed on the terms "right of first refusal", "right of pre-
emption" or "first option".' The typology therefore also serves as a catalogue of possible
constructions that drafters may use in an attempt to reflect the actual intention of the
parties before them.
6 Huber in Mertens (ed) Burgertiches Gesetzbuch mit Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen Kohlhammer-
Kommentar begrundei von Hs Th Soergel & W Siebert 3: Schuldrecht II (§§ 433-515) AGB-Gesetz, AbzG,
EAG, EKG, UN-KaufAbk (1991) (hereafter cited as Soergel & Siebert (Huber)) Vor § 504 RdNr 9 and
Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht (1975) 95 n 423 (writing on German law) criticise Henrich's
attempt to systematically discuss the different possible types of preference contract on the basis that this is
always rather a matter of interpretation.
7 See chapter 2 for examples. Cf also Lubbe's critique of Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 3 SA 739 (A) in
1985 Annual Survey 141. Cfalso the South African writers who reject the bare preference construction as
illogical and commercially useless and only recognise preference contracts which grant a conditional right
to contract (see the discussion under par 1 2 supra).
8 By default construction I mean the body of rules that should apply in the absence of clear regulation by
the parties.
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Unilaterally binding pacta de contrahendo can be grouped in different ways. They could,
for example, be grouped into two main groups according to whether they create an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, or not. In this chapter, I will instead categorise
them into two main categories according to whether they grant the holder an enforceable
right to contract or not. The first group comprises preference arrangements that grant the
holder a mere right to be preferred above third parties (a "bare preference") and not a
right to contract (5 1 below). The second category, which grants a right to contract, could
be conditional or unconditional and will be discussed in paragraph 52 below.
A "bare preference" is something less than a right to transact. It does not oblige the
grantor to do anything else than refrain from contracting with third parties until the holder
has declined the chance of contracting with the grantor. As such it only creates a
negative obligation, an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii. This negative obligation
continues until the grantor has actually concluded and performed a contract with a third
party on terms that the holder was given an opportunity to match. Therefore it can be
described as a negative obligation subject to a resolutive condition.
The second main group of contracts (which grants an enforceable right to contract) can be
divided into two main subtypes. Firstly those arrangements where the right to contract is
unconditional (5 2 1 below). This subtype comprises unconditional option contracts in the
traditional sense. Secondly, those arrangements where the right to contract is conditional
(5 2 2 below). This group comprises conditional options in the traditional sense as well
as some preference contracts. The preference contracts in this category are all
conditional upon some manifestation of a desire to contract by the grantor, whereas the
condition suspending conditional options in the traditional sense relates to some other
event. The trigger event of a preference contract granting a right to contract could be
any manifestation of a desire to sell (with some variation in its precise formulation) or it
could only be an undertaking to contract with a third party. The exact operation of these
preference contracts and their juristic explanation are also subject to variation. For
example, a right of first refusal which is triggered only by conclusion of a third party
contract could be understood as a conditional option, or as an enforceable right that an
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offer be made immediately before the grantor contracts with a third party. These juristic
explanations could impact on the remedies available for breach. For example, the
conditional option explanation means that the holder may unilaterally create the
substantive contract, whereas the other view implies that the holder must pray for an
order that an offer be made.
Only some basic aspects of each construction will be discussed, such as its sphere of
application, validity requirements, when and how it may be exercised, remedies for
breach and termination." Which type of preference contract should apply in which
situation will only be fully considered in a later chapter after possible types have been set
out here. Any comments in this chapter on a type's sphere of application will therefore
only be provisional examples of situations in which that type could or could not apply.
5 1 The bare preference contract
Parties to a preference contract sometimes intend that the holder should have no
conditional right to contract, but rather a right that the grantor would not contract with a
third party unless the holder has first been given a chance to do so. In such a case, the
holder is not entitled to contract with the grantor upon the occurrence of a certain event.
The term "trigger event" plays no role in these contracts, as the grantor's obligation does
not change from conclusion of the contract. The holder is only entitled to a non facere,
namely that the grantor refrain from contracting with third parties. This negative
obligation is subject to a resolutive condition, namely that the holder fails to match a third
party offer submitted to the holder or fails to indicate that he is interested in contracting
with the grantor. If the holder does not match the third party offer, the grantor is free to
contract with the third party.
9 A detailed consideration of issues such as what transactions would trigger the right, the effect of the
holder's inability to perform some of the obligations undertaken by the third party, whether the right is
actively or passively transmissible or capable of constituting a real right, are beyond the scope of this study,
but some of these issues will be touched upon in chapter 7 infra.
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contrahendo cum tertii:" Although South African writers have criticized these
This is the type of preference contract advocated by Henrich and German writers on
publishing law as the default Vorhand:" The majority in Owsianick v African
Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd" and the court in Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v
Van Niekerk" construed the preference contracts under consideration in a similar manner,
although they did not clearly decide on the remedies for breach of the obligatio non
decisions," some writers concede that parties may expressly structure their preference
contract as set out in the Hartsrivier Boerderye case."
As a negative obligation, the bare preference agreement is specifically enforceable by an
interdict prohibiting conclusion of a contract with a third party. Where the third party is
mala fide, the holder is also entitled to have the transfer to the third party set aside." In
the alternative, the holder may claim cancellation of the preference contract and damages.
The remedy of cancellation could be used to reclaim any counter-performance or
consideration given for the preference."
It is generally accepted that an award of damages should actually place the holder in the
position it would have been in had the grantor contracted with the holder on the same
10 See supra paras 4 1 23 and 4 1 24.
II Supra.
12 Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 19643 SA 702 (T).
13 See par 2 1 supra.
14 Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant 2nd edition (1994) 143-144; Reinecke & Otto 20
1986 TSAR 18; Eiseien "Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Voorkoopreg - regte en
verpligtinge van partye" 1986 THRHR 9597. Many writers have also welcomed the Oryx decision which
rejected the approach of the majority in Owsianick. See further par 1 2 supra.
15 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 97; Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway's Contract: Cases, Materials and
Commentary 3rd edition (1988) 92; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (1993) 62-63; Floyd
"Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253 261; Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 144-145.
16 By reason of the doctrine of notice (Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte
Biickereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 893 (A)).
17 Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox 1891 4 SAR 116.
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terms agreed with a third party." What is the justification for this in the present context,
seeing that the grantor never had an obligation to contract with the holder? Henrich
states that the holder may claim damages if he can prove that he would have made an
offer that would have persuaded the grantor to contract with him in response to notice by
the grantor that she wishes to contract with a specific third party on specific terms." He
reasons further that the grantor cannot claim that she would not have sold to the holder,
because this would amount to the guilty party relying on the contract which allows the
grantor to refrain from selling to anybody." The grantor can only rely on the contract
insofar as the grantor has acted in accordance with the contract." The following is
perhaps a better explanation. A claim for damages aims to place the holder in the
position she would have been in had the contract not been breached. The grantor could
have fulfilled the contract in one of two ways. Firstly by not contracting with anybody
and, secondly, by contracting with the holder. As the first situation is unlikely to have
occurred because of the breach that clearly shows the grantor's wish to contract, it is more
logical to compensate the holder on the basis of the second scenario. In other words, it
could be said that the holder was able to prove on a balance of probabilities that if the
grantor had obeyed the contract, the grantor would have contracted with the holder.
This type of bare preference contract can be structured in two ways, depending on the
method by which the grantor can be released from the obligatio non contrahendo cum
tertii. According to the first, the grantor need never make an offer to be freed of the
obligation, but must only invite the holder to match a third party offer. According to the
second, the grantor must make an offer to the holder to escape the obligatio non faciendi.
This distinction is probably overvalued. Even if the second construction applies, the
holder's failure or refusal to respond to an invitation to make an offer would very often be
18 Bel/airs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A) 1139H-1l40A; Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137 147; Floyd 1986
THRHR 253254; Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 367-368.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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5 1 1 Notice of third party offer prerequisite for release
regarded as a waiver of the preferential right to contract, so that the grantor would be
released without having made an offer.
In terms of this construction, the grantor can rid himself of the obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii by notifying the holder of the identity of an interested third party and the terms
offered by her and inviting him to match the third party's offer." The grantor need not
take the risk of making an offer to the holder. This would be a risk because in the
meantime a better third party offer may materialize before the grantor is able to withdraw
the offer to the holder. If the holder responds with a matching or higher offer, the grantor
need not accept that. The grantor may simply not contract with a third party at the terms
acceptable to the holder or at more advantageous terms. Therefore the grantor is better
able to sound out the market than if she had to make an offer to the holder in order to
shake off the preference agreement.
In the Hartsrivier case," the court interpreted a clause which granted the holder "a right
of first refusal if the grantor would decide to sell the farm'?" as placing a duty on the
grantor to grant the holder a reasonable opportunity to make an offer, which the grantor
need not accept. 25
I Validity Requirements
22 A notice that the grantor desires to contract should be regarded as a tacit invitation to make an offer.
23 Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk supra.
.
24 My free and abridged translation of the Afrikaans clause which read as follows: "Indien die verhuurder te
enige tyd gedurende die huurtermyn of by die verstryking daarvan sou besluit om die plaas te verkoop dan
sal die huurder die eerste reg van weiering besit om gemelde plaas aan te koop."
25705H.
153
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
/I Termination
As this type of preference contract does not give the holder a right to ultimately obtain
the object or property, it need not comply with formalities; such as those prescribed by
the Alienation of Land Act. Because it is not a conditional option or conditional right to
an offer, the terms of the substantive contract or offer need not be ascertainable from the
preference contract.
In Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk:" the court decided that the grantor
had to give the holder a reasonable time within which to make the offer." If the holder
fails to make a valid offer within a reasonable time fixed in the invitation, his right lapses.
An oral indication that the holder wants to contract is therefore not sufficient where the
substantive contract must comply with formalities." This is a fair rule. If a mere non-
binding indication that the holder is prepared to contract would prohibit the conclusion of
the substantive contract with a third party, this would be unfair to the grantor if the holder
later indicates that he no longer wishes to contract.
Where the grantor made a simple invitation to submit an offer without any additional
information, the holder's outright failure or refusal to respond would normally amount to
waiver of the right. This conduct normally indicates that the holder is not interested in
contracting at all with the grantor, and that the grantor is free to contract with any third
party at any terms whatsoever.
In the absence of such a waiver, does the preference contract continue until the grantor
performs a contract concluded with a third party, of whose ·offer and identity the holder
26 Supra.
27705H.
28 706H. See further par 2 1 2 supra.
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It is submitted that, in the absence of any complaint from the holder, the grantor's failure
to disclose a third party's identity should not preclude the grantor from contracting with
that third party. If the holder never requested such information, the grantor may assume
that this information is not important to the holder."
knew at the time of the invitation, or does the rejected invitation to the holder result in the
grantor's release?
However, the holder should be entitled to insist on disclosure of any third party offeror's
identity. The primary purpose of a preference contract is often to enable the holder to
control the identity of third parties with which the grantor may contract, rather than to
allow the holder the chance of obtaining the property. If the grantor fails to accede to
such a request, the preference contract should not terminate merely because the holder
was granted an opportunity to make an offer. In other words, where the holder made
such a request, the grantor would only be released upon contracting with a third party
whose identity has been disclosed to the holder when the latter was invited to make an
offer.
Should the same reasoning apply to a failure to inform the holder of the terms on which
the grantor intends to contract? In other words, would the grantor only be released if her
rejected invitation to the holder included information on competing third party offers?
Can the onus be placed upon the holder to find out what offers the grantor is considering,
so that the failure to do so would constitute a waiver of her right regardless of whether
the grantor is considering any third party offers? A related question concerns the effect
of an offer by the holder made without any knowledge of third party offers. Would the
grantor then be free to immediately sell to a third party at a higher figure, even if the
29 Austrian law requires the grantor to inform the holder of the third party's identity before the time limit
within which the Vorkaufsrecht must be exercised begins to run. See 1957 Evidenzblatt 547 (Nr 349) 548.
However, where the holder comes to know of the third party's identity during the course of negotiations
with the grantor, the failure to include these particulars in the grantor's notice is irrelevant (SZ 22/34
(16.3.1949».
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The fairest solution would therefore be a general rule that for the grantor to be free to
contract with a third party on certain terms, the terms must be disclosed to the holder and
the holder must be invited to make an offer at those terms." This also means that where
holder was not informed of the terms on which the grantor is willing to contract with the
third party?
If the grantor is obliged to inform the holder of the terms on which she is prepared to
contract before she may be released, the holder would more seriously consider the
invitation to make an offer. This would enhance the probability of a realistic offer and
reduce the risk of losing the preferential right through too Iowan offer. The terms of
competing third party offers are evidently important for the holder's decision on the
terms he should offer. The grantor, on the other hand, has a legitimate interest to obtain
as high a price as possible and may perhaps expect the holder to make a much higher
offer than the third party offers at hand. If the holder had an enforceable right to
information on third party offers, he would very likely pitch the offer only just above the
highest third party offer instead of at a much higher figure which he would otherwise be
prepared to offer. The grantor would then lose the opportunity to sell at a higher price to
the holder." A balancing out of these interests requires that the holder need not be
protected against voluntarily making "too high" an offer (too high because the grantor
would probably have accepted a lower one), but should be protected against "too low" an
offer, which would result in the holder losing the opportunity to contract to a third party
of whose offer the holder did not know.
30 Cfthe reasoning in Bellairs v Hodnett supra 1138F-1139A.
31 A requirement that the grantor must act bona fide by not conniving with the third party to place terms in
the third party offer which the grantor knows the holder cannot match and in which he has no bona fide
interest may be a necessary check on the grantor where the grantor proposes incidentalia in the offer to the
holder which suits the third party but which the holder cannot fulfill, and in which the grantor has no actual
interest. This would only concern incidental terms and not the contract price itself. The rule on
termination argued for sufficiently protects the holder against the grantor seeking to rid himself of the
holder by setting up a ridiculously high offer by a third party. This requirement of bona fides will not be
considered in depth here. I will return to the topic in a later chapter.
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the holder submits an offer of R5000 in response to the grantor's invitation without
knowing of a competing third party offer of R6000, the grantor would not be free to
contract with the third party at R6000 unless the holder has been given a chance to match
that offer.
Moreover, the grantor should only be released if she contracts with that third party at the
disclosed price within a reasonable time. Otherwise the possiblity of a grantor
deliberately evading his duties aided by inflation would still exist. For example, the
grantor could offer the object for sale at R200 000 to the holder, knowing that this is way
above market value at that stage. Upon the holder refusing this offer on the basis that the
price is too high, the grantor could then wait another year and offer the property to a third
party to whom he actually wishes to sell at R200 000, which could then be a fair price for
the property. Would it not be fairer if the holder should again get an opportunity to buy
at R200 000 a year later? Surely this would not prejudice the grantor. To protect the
holder against such a scenario, a qualification should therefore be added that the grantor
would only be released from the preference if she sells within a reasonable time after
making the offer to the holder (to any third party)." The grantor would therefore be
released only if she sells to the same third party whose offer was put to the holder, within
a reasonable time after the holder has rejected or failed to accept the offer. If not, the
preferential right continues to exist and the grantor would once more have to invite the
holder to match terms on which the grantor is prepared to contract at a later stage, even if
these terms are exactly the same as the ones originally offered to the holder.
This rule does not mean that the grantor is under an enforceable duty to inform the holder
of each and every offer received. Neither can a holder force a grantor who has simply
invited an offer to disclose the terms of third party offers received. Accordingly, the
holder may request that information upon being invited to make an offer and may remind
the grantor that without such disclosure the grantor may not lawfully contract with a third
32 It is granted that the "reasonable time" requirement may lead to uncertainties.
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11/ Sphere of Application
party, but the holder may not force the grantor by court order to make such disclosure."
The rule argued for is that failure to disclose such a third party offer means that the
grantor may not lawfully contract on those terms with a third party. It does not express
the grantor's duty, but merely amounts to a qualification of the method by which the
grantor may be released from the preference contract.
Is the bare preference construction excluded by a formulation that "the grantor must offer
to contract with the holder before the grantor contracts with a third party" or, "when the
grantor wants to contract, she must first offer to contract with the holder"? Does the
word "offer" mean that a mere invitation or notice to the holder is not good enough, but
that only an offer would release the grantor?"
As was said before, even if these words do import that only an offer to the holder will
release the grantor, this will not make much difference in practice as a failure or refusal
to respond to the grantor's invitation to make an offer may nevertheless amount to a
waiver of the holder's right, so that the grantor would be released without making an
offer.
However, where, in reply to the grantor's invitation, the holder insists that it is the grantor
who should make an offer, the refusal to make an offer cannot be said to amount to a
waiver. In that case, would notice to the holder of a third party offer and an invitation to
make an offer on those terms be enough, so that the holder's failure to do so, releases the
33 In any event, such a remedy would be rather toothless against a recalcitrant grantor.
34 Although the Austrian code foresees that the grantor should make an offer to the holder before she is
released (§ 1072 ABGB: anbieten salf), some Austrian writers argue that notice to the holder is sufficient.
See, for example, Faistenberger C Das Vorkauftrecht (1967), Welser R "Das Vorkaufsrecht. Zum Vorkauf
im Osterreichischen Biirgerlichen Recht. Von Christoph Faistenberger (Buchbesprechung)" 1971
Zeitschrift fiir Rechtsvergleichung 313.
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5 1 2 Offer to holder prerequisite for release
grantor? It is submitted that in this scenario the grantor has given the holder the
opportunity to contract on the same terms as the third party and if the holder fails to
indicate a willingness to contract on those terms, the grantor should be free to contract on
those terms with a third party. If this reasoning is not persuasive, the next sub-type must
be recognised to cater for clauses providing for the making of an offer.
Grantors who want to grant a limited preferential right to transact should rather not use
the word "offer" in the preference clause. An alternative formulation would be that when
the grantor wishes to contract he should first invite the holder to make an offer. If the
holder fails to do so within a stated or reasonable time, the grantor would be free to
contract at any terms with any third party. If the holder does make an offer, the grantor
need not accept that offer, but may not contract with a third party on the same terms or on
terms more beneficial to the holder, unless the holder has first been given an opportunity
to match those terms and has failed to do so.
In terms of this construction, the grantor can never be forced to make an offer, but
making an offer is the only way in which the grantor can lawfully be released from the
obligation not to contract with third parties, that is, if the holder rejects or fails to accept
that offer.
The rules relating to validity requirements and termination discussed under the previous
heading" should apply mutatis mutandis to this construction. Again, the mere fact that
the holder has rejected or failed to accept the offer, does not terminate the preference
agreement. The grantor may not after such rejection contract with a third party at any
price. The obligatio non faciendi only terminates when the grantor actually contracts
with a third party within a reasonable time on terms offered to and rejected by the holder.
This rule protects the holder against the possibility of the grantor making an
35 Par 5 1 1 supra.
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52 1 An unconditional right to contract (unconditional option)
unrealistically high offer in order to shake off the holder and thereafter contracting with a
third party on more realistic terms. It precludes the need for a rule that the grantor would
only be released upon making a good faith or reasonable offer as far as the price is
concerned, which is bound to lead to disputes."
5 2 A right to contract
These arrangements do not merely grant a right to be preferred above third parties. They
do not only encompass an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, but also grant the holder
a right to contract with the grantor or to directly obtain performance of the substantive
contract under certain circumstances. "Right to contract" is used to denote both these
possibi lities.
The holder of an unconditional option has an immediate right to contract. The only step
required to bring the substantive contract into existence is the exercise of the option by
the holder. This takes the form of acceptance of the offer embedded in or protected by
the option contract. 37 Once the holder has exercised the option, the normal remedies for
enforcement of the substantive contract are available.
The offer embedded in the option contract must comply with the normal requirements for
certainty." If nothing is said as to the contract price, the possibility of a tacit price
36 See n 31 supra on the possible need to still require a bona fide offer as far as other contract terms are
concerned.
37 See generally De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 (1992) 34; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 58 et seq; Lubbe & Murray Contract 75; Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 5th edition
(1998) 77 et seq; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th edition (2001) 59 et seq.
38 McGregor v Jordaan 1920 CPD 209 213; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 34; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 60 et seq; Lubbe & Murray Contract 74-75; cfKerr Contract 77-78. On the requirement of
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The offer embedded in the option contract and the acceptance thereof must, of course,
comply with the formalities required for the substantive contract."
determination must be considered. The grantor would be taken to have tacitly intended
the usual price, if one exists." In the absence of a usual price, our courts have been
unwilling to imply a reasonable price into a sale or lease contract, and have only done so
in respect of contracts for services." Such sale or lease contracts have therefore been
held to be void for uncertainty. Recently, our courts have indicated that agreements to
sell or lease at a reasonable price should be valid." However, no court has stated that an
obligation to pay a reasonable price should be implied where no price was agreed upon.
certainty generally see De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 93 et seq; Lubbe & Murray Contract at 314 et
seq; Van der Merwe et al Contract 161 et seq; Kerr Contract 71.
39 Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 119 (D); Globe Electrical Transvaal (Pty) Ltd v
Brunhuber 1970 3 SA 99 (E); Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 1972 3 SA 663 (T); Shell SA
(Pty) Ltd v Corbitt 19864 SA 532 (C) 526-527; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 315.
40 Erasmus v Arcade Electric 19623 SA 418 (T); Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch supra; Elite
Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 1 SA 195 (RA); Lubbe & Murray Contract
315; De Wet & Van WykKontraktereg 315.
41 See the obiter dictum to this effect in Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC
(previously NBC Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1992 1 SA 566 (A) 577G-578C. This dictum was approved in
Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd 2001 2 SA 170 (W) 170 173G-17 4G.
42 Rogers v Phillips 1985 3 SA 183 (E) 187 emphasises that Brand v Spies 19604 SA 14 (E) only laid
down that the offer and acceptance must be in writing. Therefore there is no reason why a written offer
cannot be the subject of an oral (option) agreement to keep it open for a certain period. This is also the
position laid down by Venter v Birchholtz 1972 1 SA 276 (A). Hirschowitz v Moolman supra overruled
Rogers v Phillips as far as rights of pre-emption are concerned by deciding that pacta de contrahendo
generally has to conform to the formal requirements for the contemplated contract (766D-E; obiter on
options at 767F-G). However, it is submitted that the analysis in Rogers v Phillips is correct, and that the
position regarding options is still as set out in Venter v Birchholtz, See further Van Rensburg
"Formaliteitsvoorskrifte, Voorkoopregte en Opsies" 1986 THRHR 208 213-215; Lubbe & Murray Contract
75; Van der Merwe et al Contract 60-61; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 31; Lubbe 1985 Annual
Survey 140 et seq; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 31 et seq and authorities there cited.
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The normal rules for an acceptance regulates the manner in which the conditional option
must be exercised. Where the option contract does not specify a period for its duration,
the default rule is apparently that the holder has a reasonable time to accept the offer,
otherwise it will lapse,"
The option is breached when the grantor refuses to accept that the substantive contract
came into being upon a valid exercise of the option. Breach also occurs where the
grantor contracts with a third party although the holder has not rejected the offer
embedded in the option contract. The normal remedies for breach and prevention of
breach are available, including specific performance of the substantive contract."
5 2 2 A conditional right to contract
This category comprises, firstly, options in the traditional sense that are subject to some
suspensive condition (5 1 2 2 below), and secondly, rights of first refusal that entitle the
holder to ultimately enforce the substantive contract upon occurrence of a certain event (5
1 2 1 below).
The distinction between these two subtypes lies firstly in the nature of the suspensive
condition." In the second subtype, the condition suspending the right to contract relates
to the manifestation of a desire to contract by the grantor, which is a potestative or mixed
condition. In the first subtype, the condition relates to something other than the
manifestation of a desire to contract. It could, for example, be a change in the use of the
land or the holder's marriage to the grantor's son. These conditions are mixed conditions
as the grantor retains control over fulfilment of the condition.
43 CfLubbe & Murray Contract 39; Christie Contract 54; Van der Merwe et al Contract 60.
44 Thompson v Van der Vyver 1954 2 SA 192 (C); McGregor v Jordaan 1921 CPD 301; Bates v Bates 1964
1 SA 623 (0); Van der Merwe et al Contract 61; Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987)
55-56.
45 Tew "Rights of First Refusal: The 'Options' That Are Not Options, But May Become Options" 1989
Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-7.
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5221 Conditional options in the traditional sense
Another difference encountered in South African law, but not in all foreign jurisdictions,
is the notion that the second subtype does not oblige the grantor to keep open an offer
made after fulfilment of the condition, whereas a conditional option traditionally does."
Wissekerke v Wissekerke" allows the grantor of a right of first refusal to withdraw any
offer at that stage as long as the holder had not exercised the right, but only if the grantor
can show that he no longer wishes to contract at all."
The second subtype is subject to variation according to what suffices as a manifestation
of the desire to sell, namely the conclusion of a contract with a third party or something
less, as well as according to the exact duties and rights of the parties upon fulfilment of
the condition.
The traditional understanding of a conditional option is that it is an option subject to a
suspensive condition that does not relate to the grantor's desire to conclude the
substantive contract.
An example is an agreement that, if certain land would cease to be used for racecourse
purposes or would at any time be proposed to be used for dock purposes, the holder
would have an option to buy it at an ascertainable price."
46 Boyd v Nel1922 AD 414 421; Hersch v Nel1948 3 SA 686 (A) 695; Brand v Spies 19604 SA 14 (E) 16;
Venter v Birchholtz 1972 1 SA 276 (A) 283; Anglo Carpets (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1978 3 SA 582 (T) 585.
See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 72 nl; Kerr Contract 77 et seq. However, there is some uncertainty as
to the effect of an option which does not specify a period for its duration. See further at n 100 infra.
47 19702 SA 550 (A).
48 Kerr Contract 77 suggests that the grantor should show some change in circumstances giving cause for
his change of mind, in order to ensure that the grantor is acting in good faith.
49 Cf Manchester Ship Canal Company vManchester Racecourse Company 19002 Ch 352; 1901 2 Ch 37
(CA) and Taylor & Claridge v Van Jaarsveld & Nellmapius 1887 TS 137. Another example is where A
163
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The rules on the validity requirements, exercise and remedies for breach of conditional
option are mutatis mutandis the same as that of unconditional options and will not be
repeated here.
5 2 2 2 Right to contract conditional upon the mani{estation ora desire to contract
The trigger event of a preference contract granting a right to contract could be any
manifestation of a desire to sell or it could only be an undertaking to contract with a third
party. The exact operation of these preference contracts and their juristic explanation are
also subject to variation. For example, a right of first refusal which is triggered only by
conclusion of a third party contract could be understood as a conditional option, or as an
enforceable right that an offer be made immediately before the grantor contracts with a
third party. These juristic explanations impact on the remedies available for breach. For
example, the conditional option explanation means that the holder may unilaterally create
the substantive contract by acceptance of the offer embedded in the preference contract,
whereas the other view implies that the holder must pray for an order that an offer be
made.
South African lawyers may protest that "desire to sell" is a potestative condition, which
therefore makes the conditional right to contract nonsensical. Specifically they could
argue that an option conditional upon a desire to sell cannot exist, as the intention to
create an obligation is an essential prerequisite for a substantive offer." This objection
has been dealt with under par 4 1 1 2 dealing with the BGB Vorkaufsrecht. It will be
recalled that German writers have correctly pointed out that the economic need to
agrees with B that if A cannot upgrade the zoning classification of a certain property by a specific date, B
will have the right to purchase the property at a specified sum for the next 30 days (cfTew 1989 Eastern
Mineral Law Procedures 7-1 7-5).
50 CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 76. See Wessels Contract par 1312-1321 on potestative conditions
generally.
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recognise contracts subject to at least partly potestative conditions ("mixed conditions"),
means that a blanket objection to potestative conditions as inconsistent with a serious
intention to be bound is suspect of a formalistic, Begriffsjurisprudenz approach." A more
functional and sensible approach is to consider the reasons for the objections to
potestative conditions and to test any particular potestative condition against them before
rejecting it as inconsistent with an intention to be contractually bound. Only potestative
conditions which state liability to be dependent on the mere ipse dixit of a party are
objectionable because such a contract could never be enforced by a court against that
party as long as she insists that she does not want to be bound. 52 The condition that the
grantor concludes a contract with a third party is therefore not an objectionable
potestative condition. 53 A court could enforce it against a grantor who insists that she
does not want to be bound by merely pointing to the fact that a contract with a third party
has been concluded. The same applies even where the condition is an "overt act
manifesting a serious desire to contract" or simply "a desire to contract." The court can
point to the grantor's actions which manifests such a desire or intention. Liability
depends on those actions, not on the grantor's mere ipse dixit. The condition is mixed
rather than purely potestative, and for that reason not objectionable. Also unfounded is
the more theoretical objection that the intention to be bound is of the essence of an offer
so that an option conditional upon the manifestation of a desire to sell simply cannot be
an offer. Any condition that is added to an option means that the grantor does not intend
to be bound to contract at that point, but only once the condition is fulfilled. However,
the grantor confirms that he is prepared to be bound once the condition is fulfilled. The
same is true of any other conditional contract. Yet the same objection is not raised
against such conditional contracts: they still bind the grantor pending fulfilment of the
condition.
51 CfSoergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 10;Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) § 158 RdNr 60.
Pound Interpretations of Legal History (1946) 119 speaks of a "jurisprudence of conceptions" which
amounts to a mechanistic application oflegal concepts.
52 See also Christie Contract 112.
53 Cf Milnehener Kommentar (Westermann) § 158 RdNr 60.
165
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52221 Any manifestation of a desire to contract triggers the right
It is true that a condition referring to the grantor's desire to contract may lead to disputes,
depending on what precisely is taken to be a manifestation of a desire to contract. This
issue will be dealt with more fully below.
I will now set out the two main types of preference contract under this rubric, namely
those which are triggered by any manifestation of a desire to contract and those which are
only triggered by a contract with or offer to a third party.
Many South African commentators and decisions do not specifically limit the trigger
event to the conclusion of a contract with or an offer to a third party." Some specifically
argue that a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell should be sufficient." So, for
example, Wessels JA in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres" said that
"Desire, like intention, resides in the mind, and its existence, sometimes settled and sometimes
ephemeral, is to be determined in the light of the available, relevant evidential material, such as
considered, or even unguarded confessions or other conduct which points unequivocally to its
existence. ,,57
The wording of preference arrangements is often wide enough to support such a wide
understanding of the trigger event. These contracts often provide that when the grantor
"desires" or "wishes" to contract, he shall first give the holder a chance to do so.
54 Kerr The South African Law of Sale and Lease (1996) 410; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 144-146; Lubbe
1982 Annual Survey 128 130; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 267; Lotz "Purchase and Sale" in Zimmermann &
Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 386; Eiseien 1986
THRHR 9599; Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 442-443. Cf ïot example Soteriou v Retco Poyntons
1985 2 SA 922 (A) 932H et seq. By contrast, Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 26 state that a lesser
manifestation than a valid offer to the holder should not lightly be regarded as a trigger event.
55 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253258-259,264.
56 Supra.
57327H.
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I Exercise of the right: the trigger event and contract price
The precise trigger event may be more narrowly defined than "desire to contract" but still
refer to a stage before the grantor actually contracts with a third party. For example, it
could be defined as a willingness, here and now, to contract with a specific third party."
Another view is that the test should be whether the grantor's action can be interpreted as
"the initiation of the accomplishment of the decision to alienate.t'" According to this
view, any manifestation of an intention to contract shortly is not sufficient.
By contrast, if any manifestation of a desire to contract should trigger the holder's right,
the commencement of negotiations with third parties, or listing a property for sale would
also qualify.
Which should be the default definition of the trigger event will be considered in a later
chapter after all the possible constructions have been set out in this one.
The view that the trigger event may be a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell than an
offer to or contract with a third party, raises the question of the counter-performance or
price against which the holder may enforce his right at such an early stage. Some South
African decisions and commentators favour an implied term that the holder may contract
on the terms at which the grantor is prepared to contract with a third party, apparently
even in the absence of an actual third party offer." However, until the grantor has agreed
58 This is the suggestion of Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 339.
59 In the words of Larenz "Die rechtliche Bedeutung von Optionsvereinbarungen" 1955 Der Betrieb 210
(my translation). See also Nipperdey "Uber Vorhand, Vorkaufsrecht und Einlësungsrecht" 1930 Zeitblatt
for Handelsrecht 300 301.
60 See Bel/airs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A), cited with approval by Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 137;
Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 6D-E; Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd 1985 4 SA 615 (T)
623H; Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra per Nicholas JA: "not beyond the bounds of commercial reason
and practice and made for the purpose of inducing a rejection" (9321-J, quoting Corbin On Contracts
section 261 at 477) and "fair and reasonable offer" (933D); see also at 933F.) See also Floyd 1986 THRHR
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253 257 and 260: "die bedinge wat die gewer van 'n derde sou verlang as hy 'n aanbod aan die derde sou
maak .... Die koopprys wat [so] ... vasgestel word, is nie noodwendig gelykstaande aan die markprys nie."
61 Radesich "Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Landlord and tenant-lease-right of
first refusal" 1985 De Jure 407 409-410.
62 As noted in the previous chapter, the Canadian writer Flannigan "The Legal Construction of Rights of
First Refusal" March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review 1 31-32 argues that transactions like a package deal
or dissolution of the grantor company should entitle the holder to buy the object at its market value because
"this price standard is implicit in the nature of a right of first refusal." Cf Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra
933D per Nicholas JA: "a fair and reasonable offer."
63 Setting a very high price may simply be due to optimism or stupidity on the part of the grantor and not to
a devious attempt to shake off the holder.
64 The majority in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra 932H, 933F per Nicholas JA held that while
the clause was silent as to the method of deterining rental to be stated in the offer, the grantor was not free
to fix any rental it pleased; it had to act bonafide. (On the facts, the grantor had indeed already concluded
a contract with a third party, so that it was not necessary to decide what should occur upon a lesser
manifestation of a desire to sell.)
65 See Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra 9321-J per Nicholas JA, quoting Corbin On Contracts § 261 at 477.
to contract with a third party, there is no basis to prove the terms on which he is in fact
prepared to contract with a third party. This is open to speculation and likely to lead to
disputes."
Others suggest that, in the absence of a third party contract, the holder is entitled to a fair
or reasonable price." However, forcing the grantor to contract at a reasonable or fair
price would be unfairly restrictive as there may be third parties which may offer a higher
price, and the grantor has merely undertaken to give the holder the chance to contract at
the best price she can find in the open market, before the grantor contracts with a third
party at that price. The grantor therefore has a legitimate, bona fide interest in obtaining
as high a price as possible, even higher than the reasonable or market price, as long as the
holder is ultimately preferred above third parties."
Another view would allow the grantor to make an offer in her discretion as long as it is
"in good faith"?' or "not beyond the bounds of commercial reason and practice and made
for the purpose of inducing a rejection. "65
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/I Remedies for breach
How may the holder enforce her right to contract upon occurrence of the trigger event?
The possibilities are, firstly, by the Oryx mechanism," secondly, by unilateral declaration
regarded as acceptance of an offer embedded in the preference contract, which is
therefore understood as a conditional option, and thirdly by an order that an offer be
made.
The Oryx mechanism is irrelevant to the cases under discussion here. According to the
Oryx case it only applies where the grantor had in fact already contracted with a third
party, and perhaps also ifhe had granted an option."
The juristic explanation of preference contracts as conditional options has the distinct
advantage for the holder that she could unilaterally create the substantive contract upon
the trigger event by accepting the offer embedded in the preference contract. She can
therefore pray directly for specific performance of the substantive contract. This
provides a more streamlined remedy than an order that an offer must be made. However,
the uncertain price standard that must apply upon a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell,
makes the "conditional option" explanation unsatisfactory: it is unlikely that an option to
buy at a "good faith" price or "price which the grantor would accept from a third party"
would be certain enough to be enforceable, in any event, where the grantor had not yet
contracted with a third party. As was argued above, an implied term that the holder may
buy at a reasonable price, is also not desirable. By contrast, where the parties had agreed
on a price or mechanism for its determination in the preference contract, the agreement
could be equated with a conditional option."
66 See par 1 1 for a description of this remedy.
67 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bëckereien (Pty) Ltd supra 908F-G.
68 As was noted before, the grantor would be taken to have tacitly intended the usual price, if one exists
(Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt 19864 SA 532 (C) 526-527; Adcorp Spare PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch1972 3
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Sometimes parties may provide that the grantor must invite an offer by the holder and
must then contract with the holder on the terms offered unless a higher third party offer
exists at the time the holder's offer is made. This is how the Annahmevorhand of
German law operates. Such a contract can also be understood as a conditional option to
contract at the terms set by the holder, subject to the further resolutive condition that a
higher third party offer exists. After the decisions in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River
Drive CC; Deeb & Ano v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank Ltd" and Engen
Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltcf° our courts may perhaps accept such an option
contract which leaves the determination of the contract price up to the holder. This type
of contract leaves the grantor more room to obtain the best possible price than the type
that forces the grantor to make an offer upon the trigger event. The grantor need only
inform the holder that the condition has been fulfilled and does not have to make an offer
at that stage. If the holder makes no offer, the grantor is free to sell to a third party." If
the grantor has in the meantime obtained a better offer from a third party, the grantor is
not bound to the holder's offer.
Insofar as the possible price standards which could apply on a lesser manifestation of a
desire to sell is too vague to found an option, the preference contract can be regarded as
an enforceable undertaking that an offer will be made on a manifestation of a desire to
sell. This was the remedy suggested by the minority in the Owsianick case" and ordered
by some English courts." It allows the view that the grantor should have a discretion to
make any offer he pleases.
SA 663 (T); Lombard v Pongola Sugar Mil/ing Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 119 (D); Globe Electrical Transvaal
(Pty) Ltd v Brunhuber 19703 SA 99 (E); De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 315).
69 19994 SA 928 (SeA).
702001 3 SA 1013 (W).
71 CfFloyd 1986 THRHR 253258 who states that Roman-Dutch law only required a notice to the holder if
the grantor desired to sell (whereas, on the authority of Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd supra, South
African law is said to require an offer).
72 Supra.
73 See supra par 4 2.
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Of course, some limitation should be placed upon his discretion to prevent him to get rid
of the holder by an unrealistically high offer that the holder would never accept. Wide
parameters like "good faith" and "the bounds of commercial reason and practice and not
made for the purpose of inducing a rejection" has been suggested as a check on the
grantor's freedom to make whatever offer he pleases. However, it is submitted that the
best way to prevent a malafide evasion of the holder's right is to hold that the preference
contract does not terminate until the grantor in fact contracts with and performs to a third
party at a price which the holder had an opportunity to match." This solution prevents
the uncertainty inherent in price standards like "good faith" and "reasonableness" and
sufficiently protects the holder against any malafide attempt to shake off the holder by an
outrageously high offer."
74 As suggested by Henrich 363. See par 4 1 2 1 5 supra.
75 For critcism aginst such vague requirements see Radesich 1985 De Jure 407409-410. Floyd's rejoinder
that the market or true value could be taken into account wrongly assumes that there is always a market
value for the performance in question. The established requirement that any contractual discretion must be
exercised bona fide (NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC; Deeb & Ana v ABSA Bank Ltd;
Friedman v Standard Bank Ltd 19994 SA 928 (SeA); Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd
2001 3 1013 (W» may still be a necessary check on the grantor where the grantor proposes incidentalia in
the offer to the holder which suits the third party but which the holder cannot fulfill, and in which the
grantor has no actual interest. This issue will be considered in more depth in chapter 7, as will the BGB
rule that a Vorkaufsrecht may still be exercised where the third party undertook a subsidiary personal
performance (Nebenleistung) which the holder cannot fulfill, as long as a monetary value can be placed on
that performance. This is a sensible rule that fairly balances both parties' interests. It should also be added
that where the preference arrangement indicates a mechanism for determining the price, the holder's
rejection of an offer to exercise her right should extinguish the preferential right even if the grantor
thereafter does not contract at all or contracts with a third party at better terms. This is because the holder
is entitled to an opportunity to contract at the terms agreed, and once this opportunity is given, the holder's
right should terminate.
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11/ Possible juristic explanations of this type of preference contract
If the grantor remains recalcitrant to make an offer, contempt proceedings could be
instituted to persuade her to make an offer." An objection that the grantor would then
probably set a ridiculously high price to "spite" her litigious adversary, is trumped by the
reminder that this would be unlikely if the grantor is serious about contracting at all, as
the grantor cannot lawfully contract with a third party at a lower price than that offered to
the holder. South African civil procedure may also benefit from the power given to
courts in countries like Germany and the Netherlands to order payment of a penalty for
each day that a court order remains unfulfilled." This would be a more effective
incentive for the grantor to make the offer as ordered.
The "conditional option" and "conditional right to an offer" constructions were already
mentioned in the previous rubric. Apart from their implications for the holder's
remedies, these juristic explanations may also affect the necessity of compliance with
formalities prescribed for the substantive contract, such as those prescribed by the
Alienation of Land Act, 68 of 1981. If the preference contract is understood as a
conditional option, it must comply with such formalities, since it then encompasses a
conditional offer to contract with the holder. The "exercise" of the holder's right must
then also comply with all the requirements for a valid acceptance. If the preference
contract is simply understood as an enforceable right to an offer, the preference contract
does not strictly speaking have to comply with the formalities legislation, but only the
76 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 268-269 and the authorities there cited argue persuasively that courts should not
be unwilling to grant such an order on the basis that its performance is difficult to supervise or that it would
lead to protracted disputes. If the holder wants such an order, it is up to her to end the uncertainty caused
by the grantor's refusal to perform the order by claiming damages. See also Lambiris 129-130.
77 See for example Asser-Hartkamp 4 I Verbintenissenrecht: Die Verbintenis in het algemeen 11th edition
(2000) 581 Nr 647 iro the Dutch institution of dwangsom and § 888 ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung) regarding
the German institution of Zwanggeld).
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offer eventually made by the grantor and the acceptance thereof. On the other hand, the
purpose of the legislation may arguably be thwarted if an oral preference contract could
entitle the holder to a court order that effectively forces the grantor to contract with and
ultimately transfer the object to the holder."
Another juristic explanation of pre-emption contracts has been put forward by Lambiris.
He defines pre-emptive agreements as any contractual agreement in terms of which a
future contract of sale is made subject to a suspensive condition, usually that the owner of
the property will decide to sell that property." On the one hand, he stresses that the
effect of fulfilment of the condition may vary depending on the specific agreement. On
the other, he apparently insists that such fulfilment has only two possible results."
Firstly, if the essential terms of the future sale have been agreed in the pre-emption
agreement, a perfected sale immediately comes into existence retroactively," There is
78 The "anomalous situation" which would otherwise ensue, namely that the grantee could become a
purchaser on the strength of a verbal contract, was an important reason for the court's decision in
Hirschowitz v Moolman supra that preference contracts must comply with the formalities in the Alienation
of Land Act, 68 of 1981. This view is approved by Lotz "Purchase and Sale" 386 and Van Rensburg
"Formaliteitsvoorskrifte, Voorkoopregte en Opsies" 1986 THRHR 208 215. In the case of non-compliance
with the formalities, the preference contract could still be valid, but only in the form of a bare preference
which merely entitles the holder to a non faciendi. The court in Hirschowitz v Moolman supra did not have
this variation in mind when it declared that all preference contracts should comply with the formalities.
Although a price determination in the preference contract would indicate a conditional right to contract
rather than a bare preference, a court may be prepared to enforce only the obligatio non faciendi and
therefore treat the preference contract as a bare preference.
79 Lambiris Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law 82. Lambiris
would have the conditional future sale co-exist with the pre-emptive agreement itself while the condition
remains unfulfilled, because he believes that the suspended future contract cannot give rise to legally
enforceable contractual obligations "until it actually comes into existence", presumably on fulfilment of the
condition. He thus states that the existence of the pre-emptive agreement as something apart from the
future sale explains why the grantor has certain enforceable duties in the interim, such as to refrain from
selling to a third party (84-85).
80 83 and 85. That he envisages only these two possibilities, is also clear from his discussion at 86.
81 83 and 85.
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8283.
83 It is not totally clear what criterion would determine whether a specific agreement of pre-emption
amounts to a suspended future sale or a conditional option. In discussing his "conditional option"
construction, he merely mentions a passage in Owsianick v First Consolidated Theatres in which Ogilvie
Thompson JA merely stated there that the language of the clause must be examined to determine the
contingency upon which the right of pre-emption comes into operation (316D). This is not very helpful in
the quest to determine when which approach is applicable, unless he means that the clause is expected to
state specifically whether a sale or option is created. The criterion that Lambiris apparently envisages in
the absence of clear agreement is whether the terms of the agreement are such that the essential terms of the
future sale have been agreed upon (83, 85, 86).
84 19544 SA 432 (N).
85 442C- 443A.
86 1986 1 SA 158 (A).
"perhaps" a further resolutive condition which enables the purchaser to avoid the sale
within a certain period of time if he renounces it." The effect of this construction is that
the holder's right as buyer is stronger than that of a third party buyer, as his contract of
sale comes into existence retrospectively on fulfilment of the condition.
Secondly, where the essential terms of a future sale have not been agreed in the
agreement of pre-emption, an option to purchase comes into being." The effect of this
construction is that the third party buyer has a stronger (prior) right to delivery than the
holder whose right comes into existence only upon exercising the option.
Lambiris's construction is problematic for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the contrived suspended sale construction is not necessary to protect the holder in
the event of a sale to a third party in conflict with the holder's rights. In Le Roux v
Odendaal" the Natal Provincial Division decided that a prior right of pre-emption places
the holder in the same position in law as a prior purchaser." In Krauze v Van Wyk" the
Appeal Court stated, albeit obiter, that a holder of a right of first refusal or option is
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Secondly, the holder does not intend to bind herself to a sale. If the holder has not
signified her consent to be bound to a conditional sale, there is no justification in
regarding this contract as a conditional contract of sale." This is why this construction is
so contrived.
protected by the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est jure, before exercising his right,
just like a prior purchaser."
Thirdly, it is confusing and unnecessary to say that afuture sale exists, which is moreover
suspended, but which comes into existence retroactively," and which co-exists with the
pre-emption contract." Lambiris relies on Corondimas v Badat" for his statement that
no contract of sale exists pending fulfilment of the condition." However, the
Corondimas case has been criticised by the Appellate Division in Tucker's Land &
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom," Certainly, a suspended sale binds the
parties thereto in the sense that a party may not resile from the contract and the creditor
(holder in the present context) may protect his rights by an interdict." Thus it is not
necessary for Lambiris to maintain that the conditional sale co-exists with a separate
agreement of pre-emption. If the agreement of pre-emption could have been regarded as
a conditional sale, the holder's power to obtain an interdict prohibiting the grantor from
selling to a third party, would flow from the conditional sale itself. There would be no
87 172B-E.
88 The main justification for the doubly conditional sale construction of the BGB Vorkauftrecht, namely
that the BGB requires the preference contract to be in writing whereas the holder may exercise the right
orally, does not apply to South African law. See further par 4 1 1 2 supra.
8984.
90 84 in fine to 85.
91 1946 AD 548.
92 84
93 1984 1 SA 1 (A).
94 Lubbe & Murray 435 n5, relying on Fichardts Motors (Prop) Ltd v Nienaber 1936 OPD 221 and
Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1948 2 SA 656 (0). Lambiris
apparently accepts this in n 25.
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IV Sphere of application
need for the agreement of pre-emption to exist in more than one guise: as conditional sale
and agreement of pre-emption creating a negative duty only.
Fourthly, Lambiris's criterion for whether the agreement amounts to a conditional option
or conditional sale is problematic. It is trite law that an option also requires that all the
essential terms of the envisaged transaction are set out in the offer, whether it is
conditional or not." Perhaps Lambiris means that if the price is set in the agreement of
pre-emption, it would amount to a conditional sale, whereas if the price is implied to be
the price at which the grantor is prepared to sell, the agreement of pre-emption amounts
to a conditional option. If such a term can be implied into the conditional option, why
could it not be implied into the conditional sale?
In many cases "first options" are granted after the grantor has already manifested a desire
to contract." In such a situation, it would be absurd to regard the trigger event as any
manifestation of a desire to sell, which entitles the holder to contract with the grantor. If
that was the intention of the parties, the grantor would have made an outright offer to the
holder. In such cases, the parties must intend a more limited preferential right than a
right to contract conditional upon a manifestation of a desire to sell. What the default
rule or construction should be in such a case will only be considered in chapter 7 after all
the possible types of preference contracts have been set out in this one.
The question also arises whether a formulation that requires the grantor to make an offer
necessarily excludes the "conditional option" explanation of this type of preference
95 Brand v Spies 19604 SA 14 (E) 16-17. Cf Hattingh v Van Rensburg supra 582C-E. See Lubbe &
Murray Contract (1988) 74 n 6; Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 37. In
McGregor v Jordaan 1920 CPD 209 213 for example, the court said that if the agreement was an option
and not a right of pre-emption, the exception that the term "for a price not exceeding £500" was too vague,
would have been a good one.
96 For example by advertising a property for sale and commencing negotiations with interested buyers.
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Another question is whether the preference contract can be regarded as a conditional
option where it does not specify a time period for which the offer is to be kept open.
Most preference contracts encountered in South African case law do not specify such a
time period. The effect of an "option" which does not specify a time limit is presently
uncertain." However, it is submitted that such an agreement could still be regarded as an
option that tacitly obliges the grantor to keep the offer open for a reasonable time upon
contract. The argument would be that if an offer must still be made it indicates that there
is not yet an offer embedded in a conditional option contract. To interpret such wording
as creating a conditional option or conditional offer, is arguably strained." However, the
argument that a preference agreement should be construed as a conditional option in spite
of a reference to a future offer is very strong when the preference contract already
specifies a price. In that case, an offer by the grantor would really be superfluous. The
duty to make an offer should then be interpreted rather as a duty to give notice that the
condition has been fulfilled and, where the price was determinable, that it has now been
determined, for example by valuation."
97 For example, the clause in the Oryx case provided that the grantor shall not have the right to sell the
shares, until it has first offered them for sale to the holder. The court decided that if the grantor breached
the contract by contracting with a third party first, the holder may bring the substantive contract into
existence by unilateral declaration. The court did not regard the preference contract as a conditional option.
An attempt to explain the so-called Oryx mechanism as a conditional option may appear strained
considering the wording of the agreement that calls for the making of an offer.
98 Cf the Austrian writers who argue that notice to the holder of an intention to contract is sufficient despite
the reference to an offer in their code (§ 1072 ABGB: anbieten soll). See for example Faistenberger C Das
Vorkaufsrecht (1967), Welser R "Das Vorkaufsrecht. Zum Vorkauf im Ósterreichischen Biirgerlichen
Recht. Von Christoph Faistenberger (Buchbesprechung)" 1971 Zeitschrift for Rechtsvergleichung 313.
99 See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 34-35; Van der Merwe et al Contract 60; Lubbe & Murray
Contract 75; Christie Contract 62 n 179. In Treadwell v Roberts 1913 WLD 54 an option "for an indefinite
period" was held to be either terminable at will or too vague to enforce as an option. In Hanekom v Mouton
1958 1 PH A9, it was held that an option could endure for an indefinite time.
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100 This appears to be the suggestion of Van der Merwe et al Contract 60: "The better view is that ... an
option which does not specify a period for its duration or which is stated to be of unlimited duration, is not
void for vagueness, although it may terminate after a reasonable time."
101 Supra.
102 Christie Contract 62; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1833; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 259; Janisch 1990
Responsa Meridiana 434 444.
103 Supra.
104650D.
105 The typical aspect of a preferential right to contract is that the grantor is totally free in the decision
whether to contract. There is therefore a strong case for the correctness of Wissekerke v Wissekerke supra
according to which the grantor who does not want to contract at all anymore after the occurrence of the
trigger event, is not obliged to contract with the holder. This is also the position in England. See Lyle &
Scott v Scott's Trustees; Same v British Investment Trust Ltd 1959 AC 763. Interestingly, Van der Keessel
Theses Selectae 3 16 2 states that the law in Holland was initially that upon a completed sale to a third
party, the owner was bound to the ex lege naastingsreg and that the holder's remedies remained in spite of
a purported withdrawal from the sale. However, later legislation allowed a bona fide withdrawal from the
sale before exercise of the naastingsreg. Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 258 seems to have overlooked this text
by relying solely on Voet 18 3 24 (on the ex lege naastingsreg) for his statement that the intention to sell
triggers the right even where the sale to the third party is later cancelled or even where the third party sale
is subject to non-exercise of the right of pre-emption. By contrast to Roman-Dutch law, the BGB does not
allow a withdrawal from the third party contract to influence the holder's power to exercise the
Vorkaufsrecht (§ 506).
occurrence of the trigger event. 100 Wissekerke v Wissekerkelol is often quoted as authority
for a statement that the grantor of a preferential right to contract is not obliged to keep an
offer open, but may withdraw an offer to the holder as long as the grantor no longer
wishes to contract at al1.102 Accordingly, it appears that preference contracts cannot be
understood as options. However, the court in Wissekerke'" was not required to decide on
the revocability of offers in respect of preference contracts generally. Firstly, it was
common cause that the grantor may have withdrawn the offer before acceptance
thereof.'?' Secondly, the grantor's offer was made voluntarily. Other considerations may
apply when the grantor has breached the preference contract by contracting with a third
party, which could be considered as the event triggering the holder's conditional option.
If the reasoning in Wissekerke should apply to all preference contracts that do not specify
a period for their exercise, and whether or not breach has occurred.!" a preference
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Alternatively, its revocability could be considered as fatal to its status as a conditional
option. In such a case, it could be understood as a conditional offer coupled with an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii. Like any offer it would lapse if not accepted
within a reasonable time after fulfilment of the condition. Although the offer may be
withdrawn before acceptance by the holder, the preference contract, including the
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, continues to exist. Accordingly, if the condition is
fulfilled again, the offer becomes operative once more.
contract could still be regarded as an option, in the sense that it does limit the grantor's
capacity to withdraw the offer. The offer that becomes operative upon fulfilment of the
condition may not be withdrawn in order to contract with another, as in the case of an
ordinary offer. Itmay only be withdrawn where the grantor no longer wishes to contract
at all.
Interestingly, Christie says that an option that does not specify a time limit, is open for
acceptance or rejection for a reasonable time, but may be withdrawn at any time before
acceptance unless the contract forbids the grantor to do SO.106 If this is correct, a
preferential right to contract which does not specify a period for exercise thereof would
indeed be equal to an option which does not specify a time limit. However, Christie's
statement on options is based on Wissekerke itself, and is therefore not supported by
authority in respect of options generally.!" Such a preference contract could instead be
described as a sui generis conditional option, which deviates from normal conditional
options in this respect.
Whether Wissekerke should apply to all preference contracts and which judicial
explanation should be chosen as the default construction under which circumstances will
be considered finally in chapter 7.
106Christie Contract 62 n 179.
107 Ibid. As stated before, both parties accepted that the offer could be withdrawn before acceptance and
the court therefore did not decide this point. Moreover, the court did not typify the offer made as an option.
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52222 Only an undertaking to contract with a third party triggers right
There is also authority that the only event which should trigger the holder's right to
contract, should be an offer to or contract with a third party, and not a lesser
manifestation of a desire to sell.!" This is therefore certainly an alternative possible
construction or type of preference contract.
108 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 26-27 explicitly state that any lesser manifestation of a desire to sell
should not easily be held to trigger a right of pre-emption as this would be unfair to the grantor and
contrary to the spirit of a right of pre-emption. Cf also the Oryx case supra at 908E where the court left
open the question whether only the conclusion of the contract with a third party would entitle the holder to
the Oryx mechanism, "and not also, for example, if the seller made an offer to a third party" (my
translation). In the Oryx case the court only stated that the relevant contract of December 1973 provided
that the grantor was not entitled to sell or alienate the shares and claims to a third party until he had first
offered it to the holder at the same price and terms on which he was prepared to sell to a third party. As
this wording does not speak of a duty to offer upon a manifestation to sell, and only prohibits the sale or
alienation to a third party, the wording of the clause itself supports an interpretation that any duty to make
an offer would arise only immediately before such a sale or alienation. In Skinner v Goldberg 1943 WLD
42 supra the court also decided that the date for calculating the damages is the date of conclusion of the
contract with the third party (44). The implication could be that breach only occurred at that point and that
up to that point the grantor need not have made an offer. In Ah Ling v Community Development Board &
Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E) 39G, the court interpreted "a desire to dispose of the property" in the context of a
a statutory right of pre-emption as "an unqualified and sustained desire on the part of the owner [grantor]
resulting in a sale to the [holder]." The statutory provision in question was art 15(5)(a) of the Community
Development Act 3 of 1966, which provided as follows: "Any owner of immovable property in an area in
respect of which any notice under sub-sec (2)( e) is in operation, who desires to dispose of such property
shall offer such property for sale to the Board and the Board shall thereupon have a preferent right to
purchase such property at a price agreed upon between it and the owner concerned, or (if within 60 days
after the date on which the offer was made the Board and such owner fail to agree as to the price to be paid)
at a price fixed by arbitration .... " This case was not concerned, however, with the situation where the
grantor has shown a desire to contract with a third party, but rather revolved around the question whether
the grantor has shown a sufficient desire to contract with the holder by writing to the holder that it intends
to contract, but only at certain specific prices, which the holder did not accept, insisting instead to have the
price fixed by arbitration. However, the same reasoning arguably applies in both contexts.
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I No obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii
The advantages of this construction over the preVIOUSone is that there can be no
uncertainty about either the occurrence of the trigger event or the price on which the
holder may contract upon the trigger event. It is either the price determined by the
preference contract itself, or the price offered to or agreed with the third party.
Moreover, the grantor is left free to negotiate with third parties in order to obtain as high
a price as possible where the preference contract does not stipulate a price.
There are two main types of preference contracts under this category. First, preference
contracts which allows the grantor to contract with a third party first, and second,
preference contracts prohibiting this.
This is the type of preference contract known to German law as the Vorkaufsvertrag, and
for brevity's sake I will use the term Vorkaufsrecht to refer to the preferential right to
contract that it creates.!" This type of preference contract was discussed in depth in
paragraph 4 1 1. In short, one distinctive characteristic of the Vorkaufsrecht is that it
can only be exercised upon a completed valid contract with a third party. However, the
grantor is not obliged to refrain from contracting with a third party until she has first
offered to contract with the holder. Contracting with a third party without first having
given the holder the opportunity to do so is not a breach of a Vorkaufsrecht. Instead, it is
a neutral trigger event or condition for the holder's right to become operative. Any
agreement worded to the effect that there is a duty to refrain from selling to a third party
109 Such contracts are also encountered in other jurisdictions. See for example the discussion of the English
case of Birmingham Canal Co v Cartwright 1879 11 eh D 421 and the American decision of Brenner v
Duncan 1947318 Mich 127 1 27 2d 320 in paras 42 and 43 supra respectively. The term "right of first
refusal" may be too narrow to encompass these rights. "First refusal" implies that the holder will have the
fust opportunity to contract, and not that the grantor may fITStcontract with a third party.
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/I An obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii
unless the holder has first been given a chance to contract, therefore excludes the
Vorkaufsrecht. 110
This type of contract is clearly intended when the preference contract provides that the
holder should have a chance to contract on the terms agreed with a third party. It could
be understood as a conditional option. As the agreement with the third party fixes the
terms of the offer to the holder, it is not necessary to require an explicit predetermination
of the terms of the substantive contract in the preference contract. They are certain
enough when the holder may accept the offer. The situation is analogous to a conditional
option providing for a third party to fix the price upon fulfilment of the condition.
What is the juristic explanation of this type of preference contract? I will consider three
possible explanations. The first is that the obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii is
coupled with an option conditional upon breach thereof (that is, in the form of agreement
to contract with a third party). This means that breach entitles the holder to create the
substantive contract by accepting the offer embedded in the option contract. Conclusion
of a contract with a third party is not just a neutral condition which triggers the option,
but is typified as breach due to the normal understanding and formulation of preference
clauses in South African law as prohibiting the grantor from contracting with a third party
unless the holder has first been given the opportunity to contract. The terms of the offer
reinforced by the option are sufficiently certain - it is the price actually agreed with or
offered to a third party.
The second explanation is the existence of a duty to make an offer immediately before
the grantor agrees to contract with a third party. This point in time can only be
established ex post facto, after the conclusion of the contract or the making of the offer.
110 See the authorities cited in paragraph 4 1 1 supra.
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5 3 Conclusion
Therefore the grantor is only in breach upon contracting with or making an offer to the
third party and can only be forced to make an offer at that point.
A third alternative explanation is that the preference contract remains a bare preference,
and therefore a negative obligation, but upon breach the holder has a contractual power to
create the substantive contract by unilateral declaration. Alternatively, the preference
contract could be understood as entailing a duty to make an offer before the grantor
contracts with a third party, but coupled with such a contractual power upon breach of
that duty. Breach occurs only where the grantor has concluded a contract with or made a
valid offer to a third party. The holder's power is implied into the preference contract on
the basis of policy considerations. In German legal terminology, the holder has a
Gestaltungsrecht. III
These three juristic explanations will be discussed in more depth in chapter 7 when I
finally make a proposal on how our courts should approach preference contracts.
There are two main types of preference contracts. The first creates only a bare preference
or negative obligation, whereas the second creates a conditional right to contract. Each
type can be understood in a number of different ways, so that sub-types exist.
The grantor of a totally negative or bare preference contract only has an obligation not to
contract with a third party. He may not be forced to make an offer to the holder simply
because there is never an obligation to contract with the holder. This negative obligation
continues until the grantor has actually concluded and performed a contract with a third
III As indicated above (par 4 1 1 2 supra) South African law knows the concept of contractual powers to
unilaterally terminate or amend the contents of a contract or to bring a new contract into existence, which is
the meaning of Gestaltungsrecht in German law.
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Mostly, preference contracts in South Africa are worded so as to prohibit the grantor
from contracting with a third party before the holder has been given a chance to do so.
However, preference arrangements may be drafted to allow conclusion of a contract with
a third party as a neutral and necessary precondition or trigger event for the holder's
exercise of the right to contract. This is the construction of the BGB Vorkaufsrecht. In
this case, the holder has a right to contract, which she can enforce only after the grantor
had already concluded a contract with a third party.
party on terms that the holder was given an opportunity to match. As such it can be
described as a negative obligation subject to a resolutive condition. A variation on the
totally negative preference contract would be to allow the holder a contractual power to
unilaterally create the substantive contract on breach, on the basis of policy reasons or
express agreement by the parties, and not because the grantor is regarded as having a duty
to contract with the holder. However, as this sub-type of contract ultimately grants a
right to contract with the holder, it belongs more properly under the second main
category.
In cases where the wording does import an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii,
preference contracts creating a conditional right to contract could be triggered at various
points in time. The trigger event could be:
1. any manifestation of a desire to contract (such as listing a property for sale or
negotiating with third parties); or
2. at least a manifestation of a serious desire to contract shortly with a specific third
party (which would include serious negotiations with that third party); or
3. at least the existence of a third party offer plus a manifestation of a desire to
contract with that third party which may come short of an undertaking to contract.
4. only an undertaking to contract with a third party (it would be sensible to include
not only the conclusion of a contract under this trigger event, but also an offer by
the grantor to contract with a third party as they amount to the same thing.)
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Where it is decided that only an agreement to contract with a third party should allow the
holder to exercise the right to contract, whereas the grantor has an obligatio non
contrahendo cum tertii, the preference contract could only be understood as a conditional
option contract on the following basis. The basic obligation of the grantor would be an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii subject to a resolutive condition that the holder has
failed to match the terms offered by the third party with whom the grantor has
subsequently contracted. The grantor is only in breach of her obligation when she
contracts with a third party. This basic obligation is then supplemented by an option
conditional upon breach.
There are also a number of possible juristic explanations of the conditional right to
contract, which may impact on certain practical aspects thereof, such as the holder's
remedies upon breach. Preference contracts that create a conditional right to contract
could be understood, firstly, as conditional options. However, this explanation is
problematic when the trigger event is a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell than a
concluded contract as the terms on which the option may be exercised is uncertain in
such a case. One variation on the conditional option construction is that the preference
contract constitutes a conditional option to buy at a price offered by the holder, unless a
better third party offer exists at that stage. Secondly, preference contracts creating
conditional rights to contract could be understood as enforceable conditional rights to an
offer. They could also be understood as obligationes non contrahendo cum tertii coupled
with a power to unilaterally create the substantive contract on breach thereof. Lambiris'
construction, namely of a suspended future contract of sale, is not a persuasive juristic
explanation.
If the preference contract is instead regarded as a conditional right to an offer, the grantor
only has a duty to make an offer to the holder the moment before the grantor contracts
with a third party. This explains why the holder would only be entitled to enforce the
right to contract once the grantor has agreed to contract with a third party.
185
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1. never, in terms of the totally negative or bare preference contract. Only the
usual remedies for breach of a negative obligation are then available.
If the preference contract is understood as a conditional option, the holder's remedies are
straightforward and effective. By contrast, if it is understood as a conditional right to
make an offer, it can be enforced in a number of different ways. They will all, however,
eventually entitle the holder to performance of the substantive contract. The court could
enforce the preference contract:
1. by an order that an offer be made. This means that the holder must approach
the court again if the grantor refuses to make the offer or fails to perform upon
acceptance of his offer.
2. by an order that an officer of the court makes the offer or acceptance on behalf
of the grantor, after which the holder must first accept the offer before an
order for specific performance of the substantive contract may be prayed for.
3. by an order for specific performance of the substantive contract. This could
be explained, firstly, by procedural rules, for example a rule that allows
simultaneous orders that an offer be made and the substantive contract be
performed or a deliberate bypass of an order that an offer be made. There is
some authority for such an approach in South African law and overseas
jurisdictions. Alternatively, it could be explained by recognising a contractual
power to unilaterally create the substantive contract upon breach of the duty to
make an offer.
Accordingly, preference contracts could also be grouped as follows according to the point
at which the holder can force the grantor to conclude or perform the substantive contract.
This point could be:
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3. upon an overt act manifesting a serious intention to contract with a specific
third party, which is not to be equated with any manifestation of a desire to
contract. Preference contracts in this category could be understood as
conditional options, where the price must however be ascertainable and where
it would be unacceptable to accept simply that the holder would have an
option to contract at a price which the grantor would be prepared to accept
from a third party, since this is too vague and disputable in the absence of an
actual undertaking by the grantor to contract with a third party. The
preference contract could also be construed as a conditional right to an offer
or as a conditional right to an acceptance of the holder's offer if that is the
highest offer available. In the case of the conditional right to an offer there is
probably no justification or need to require that the offer be "reasonable" or
bona fide as far as its price component is concerned. The holder is
sufficiently protected against a grantor who attempts to escape the preference
contract by submitting a ridiculously high price by the rule that the preference
2. upon conclusion of a contract between the grantor and a third party.
Logically, any undertaking to contract with a third party, including an offer to
the third party, should also trigger the holder's remedy. This category
includes both the Vorkaufsrecht, which contains no obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii, and preference contracts which contain such a negative obligation.
The Vorkaufsrecht could be juridically explained as an option conditional
upon conclusion of a third party contract, or as a sui generis (preference)
contract which grants the holder a contractual power to create the substantive
contract by unilateral declaration at that point. As noted before, preference
contracts with an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii could be juridically
explained either as an option conditional upon breach of the negative
obligation in the form of conclusion of a third party contract only, or as a duty
to make an offer immediately before the grantor contracts with a third party,
or as a negative obligation coupled with a contractual power to unilaterally
create the substantive contract upon breach.
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contract does not terminate before the grantor has contracted with and
performed to a third party whose offer the holder had an opportunity to match.
4. upon any manifestation of a desire to sell. Once again the preference contract
could be construed as a conditional option where the price is ascertainable. It
could also be regarded as a conditional right to an offer.
In choosing a default type and delineating the default field of application of each
construction, it will be important to decide at which point, if any, the holder should be
able to force to grantor to perform the substantive contract. This issue will be considered
in chapter 7.
It remains to comment on the relationship between options and preference contracts. It is
clear that the second main type of preference contract, which grants a conditional right to
contract, can often be understood as a conditional option (or at least as a conditional
option subject to a resolutive condition that the grantor does not want to contract at all
anymore). The traditional distinction between options and rights of first refusal can only
be maintained in respect of some types of preference contracts, namely negative or bare
preference contracts which only give rise to remedies aimed at restoring the status quo
ante the breach, and those preference contracts creating conditional rights to contract
which courts refuse to treat as conditional options because their wording points to a duty
to make or accept an offer, or because the requirement of certainty precludes them from
being options.!"
If the term pactum de contrahendo is understood as an agreement to conclude a contract
in future, or if it necessarily implies the existence of the substantive offer to contract in
112 CfLubbe 1985 Annual Survey 137. Although the contract price was tacitly fixed in the preference
contract in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt & Another 19864 SA 523 (C), so that it is tempting to describe it
as a conditional option to sell, the quantity of gas to be supplied from time to time was not specified.
Therefore the agreement does not contain a completed offer that is required for an option contract (Lubbe
1986 Annual Survey 143).
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future."? not all preference contracts fall under that concept. Bare preference contracts
could only constitute a pactum de contrahendo if the latter term is defined widely as any
agreement which may lead to the conclusion of a further contract. 114
113 As Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 33 states.
114 CfLotz "Purchase and Sale" 357.
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6 Methodological considerations in constructing
existing and new types of specific contracts
The previous chapter has demonstrated the very different ways in which contracts of
pre-emption may be understood in the absence of clear regulation by the parties.
The common denominator in preference contracts is a negative duty to refrain from
either negotiating or contracting with or performing to a third party until the holder
has rejected an opportunity to either negotiate or equal the terms on which the grantor
has contracted or intends to contract with the third party. To this common
denominator could be added an enforceable duty to negotiate, contract with or
perform to the holder.
South African case law and legal literature reveal a number of different views on the
precise construction or legal nature of preference contracts. Adoption of a specific
construction is in most cases not based on the interpretation of the arrangement under
consideration, but rather on the view that there is one "correct" construction
prescribed by precedent and historical authority, which should apply unless otherwise
agreed. The study so far has demonstrated that there is not a single correct
understanding of the basic rights and duties which parties may intend. Precedent and
historical authority do not clearly and convincingly support only one construction.
All the conflicting constructions identified here make economic sense and may very
well be intended by parties to preference arrangements. As such, they can all be
regarded as different types of preference contracts, 'reflecting very different
contractual purposes. In fact, policy considerations can be garnered in favour of more
than one type as the most suitable default construction for unclear transactions.
What, therefore, must courts do when the wording of a preference contract is wide
enough to encompass more than one type? This would certainly be the situation
where the contract grants a "right of pre-emption" or "first option." In such a case the
basic contractual purpose and consequences intended are open to conflicting
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interpretations, so that classification of the transaction is difficult. Obviously courts
will be loath to declare the contract invalid for uncertainty as the parties clearly
intended to be bound and it would be unfair to allow one of them to escape from the
bargain.' How must the court choose between the different possible understandings
of the contractual end, and thus, the basic rights and duties of the parties? On what
basis can the court supplement the contract to provide for situations not expressly
provided for?
The variability of contractual purpose also raises the following question: when is a
recurring contractual purpose worthy of recognition as a separate type of contract
with special default legal consequences, and what are the prerequisites for the
classificatory criteria of such a contract type? The methodological questions posed
by preference agreements are therefore more basic than and go beyond the more
familiar question on the determinants of default legal rules governing the
consequences of a specific contract type. This latter question presupposes that the
specific contract type in question is already recognised as a separate type and that
there are sufficiently clear criteria for the classification of transactions into that
contract type. For example, considering that a particular agreement can be classified
as a contract of lease, the question familiar to lawyers is what the default legal
consequences of a lease contract should be, and on what basis one default rule is
chosen above another.
In the terminology of the essentialia - naturalia - incidentalia model traditionally
used to formulate default legal rules for a specific type of contract, the present
difficulty with preference contracts is that neither the essentialia nor the naturalia of
the different types of preference contracts are clear. This raises the more
fundamental question whether the types of preference contract identified in the
previous chapter can be cast into the "essentialia - naturalia - incidentalia" model,
where the essentialia are supposedly clear and definite preconditions for the
application of the naturalia, which together form the body of rules on a specific
] See, for example, Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A) 93IG-H; Genae Properties
iHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I 566 (A) 579G; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) 670.
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contract type. In other words, is it possible to formulate clear and definite
characteristics or preconditions (essentialia) for each type of preference contract? If
not, does this prevent a particular construction from being regarded as a separate sub-
type? If not, how does a court choose which type applies? Do we need a default type
or types of preference contract which should apply when the contract wording is
unclear? If yes, what considerations should guide the process if deciding which type
or types should be the default type or types?
Clearly, the construction of existing or new types of specific contracts raises
methodological concerns, which will be considered in this chapter. After
establishing some working definitions (6 1 below), the function and determinants of
contract law rules on the identification and consequences of specific types of contract
will be considered in general (6 2 below). Next, the preconditions of recognising a
recurring type of transaction as a specially regulated contract type or sub-type will be
considered (6 3 below). This enquiry will centre on the adequacy of the traditional
essentialia - naturalia - incidentalia model to fulfil the purposes of specific contract
law, as well as a possible alternative to this model. Thereafter I will discuss the
interrelationship between the various conceptual tools used to regulate the
consequences of contracts, namely the rules on interpretation and implication of
terms, including the different kinds of residual rules or ex lege terms (6 4 below). The
insights gained will finally be applied to preference contracts (6 5 below).
61 Terminology
I use the terms "contract type", "specific contract type" or "type of specific contract"
to refer to a category of contracts' with a recurring, typical contractual purpose or
recurring, typical "interest constellations",' for which the láw traditionally formulates
reserve rules that apply absent regulation by the parties." An obvious example is the
2 As contracts they are enforceable agreements complying with the validity requirements set by general
contract law rules.
3 Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen Band I: Leasing und Factoring (1991) 2.
4 Nereus Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak (1991) 62 defines contract types as having an own typical
identity in legal traffic. Elsewhere he defines them as contracts which have already obtained a certain
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Differentiation within some specific contract types are also recognised. As a result of
this differentiation, sub-types can be identified, although the variation mostly
concerns only one or two residual rules amongst the many attached to such contracts.
These variations find their authority or source either in common law or in statute. In
the case of sales contracts, they may relate to the identity of the seller, as in the case
of sales by manufacturers and certain traders which are treated differently to sales by
normal sellers.' They may also result from the identity of the buyer. The Credit
Agreements Act 75 of 1980 creates the subtype of credit sales of certain consumer
goods in order to protect consumer buyers. Variations may also be precipitated by
the nature of the object sold. There are different rules relating to the sale of movables
or immovables, for example. The counter-performance for transfer of undisturbed
possession of the object may also lead to differentiation. For example, there is a
difference between the rules for cash sales and credit sales.
contract of sale where the recurring contractual purpose or the major result intended
by the parties, is the permanent transfer of undisturbed possession of an object, and
eventually all the transferor's rights therein to another against payment of a sum of
money. Because this type of contract occurs recurrently and parties often make no
detailed provision for the various circumstances which may arise and lead to disputes
after conclusion thereof, a body of residual rules has developed to regulate the
consequences of such contracts. These rules take their cue from the purpose or main
consequence intended by the parties to some extent. How these rules are and should
be arrived at exactly will be considered below..
As stated in the first chapter, I use the verb "construct" to refer to the formulation of
rules surrounding a specific contract type. It encompasses the abstract process of
incorporating a specific contract type, identified in practice, into the legal system,
recurring content in legal practice ("Regsontwikkeling by nuwe verkeerstipiese kontrakte" 1992 TSAR
213).
5 See, for example, Holmdene Brickworks v Roberts Construction 1977 3 SA 670 (A); Kroonstad
Westelike Boere Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha 19643 SA 561 (A); Langeberg Voedsel Bpk v
Sarculum Boerderye Bpk 1996 2 SA 656 (A).
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which enables compansons with other provisions." A category of contracts is
therefore described and coherent rules developed for it, which category is then added
to the pantheon of separately regulated specific contract types. The "construction" of
a specific contract type refers not only to reserve rules or legal incidents regulating
the consequences of the contract/ but also to the criteria for classifying a transaction
as belonging to the contract type in question. It therefore also encompasses rules on
the main rights and duties of the parties which may be classed together with the
consequences of the contract, but which may also constitute the criteria for
application of the other reserve rules.
The term "residual rules" is used to refer to the reserve rules already mentioned." A
"residual rule" can be defined as a rule deliberately formulated with a particular,
recurring kind of situation in mind, provided only that it is not inconsistent with the
parties' contract." They can also be defined as "contractual provisions which the law
provides and imposes in the absence of express or implied [tacit] agreement of the
parties.'?" However, I occasionally also use the terms "legal incident", "ex lege term"
and "term implied by law" in the same sense. These terms arguably connote a wider
class of terms, referring also to terms implied by law that will not necessarily function
6 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 268. The definition of "construct"
as verb in the Concise Oxford Dictionary reads as follows: "fit together, frame, build (lit. or fig.);
(Gram.) combine (words) syntactically; draw, delineate, esp. according to given conditions ... ". As a
noun it is defined as "thing constructed, esp. by the mind .... "
7 These terms are defined infra under this same rubric.
S Kerr is a great champion of this terminology. See, for example The Principles of the Law of Contract
5 ed (1998) 335; "The need to use words with different meanings to describe different categories of
provisions of contracts" 1999 SALf 711; "Dangers in the use of synonyms to describe different
categories of contractual terms" 1994 THRHR 279; "Some problems concerning implied (tacit)
provisions of contracts" 1993 THRHR 114 and other articles cited in Kerr The Principles of the Law of
Contract 5th edition (1998) 316, 318.
9 Vorster Implied Terms in the Law of Contract in England and South Africa unpublished PhD thesis,
St John's College, Cambridge (1987) 72; Vorster "The resolution of contractual disputes: interpretation
versus the recognition of novel naturalia" 1987 THRHR 450 452.
10 Kerr Contract 344.
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6 2 The function and determinants OT residual rules of
contract law
as "residual terms" due to the rather unique circumstances necessitating implication
of the term, II as in the case of innominate contracts.
I will use the term "general residual rules" when referring to the residual rules on the
consequences of contracts generally. These are the rules that apply prima facie to all
types of contracts, such as the general rules on the remedies for breach of contract.
"Naturalia" is used in its well-known sense as the residual rules particular to a
specific type of contract, the supposed "natural" consequences of entering into a
contract of that type."
"Tacit terms" is used to refer to provisions based on unexpressed consensus (or
reasonable reliance thereof)."
Contract law has two main functions. First, contract law lays down prerequisites for
the formation and validity of the legal institution it regulates, namely contracts.
These could be called the constitutive rules." These rules may cause a supposed
contract to be wholly or partially unenforceable. IS Second, it comprises rules on the
consequences attached to valid contracts (consequential rules). These rules apply
Il "Legal incidents" is the term preferred by Vorster (see the previous two footnotes) who also proposes
such a wide sphere of operation for ex lege terms, as will appear hereunder.
12 See for example Van Jaarsveld (editor) Suid-Arikaanse Handelsreg Vol I 3,d edition (1988) 22.
13 As "implied term" and "the implication of terms" is often used with reference to both residual rules
and tacit terms, I prefer not to use it in respect of only one of these categories (contrary to what Kerr
Contract 316 et seq suggests).
14 See Van der Merwe "Judicis est ius dicere. non dare: Judicial law-making by institutional
development of the common law" in Van Wyk & Van Oosten (eds) NihilObstat: Feesbundel vir WJ
Hasten/Essays in honour of WJ Hasten (1996) 225 233.
15 Contract law rules may cause some contractual terms to be unenforceable, for example, because they
are unlawful, but severable from the rest of the contract, and therefore regarded as pro non scripta.
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and giving effect to contracting parties' (likely) intention. As the courts are
where the contract is unclear or ambiguous on its consequences, or where certain
circumstances were not expressly provided for in the agreement.
The consequential rules exist because, once it appears that parties intend a binding
transaction, courts are loath to refuse to enforce the bargain simply because every
possible circumstance or dispute which may arise have not been provided for, or
because the express terms may be ambiguous. It would be patently unfair to allow a
party to escape from the contract simply because the parties did not clearly provide
for all possible eventualities. If such a dispute arises, the law must therefore provide
a solution. The parties expect the law to supplement their agreement where necessary
to provide for circumstances that their contract does not clearly regulate. The
beneficial effect of the law's willingness to do so, is to "reduce the complexity and
the cost of transactions by supplying a set of normal terms that, in the absence of a
law of contract, the parties would have to negotiate expressly.':"
The consequential rules of contract law encompass the rules on interpretation of
contracts, as well as the residual rules on the rights and duties of the parties, including
the remedies for breach of their rights, the transferability of their rights, and
termination of the contractual relationship. The rules on termination of contracts
can be classed on their own as the terminative rules of contract law. I? The
interrelationship between the rules on interpretation and the residual rules, as well as
the different categories of residual rules recognised in South African law, will be
discussed in more depth below. Under the present rubric, I will concentrate on the
general function and determinants of the consequential rules.
It is generally accepted that the first category of rules (the constitutive rules) are co-
determined by policy considerations which do not only take the parties' interests into
account, but also the function of the legal system and the interests and values of
society as a whole. The requirement of legality most clearly demonstrates the
regulatory role of contract law. In this respect contract law goes beyond establishing
16 Posner Economic Analysis of Law 2nd edition (1977) 69.
17 Van der Merwe "Judicis est ius dicere" 233.
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621 Two broad ideals: fairness and legal certainty
instruments of the state and the state must and may protect certain values, most
notably those protected in the Constitution," the courts will not enforce bargains
which conflict with these values."
In this study, that first category of contract law rules are left out of consideration as it
is presumed that preference contracts comply with the validity requirements for
contracts generally." Therefore only the consequential rules will be considered, and
any further remarks under the present rubric pertain only to that category."
In broad terms, the consequential rules on contracts strive for approximation of two
supreme ideals, namely fairness or justice and legal certainty.
18 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996.
19 Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 3rd edition
(1988) 238-239; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (1993) 140 et seq; Kerr Contract
179, 202 et seq; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th edition (2001) 172, 398 et seq. Cf
Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 19844 SA 874 (A); Sasfin v Beukes 1989 I SA I
(A).
20 Preferential rights to contract in fixed term employment contracts may conceivably be challenged as
unlawful restrictions on freedom of trade. The employee (for example, a sportsman) could assert that
his fundamental right to engage in work of his own choice is not sufficiently protected by the provision
that he can only be forced to remain in employment if the employer matches a third party offer. He
could maintain that monetary compensation is not the only benefit obtained from work, but that a good
relationship with his employer and colleagues is also important, so that where these relationships have
deteriorated, the employee should be allowed to find other employment, even where the employer can
match the monetary terms offered. Cfthe unpublished decision by Swart J of the Transvaal Provincial
Division in Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter & Others case no 2007/2000 dated II February 2000,
in which an argument was rejected that a right of first refusal in respect of a rugby player's services
was an unreasonable and unenforceable restraint of trade. See also the discussion of this case by
Loubser "Sport and competition law" in Basson & Loubser (eds) Sport and the Law in South Africa
Service Issue 2 (August 2001) Ch 8-39 et seq and Prinsloo "Enkele opmerkings oor spelerskontrakte in
professionele spansport" 2000 TSAR 229 235 et seq. A full consideration of this issue is beyond the
scope of this study.
21 This study is also not concerned with mandatory consequential rules.
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That law has something to do with justice and that judges must aim to find just
solutions to disputes should be axiomatic." The Constitutional mandate to "develop
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice" clearly adopts this
truism for our legal system." It is also widely accepted in our case law and legal
literature that residual rules aim for the fairest and most reasonable solution for each
case or dispute that the parties had failed to regulate." The aims of "justice, fairness
and reasonableness" will be considered further below. At this stage I will concentrate
on the relationship between justice or fairness and legal certainty in broad terms.
Justice calls for flexibility in the law. The precise circumstances of a particular
dispute may not have been allowed for when the existing residual rule was
formulated. Even though the existing rule was stated wide enough to encompass that
situation, its application may come to be regarded as unfair. The resultant unfairness
of applying the existing rule might result from its failure to take into account existing
needs, practices and notions of fairness in legal reality, or because new needs and
practices have evolved in the increasingly complex business world, which the rule did
not take into account. In such a case, the rule must be qualified or changed in order
to arrive at a just solution." This need for change or flexibility is denied or resisted
by some judges, but most realise that judges inevitably change the law, thereby
22 Neels "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel I)" 1998 TSAR
702 and "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel 2)" 1999 TSAR
256 261 and the numerous Roman, Roman-Dutch and South African authorities there cited; Larenz
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 2nd edition (1975) 12, 121; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre
der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) II 3rd edition (1995) 168. CfDworkin A Matter of Principle (1985) 90.
23 Section 173.
24 See, inter alia, Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA
506 (A) 532G-H; Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A)
651-2; A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A) 420G-H; Ex Parte Sapan Trading (Pty)
Ltd 1995 1 SA 218 (W) 226H et seq; Vorster Implied Terms 78-79, 81-83, 85,150-9; Kerr Contract
348; Van der Merwe et al Contract 201; Lubbe & Murray Contract 423; Neels "Die aanvullende en
beperkende werking van redelikheid en billikheid in die kontraktereg" 1999 TSAR 684 697; Cockrell
"Substance and form in the South African law of contract" 1992 SALJ 40 53; Joubert 1992 TSAR 213;
cf Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 69; Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel en de
contractuele gebondenheid (1995) 23.
25 Vorster Implied Terms 147; Joubert 1992 TSAR 213 214 et seq.
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creating law. The oft-quoted dicta of Sir James Rose Innes in Blower v Van
Noorden" and Lord Tomlin in Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government"
immediately springs to mind. Rose-Innes CJ stated that:
"There come times in the growth of every living system of law when old practice and ancient
formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and to
keep pace with the requirements of changing conditions. And it is for the courts to decide
when the modifications, which time has proved to be desirable, are of a nature to be effected
by judicial decision, and when they are so important or so radical that they should be left to
the Legislature. ,,28
To that, Lord Tomlin added that our Roman-Dutch common law "is a virile, living
system of law, ever seeking, as every such system must, to adapt itself consistently
26 1909 TS 890 905.
27 1934 AD 560 563.
28 This suggests the argument that judicial modification of the law serves the public interest in the sense
that it could effect the desirable solution faster and in a more cost-effective manner than parliament.
Legislators should not be bothered with all the minor amendments to the law that changing conditions
require and that could be solved by the courts consistent with any principles laid down in legislation
(such as constitutional values and the constitutionally sanctioned aim of 'Justice"). In any event, since
legislation is forward-looking and requires imagination as to the situations that may arise, gaps and
inapposite applications are likely. History has shown that not even the most careful legislator could
ever force all eventualities of life within the framework of legislation (Weber "Einige Gedanken zur
Konkretisierung von Generalklauseln durch Fallgruppen" 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 518,
520, 521, 549). To refer each gap revealed by the judicial process in its grappling with concrete
situations to the legislator would not solve the problem and be very costly: new gaps and unfair effects
would probably be shown up shortly thereafter by the judicial process. In fact, legislators sometimes
deliberately refuse to decide certain issues, "passing the buck to the judiciary" (Hlophe "The Role of
Judges in a transformed South Africa - Problems, Challenges and Prospects" 1995 SAL! 22 27) or
deliberately delegates limited "legislative powers" to the judiciary (cf Hart The Concept of Law 2nd
edition (1994) 275). This is what the legislator has done by expressly mandating courts to develop the
common law "taking into account the interests of justice" (s 173 of the Constitution, 108 of 1996).
Hart also argues that judicial law-making is "a necessary price to pay for avoiding the inconvenience of
alternative methods of regulating them such as a reference to the legislature." (The Concept of Law
275).
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"Die naturalia van verskillende kontraksoorte kan, wat die Suid-Afrikaanse reg betref, in
hoofsaak teruggevoer word na begrippe van redelikheid en billikheid wat in die Romeinse reg
ontwikkel het, maar kan in 'n lewende regstelsel nie as 'n numerus clausus beskou word nie.
By die aanpassing van die reg by veranderde omstandighede en nuwe behoeftes kan dus
steeds by wyse van analogie addisionele naturalia erken word.,,3o
with its inherent basic principles to deal effectively with the increasing complexities
of modem organised society."29
Our courts have also specifically recognised the need for residual rules of contract law
to adapt to changing circumstances. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeal has
said that
29 See also A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker supra 420G-H; Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397
(A) 418H-419C; Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A) 749D-E; Janse van
Rensburg v Grieve Trust 2000 I SA 315 (C) 323 et seq; Tuckers Land and Development Corporation
(Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 I SA 645 (A) 651-652; Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank v Saayman NO
19974 SA 302 (A) 319 et seq; Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 19942 SA 464 (W)
475H et seq; Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 at 542; Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas 19883 SA 580 (A)
612H-I; Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890905; Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda 1991 2 SA
825 (ZSC) 832C-D. Cf Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 157; Willis Faber Enthoven
(Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 19924 SA 202 (A) 2200-221; S v Graham 1975 3 SA
569 (A) 576F. In Roman law the praetor could adapt the ius civile when fairness demanded this. In
Roman contract law, the ideal of bona fide conduct was an important driving force for amendments to
the law. The praetor's appointment by election in the comitia centuriata, an assembly of the people,
provides a justification for this power which modem judges arguably lacks. However, later judges
were also expressly granted the power to prefer justice and equity rather that the demands of the strict
law by the emperor Constantine (C 3 1 8). Of course, many other developments in Roman law took
place after the praetor's power was curtailed by the Edictum Perpetuum around 132AD. Roman-Dutch
writers and South African case law also acknowledge the power of courts to change the law when it
leads to injustice (see, for example, Voet I 1 5, 1 I 6 and the other Roman-Dutch writers and case law
cited by Neels 1998 TSAR 702 716-717 and Van der Merwe "ludic is est ius dicere" 230-231). See
also De Vos & Kelbrick "Discretionary powers of the judge in South Africa" 2000 THRHR 537 541;
Joubert 1992 TSAR 213 214; Corbett "Aspects of the role of policy in the evolution of our common
law" 1987 SALJ 52 54; Neels "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid
(deel 3)" 1999 TSAR 484 and authorities there cited; Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel43.
30 A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker supra 420G-H. The first five cases listed in n 29 supra also
confirm the need for residual contract law rules to adapt to changing circumstances and notions of
justice.
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particular case, changing the law where necessary. There is a need for
The Constitution clearly mandates judges to develop the common law in order to
reflect the spirit of the Bill of Rights" and "taking into account the interests of
justice.'?' In any event, contract law rules, like all legal doctrine, are only conceptual
intellectual constructions or products of human thinking, which are aimed at grasping,
comprehending, explaining and ordering legal reality, and which do not exist for their
own sake. Therefore if they do not serve their function well, they should be changed
or refined."
Apart from this broad ideal of justice or fairness, contract law rules also serve the aim
of legal certainty. Contracts are planned relationships that require a predictable legal
framework to proceed with confidence." Law does not operate only in courtrooms.
The outcomes of specific scenarios should be predictable to enable parties to draft
contracts and to decide whether to proceed with litigation. Parties cannot be satisfied
by a mere assurance that contract law exhorts a judge to find a fair solution in each
understandable, abstract rules that give guidance as to the likely resolution of future
possible disputes.
The ideals of fairness and certainty appear to clash with each other. It has been said
that contract law has always struggled to serve the conflicting aims of certainty and
flexibility." In similar vein is the statement that "the central question of practical
31 Section 39(2) provides that "When ... developing the common law ... every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
32 Section 173.
33 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 45. This notion enjoys widespread support in South African legal
literature. See, for example, Corbett 1987 SALJ 52 54; Corder & Davis "Law and social practice: an
introduction" in Corder (ed) Essays on law and social practice in South Africa (1988) 1 et seq; Lubbe
"Estoppel, vertrouensbeskerming en die struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatreg" 1991 TSAR 1
13-18; De Vos & Van Loggerenberg "The activism of the judge in South Africa" 1991 TSAR 594. See
also Esser "Dogmatischen Denken im Zivilrecht" 1972Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 112, 124.
34 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel45; Tillotson Contract Law in Perspective 3rd edition (1995) 27.
35 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 43; Lubbe "Die verpanding van vorderingsregte en die
regsdogmatiek - quo vadis?" I991 Stell LR 13I 137; cf Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC
19942 SA 464 (W) 476.
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jurisprudence" is how far certainty in the law may be reconciled with the achievement
of justice in the particular case."
However, it is important to note that the aims of justice and certainty are interlinked.
That there is a link between them emphasises the need to aim for the best compromise
or optimum between these goals, so that the one is not downplayed at the expense of
the other." The link is this. On the one hand, uncertainty and unpredictability is
unfair." On the other hand, unjust rules or an unjust result is surprising and
unpredictable and therefore creates legal uncertainty. The first proposition has
already been alluded to. It is only fair that parties who draft contracts or decide
whether to embark on litigation, have guidelines in the form of abstract, consistent
rules as to what a court is likely to lay down in respect of their rights, duties and
remedies. It would be unfair and unjust if they had little or no guidelines as to what
may be expected from a court, apart from a general assurance that the court will
endeavour to reach a fair solution in the circumstances of each case." The party who
loses the dispute would have had no opportunity to appreciate her legal position, so
that the resultant loss of time and money is unfair." On the other hand, inflexible and
strict rules aimed at legal certainty create a false sense of legal certainty when they
tum out to be clearly unfair in certain circumstances. Such rules that are unjust in
certain situations actually create legal uncertainty, as parties are bound to challenge
rules that are out of step with commercial reality and generally accepted notions of
fairness and collective welfare goals (public policy), and courts are bound, sooner or
36 Lord Reid "The Law and the Reasonable Man" 1986 Proceedings of the British Academy 193. See
also Van Aswegen "Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict" 1993 THRHR 171 194; Neels 1998
TSAR 702 266; Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 536; Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht
Deel J: Contraetenrecht 2nd edition (1993) 121.
37 Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 120.
38 Cf Neels 1998 TSAR 702 703 ("Redelikheid sluit onder meer die strewe na regsekerheid in").
However, Neels imbues reasonableness with a different meaning than fairness, as discussed in n 92
infra.
39 Cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 194.
40 Moreover, previous decisions create a reasonable reliance that the same result would be reached on
similar facts, provided that the result is not clearly unjust. Cf Neels "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende
werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel 2)" 1999 TSAR 256.
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6 2 2 1 Not a matter of mere intuition or logic
later, to adapt or overturn these rules." For example, there is bound to be uncertainty
when courts hold that one set of residual rules should apply to all rights of pre-
emption if in commercial reality pre-emption contracts are expected to serve different
purposes in different contexts.
6 2 2 The determinants of fairness
What considerations determine whether a solution, or set of default rules is "fair" or
"reasonable"?
Firstly, it is not a matter of mere intuition or a subjective sense of equity and fairness,
as different people may have different views of what is fair and reasonable." Schorer
has famously said that" ... a judge who judges in accordance with his own common
sense and sense of equity and without rules of law is to be feared more than dogs and
snakes."? One implication is that detailed reasons must be given for why a solution
or rule is fair and reasonable, especially where a court deviates from the prima facie
legal position." One of the advantages of formal modes of reasoning is to prevent
judges from simply reaching conclusions that they regard as logical and obviously
correct, whereas there may be a difference of opinion on the matter." As it is aimed
at persuasion, such reasoning also assists a discourse by other judges and
commentators on the correctness of the decision. Giving reasons forces judges to
41 CfSmits Het vertrouwensbeginsel58; Neels 1999 TSAR 256 271.
42 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 13.
43 Cited with approval in Preller and Others v Jordaan 1956 (I) SA 483 (A) 500G.
44 Edouard v Administrator Natal 1989 2 SA 368 (D) 378D-F; Lubbe "Bona fides, billikheid en die
openbare belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg" 1990 Stell LR 13 15; Neels 1999 TSAR 684 696;
Neels 1999 TSAR 256 260, 267; Neels 1999 TSAR 484 486 and authorities there cited.
45 CfWeber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 561.
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business community or other contractants." Therefore, "an increase in the
critically evaluate their judicial hunch or innate legal sense (regsgevoeïï." The
judicial hunch or legal sense can probably be partially ascribed to actual experience
of applying the law and ingrained knowledge of legal rules 'and standards, which may
therefore differ from person to person." It should also be accepted that people's
thought processes are frequently not "logical" so that their "judicial hunch" is not a
guarantee of correctness." Consider for example the South African writers on
preference contracts who simply branded the bare preference constructions of Botha
JA and the Hartsrivier case" as "illogical", "unreasonable.'?" and "practically
useless.'?' without giving any reasons, whereas these constructions are championed as
commercially sensible in other jurisdictions."
6 2 2 2 The hypothetical consensus of typical parties
Secondly, contract law rules can only be fair if they are in fact suitable and
appropriate to comprehend, explain or reflect legal reality, including practices of the
complexity of some areas of law may be desirable, if it accurately mirrors the
increased complexity of social and economic life.'?' Contract law should not be less
changeable than the economy and society. Formalism is to be decried because it
46 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 13 who emphasises that one's legal intuition (regsgevoel) should
only be a factor which starts off the process of searching for grounds that would cause a certain result
to be regarded as just.
47 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 179.
48 Vorster Implied Terms 10.
49 Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v VanNiekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T). See par 212 supra.
50 EiseIen "Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Voorkoopreg - regte en
verpligtinge van partye" 1986 THRHR 95 97.
51 Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 20, 21 n 26.
52 See Ch 4 supra.
53 Tillotson Contract Law 3; Zweigert & Këtz Introduction to Comparative Law 3rd edition (translated
by Tony Weir) (1998) 34. CfLarenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafi (1995) 154-
155.
54 Eisenberg "The Bargain Principle and its Limits" 1982 Harvard Law Review 741 801 (reproduced in
Alexander Contract Law Volume I (1991) 323 et seq).
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If I am faced with the alternative of forcing commercial circles to fall in with a legal
doctrine which has nothing but precedent to commend it or altering the doctrine so as
to conform with what commercial experience has worked out, I know where my
choice lies. The law should be responsive as well as, at times, enunciatory, and
good doctrine can seldom be divorced from sound practice.i"
tends to isolate law from society, thereby encouraging the spurious idea that law is
autonomous and an end in itself rather than a means to social order." The need for
law to be in step with commercial reality has often been pointed out. Apart from the
dicta from Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government" and Blower v Van Noorden"
cited above, the following statement by Lord Wilberforce drives the point home:
Therefore specific contract types must be continually rethought, changed and refined
to make sure that they are functional and related to the demands of life." The
economic realities of the typical situation, the economic purpose of the contract type,
must therefore be taken into account when formulating default rules." This means
that it is clearly dangerous to try and formulate general rules or propositions for a
class of contracts, for example preference contracts, if the contracts in the class do not
55 Tillotson Contract Law 18. This problem with formalism has long been recognised by, inter alia,
North American pragmatists and realists like Pound ("Mechanical jurisprudence" 1908 Columbia Law
Review 605; cfVan Blerk "American Realism Revisited" in Van Wyk (ed) Nihil Obstat: Feesbundel
vir WiHosten/Essays in Honour of WiHasten 191) and the German Freirecht ("free law") school (see
Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 519-520). Of course, already in Roman times fairness
and the demands of a society active in international trade came to be seen as more important than
formalistic doctrine or "strict law". See n 29 supra and texts like C 3 1 8 and D 50 17 183. See also
the Roman Dutch writers cited by Neels 1998 TSAR 702 716-717 and Van der Merwe "Iudicis est ius
dicere" 230-231.
56 Supra.
57 Supra.
58 Cited by Tillotson Contract Law 3.
59 Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 2; cf Zweigert & Këtz Introduction to Comparative Law 34.
60 Vorster Implied Terms 33; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 30; Gordley The Philosophical Origins
of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) 241. CfSmits Het vertrouwensbeginseI30-31. The originators of
the concepts of essentialia and naturalia in the middle ages emphasised this: one had to establish the
end or purpose of the contract, and its essentialia and implied terms would be determined by that end
(see par 6 4 1 at n 228 infra where the origin of this model is discussed in more depth).
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in fact follow a single pattern in practice." It also means that a set of default rules
accepted for preference contracts should not be denounced simply on the basis of
historical authority, precedent or "logic," without considering its social or economic
usefulness. Moreover, the law must be prepared to recognise new types of specific
contracts that require special rules." This is the necessary consequence of contractual
freedom."
In the endeavour to correctly reflect legal reality, residual rules should attempt to
reflect the conventional understanding of most parties to such contracts where the
parties' actual purpose or interests cannot be known." One of the functions of
dispositive contract law is therefore to seek the typical will of parties for typical
conflicts of interests, in an attempt to approximate the actual parties' likely
intention." Many terms implied by law probably developed from an interpretation of
what typical parties intended in the normal case."
61 Vorster Implied Terms 157 n 109, 37. A danger of general ising abstraction is that concepts are
defined so broadly that factual situations may be grouped together on formally logical and systematic,
but essentially artificial grounds. See Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 137 n 48; cfWicke Vicarious Liability
in Modern South African Law unpublished LLM thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1997) 244, 247.
62 For examples of new contract types see Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 2.
63 Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 15.
64 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 63.
65 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung (1977) 180. Cf Eisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" in Benson
(ed) The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (2001) 206227.
66 Joubert General Principles 66; Corbett AJA (as he then was) in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 532G-533A recognised that implied terms in
the sense of rules of law which the Court will apply unless validly excluded by the contract itself "may
have originated partly in the contractual intention". The "objective" application of the bystander test in
terms of which the question is what reasonable persons in the position of the parties would have agreed
to, confirms that the understanding of typical parties to such contracts are relevant to the implication of
terms. For examples of cases where the bystander test was applied in this objective manner, see
Vorster Implied Terms 167 et seq; Kerr Contract 335 et seq; cfCockrell 1992 SAL.! 4053. These cases
are criticised by some authors for failing to distinguish clearly between tacit and residual provisions
(see for example Kerr Contract 335-336). I agree with this criticism insofar as courts implying residual
provisions should not only rely on the likely consensus of the parties (as I will show below). On the
other hand, it is better to expressly involve objective fairness and reasonableness considerations in the
process of implying tacit terms than to totally ignore these considerations by hiding behind a facade of
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That an ex lege term would probably concur with the conventional understanding of
most parties to such contracts provides an additional justification for overcoming the
fear of "making contracts for parties." The implication of ex lege terms can therefore
also be partly defended with reference to what parties would probably have done
themselves had they negotiated the matter.
The legitimacy of considering the conventional understanding of typical parties
allows consideration of the respective positions of bargaining power of parties who
typically conclude these contracts, at least where this does not lead to oppression or
exploitation as a result of a typical disparity in bargaining power. The need for a
paternalistic attitude that seeks to protect the weaker party, is excluded where neither
party typically has such a preponderance of bargaining power as to be in a position to
oppress the other," and where market forces operate freely." Freedom of contract is
only undermined and injustice done where there is an almost complete lack of
bargaining power so that terms are basically imposed on the weaker party to the
latter's disadvantage." Therefore, the only sensible way of dealing with inequality in
bargaining power is to have regard to its causes and the circumstances surrounding
it." It should be checked whether any oppression or exploitation typically results
from the inequality. If yes, the weaker party should be protected. If no, effect should
be given to the relative bargaining positions of the parties." Transposed to preference
contracts, these principles mean that it can be taken into account that grantors of
unexpressed consensus between the parties. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 199; Neels 1999
TSAR 684 695.
67 Vorster Implied Terms 34.
68 Ibid. Where two businessmen have contracted at arms's length, the fact that one of the parties was
unwise or unlucky in agreeing to a specific bargain, or that one party is richer than the other or that
supply exceeds demand at that stage, has nothing to do with ensuring that justice is done. Justice is
only done if parties who have bargained on equal terms in a free market without oppression are forced
to stick to their agreements (Vorster Implied Terms 34). Inequality between a consumer and a
corporate body that virtually monopolises a market is very different from inequalities in the
marketplace due to demand for a commodity (Vorster Implied Terms 56).
69 Tillotson Contract Law 7, 41.
70 Vorster Implied Terms 56.
71 Ibid.
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rights of pre-emption in respect of property are generally in a stronger bargaining
position than the holders, and that such rights are often granted gratuitously, without
any oppression of the holders. Therefore it is legitimate to argue for a default
construction that limits the grantor's freedom to deal with his property as little as
possible, as that this is what grantors would most likely have agreed to and what
holders would most likely have been forced to accept. 72 The only contexts in which a
paternalistic attitude may be called for is in favour of artists such as authors as
grantors vis-a-vis publishers, in favour of franchisees as grantors vis-a-vis franchisors
and in favour of employees or independent contractors as grantors vis-a-vis
employers. In most other contexts where preference contracts operate, free market
conditions prevail.
However it would be very problematic to regard the approximation of the subjective
will of typical parties to a specific type of contract, in other words the parties'
hypothetical consent, as the only determinant and justification of residual rules for
that contract type. This is what libertarian "contractarianist" or "consensualist"
theorists seek to do," and their radically individualist theories have justly been
criticised."
There are at least two reasons why an attempt to only approximate the actual or
hypothetical consent of parties when determining the consequences of a contract is
unsatisfactory .
72 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 305.
73 Prime examples are Charles Fried (Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation
(1981)) and Randy Barnett. Barnett's "consent theory" has been set out in articles such as "A Consent
Theory of Contract" 1986 (vol 86) Columbia Law Review 269-321. Posnerian contract theory also
justifies the criterion of wealth maximisation on the basis that wealth maximisation is based on implied
general consent. In this sense Posnerian contract theory is also consensualist. Posner's argument rests
on the debatable presupposition that parties seek only to maximise wealth.
74 Posner's fictional assumption about human nature "denies human desires for fairness, decency, trust,
co-operation and the like." (Braucher "Contract versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law" 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697 707). See Braucher 737 n 160 on the other
problematic aspects of pure Posnerian contract theory. See also Eisenberg 'The Theory of Contracts"
225 et seq.
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Firstly, searching after the presumed intention of parties would often involve an
artificial inquiry and a fiction, which makes it unnecessary to articulate the basis for
the decision, and opens the door to speculation." To regard all residual rules as
consensual "is to ascribe too much calculation to parties."76. When a court is guessing
at an intention that never in fact existed, it is difficult to discover what factors have
really weighed with the court in reaching its decision." This allows courts to give
effect to their own unreasoned perception of justice in the individual case without
being forced to consider conflicting views of doing justice." Because the basis of
decisions is left obscure and unarticulated, it becomes unnecessarily difficult for
lawyers to advise clients." The dangers and inadequacy of the "officious bystander"
test and the "Mooreock doctrine" of English law which focus on the hypothetical
consensus of parties (both in the context of establishing "actual tacit terms agreed on"
as well as terms implied by law), have been clearly demonstrated by, amongst others,
Vorster in his extensive study of implied terms, and will not be repeated in depth
here."
75 Vorster Implied Terms 177, 187; Lubbe & Murray Contract 463; Van der Griten Redelijkheid en
Billijkheid in het Overeenkomstenrecht (1978) 3 cited by Neels 1999 TSAR 684 696 n 82. The court's
decision needs merely be justified by judicial assertion that, of course, this is what (typical) parties
would have agreed.
76 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697731; cfGordley The philosophical origins 209-
210.
77 Cf Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract 5th edition (1995) 203. The search for the
probable consent of the parties is beset with difficulties especially because the search commences at a
time when the relationship has broken down and there are disputes on what was intended. Therefore
interpretation and supplying of terms cannot depend entirely upon consent, except in a fictitious sense.
(See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 463; Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 119; Braucher 1990
Washington and Lee Law Review 697 711; Eisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" 237).
78 Vorster Implied Terms 177, 187; Eisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" 237-258.
79 Ibid 190.
80 See especially at 63 et seq and 177 et seq. See also Vorster Implied Terms; Vorster "The Influence
of English Law on the implications of terms in the South African Law of Contract" 1987 SAL! 588-
598; Vorster "The bases for the implication of contractual terms" 1988 TSAR 161 178-179; Van der
Walt "Die huidige posisie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg met betrekking tot onbillike kontraksbedinge"
1986 SAL! 646 653; Findlay & Kirk-Cohen "On Fictitious Interpretation" 1953 SAL! 145; Olivier
Legal Fictions: An Analysis and Evaluation (1973) 127-128. Vorster's criticism has been referred to
with approval by, amongst others, Neels 1999 TSAR 684 696. Neels points out that whereas courts
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Vorster argues that where the parties' actual intention cannot in fact be ascertained,
the law should rather aim for the rational development of guidelines for solutions of
particular problems and thereby contribute to the predictability of law," instead of
insisting on using the fictitious bystander test. Other authors have also argued
strongly that he law should make policy choices explicitly and in a reasoned manner
and not mask the choices as "consent", whether actual but tacit or hypothetical. 82
The need to take into account policy considerations in formulating residual rules and
the desirability of legal certainty, means that the courts should not insist that each
dispute on the apposite rule could be decided simply by construing or interpreting the
transaction without reference to normative considerations. Such an ad hoc approach
would require courts to embark upon "an exasperating goose chase after non-existent
contractual meaning" in cases where the parties left the situation completely
unprovided for." Such an approach is actually more exposed to undue reliance on
personal preference and the spectre of legal uncertainty than one admitting to judicial
law-making on the basis of fully fleshed out policy considerations. Moreover, rules
or principles formulated in the abstract give future courts the benefit of previous
habitually used the tacit term approach in the context of choice of law provisions, more recent
decisions are accepting that an ex lege term is involved. See also Kerr Contract 346 who points out
that residual provisions would frequently not pass the officious bystander test.
81 Vorster Implied Terms 190; Vorster 1987 THRHR 450; Neels 1998 TSAR 702 707. On the
undesirability of legal fictions, see Olivier Legal Fictions (especially at 125 et seq with regard to
interpretation); Lubbe & Murray Contract 442 n 6; Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review
697 707. The use of fictions to disguise a new rule is an ancient technique in which the "new" (a
policy choice) can overcome the prejudices of the present without dealing with the resultant doctrinal
contradictions (Joubert 1992 TSAR 213 217; Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 105). If a
term was recognised as a (probably fictional) tacit one in a number of cases, it may develop to a
naturale. Recognition of a tacit term in the face of unwillingness to create law by recognition of a
novel naturale, is therefore better than total refusal to imply any term at all when fairness and policy
considerations demand this.
82 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697 733. CfKerr Contract 336.
83 Vorster Implied Terms 37, quoting from Stoljar "Prevention and Co-operation in the Law of
Contract" 1953 Canadian Bar Review 231 244. See also Cockrell "Second-guessing the exercise of
contractual power on rationality grounds" 1997 Acta Juridica 26 39.
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6 2 2 3 Policy considerations and underlying principles
courts' experience and insights in attempting to reach a fair solution." Rules reflect
current opinions about the fair weighing of interests and policy considerations, and
the factual case can therefore be compared with what has been achieved earlier."
This is another reason why courts should generally not be content with mere ad hoc
pronouncements on a fair implied term in the specific case."
Whether these laudable goals for the filling of contractual gaps should be
accomplished by means of the conceptual tool of ex lege terms in situations
traditionally regarded as the territory of "tacit terms", or rather through a process of
"normative interpretation" of each contract, or both, is considered at a later stage."
Secondly, presumed intention or consent as the only determinant of default rules,
would not help much where the typical interests of typical parties conflict. That their
interests conflict means that they would very likely not have considered a particular
solution as "obviously correct" or "obviously fair" in terms of an officious bystander
type of test aimed at establishing their probable consensus." Therefore, the
development of default rules must aim for a fair balance of typical party interests by
an outsider, that is, the courts. An important function of default rules is indeed to
ensure a just and suitable, expedient and functional balance of conflicting party
interests." In other words, absent provision by the parties, courts should consider
what parties should have agreed, and accept the probability that that is what they
would have agreed."
84 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 46.
85 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 40, 46.
86 Cf Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 10. See also Neels 1998 TSAR 702 711 et seq on the general
undesirability of ad hoc decisions on the basis of a judge's idea of fairness.
87 Par 6 4 infra.
88 CfCockrel1 1997 Acta Juridica 26 39; Eisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" 227.
89 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 129; Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 63-64.
90 CfGordley The philosophical origins 243.
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of fairness can be grouped together as "policy considerations'?"
interrelationship is considered in more depth below.)
(Their
"Fairness" entails not only fairness between the parties, but also doing justice in the
eyes of the community as a whole. This requires the advancement of desirable goals
of collective social welfare, including the promotion of ethical values and generally
accepted underlying principles of our law. The Roman Dutch writer Huber
recognised this extended meaning of "fairness" by his distinction between natural
fairness and civil fairness (burgerlijke billijkheid). The latter, he says, includes "the
considerations of what is useful and profitable for a nation."91 All these determinants
The relevance of policy considerations to residual rules is not a new truth for South
African courts and lawyers. Vorster has clearly shown that South Africa courts do
not shy away from using their power to recognise new residual rules or ex lege terms
on the basis of policy considerations relevant to the kind of contractual relationship in
question." For example, the South African locus classicus on implied terms, Alfred
McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration" expressly
recognises that legal policy contributes to the creation of residual provisions."
Already in Roman law, an important source of South African contract law rules,
residual rules were based not on hypothetical consent, but on objective notions of
fairness and good faith, asformulae of contractual actions ordered the judge to reach a
solution which is in accordance with bonafides."
91 HR 1 1 15 (Gane's translation).
92 The following writers agree that "policy considerations" refer to ethical values or desirable goals of
collective social welfare: Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 174; Corbett 1987 SALJ 52 59; Lubbe 1990
Stell LR 13-17; Lubbe & Murray Contract 241; Cockrell 1992 SALf 40; Bell Policy arguments in
judicial decisions (1983) 22-23.
93 See inter alia at 74, 147 of his thesis. See also Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 63; Corbett 1987
SALJ 52 52; Van der Merwe & Lubbe "Bonafides and public policy in contract" 1991 Stell LR 91 99-
101; Lubbe & Murray Contract 424; Neels 1999 TSAR 684 697. A number of the cases listed in n 29
supra serve as examples. See also Par Excellence Colour Printing (Pty) Ltd v Ronnie Cox Graphic
Supplies (Pty) Ltd 1983 I SA 295 (A); Falch v Wessels 1983 4 SA 172 (T).
94 19743 SA 506 (A).
95 532G-H.
96 The judge was enjoined to decide the case in accordance with bona fides, either by the intentio of
actions on contractus consensu like sale and lease, or by the exceptio doli, a clause which could be
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In fact, all legal rules ought in the final analysis to be justifiable by reference to some
consideration of policy." This is because all law, including contract law, is
regulatory: it involves use of state power." When it is worthwhile for the state to put
the machinery of the law in the service of the one party against the other, and how that
should be done, are important questions of public policy." The application or
statement of the law (ius dicere) is therefore "unavoidably embedded in political
considerations. "100 Policy considerations should be seen "as an inherent part of legal
materials, often reflecting fundamental principles immanent in the legal system."!"
The reasons why the application of rules do not always go hand in hand with a
detailed analysis of the relevant policy considerations is that it is (mostly correctly)
presumed that existing rules based on precedent or legislation are based on sound
considerations of policy.!" Usually it would therefore only be necessary to refer to
policy considerations if an existing rule is challenged or a dispute is not covered by
inserted into the formulae of other contractual actions whose intentiones did not contain a reference to
bona fides, such as the actio ex stipulatione. See generally Schermaier "Bona fides in Roman contract
law" in Zimmermann & Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 63 66 et seq.
For a historical overview see Zimmermann "Good faith and equity" in Zimmermann & Visser (eds)
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217. See also Tuckers Land and
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis supra 652 where the court refers to Roman law as
justification for the court's power to imply an (ex lege) term on the basis of good faith or fairness. See
also A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker supra 420G-H.
97 Vorster Implied Terms 18. CfCorder & Davis "Law and social practice: an introduction" 1 2.
98 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697 699.
99 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697 700 quoting from Cohen "The Basis of
Contract" in Law and the Social Order (1933) 78-79; 103-104. Cf Eisenberg "The Theory of
Contracts" 228.
100 Van der Merwe "ludicis est ius dicere" 231. See also Hlophe 1995 SAL/22 28, quoting from Wade
Constitutional Fundamentals revised edition (1989) 78.
101 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 194. CfHutchison's description of good faith as "an ethical value
or controlling principle based on community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and
informs the substantive law of contract" ("Non-Variation Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the
Shifren Straitjacket?" 2001 SAL/720 quoted with approval by the majority in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4
SA 1 (SCA)).
102 Vorster Implied Terms 18.
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6223 1 Underlying principles
precedent or statute.!" (Of course, another reason for the dearth in policy analysis in
some South African legal literature and case law is the mistaken assumption by some
authorities that contract law, or at least its consequential rules, is a "seamless web of
[value-neutral] rules which possesses a determinative rationality of its own, such that
answers to any dispute will be thrown up by the inexorable logic that is internal to the
system itself."104)
Conflicting interests and purposes must therefore ultimately be balanced fairly by
having regard to fundamental principles underlying our contract law rules, such as the
protection of reasonable reliance.'?' good faith,'?" individual autonomy,'?'
103CfVan Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 194-5 who says judicial law-making using policy considerations
is "basically interstitial" as it occurs where a plain and clear valid legal rule cannot by means of the
conscious rational use of ordinary logical and deductive reasoning, furnish an answer." Policy
considerations should in my view also be kept in mind where "a plain and clear valid legal rule" does
apparently "furnish an answer", but is challenged on the basis that it does not adequately reflect and
fairly regulate the situation which it seeks to order, even though the situation is not a novel one. Van
Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 probably caters for this concern by including cases where law is changed
or adapted by using policy considerations as "interstitial" in the sense that the settled legal materials are
"inadequate" to reach a decision (189).
104Cockrell 1992 SAL.! 40.
lOS That reasonable reliance should be protected, is widely acknowledged as an important principle
underlying our law, particularly as a supplementary basis for contractual liability. See Lubbe & Murray
Contract chapter 3 especially at 108, 163 et seq and authorities there cited; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 29-41; Kerr Contract 20, 23; Cockrell 1992 SAL.! 40 49. This necessarily means that legal
consequences may be determined by the reasonable expectations of a party (Lubbe & Murray Contract
425; Vorster 1988 TSAR 161). However, this principle is so open-ended that a statement that a certain
residual term is justified by it should not be accorded much weight without full motivation. Some of
the authors who deny the commercial utility of Botha JA's construction of preference contracts have,
for example, simply stated that it is unreasonable, and by implication, that it thwarts the reasonable
expectations of the holder, without considering whether parties may in fact have reason to agree to such
contracts. Use of the language of reasonable reliance without further motivation comes close to the
radically eonsensualist or "hypothetical bystander" method of implying residual terms for which the
only test for residual terms is "the terms that typical parties would have consented to." The limitations
of this approach was discussed at n 73 et seq supra. See also Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische
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reciprocity.!" that there should be a balance of power!" or "substantial equivalence"
of exchanges, 110 and that the vulnerable should be protected. These are all expressions
of the fairness ideal and simultaneously desirable policy goals. III They are regarded
as underlying principles as they are the motivation or basis for a number of legal
rules.!" As they are realised and sanctioned through accepted rules, they have
Praxis 516 524 who regards "reliance" as an open-ended standard together with "good faith" and
"fairness".
106 See especially Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A)
652G. See also the majority decision in Brisley v Drotsky supra par 21 and Afrox Health Care Limited
v Strydom 20026 SA 21 (HHA) par 32. CfLubbe "Bonafides, billikheid en die openbare belang in die
Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg" 1990 Stell LR 7 20; Van der Merwe & Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 91 and
Cockrell 1997 Acta Juridica 26 42-43 who attempt a closer description of this policy consideration.
See also Lubbe & Murray Contract 425 n 7; Cockrell 1992 SALJ 4055 et seq; Zimmermann "Good
faith and equity".
107 See especially Lubbe 1991 TSAR 1 13 et seq for a discussion of this principle.
108 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A) 415H; 417
("wederkerigheidsbeginsef'). See also Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen van Contraetenrecht (1979), an
in depth study of the three basic principles of party autonomy, the protection of reasonable reliance and
reciprocity.
109 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697701.
110 Vorster Implied Terms 20; Joubert 1992 TSAR 213214. Cockrell 1992 SALJ 4051 calls this goal
"preservation of justice-in-exchange". Grotius De iure naturae et gentium libri tres 2 12 9 I, for
example, relies on the principle that contracts requires equality as an argument for the duty to disclose
defects in the merx.
III Hart The Concept of Law 260 states that "principles, because they refer more or less explicitly to
some purpose, goal, entitlement, or value, are regarded from some point of view as desirable to
maintain, or to adhere to, and so not only as providing an explanation or rationale of the rules which
exemplified them, but as at least contributing to the justification." Because they are expressions of the
fairness ideal and desirable policy goals, some of these principles, such as the protection of reasonable
reliance and individual autonomy, also playa role in other fields of private law. See Neels 1999 TSAR
484 488 et seq for an overview of fundamental principles applicable to private law generally and to
delict and property law in particular.
112 On the concept of principles of law and their function see Lubbe 1991 TSAR I 3; Van Aswegen
1993 THRHR 171 177 et seq; Neels 1999 TSAR 484 486 et seq; Canaris Systemdenken und
Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz (1969) 46 et seq; Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft
(1975) 458 et seq; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 223 et seq, 302 et
seq; Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1978); Dworkin A Matter of Principle (1985) 72; Nieuwenhuis
Drie Beginselen van Contraetenrecht (1979) 3 et seq; Hart The Concept of Law 260 et seq. The
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As open-ended concepts, their application compnses a value judgment, especially
since some of them appears to conflict with each other. An attempt must be made to
avert these contradictions between principles by an optimal or fair balancing of the
relevant principles, with due regard to their interrelationship.!" Sub-principles have
normative power in arguments about what rules should be, apart from their inherent
persuasive power as ethical postulates.'"
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky'" and Afrox Health Care Limited v
Strydom:" has recently expressly recognised the creative function of underlying
principles of contract law, such as good faith, in so far as they may inspire and justify
the creation and amendment of rules. 116 The majority in Brisley v Drotsky approved
Dale Hutchison's statement that good faith as an underlying principle has a creative,
controlling, legitimating and explanatory function, but emphasised that it is only one
of the principles underlying our law."? This implies that the same functions are
served by other principles underlying our law.
distinction between principles and (black letter) rules is gradual or fluid: principles sometimes function
directly as open-ended rules or standards. Cfthe rule that contracts contrary to public policy are void
(Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 19844 SA 874 (A)). See also Neels 1999 TSAR
256 258 et seq; Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen 4; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 307-308; Hart The Concept of Law 260.
113 Cf Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 302; Hart The Concept of Law
260.
114 Supra 15E-G par 22 of the joint majority judgment.
11520026 SA 21 (HHA) par 32.
116The court in Brisley v Drotsky ultimately decided that the other fundamental principle of party
autonomy weighed against a proposed rule that would qualify or abolish the "Shifren straitjacket" on
the basis that it conflicts with the principle of good faith. See also Lubbe 1991 TSAR 1 for an
interesting analysis of a legal problem (the requirements for estoppel) by reference to the underlying
principles of individual autonomy and reasonable reliance (especially at 16 et seq).
117Hutchison 2001 SALJ720, quoted in par 22 of the decision.
118Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 263, 303. The authors speak of
the Optimierungsgebot. As they are all meritorious goals, the fact that they sometimes conflict and
must therefore be balanced does not mean that they are inconsistent. Eisenberg "The Theory of
Contracts" 243-244 explains this by the example that it does not lessen our commitment to the moral
norm of truth-telling that we believe it is sometimes morally permissible not to tell the truth, for
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property!" and the quick settlement of disputes. However, the ideal of
evolved from these general principles, which are also helpful for arriving at a fair
solution, or, at least, to test and legitimate a solution regarded as "fair" on the basis of
one's legal intuition (regsgevoel). The principle of good faith, for example, embraces
the principle of protection of reasonable reliance and the "general principle of
contractual co-operation" relied upon by Corbett AJA for implication of a residual
term in Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration.ï"
Protection of the vulnerable finds expression in the principle that the burden of clear
communication must be placed on the generally most sophisticated party. Effect must
therefore rather be given to the interests of the other party where the more
sophisticated party has not clearly provided in the contract how its interests are to be
protected. For example, in the context of rights of first refusal granted by authors to
publishers, this principle may be used to argue for a restrictive default construction of
such preference contracts in order to safeguard the author (grantor) as the weaker
party, whilst placing the burden of clear communication on the publisher (holder) as
the more sophisticated party.
62232 Other policy considerations
Other policy considerations to be taken into account when balancing the parties'
interests include the effect of the different possible solutions on third parties as well
as the benefit of maximisation of wealth and cost-effectiveness to society as a whole.
These policy goals include ideals such as the desirability of the free alienability of
example in lying to an assassin about his victim's whereabouts, because of the moral norm that life
must be venerated. He also gives the example that the goal of developing a fruitful and rewarding
career is not inconsistent with the goal of being a nurturing parent, although time pressures may lead to
a conflict between these goals.
119 19743 SA 506 (A) 534D. Corbett AJA relied on the statement of this principle in Mackay v Dick
18816 App Cas 251 263, per Lord Blackburn, and by Viscount Simon in Luxor Ltd v Cooper 1941 AC
108 118.
120 Cases on preference contracts confirming the general principle that restraints on alienation should be
strictly construed, include the majority decision in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty)
Ltd 1967 3 SA 310 (A) 321; Robinson v Randforntein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 188;
Edwards (Waaikraal) Gold Mining Co Ltd v Mamogale NO & Bakwena Mines Ltd 1927 TPD 288; Ah
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Vorster mentions further policy considerations that have been taken into account by
courts in England and South Africa in formulating residual rules.!" They are
whether a rule would tend to encourage or discourage conduct that is not beneficial or
detrimental to the interests of society, which party is generally in a better position to
ascertain and guard against the risks regulated by the proposed rule, whether one of
"maximisation of wealth" must not be understood as the only value served by
contract law as radical Posnerian contract theory would have it. Posner's contract
theory assumes that people are only ever out to maximise wealth, which simply does
not reflect reality correctly.!" Courts should also realise that, just like "fairness" and
"reasonableness", "cost-effectiveness" is so open-ended that it should not be the only
language of justification for a particular term.!"
Ling v Community Development Board & Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E) 370-38A. See also Gien v Gien
1979 2 SA 1113 (T) 1120-1121; Regal v African Supers late (Pty) Ltd 1963 I SA 102 (A) 106-107.
This principle is also encountered in other jurisdictions. See for example, Cross "The ties that bind:
preemptive rights and restraints on alienation that commonly burden oil and gas properties" 1999 Texas
Wesleyan Law Review 193 209-210; Conine OB "Property provisions of the operating agreement -
interpretation, validity, and enforceability" 1988 Texas Tech Law Review 1263.
121 Cf note 73. One illustration is that many parties litigate to enforce contracts when litigation is
commercially unviable (cfVan Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 18). Even if efficiency is widely defined as
making one person better off without making another worse off, where "better off' means to move to a
position which the person chooses in preference to another, the theory remains problematic when it
attempts to explain all contract law. As Posner has noted, it is puzzlir:g from an economic standpoint
that Shylock cannot enforce his contract with Antonio, or that a person cannot sell himself into slavery
(Posner Economic Analysis of Law 2nd edition (1977) 187). However, it is generally accepted even by
opponents of Posnerian theory that wealth maximisation is one of the values which the consequential
rule of contract law should serve. See, for example, Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review
697 711; cfEisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" 238.
122 Certainly law and economics theorists who claim a eonsensualist basis for their theories, contradict
themselves when they seek to argue about implied terms on the basis of economic efficiency, because
the fact that the parties did not provide for the contingency shows that "ex ante it was not worth the
parties' time to decide how to deal with the risks and burdens. If so, the way these risks and burdens
are allocated ex post will not affect the value of the contract to the parties ex ante or their decision to
enter into it. If it does not, then an economist has no reason for caring about what happens ex post"
(Gordley "Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition" in Benson (ed) The Theory of Contract Law:
New Essays (2001) 265 (hereafter cited as Gordley "Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition") 324).
123 Vorster Implied Terms 30 et seq and 157 et seq, cited with approval by Joubert 1992 TSAR 213 215.
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the parties IS entitled to an indemnity from a third party, whether a refusal to
recognise the residual rule will mean that the innocent party will have no remedy, the
economic realities of the typical situation, which includes the respective bargaining
positions of the parties and the need to protect the weaker party in the case of
oppression, the ability of the party on whom it is sought to place the obligation to
redistribute the costs spent in fulfilment of the obligation, the ability of the parties to
insure against the regulated risk, the onerousness of the duty sought to be imposed
and the degree to which the proposed residual rule fits with existing rules and
principles.!"
Therefore, the formulation of residual rules requires that both the approximation of
the typical intention of typical parties to the class of contract and the ideals of fairness
and efficiency be strived for.!" This reflects the fact that in contract law elements of
the old idea of market individualism are not entirely displaced by, but mingles with
elements of the newer competing ideology of the social welfare mixed economy
state.!" In any event, there is no clear-cut, radical division between consent and
residual rules supplied on the basis of policy considerations.!" The residual rule is
supposed to be consistent with a general intention of the parties that their transaction
should be effective and fair.!"
124 Ibid.
125 CfKerr Contract 348 n 239.
126 Tillotson Contract Law 43-45. Of course, market individualism still forms an important part of a
social welfare mixed economy state like ours.
127 Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697735.
128 Vorster Implied Terms 80, 83. Gordley "Natural Law Origins of the Common Law of Contract" in
Barton (ed) Towards a General Law of Contract (1990) 367 418 also shows that the natural lawyers
believed the requirement of equality and, therefore, fairness, for the naturalia ("natural terms") was not
something imposed on parties against their will, but honoured the intention of contracting parties
(hereafter cited as Gordley "Natural Law Origins"). A comment in the Restatement of Contracts in the
USA on supplying terms, illustrates this link between consent and community standards. The comment
explicitly rejects the fiction that "the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to if the
question had been brought to their intention" (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 comment d
(1979) quoted by Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697736). Rather, "the probability
that a particular term would have been used if the question had been raised" is described as relevant to
the question what is a reasonable term (Ibid. CfKerr Contract 348 n 239.) The comment emphasises
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Specific contract law rules therefore have both empirical and normative elements:
they capture the dialectic of "is" (adhesion to reality) and "ought" (the normative
quality of the rulesj.!"
It should be clear from the above discussion that contract law rules on the
consequences of valid contracts seek to attain the best compromise between mixed
and sometimes conflicting ideals.!" which are moreover vague and open-ended. The
possibility always exists that some policy considerations, principles or business
practices which are relevant have been ignored or that new policy considerations have
become relevant which the existing rules did not take into account due to changing
that where there is in fact no agreement, a term should be supplied which accords with community
standards of fairness and policy. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 comment d (1979) quoted
by Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697 736. Another comment on the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (USA) confirms the close connection
between the need to honour expectations, both subjective and objective, on the one hand, and
community standards on the other: "Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasises
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterised as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." (Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 comment a (1979) quoted by Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697
735).
129 The latter phrase is taken from Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 31. Cf Joubert Die Finansiële
Huurkontrak 63-64.
130 Brisley v Drotsky supra par 24: "Die taak van die howe in die algemeen ... is om hierdie
grondliggende waardes wat soms met mekaar in botsing kom teen mekaar op te weeg en om by
geleentheid, wanneer dit nodig blyk te wees, geleidelik en met verdrag aanpassings te maak." Cf
Lubbe "A doctrine in search of a theory: reflections on the so-called doctrine of notice in South African
law" 1997 Acta Juridica 246 271 ("multiplicity of factors exerting a normative influence"); cf Corbett
1987 SALJ 52 67-68; Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697702; Neels 1998 TSAR 702
707; Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen 3-4. Braucher 701 states that she "remain[s] a skeptic about the
need for and the wisdom of a unified field theory of contract, particularly a one-dimensional one; a
good grey compromise statement of competing concerns will probably do." Eisenberg "The Theory of
Contracts" 241 also favours a "multi-value theory" which he calls the basic contracts principle, which
includes an exhortation to affectuate the objectives of parties, subject to appropriate constraints, and
which aims at "the best possible rules of contract law" "taking into account all relevant moral, policy
and empirical propositions."
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views or practices in society."' The endeavour to lay down fair default rules can
therefore not be regarded as anything but a continuing, never-ending quest, an eternal
debate or discourse.!" Courts must therefore be prepared to give up the present
position or solution when it is shown to be clearly out of step with existing policy
considerations and notions of justice as well as the actual purposes of typical parties
to such contracts.!" Similarly, the specific contract types are only model contracts
catering for the most important contractual purposes and courts must recognise that
new or mixed forms of typical contracts may arise requiring new default rules.
The relevance of policy considerations to residual rules raises a number of questions.
May courts take judicial notice of policy goals or are they supposed to be proved on
evidence'i'" Are judges not fundamentally incapable of assessing the interests of the
community at large due to lack of training and capacity to conduct sociological data
gatberingz'" Does a heterogeneous society like ours prevent judges from determining
public interest'/!" Is there some kind of systematic hierarchy between the policy
considerations and principles mentioned? Does the consideration of policy
considerations and open-ended principles of law not make the law utterly
unpredictable?
131 Cf Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 65; Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 137; Larenz Methodenlehre
der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 14.
132 Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 29 states that the determination of the legal nature of contract
types and their legal consequences can only be understood as a long development process and that
institutionalisation of these very complex economic and legal backgrounds and purposes must
necessarily proceed in a pluralistic discoursive communication process. Cf Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131
138; Cockrell 1992 SALf 4046 after n 24; Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516563-564,
566.
133 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 127; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 15; Joubert Die Finansiële
Huurkontrak 65.
134 These issues are raised, but not explicitly addressed by Hawthorne "The principle of equality in the
law of contract" 1995 THRHR 157 173 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 140.
135 This is a question identified by Hlophe 1995 SALf 22.
136 hHawt ome 1995 THRHR 157 173; Van der Merwe et al Contract 140; Lubbe & Murray Contract
241.
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62233 Judicial notice of policy considerations
There is no reason why courts should not "take judicial notice" of policy goals as they
always have done. Judges are "in reality ... up to their necks in policy, as they have
been all through history .... "137 The application of the bani mores standard in delict,
which includes the consideration of policy factors weighing against delictual liability
(such as unlimited liability) and the application of the "public interest" test for legality
of contracts are stock examples of overt policy decisions usually taken without
sociological evidence.!" Sometimes policy goals have been recognised in so many
cases that they have become underlying principles of our law, and evidence should
therefore not be required to prove them. An example is the principle that contractual
restraints on alienation should be strictly interpreted. The constitutional mandate to
develop the common law in accordance with the spirit of the Bill of Rights is
sufficient authority for courts to interpret and apply the values underlying the
Constitution in the absence of evidence on society's general understanding of these
values. This process requires policy decisions. Nevertheless, judges should not easily
disallow evidence on public policy issues in appropriate cases, especially where
interpretation of the Constitution is at stake. Rule 30 of the Constitutional Court
Rules allows parties to present social science and economic data relevant to
interpretation of the Constitution.!" It provides that parties may canvass factual
material which are relevant to the issues to be decided by the court, regardless of
whether such material appear on the record, provided that such facts are common
137 Wade Constitutional Fundamentals revised edition (1989) 78, as quoted by Hlophe 1995 SALf 22
28. As a result Hlophe 1995 SALf 22 states that judges' fear of trespassing upon the functions of the
legislature and involvement in political controversy and policy decisions is insupportable. See also the
text at n 97 et seq supra.
138 According to Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679, the legal convictions of the community must be
sought in the convictions of the community's legal policy makers, such as the legislator and judiciary.
According to Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 195 "the reference to the generally accepted views of
the community, does not simply imply a type of majority view based on a simple opinion poll. It
presupposes a reflection of inherent values accepted in the community and apparent from the accepted
legal standards and institutions of the community."
139 See Chaskalson & Loots "Court rules and practice directives" in Chaskalson et al Constitutional
Law of South Africa (Revision Service 5, 1999) 7.3(d) and Erasmus, Farlam & Van Loggerenberg
Superior Court Practice (Review Service 18-2002) C4-69.
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statistical nature capable of easy verification. Although the High Court and
cause or otherwise incontrovertible; or are of an official, scientific, technical or
Magistrate's Court Rules do not contain a similar provision, these courts should allow
similar evidence.!"
62234 The difficulties caused by a heterogenous society
The difficulties of deciding on public policy in a heterogeneous society has always
existed and will always exist, yet contract law demands policy decisions, most notably
in the context of legality. A realistic model of adjudication, acknowledging that
judges are not just value-neutral applicators of the law, and a representative judiciary
in a democratic political system, are important prerequisites (but not guarantees) for
sensitivity to communal values and goals.!" Judges must therefore attempt to link the
reasons for their policy or value decisions to generally accepted views of what justice
and common welfare demands,'? and consciously guard against allowing personal
preferences influencing a decision, where these are not in accordance with generally
accepted views.'? Reasoned and overt policy choices will do much more to eliminate
the danger of adopting a policy goal not shared by society in general than an averred
refusal to make any policy choices. A refusal to consider policy considerations is
itself a policy choice in favour of political minimalisrn'" and retention of the policy
choices underlying the status quo.
140 cf S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) paras 15, 23, 24 and 68; National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and others 1999 1 SA 6
(CC) par 88. See further Naudé "The value of life: a note on Christian Lawyers Association of SA and
others v Minister of Health and others 1998 4 SA 1113 (T)" 1999 SAJHR 541.
141 Lubbe 1991 StellLR 131137.
142 Corbett 1987 SALJ 52 67.
143 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 190-191, 194; Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 13 15; Lubbe & Murray
Contract 240-241. The risk of undue reliance on personal preference always exist, regardless of
whether a judge is willing to consider policy considerations.
144 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 40.
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All value judgments, including application of open concepts such as "fairness" and
"reasonableness" which must necessarily be applied in the context of residual rules,
remain subjective, influenced by the judge's legal consciousness and beliefs about
ethics and morality.!" As long as the judge openly declares his value decisions, and
because judges are bound by a process of dialogue and rational argument aimed at
persuasion, this subjective influence is not to be decried: it aids in the avoidance of
unfair application of norms in atypical cases.!"
62235 No precise hierarchy of principles and policy considerations
Is there a hierarchy or system of underlying principles and policy considerations
setting out the relative values which each must carry? Firstly, a claim that courts
must decide hard cases only with reference to underlying principles of law and not
with reference to policy considerations (in a narrow sense) must be treated with
SuspICIOn. Dworkin is often understood to be a proponent of this argument."? He
has defined arguments of principle as arguments for a right that do not "necessarily"
advance a desirable economic, political or social goal, but serve some moral aim such
as fairness or justice. Arguments of policy are arguments for a collective goal of the
community as a whole.!" However, as Dworkin himself points out, there is no clear
distinction between these categories: a principle can be stated as a policy and a
policy as a principle.!" If that is possible, it undermines the argument that courts
145 Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 561.
146 Ibid 563-564.
147 See, for example, Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 177. Taking Rights Seriously 294 et seq; 363
(inter alia) does seem to support this interpretation. But see Mureinik "Dworkin and Apartheid" in
Corder (ed) "Essays on law and social practice in South Africa" (1988) 181 for a different
interpretation.
148 Taking Rights Seriously 22-23.
149 Taking Rights Seriously 22, 96, 100, 295. Bell Policy arguments in judicial decisions 22-23,
describes policy arguments as either ethical or goal-based. They are ethical if they appeal to an ethical
standard such as fairness, and goal-based if they advocate advancement of some social goal. In fact,
there is considerable overlap between these two supposedly separate "categories" of policy
considerations. The promotion of ethical or moral values is a desirable goal of collective social
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must decide hard cases only with reference to principles and not with reference to
policy.l" Dworkin clearly concedes that policy considerations should at least be
taken into account when a rule is uncertain, as he allows their use as arguments to
determine the existence and scope of individual rights.!" What Dworkin therefore
really warns against is an untrammelled adjudication on the basis of policy
considerations that have not already been recognised in the legal system (they are
therefore not legal principles recognised in existing rules), without sufficient regard
for consistency and coherence within the legal system.!? Such necessary checks on
the courts' power to make law based on policy considerations will be discussed
further below.
In any event, the general welfare of the community is a general legal principle
underlying our contract law and arguably a value underlying the Bill of Rights.'? The
"public interest" certainly functions as a principle affecting the legality of contracts,
welfare, and "rightness reasons ultimately depend on general-welfare considerations" (Eisenberg "The
Theory of Contracts" 228).
150 Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions 74-75 agrees that fairness arguments as well as
judgments about the collective welfare plays an important part in the decisions judges make. Neels
1998 TSAR 702 705 also distinguishes between moral and ethical values (which is concerned with
"fairness") on the one hand, and desirable goals of collective social welfare (which is concerned with
"reasonableness") on the other. Once again this distinction is not watertight. Reasonableness is
certainly also a moral or ethical value and can relate to the conduct expected, ethically and in fairness,
from an individual, apart from communal policy goals. However, like Bell, Neels does not use this
distinction to argue for a lesser role for "collective social welfare goals" and criticizes Dworkin's
distinction as an argument for excluding policy arguments (Neels 1998 TSAR 702 709).
151 Taking Rights Seriously 294 et seq.
152 Cf Mureinik "Dworkin and apartheid" 199 et seq; Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously 297 ("The
difference between an argument of principle and argument of policy ... is a difference between two
kinds of questions that a political institution might put to itself, not a difference in the kinds of facts
than can figure in an answer").
153 On the relevance of values in constitutional adjudication, see for example S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642
(CC) paras 17-18; S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC) par 9; De Lange v Smuts NO 19983 SA 785
(CC) paras 31, 43-48, 56, 59; Kentridge "Interpretation" in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of
South Africa (Revision Service 5,1999) 11-23 et seq; Naudé "The value of life: a note on Christian
Lawyers Association of SA and others v Minister of Health and others 1998 4 SA 1113 (T)" 1999
SAJHR 541.
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or indeed as a black letter open norm. Edouard v Administrator Natal, 154for example,
refers to "collective welfare" as one principle operating in this context. Sub-
principles of "collective welfare" already recognised in our law include the protection
of the weak against oppression, the desirability of the free alienability of property and
the desirability of freedom of trade.!" All three, especially freedom of trade, can also
be regarded as constitutional values, so that the legislator has indeed vested them with
the highest authority.!" In this sense any policy consideration which can be linked to
a constitutional value would not fall foul of Dworkin's test, as he allows judges to
reflect political decisions of the past, but not oppose them.!" As constitutional values
have the highest authority in our law, one cannot relegate policy arguments based on
constitutional values to second-rate arguments which rank somewhere below
generally recognised underlying principles of contract law.!" The only policy
considerations that must be excluded, even in Dworkin's own terms, seems to be
those that conflict with the Constitution.
15419892 SA 368 (D) 379.
155On freedom of trade, see Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A).
The desirability of the free alienability of property is partly informed by the fundamental principle (and
"ethical postulate") of individual autonomy, but also by the collective interest in increased income
generated by property transactions. That individual autonomy is an ethical postulate has been pointed
out by Lubbe 1991 TSAR 1 13.
156 Freedom of trade, occupation or profession is expressly guaranteed in s 22 of the Constitution. The
protection of individual rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights shows the importance of protection of
individual autonomy (Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky supra 35E par 94; Neels 1999 TSAR 484 485).
As such the individualistic value of individual autonomy is also a community value, which should not
be vilified and thrown out together with the bath water of extreme individualism.
157 Taking Rights Seriously 87.
158Derek van der Merwe "Judicis est ius dicere" 227 also considers that the Constitution's imperative
that the common law be developed to reflect the spirit or values of the Constitution relegates the
importance of the nice distinction between legislative considerations of policy and judicial
consideration of principle to "a secondary, if not wholly minor role." See also Hart The Concept of
Law 274 et seq for criticism on Dworkin's objections to judicial law-making by reference to policy
goals. CfPhang "The Concept of Law revisited" 1995 TSAR 403419 for a discussion of Hart's views.
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A preetse hierarchy of principles and policy goals, with a pronuse of more
predictability in application, seems an impossible ideal.!" What can be said with
certainty is that the values underlying the Constitution carry the highest authority.
The more pervasive any (other) underlying principle of contract law, that is, the more
rules underpinned by it, the more weight it probably carries in arguments about what
rules should be. Past judicial referral to policy considerations and principle increases
the weight carried by these arguments and, to some extent, allows a comparison of
the weight allocated to different principles."? The more concretely a principle or sub-
principle is stated, that is the more it approximates the concrete rules flowing from it,
the more weight it carries in an argument on what (residual) rules should be. This is
because the more general any concept, the more unfixed its meaning, the less it says.
The spectrum of rules that are clearly inconsistent with a principle is conversely
related to the breadth of the principle."! For example, "fairness" or "good faith" is so
open-ended that mere references to them are bound to carry less weight than more
concrete expressions thereof, such as the reasonable reliance principle or the principle
of reciprocity or justice-in-the-exchange.!? A generally stated reference to reasonable
reliance is less weighty than its more concrete expression that a person who has
reasonably acted to his detriment in reliance on another's action, should be protected
159 cf Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 113-114; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 223 and especially at 304; Hart The Concept of Law 275; Eisenberg "The
Theory of Contract" 244.
160 CfLarenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 232.
161 Sinnentleerung is said to take place: the wide concept becomes emptied of meaning.
162 Cf Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen 7 who states that the weight of an appeal to the most general
valuational concepts like fairness and good faith in a debate on the binding force of agreements is nil.
He refuses to regard fairness and good faith as arguments, but sees them as "vooronderstellen
argumenten" (presuppositions of arguments). See also Gordley The philosophical origins 234 ("The
principle of fairness is thus like a clothes hanger on which one can hang a system of contract law after
someone else makes it. It does not explain what the rules should be.") Although I agree that the
principles of fairness and good faith are very vague and should be fleshed out in argument, it is an
overstatement to say that these principles carry no weight whatsoever. These principles are not so wide
that no conduct or result could ever fall foul of them. Most people recognise gross unfairness or bad
faith. If these principles are too wide to explain what rules should be, at least they are sometimes clear
enough to show what it should not be, in other words to show up existing rules which must be changed
for allowing clearly unfair results and bad faith conduct.
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"Most probably there will always remain in comparative law, as in legal science generally, let
alone in the practical application of law, an area where only sound judgment, common sense,
or even intuition can be of any help. For when it comes to evaluation, to determining which
of the various solutions is the best, the only ultimate criterion is often the practical evidence
and the immediate sense of appropriateness. ,,167
or compensated.!" Although past application concretises constitutional values,
underlying principles and policy considerations to some extent, they remain open-
ended ideals.
Because contract law serves such vague and open-ended ideals, which are, moreover,
often pulling in different directions, there is in fact no magic formula that guarantees
an uniquely right answer for every situation.!" More than one defensible optimum is
often likely. The demands of each particular situation are also too variable for a
prospective in abstracto ordering of principles and policy considerations into a
hierarchy, to be of much help.!" Each principle or criterion must be tested anew in
every factual situation for its relevance, meaning and weight within that context!"
Zweigert & Katz have said that:
163 On the other hand, the more general principles are stated the more they equal generally accepted
basic ethical postulates and requirements of justice. In a sense their persuasive power increase for that
reason with respect to conduct or rules that unmistakably conflict with them.
164 Cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 193. Dworkin insists that there is always, in principle, "one
right answer" (for example, in A Malter of Principle 119 et seq (part 2)) so that interpretation is not a
pointless exercise. However, "it does not follow that we can always discover that answer, or even that
we can ever discover it. Nor does it follow that when we have discovered it, we can be certain of that
fact. We may be unwitting custodians of the truth, and we may be unwitting dupes of our firmest
convictions." (Mureinik "Dworkin and Apartheid" 186.) Dworkin admits that in instances of judical
discretion more than one answer is possible (A Matter of Principle 122). As the balancing of all
relevant principles involves application of an open-ended standard, and therefore a discretion, more
than one answer is possible. Dworkin's one answer can in such a case be described as the fairest
answer, perhaps an elusive ideal.
165 Cf Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 114; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 224, 231-232 .
. 166 Ibid.
16733.
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A court's "immediate sense of appropriateness" is moreover not a guarantor of a
correct solution. As stated before, one's immediate sense of appropriateness or
"regsgevoel" also depends on one's knowledge of the policy considerations and
principles at stake.!" Moreover, as I will show more clearly below, a judge's
"immediate sense of appropriateness" or regsgevoel does not always point to only one
possible compromise between the conflicting ideals at stake.
This relative indeterminacy of the optimal solution should not stop us from
establishing the range of fair solutions, and imagining and considering as many
arguments and policy implications as possible on all sides to approximate the best
solution for a legal problem.!" Legal writers, with more time for reflection than
courts, can play an important role in this regard. For their part, courts should set out
fully the process of weighing of interests and principles.!" An in-depth investigation
of case law aimed at discovering the influence of principles and their concrete
implications would be helpful to give guidelines as to development of rules at the
hand of principles.
6 2 3 The demands of legal certainty
The call to consider the tenability of default rules in the light of all the possibly
relevant policy considerations and tenets of justice is bound to elicit the objection that
it would lead to utter uncertainty and unpredictability of the law, which has already
been described as unfair in itself.
168 As noted above, Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 179 considers that the judicial hunch or legal
sense ("regsgevoef') can be partially ascribed to actual experience of applying the law and ingrained
knowledge ofJegal rules and standards.
169 The provisionality of answers is a reality for all sciences, and is not an argument for giving up the
pursuit (Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 315).
170 Cf Edouard v Administrator Natal supra 379C-F; Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 13 et seq; Lubbe 1991 TSAR
1 14; Neels 1999 TSAR 484 487.
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A judge must often, in the exercise of his judicial function, move about in areas of relative
uncertainty, where he is called upon to form moral judgments without the assistance of precise
guidelines by which to arrive at a conclusion... The application of broad considerations of
fairness and justice is almost an everyday occurrence in a court of law... I do not see why a
judge should shirk from performing this kind of task, however difficult it may seem to be.172
On the other hand, a measure of uncertainty is inevitable in a number of areas in law
where standards of reasonableness and fairness apply. In the oft-quoted words of
Botha J in Rand Bank v Rubenstein: 171
The capacity for change in policy considerations should also not be overstated: many
of the underlying principles of our contract law, which are simultaneously policy
ideals, have been recognised for centuries in many legal systems. The capacity for
change often relates rather to the "secondary value judgments", namely the
concretisation and balancing of principles.!"
6 2 3 1 The role of precedent
In any event, precedent plays a stabilising role to some extent. It should be presumed
that the existing, authoritative position is fair.!" The precedent system does not,
however, preclude the recognition of exceptions to existing rules, by a process of
distinguishing the instant case from the authoritative one.!" A Provincial or Local
Division of the High Court may also depart from its own prior decision if it is
convinced that it was clearly wrong.:" Due to the wide acceptance in case law that
171 19812 SA 207 (W) 215E-F.
172 See also Neels 1998 TSAR 702 704 for instances where reasonableness or fairness is a direct source
of our law.
173 CfLarenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 315.
174 CfVan Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 194-5, quoted with approval in Payen Components SA Ltd v
Bovic Gaskets CC supra 476.
175 Vorster "The bases for the implication of contractual terms" 1988 TSAR 161 181; Vorster Implied
Terms40-41,158.
176 See, for example, Harris & Others v Minister of the Interior & another 1952 2 SA 428 (A) 453;
Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 248; Kerr "Judges and
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residual rules must be responsive to changing circumstances and notions of fairness, a
prior decision on a residual rule could be wrong for the reason that certain important
policy considerations were not brought to the attention of the court when the rule was
originally laid down, or because the policy considerations upon which a rule was
based no longer apply or is outweighed by contrary policy considerations.!"
6 2 3 2 Judicial restraint
Judicial restraint in respect of adaptation of the law in this manner is always called for
and to be expected.!" Judges are and should generally be wary of making sweeping
reforms in the form of general statements transcending the facts at hand as such
decisions may have effects which the judge is unable to foresee and evaluate on the
information before her.!"
In a "hard case" apparently regulated by clear rules, a court must first establish the
prima facie legal position according to precedent, and then consider whether it may
justifiably depart therefrom.!" Only clear injustice, unfairness or inappropriateness
should justify departure from an existing rule."! although flagrant or extreme injustice
academic lawyers on the relative values of justice and certainty should they conflict, and on the
hierarchy of authority" 1985 SAL.! 403-405.
177 As residual contract law rules are affected by changing considerations such as notions of public
policy, courts may depart from pre-Constitution decisions on these rules if they no longer reflect the
values of society, including the constitutional values. See Afrox Health Care Limited v Strydom supra
which holds that the principle of stare decisis still binds courts to apply pre-Constitution decisions on a
common law rule, unless the rule conflicts with the Constitution or depends on changing considerations
such as the boni mores or public interest.
178 CfNeels 1998 TSAR 702 706; Van der Merwe "Judicis est ius dicere" 229; Joubert 1992 TSAR 213
216.
179 Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions 228-229.
180 Neels 1999 TSAR 256 267.
181 See the authorities cited by Neels 1999 TSAR 256 267 n 201 and 269 n 208. In the Netherlands, the
concept "marginal testing" (marginale toetsing) is often used to denote the court's function of
excluding the application of a rule due to a conflict with the demands of reasonableness and justice.
See Neels 1999 TSAR 256 269 and 1999 TSAR 484 484. With marginal testing is meant examination
of the primafacie legal position for its consistency with fairness and reasonableness, but with restraint.
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innocent sellers, The qualification placed by Kroonstad Westelike Boere Ko-
or inappropriateness should not be required.!" Courts should therefore generally act
with caution and circumspection before they extend, adapt or modify residual terms.!"
As stated earlier, detailed reasons for doing so must be given.!" Legal certainty, we
have seen, is an important ideal in contract law, especially in the context of
commercial contracts.!"
A more basic reason for requiring clear injustice for a departure from the present
position is that opinions can legitimately differ on the fairness of rules, that is, on the
proper balancing of opposing principles, policy considerations and ethical
postulates.!" When considered separately from the fairness ideal of legal certainty,
there is often a spectrum of possibilities for "fair residual rules."!" Many of the
residual terms of South African sales contracts, for example, could be both defended
and criticised on "fairness" grounds, One could argue that it is unfair towards
buyers that any consequential loss caused by a latently defective merx is not
compensable by a non-expert, innocent seller, on the basis that the seller is in a better
position to ascertain the defect and should bear the risk of selling a defective thing
which may cause damages, On the other hand, one could defend our Roman law
based rules due to the balancing of interests of innocent sellers and innocent buyers
which it affords: innocent buyers will get some, but not unlimited compensation from
operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha:" on the so-called "Pothier rule" concerning the
extended liability of traders for latent defects has been criticised by some as too
narrow and unfair to consumers, and by others as too wide and unfair to traders.!" In
182 Neels 1999 TSAR 256 270.
183 See Neels 1999 TSAR 256 271. For this reason modification, for example by recognition of
exceptions, should be attempted before a rule is totally "overruled." As stated before (at n 175 supra),
stare decisis does not prohibit recognition of exceptions to existing rules, whereas overruling a prior
decision is only allowed under limited circumstances,
184 See text at n 44 supra.
185 CfNeels 1999 TSAR 256 268,
186 See also Neels 1999 TSAR 256 271; Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 20.
187 CfLarenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 316.
188 1964 3 SA 561 (A).
189 See for example, Langeberg Voedsel Bpk v Sarculum Boerderye Bpk supra 568J, 570C-572H.
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the same manner, one could legitimately argue the fairness and injustice of allowing
an evicted buyer who has had the use of the merx for a long time to claim the
purchase price instead of the decreased value of the merx at eviction.!" Ultimately the
law makes a choice, perhaps an arbitrary one, from the spectrum of fair solutions.
The law should stick to that choice unless a new situation or new insight into the
demands of fairness demands a modification.
62 3 3 "Sharp" norms versus open-ended standards
Certainty and predictability is promoted if courts laying down a new residual rule on
the basis of policy considerations, fully flesh out those policy considerations, and in
addition attempt to define the rule as precisely as possible so that its application in a
certain case can be determined without a full examination of value or policy
considerations.!" If the innumerable considerations of policy which may turn out to
be relevant to a specific dispute or rule, have to be canvassed in every single case, the
resultant costs, waste of time and unpredictability may in itself be unfair to parties."?
There is thus a policy argument in favour of "sharp" norms which can be regarded as
provisional models of justice, that is, theories about a fair solution for a specific case,
which realises the relevant policy considerations, and which may later be qualified or
improved. This may be done if the rule no longer leads to a fair outcome in all cases
190 See especially Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A) 742A-F where the court
laid down this principle, but raised the possibility of our law developing towards recognition of an
exception in the case of "rapidly depreciating assets." This suggestion was rejected in two subsequent
cases for reasons which appeal to "fairness" (see Katzeffv City Car Sales 19982 SA 644 (C); Mdakane
v Standard Bank 1999 1 SA 127 (W)). That the buyer should have some compensation on eviction is
clearly fair as the minimum result intended by contracts of sale is in fact that the buyer should have the
ability to use the thing free from interference by third parties with stronger title. The spectrum of fair
possibilities lies in the measure of that compensation. See also the debates of the Spanish scholastics
on the fairness of naturalia of the contract of sale discussed by Gordley The philosophical origins 106
et seq.
191 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafl (1975) 110.
192 CfNeels 1999 TSAR 484 486; Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe "Good faith in contract: proper
behaviour amidst changing circumstances" 1990 Stell LR 244 247.
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regulated by it, does not provide a clear answer or conflicts with other rules,
principles or the needs of practice."?
In areas of the law where conflicting decisions and uncertainty abound, a refusal to
comprehensively consider underlying principles and other policy considerations to
arrive at a fair rule deepens legal uncertainty. In respect of preference contracts, I
have shown that the system of precedents broke down repeatedly as contrary
decisions were disregarded and wrong or questionable interpretations of prior
decisions and historical authorities were relied upon.!" This is therefore certainly an
area of our law where the courts would be justified in examining the policy
considerations in favour of the conflicting approaches comprehensively in the interest
of legal certainty. As the basic rights and duties of the parties are steeped in
controversy, a court considering "specific performance" of a preference contract
would not be transcending the facts if they were fully to consider the policy
considerations surrounding these contracts.
Of course, the benefits of stating law in the form of open-ended "standards" (as
opposed to precise rules) must also be kept in mind when a new or qualified rule is
laid down.!" Open-ended standards allow and force judges to fully examine the
equities and relevant policy considerations of each particular case, but "on a
principled basis."!" Their formulation often includes their underlying policy
justification or principle and therefore prevents mere automatic deductive
subsumption under the concept:" Our law, for example, takes a principled stand in
favour of specific performance, which brings some certainty and predictability, but
193 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 180-8, especially at 188 n 65; Lubbe 1991 TSAR 1 14; Van der
Merwe, Lubbe & Van Huyssteen "The exceptio doli generalis: requiescat in pace - vivat aequitas"
1989 SALJ 235 241; Corbett 1987 SALJ 52 67-68; Van Zyl "Aspekte van billikheid in die reg en
regspleging" 1986 De Jure 110 278; Neels 1998 TSAR 702 710; Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 64;
Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 113.
194 See chapter 2 supra.
195 CfCockrell 1992 SALJ 4043.
196 They are well-suited to regulate factual developments which are unforeseeable at the time of their
creation.
197 CfLarenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 285.
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still allows an equitable discretion to refuse this on the basis of all the facts and
relevant policy considerations. Usually a number of factors, sub-rules or categories of
cases evolve that bring greater predictability to application of the open-ended
standard.!" Even where a choice is made to formulate a rule as a sharp norm, the
purpose served by the rule must always be kept in mind in its application.!" Concepts
must continually be reevaluated for their appropriateness. Courts must always be
aware of the danger that the rule was too widely stated, encompassing situations that
are not properly regulated by it on a comparison of the situation and the justification
for the rule. A suspicion that the rule is unfair, does not provide a clear answer,
conflicts with other rules, principles or needs of practice, should not merely be
dismissed by branding the situation at hand as a "hard case," but should immediately
raise questions as to the desirability of qualifying or amending the rule itself. Hard
cases may disclose bad law.?"
198 Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 117. See also Naudé & Lubbe "Cancellation for
'Material' or 'Fundamental' Breach: A Comparative Analysis of South African Law, the UN
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts" 200 I Stell LR 371 for identification of some factors informing
application of the open-ended standard of "material breach" which justifies cancellation of a contract.
A similar process has taken place in the law of delict where the bani mores, an open-ended standard,
remains the ultimate criterion for unlawfulness, but specific sub-rules have concretised this criterion so
that it is only really applied in new situations, borderline cases or to adapt existing rules. (Neethling,
Potgieter & Visser Delict 4th edition (translated and edited by Knobel) (2001) 46 et seq, especially at
48; Van der Walt & Midgley Delict: Principles and Cases (1997) 56; Boberg The Law of Delict: Vall
Aquilian Liability (1984) 56; cf McMurray v HL & H (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 887 (N) 905.) See also
Neels 1999 TSAR 256 263. In this context, many of the sub-rules are not in the form of factors, but
comprise Fallgruppen, that is, groups of cases with a common characteristic. Once again, a balance
between the apparently conflicting but interlinked aims of certainty and justice in the particular case
should be attempted. If the open-ended concept is totally superseded by sub-rules on how it should be
applied it no longer serves the goal of sensitivity to each particular case, and a new kind of formalism
may develop. (CfWeber 1992 Archiv des civilistisches Praxis 516, 529, 535; Beater "Generalklauseln
und Fallgruppen" 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 82 et seq.)
199 Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97 112; cf Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 312.
200 Steyn "Oor die taak van regbank en regsfakulteit" 1967 THRHR lOl 104 ("Hard cases disclose bad
law"); Neels 1998 TSAR 702 711.
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6 2 3 4 The role of doctrine
An attempt to fit a new rule or set of rules into the existing conceptual structure and
to reconcile it with other rules and underlying principles of law, also has a stabilising
effect. 201 On the other hand, courts and legal writers should guard against imbuing
doctrine and concepts with a life of their own.i" As noted before, all doctrine or
concepts provide a provisional framework for understanding rules and should be
adapted or supplemented when it does not adequately serve its purpose.i" The
purpose served by concepts and legal institutions in legal reality, including the needs
of practice and the ideal of an individually and communally just solution, should
always be kept in mind?" Default rules are in danger of becoming removed from
reality and therefore unfair if they are considered to be simply logically deductible
from existing concepts, such as "the legal nature" of a specific type of contract.
Whether a solution fits with existing abstract theory is not a test for its suitability or
correctness.?" I therefore do not argue at all that a rule arrived at on the basis of
policy considerations should be disqualified for not fitting the present conceptual
structure or system. The system itself may have to be re-interpreted, developed or
amended to make provision for the new rule. This possibility of system adaptation
should always be kept open. However, in the interests of coherence and consistency,
such adaptation should as far as possible be justified with reference to existing legal
201 Cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 191, 195. Her comments were approved of in Payen
Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC supra 476. See also Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 135 n 34
("sisteemkoherensie [is] van groot belang in dogmatiese denke"); Lubbe "Sessie in securitatem debiti
en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang" 1989 THRHR 485 461, 490; Neels 1998 TSAR 702 711,
717; Neels 1999 TSAR 484 490; Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen 4; Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische
Praxis 97103-104.
202 Corder & Davis supra 2 et seq; Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 135 et seq. On the limits of a doctrinal
system, see further Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 317.
203 See the text after n 31 supra.
204 Lubbe 1997 Acta Juridica 246 271.
205 Corder & Davis supra 2 et seq; Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 135 n 34; Esser 1972 Archiv des
civilistische Praxis 97 111, 124. Esser 125 points out a number of well-known "doctrines" which do
not fit nicely into existing conceptual structures, but which are nevertheless recognised due to the
demands of practice and justice.
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rules or principles underlying existing rules.?" An attempt to harmonize the proposed
solution and the existing conceptual structure enhances coherence and consistency, as
the proposer is forced to consider and deal with the effect of the proposed solution on
the system and to search for alternatives where it creates contradictions or
inconsistencies in the system (whether this means an alternative new rule or
qualification of the existing rules or concepts)."? Inconsistency is unfair, as it is a
basic postulate of justice that like cases must be treated alike.ê" Consistent and
coherent rules are important to realise the central constitutional right of equality
before the law?" Coherence in the legal system means that the system is
understandable. This enhances predictability, and therefore fairness itself?"
Doctrine as a conceptual system of rules or principles lessens complexity."! A
conceptual system of rules and principles allows a systematic overview of the whole
206 Cf Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously 340. For an example of such an approach, see Lubbe 1991
TSAR 1 13 et seq. This is what judges usually do when faced with a gap in the law or "hard case" (Hart
The Concept of Law 274).
207 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 14, 113; Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische
Praxis 97 104. Cf Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 301; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 279-280. Time constraints and other limitations of the adjudication process
(such as insufficient argument by counsel) may sometimes cause an "illogical" deviation from accepted
doctrine in the name of fairness or policy considerations (an instance of hard cases making bad law).
Commentators and courts in subsequent cases have the opportunity to consider reformulation of the
rule or existing doctrine, or to show that the new rule is in fact consistent with underlying legal
principles. In this manner legal certainty is enhanced (Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 133. CfJoubert 1992
TSAR 213 218; Neels 1998 TSAR 702 713-714.
208 Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 136; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995)
280, 113, 155. CfFuller The Morality of Law (revised edition 1969) 38-39.
209 Section 9(1) of the Constitution, 108 of 1996.
210 Mureinik "Dworkin and Apartheid" 195; Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 136, 139; Lubbe "Sessie in
securitatem debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang" 1989 THRHR 485 461, 490; Lubbe
"The Law of Contract in South Africa by RH Christie" 1981 Acta Juridica 177 178, 180; Lubbe 1997
Acta Juridica 246 246; cfCockrell 1997 Acta Juridica 26 38, 39; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171 195;
Neels 1998 TSAR 702 717; Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel 39; Fuller The Morality of Law (1969) 38-
39; Zweigert & Këtz Introduction to Comparative Law 2.
211 Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 136; Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 121; Bydlinski
Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff T" edition (1991) Ill; Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische
Praxis 97 124.
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body of rules, which makes it easier to arrive at the apposite rule for a problem.i" A
conceptual system rationalises law by norm reduction, which makes it unnecessary to
repeat the whole body of rules and their justification in each situation.i" Another
function of the framing of concepts is to prevent those taking part in the debate on the
appositeness of a solution from talking past one another?" As was noted before, a
coherent system of contract law rules formulated in the abstract gives future courts
the benefit of previous courts' experience and insights in attempting to reach a fair
(and predictable) conclusion.!" Although an uncodified system like ours allows
considerable opportunity for deviation from the existing doctrinal structure.i"
coherent doctrine must be valued for its role in realising the fairness ideal. 217 As long
as one guards against formalism by decrying claims of value-neutral deductive
necessity from abstract concepts, and always consider the reality behind concepts,
coherency and consistency are two worthy ideals.
The unpacking of policy considerations, underlying legal principles and fairness
arguments relevant to a legal problem as well as doctrinal explanation of the proposed
solution are likely to benefit from comparative legal study?" Even if the foreign
jurisdictions studied do not clearly reveal the policy considerations, underlying
principles and fairness arguments supporting their particular solutions, at least they
posit model solutions that may surpass the local one.i" and force the researcher to
consider the principles and policies that might justify the foreign system's different
solution. In this manner, comparative study encourages "the abandonment of deadly
212 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre III, 118. Ross On Law and Justice (1958) 171 points out that
a statement of the law merely as a collection of rules "would be so unwieldy as to make it practically
worthless." (Quoted by Lubbe 1997 Acta Juridica 246 265 n 152; 1991 Stell LR 131 136 n 39 and 1981
Acta Juridica 177 178.)
213 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 111, 118; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 11.
214 Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen 51.
215 Smits Het vertrouwensbeginsel46.
216 Lubbe 1991 StellLR 131139.
217 See also Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 131 136.
218 Zweigert & Këtz Introduction to Comparative Law 4; 46.
219 Zweigert & Kótz Introduction to Comparative Law 15.
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complacency, and the relaxation of fixed dogma.'?" A historical study of a legal rule
or institution can do the same. It aids understanding of the justification for the
present rule, and may also force abandonment of complacency about its correctness.
This is the result when historical research reveals that authority hitherto relied on was
wrongly interpreted, or that contrary historical authority exists, or that the rule's
rationale or underlying principle is no longer accepted in modern law?"
6 3 The preconditions for recognition of a specific type or
sub-type of contract
I agree with Vorster that a contractual arrangement need not be of common
occurrence before a set of residual rules can be recognised for it and before it can
therefore be designated or recognised as a "type" of specific contract. If there is a
possibility that a type of contract may be concluded by other parties, it is helpful to
treat the implication of terms for situations not provided for by the parties not as mere
interpretation in the sense of identifying tacit terms, but as legal incidents so that "an
exasperating goose chase after non-existent contractual meaning" and the resort to
fictional intention is avoided in favour of a reasoned consideration of all relevant
policy considerations and a fair balancing of any conflicting interests.
Are there any prerequisites for the formulation of classificatory features before a type
of preference contract, or indeed any type of contract, can be recognised as such? In
other words, is there any formula that the classificatory criteria of a type of contract
must comply with? The classificatory criteria of the sub-types of preference contracts
listed in the previous chapter are as yet unsettled.
The key question for the process of classification of contracts is to find a method
according to which it can be determined which common characteristics of different
contracts justify the application of the same norms to all contracts displaying those
characteristics.ê" If classification occurs on the basis of too few characteristics, it
220 Zweigert & Këtz Introduction to Comparative Law 3; 21-22, 33-34.
221 See further chapter 3 supra.
222 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 67.
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may lead to injustice by reason of the application of inappropriate norms to some of
the wide variety of transactions that may be gathered under a single contract type.?"
The traditional methodological approach to the classification of contracts described in
South African textbooks is to distinguish the various specific contract types from one
another by a list of characteristic rights and duties, the so-called essentialia of the
contract.f" The classification process is generally portrayed as a simple matter of
establishing whether the transaction under consideration contains all the essentialia or
not. 225 The essentialia are generally regarded to comprise the purpose of the contract,
that is, the most important result or economic end intended by the parties, as well as
the most important terms on which there must be consensusi" For example, in the
case of lease, the essentialia is an agreement that the one party will be granted the
temporary use of an object against payment of a sum of money or a percentage of the
proceeds of land leased, agreement on that sum of money and on the object to be
leased. There must be agreement, or reasonable reliance of agreement on all these
aspects for the contract to be a valid lease contract. The essentialia therefore do not
only serve as classificatory characteristics, but also flesh out the certainty requirement
in respect of each type of contract. The essentialia - naturalia approach to
classification can be described as "conceptual", as the question whether the contract
can be classified as a particular type of contract is determined exclusively with
reference to a closed number of elements making up the concept.
With regard to preference contracts, the question therefore anses whether the
classificatory criteria for each sub-type identified must be formulated in terms of clear
and definite essentialia before it can be validly recognised as a separate type of
223 Ibid.
224 LA WSA vol5: Contract First Reissue (1994) par 183; Lubbe & Murray Contract 416; Van Jaarsveld
(ed) Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg 22; Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 23. See also
Pothier A Treatise on the Law of Obligations translated by Evans sections 5-6.
225 Ibid.
226 Joubert General Principles 23.
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contract with its own set of naturalia or residual rules."? Or may other and perhaps
vaguer characteristics, which are not in the form of essentialia, be sufficient?
Consider, for example, Henrich's criterion for classifying transactions into the
Angebotsvorhand construction, in terms of which the holder has a right to an offer
upon a manifestation of a desire to sell. The classificatory criterion is that the
preference contract predetermines the price at which the eventual contract may be
concluded. This criterion is not in the form of an essentiale: it cannot be said that it is
a essential term for the validity of preference contracts that the price at which the
eventual contract may be concluded must be predetermined. Neither does it have a
clear and direct bearing on the basic contractual purpose of this type of contract. Yet
classifying the transaction into that type of preference contract on the basis of that
criterion makes logical sense: if the preference contract predetermines the price,
there is no justification for the grantor to enter into any negotiations with third parties
whatsoever, and any manifestation of a desire to conclude the eventual contract
should enable the holder to enforce performance of the eventual contract at the
predetermined price. Should the fact that the classificatory criterion is not in the form
of an essentiale, make it unacceptable for South African contract law?
6 3 1 The inadequacy of the essenfialia-nafuralia model
The essentialia-naturalia model certainly has merit. It rationalises the law by norm
reduction, which mediates understanding and application of the legal rules involved.
This it does by identifying a set of residual terms (naturalia) applicable as a matter of
course to transactions falling within the parameters of the essentialia, unless
inconsistent with the parties' agreement
It also facilitates a differentiated treatment to the separate types of contract identified
in terms of this model, based on the typical party interests and purpose and special
policy considerations involved. As such it provides a valuable corrective to the
227 The common denominator of or classificatory criterion for preference contracts as a genus has been
described at 190 supra.
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general principles of contract law that may not be suitable or sufficient to arrive at a
fair solution for a conflict of interests in a specific case. The interrelationship
between specific contract law rules and the general principles of contract law will be
considered further in par 6 4 infra.
On the other hand, the essentialia-naturalia model is problematic. Firstly, its
philosophical basis has been rejected. It stems from the Aristotelian metaphysical
concept that each thing had a nature or essence, and changes when it changes its
essence or substance but not when it changes its accidents.?" The Aristotelian
metaphysics of essences fell from favour in the seventeenth century?"
This concept of "essences" was applied to contracts by, amongst others, the medieval
commentator, Baldus, who concluded that each type of contract had a nature or
essence from which certain obligations followed "naturally"."? This justified reading
terms into the contract, absent express provision by the parties. The nature or essence
of an agreement depended on its end, and its natural terms were means to that end?"
Thus a party who desired the end would also desire the means?" These ideas were
later applied by the Spanish natural school (the Spanish scholastics), and through
their influence, accepted by Roman Dutch writers such as Grotius.?" Although
Baldus and later writers claimed to find the distinction between essentialia and
naturalia in Roman texts, they would not easily have arrived at it but for the influence
of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas who endorsed Aristotle's view.?"
228 Gordley The philosophical origins 61,7. See also Gordley "Natural Law Origins" especially at 386.
This metaphysical concept is related to the presupposition of Aristotelian philosophy that there was an
implicit order in any just human society that the mind could discover, a notion developed by Thomas
Aquinas, an ardent follower of Aristotle.
229 Gordley The philosophical origins III et seq.
230 Ibid 61 et seq.
231 Gordley The philosophical origins 63.
232 Gordley "Natural Law Origins" 418. In the sense that "a person who buys a car wants a camshaft
even though he has never heard of one: He wants whatever the car must have to make it do what it is
supposed to do." (Gordley "Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition" 325.)
233 Gordley The philosophical origins 102 et seq, especially at 105.
234 Zimmermann The law of Obligations (1990) 234; Gordley The philosophical origins 102 et seq.
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What cannot be faulted in this approach is the emphasis on the parties' purpose or end
to define contract types used for classifying transactions and for the identification of
essential and residual terms.i" However, it is problematic as well. The notion that
the implied ex lege terms "flow naturally from the essence of the contract" suggests
incontestable immutability and a process of logical value-neutral deduction from the
definition of the contract?" As argued above.:" only some of the basic residual rules
flow naturally or logically from the purpose or end, for example, the seller's duty to
give undisturbed possession and to pay compensation on eviction. That obligation is
in fact so intertwined with the basic contractual end that it is in fact invariable
according to our law.?" But "the devil is in the detail." Many of the more detailed
235 See also Gordley The philosophical origins 241; Kerr Contract 122. By contractual purpose is
meant the main end which the parties seek to achieve. Their ipse dixit is of course not decisive in this
respect. The contractual purpose is used to identify the body of rules applicable to the transaction.
This body of rules includes the constitutive rules that determine whether it is a valid contract, most
importantly, the essential terms on which there must be sufficiently certain agreement to give effect to
the contractual end (essentialia). The emphasis on the contractual end is especially clear from the
courts' treatment of simulated contracts or contracts misnamed in good faith. Courts will ignore
apparent agreement on the essentialia, such as a purchase price and identification of an object as the
merx, in the classificatory process, ifit appears that the parties' actual purpose is to conclude a different
type of contract. See McAdams v Fiander's Trustees & Bell NO 1919 AD 207 223-224 "The
question ... always is what is the true nature of the transaction and this is not necessarily determined by
what the parties may conceive the contract ... to be. Parties may honestly think that they are entering in
to a contract of purchase and sale, which turns out to be one of pledge .. " There can be no contract of
purchase and sale without the animus emendi on the part of the purchaser, and the animus vendendi on
the part of the seller .. .." The court accordingly placed emphasis on the contractual purpose, namely to
buy and to sell or rather, to provide permanent undisturbed possession and to ultimately transfer all the
seller's rights in the property against payment, and not on the essentialia, which would include
agreement on the price and property involved. See also Joubert General Principles 91 n 152 and cases
there cited; Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 I SA 603 (A); Lubbe & Murray Contract 106-107;
Kerr Contract 122; Christie Contract 222.
236 CfGordley "Natural Law Origins" 414.
237 At n 190.
238 See Vrystaat Motors v Henry Blignaut Motors 19962 SA 448 (A) 457D-E; Alpha Trust v Van der
Watt supra 739A-B. According to the medieval commentators and Baldus, any provisions the parties
made had to be consistent with the contract's end. The "essential" or "substantial" terms of a contract
could not be taken away without a change in the essence of the contract. The essential terms are the
"original root" of the contract, and the natural terms are "an extension of this root to the production of
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aspects of the rules, for example, how much compensation is payable on eviction, is
not logically preordained by the contractual end. In many instances there is rather a
spectrum of possibilities of fair and reasonable consequential residual rules that are
consistent with the ends of the parties.i" The existing choice of rules should remain
open to change when it is shown up as clearly inappropriate for the needs of practice
or clearly unfair on a proper consideration of its current policy implications and the
competing principles and policy ideals at stake.
That all naturalia do not flow naturally or logically from the essentialia is
demonstrated by the fact that some residual rules can also attach to a subgroup of a
nominate class of contracts."? In such cases, other factors influence which default
rules apply. An example is the liability of manufacturers and certain traders for
consequential damages arising from latent defects in goods sold by them, which goes
beyond that of other sellers. The essentialia for contracts of sale concluded by these
types of sellers remain the same. So does the main result intended by the parties, in
other words, the contractual purpose. The fact that the seller is a manufacturer or
trader is an additional criterion for certain legal consequences, which criterion is not
in the form of an essentiale?" It is considerations of public policy that cause the
identity of the seller to become a criterion for certain consequences of sales
mere qualities" (Gordley The Philosophical Origins 63). One could therefore argue that a term
excluding the seller's obligation to compensate the buyer on eviction is inconsistent with the contract's
end.
239 See further Kerr Contract 316. CfGordley "Natural Law Origins" 418. At 416, Gordley states that
"The late scholastics typically responded by accepting the Roman solution as a rule of natural law and
then devising an explanation for it.... They often failed to show that this rule and none other follows
from these principles and the nature of the contract in question." That parties could set aside by
express agreement the terms that would otherwise be read into their contract, also shows that "the
means that would be most appropriate to obtain the contractual end might vary" (Gordley "Natural Law
Origins" 418).
240 Vorster Implied Terms 75.
241 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 69 states that South African contract law follows a conceptual
model of specific contract types (that is, the essentialia - naturalia model) with the corrective of
further differentiation within a particular type of contract.
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contracts."? Therefore, insofar as the essentialia prepare the way for application of a
set of norms, it is not the only prerequisite for application of norms. The problem
with the conceptual approach is that it does not always bring to light the need for
further differentiation on the basis of other characteristics not in the form of
essentialia/" Therefore one must guard against the idea that an essentialia analyis
supplies complete answers on the ex lege consequences of contracts.
A related danger of the essentialia-naturalia model is an overly wide definition of the
contractual end as the major premise of classification, coupled with naturalia which
reflect only one possible manner in which parties may intend to realise that end. This
would result in the imposition of inappropriate naturalia upon parties whose precise
purpose merits separate treatment. All juridical analysis is necessarily language based
and may suffer unwittingly from overly wide or ambiguous definitions.r" For
example, a definition of a "right of first refusal" as a right to first refuse an offer to be
made when the grantor wishes to contract, is ambiguous. It is true that in all cases the
parties' purpose are to grant the holder a preference above third parties, but the
manner in which they intend to do this may differ. However, the essentialia-naturalia
model, when uncritically applied, tends to force a transaction into the limited mould
of one type of preference contract, simply because their purpose is to grant a
preference to the holder generally, even though the exact way in which they
understand that end may differ.
It is also difficult to state the different possible purposes of parties to preference
contracts in the form of essentialia as a means of distinguishing them - the only term
242 Namely, that it is fair that an expert whose business it is to sell goods and who is able to insure
against the risks of latent defects should be liable for all the consequences of latent defects in the
goods, whereas in the case of a normal seller, it is fairer that the seller's liability for latent defects is
limited to price reduction or reimbursement of the purchase price. Another example is the requirement
in agricultural leases that the lessor consent to cession or sub-letting whereas this is not required in the
case of residential leases. Once again, public policy justifies this distinction.
243 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 69.
244 On the limits of language, specifically in relation to first refusal contracts see for example Holmes
Corbin on Contracts: Vol3 Formation of Contracts revised edition (1996) § 11.4.
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essential for the validity of all preference contracts is that the parties agree that the
holder will be preferred above third parties in the contracting process.
Another limitation of the essentialia - naturalia model is that it creates the
impression that only existing nominate contracts can have naturalia or residual
rules.ê" However, even if a specific type of contract has never been recognised
before, and therefore no essentialia exist, there remains a practical need for ex lege
rules to be implied. In the case of such innominate contracts, parties are unlikely to
provide for all possible consequences and circumstances. Therefore if controversies
or circumstances arise for which the parties did not provide, the law must make a
choice either to declare the contract invalid for uncertainty or to supply a rule. The
courts will be loath to declare the contract invalid as the parties clearly intended to be
bound. To always search for a "tacit" or "logical" term in such cases would amount
to the imputation of fictitious consent and may lead to a failure to consider rationally
all the relevant considerations of fairness and public policy at play. Itwould be better
if the court would consider the parties' purpose and all relevant policy considerations
and fashion an appropriate residual rule. If a similar contract is considered at a later
stage, that court will have the benefit of the earlier court's deliberations. Vorster has
correctly emphasised that whether a legal incident or ex lege term should apply to a
particular kind of contractual relationship depends on the practical and policy
considerations attending such a relationship and not whether the relationship is of
common occurrence.t" That legal incidents can be implied into innominate contracts
is sometimes overlooked by writers on South African law precisely because of a
fixation on the essentialia - naturalia model. For example, Van Rensburg, Lotz and
Van Rhijn in LA WSA state that:"?
"The main reason why contracts are divided into different types is to provide for those
contingencies which the parties themselves did not specifically cover in their contract. Every
type of contract has its own set of essentialia and naturalia; the essentialia serve as a criterion
for the classification of a contract, and the naturalia determine the consequences of a contract
in accordance with its classification. Not all contracts are capable of classification. If the
245 Vorster Implied Terms 75.
246 Vorster Implied Terms 75.
247 LA WSA Vol 5 Part 1: Contract par 183.
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contract does not contain the essentialia of any of the recognised types of contract, it is known
as an innominate contract whose consequences depend exclusively on its own specific terms."
The last phrase of this statement is clearly incorrect. Apart from the fact that certain
general default rules apply to all contracts, Vorster points out that "the law would be
in a sorry state if the fact that a judge is unable to classify a transaction as belonging
to one or other of the well-known nominate classes, renders him powerless to imply
terms as legal incidents.'?"
Moreover, as we have seen, even the originators of the essentialia-naturalia model
did not regard the essentialia as criteria for classification of contracts, but rather as
validity rules flowing from the contractual end or purpose. The latter was used to
connect a transaction to the set of rules for a specific contract type. Once the
transaction had passed the validity test set by the essentialia, the implied terms were
attached to it as a matter of course.
Therefore, the authors' statement that "the essentialia serve as a criterion for the
classification of a contract, and the naturalia determine the consequences of contract
in accordance with its classification" should not be accepted.
Exclusive recognition of an essentialia - naturalia model which regards essentialia
as the only possible classificatory criteria seems an unrealistic and unacceptable
doctrinal straitjacket on the development of new ex lege terms, whether for existing or
new types of contract, where this is required by policy but where the determinants of
their applicability cannot be formulated in terms of essentialia.249 Fortunately, as I
will show, our law does not exclusively rely on the essentialia - naturalia model for
the recognition of specific contract types. This is another reason why the statement
quoted from LA WSA is incorrect.
248 Vorster Implied Terms 158. Kerr Contract 123 confirms, at least, that if a new kind of class
"becomes popular", a new class of specific contract can be formed (with reference to Inst 3243).
249 A strict application of the conceptual approach could lead to an inappropriate treatment of mixed
contracts if a court refuses to apply legal incidents or naturalia of both the main types for the reason
that the mixed type does not comply with all the essentialia of both types (See Joubert Die Finansiële
Huurkontrak 68; Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 131).
247
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6 3 2 The Typenlehre as an alternative or supplementary
methodological model for specific contract types
In Germany, dissatisfaction with the essentialia - naturalia model or conceptual
approach to specific contract types"? (and with conceptual subsumption generally)
has led many academics to champion a different methodological model, the
Typenlehre, through which to view and construct specific contract rules.i" Although
the Typenlehre, or "theory of types" has been applied to other areas of law/52 most
controversially in criminal law and the law of persons during the Nazi period/53 this
study will only consider its usefulness in the field of contract law, and specifically in
respect of the analysis of specific contract types.?"
Adherents of the Typenlehre criticise the traditional understanding of specific contract
types as concepts in the strict sense.?" When they speak of "concepts" they refer only
to those terms or concepts that can be defined by a complete enumeration of exact
characteristic criteria.?" Only if the case under consideration agrees with the full list
250 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 123, 143.
251 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 78; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft
(1995) 290 et seq; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 19 et seq; Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre
543 et seq, 136-137; Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 533 et seq; Joubert Die Finansiële
Huurkontrak 70 at n 65 and authorities there cited. It is also sometimes called the Typuslehre.
252 See Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 17 et seq.
253 CfKuhlen Typuskonzeption in der Rechtstheorie (Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Heft 66) (1977) 167 n
28 and 168 n 34 and authorities there cited.
254 The typological method also has other applications in contract law. For example, policy
considerations and general principles of contract law can also be regarded as "types" rather than
concepts capable of simple logical subsumption. (Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 293). A full consideration of the Typenlehre merits a thesis on its own and I
therefore restrict myself to its relevance to specific contract types.
255 See generally Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 162 et seq.
256 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 544.
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of criteria can and must it fall under the concept ("only then and then always")?"
Therefore compliance with the criteria is logically compelling and conclusive, a
matter of simple logical subsumption.l" For example, "a contract of sale" is a
concept when it is defined in terms of the traditional set of essentialia for sales
contracts. These essentialia either exist in a contract under consideration or they do
not. If they all exist, the contract is a contract of sale. If not all exist, the contract is
not a contract of sale.
The danger of conceptual subsumption is that when conceptual criteria are applied in
isolation, a juristic fact such as a contract, may be subsumed under the concept, say a
category of contract, whereas its particular attributes makes it a deviating contract.f"
To treat contract types as concepts may lead to formalism and a mechanical insistence
upon a uniform construction of all contracts falling under a specific type, whereas
freedom of contract allows variation and modification of the rights and duties within
the type.i" Such variation and modification may occur recurringly, requiring default
rules for the sub-types which come to exist. Conceptual subsumption may hide the
need for further differentiation within a contract type for policy reasons.?" The
tendency for conceptualism to lead to formalism results from formulation of the
concept in abstract terms, so that it is "emptied of meaning" and the original purpose
of the concept is forgotten. This tendency of concepts is called Sinnentleerung by
257 Nur dann und immer dann. Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 104; Bydlinski
Juristische Methodenlehre 544.
258 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975)104.
259 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 152-153. Cf generally Lubbe "Die verpanding van
vorderingsregte en die regsdogmatiek - quo vadis?" 1991 Stell LR 131 137 n 48 on the dangers of
abstracting conceptualism; Wicke Vicarious Liability 244, 247; Esser 1972 Archiv des civilistische
Praxis 97 109. Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 529 warns that an uncritical conceptual
method may lead to judges becoming "subsumption automatons" (Subsumtionsautomaten).
260 Cf chapter 2 supra where I suggest that some judges in South Africa have paid only lip service to
the possibility of parties deviating from the "normal" construction of preference contracts, whereas
they do not seriously consider the possibility of parties intending one of the conflicting constructions
which they typify as "wrong" for lack of historical authority.
261 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 69.
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adherents of the Typenlehre/" Abstract conceptualisation emphasises the
commonality between related phenomena.ê" This may result in functional
differentiation on the basis of the actual function or operation of the phenomena being
overlooked.
Adherents of the Typenlehre distinguish concepts from types. They point out that
there are various legal terms that cannot in fact be defined by a complete enumeration
of exact, strictly conceptual characteristics, the application of which is a simple
matter of logical subsumption. Rather, some terms are defined by indicative or
symptomatic factors that do not necessarily all have to exist and which can exist to a
greater or lesser extent (their characteristic criteria are therefore gradeablej.?" These
terms are called Typen or types to distinguish them from concepts. Types are not
defined, but described, in terms of the aforesaid indicative factors or concrete
examples.i" There is some variation on the meaning of the term Typus or type
amongst proponents of the Typenlehre?" What is described here is the so-called
classical Typenlehre?" The decision whether a specific factual situation, say a
contract, falls within the type, benefits from a Typenvergleich or "comparison of
types.'?" That means that the contract considered should be compared with other
262 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 282 et seq; Joubert Die Finansiële
Huurkontrak 72-73. CfKuhlen Typuskonzeption 16.
263 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 287 (with reference to Hegel's
distinction between abstract and concrete concepts).
264 Cf also Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 526: true "general provisions"
(Generalklauseln) are so widely or vaguely defined that they do not allow simple subsumption in terms
of which the major premise is the legal norm and the minor premise the factual situation. Such
subsumption presupposes that the norm must contain criteria which are sufficiently exact, which is not
the case with general open-ended provisions. The general provisions can therefore be regarded as
"types."
265 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 297; Bydlinski Juristische
Methodenlehre 544.
266 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 544; Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 533.
267 See Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 544.
268 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 111, 181; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung
184; Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 548 et seq; Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 80.
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contracts that were denoted as "typical" or "a-typical" in previously decided cases.?"
The question is whether the typical characteristics of the type are present to such a
degree that the factual situation as a whole corresponds to the type?" Not all the
typical characteristics need therefore be present for, say, a transaction to fall under the
type. One must look to the total picture, the Gesamtbild?" There are no completely
269 Ibid. This may perhaps suggest that the typological method is the same as the Fallgruppen method
of identifying groups of cases reflecting the application of an open-ended concept (as to which see
Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 517 et seq; Beater 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis
82 et seq). Obvious examples of Fallgruppen are the sub-rules regarding delictual unlawfulness which
have concretised through application of the open-ended boni mores standard. Actually the typological
method differs from the Fallgruppen method. Most importantly, typological thinking remains focused
on the unity of the idea (Rechtsgedanke) or purpose underlying the legal norm or institution, whereas
Fallgruppen focuses on different categories of cases falling under the norm (Weber 1992 Archiv des
civilistische Praxis 516 534). If one translates Fallgruppen terminology to Typenlehre terminology,
the open-ended concept itself amounts to a "type", and the Fallgruppen to sub-types. However, many
Fallgruppen could indeed be described conceptually in terms of clear and definite markers, and are
therefore not types but concepts. (cfWeber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516 531-532). Very
often they become conceptual sub-rules, which are inconsistent with the typological method. Instead,
Fallgruppen are more closely related to the decided cases that are used to facilitate application of the
factors describing the type (that is, through a Typenvergleich). However, Fallgruppen presupposes
groups or categories of cases covered by the open concept. As previous cases facilitating a
Typenvergleich are not always classified or indeed classifiable into different groups of cases, but
remain focused on elucidating the type itself, Typenvergleichung cannot be perfectly equated with the
identification of Fallgruppen. Identifying Fallgruppen and a Typenvergleicb serve the same function,
however: elucidating an open-ended, vague concept. See Weber 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis
516 533 et seq for criticism on the Fallgruppen method; he considers that it often impairs the flexible
value judgments intended by adoption of the open-ended concept. His criticism is more apposite to a
codified system where the legislator specifically creates open-ended concepts. In any event,
identifying factors and Fallgruppen for application of an open-ended standard, ifnot seen as a numerus
clausus, does much to ensure that all the relevant circumstances and policy considerations are taken
into account and makes the result more predictable (Beater 1992 Archil! des civilistische Praxis 82 84,
87; cf Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 113-114). Once again a
balance must be struck between the demands oflegal certainty and the desirability of flexibility if the
open-ended concept is to serve its purpose.
270 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 109; Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre
544; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 28,34 et seq.
271 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 123. For a practical example, see Leenen Typus und
Rechtsfindung 143. Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 549-550 is more in favour of the comparison
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clear, fixed borders between cases that do fall within the type and others which do
not.!" Types are therefore more "open" than concepts. The application of the type
requires a value judgment or judgment based on social experience and views in the
marketplace.i" The law builds the type with reference to the consequences
connected to it. Therefore, when considering whether a concrete example falls under
the type, one must look to the purpose why the law wants these consequences to
attach to this type.!" Types and typological thinking therefore force one who
applies the law to always consider the purpose of legal conceptualisation and the
appropriateness of a rule's legal consequences.?' The recognition of types in addition
to concepts is necessary because the exact characteristics of concepts do not always
cover all the cases intended by the purpose of the rule or sometimes cover more than
intended by the purpose.
A factual situation that displays all the typical characteristics of the type is sometimes
called a "normal type.'?"
The Typenlehre also recognises that in commercial reality legal institutions, such as
specific contract types, are not always uniform figures, but that "sub-types" and
mixed types come to exist. 277 It allows the creation of a range of types
of the individual characteristics of the type, even though they do not all exist, than of an "intuitive
Gesamtbild comparison."
272 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 544.
273 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafi (1975) 104, 107; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung
138; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 19.
274 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafi (1975) 109; Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 13;
Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 545; cfBydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 552.
275 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafi (1975) 110; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 64 et
seq, 138, 150 et seq. Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschafi (1995) 314 calls the
Typus afunktionsbestimmte Begriff that is, a concept determined by its function, which therefore refers
back to its function. As such it is richer in content than comparable abstract concepts.
276 See, for example, Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 96.
277 Martinek Moderne Vertragstypen 20 et seq, with examples; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 133 et
seq; Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 552.
252
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
253
tTypenreihenï?" Typenreihen are based on the reality that types may blend into each
other due to the variability of their elements. The borders between different types
may therefore be fluid?" In a range of types (Typenreihe), closely related but still
distinguishable types are strung together in such a manner that their common
characteristics and distinctions and thereby also the transitional manifestations
become clearer.
The typological method therefore gives expression to the complexity of the
relationships which the law must deal with.?" It denounces the simplistic solutions
which legal concepts with clear and definite markers offer, as such concepts satisfy
lawyers' love for principled clarity, but sometimes unfairly thwart parties' expectation
of the legal position in a given factual situation."! It aims to deliver an adequate
description of legal phenomena to be considered in order to correctly reflect legal
reality and to exclude conceptual sham problems.?"
However, concepts and types are not stark opposites and may show some overlap.i"
A concept can have one open characteristic, similar to a type. On the other hand, a
type can contain some essential characteristic apart from other merely symptomatic
ones and thereby approach a concept. 284 The description of a type can be intended as
278 Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 138; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft
(1995) 298.
279 Interestingly, Kriek J in Van Rensburg v City Credit (Natal) (Pty) Ltd 19804 SA 500 (N) 506F-G
seems to approach typological thinking when he proposed to merge the three steps laid down in
Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) on the use of evidence in interpretation. He
regarded the three steps as merging into one "like the colours of a spectrum with diffused borders
between the different colours." This would be an apposite description ofa spectrum of types with fluid
borders.
280 CfLeenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 137-139; Wicke Vicarious Liability 41.
281 Cf Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 443ff; Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung;
Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre I09ff and especially at 543ff.
282 Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 137, 162.
283 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) Ill. Critics of the Typenlehre such as
Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 545 also emphasise this.
284 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) Ill. See the text at n 294 supra for an
example.
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a preliminary stage in the process of the building a concept that correctly reflects
legal reality.:" Larenz, a proponent of the Typenlehre, recognises that in the interest
of certainty, a legal term must be defined as precisely as possible.?" Therefore where
a lawgiver formulates rules by using a concept as opposed to a type, the adherents of
the Typenlehre will have no problem with this if the interpreter of the rules interprets
the concept teleologically.i" Adherents of the Typenlehre recognise that where a
specific transaction does not differ at all from the generally recognised normal type
there is nothing wrong with using the traditional conceptual method.?" However,
where it is not possible to define a legal term as a concept that can be applied without
a value or policy judgment, it is inevitable that a legal institution must be formulated
as a type.
Applied to contract law, the Typenlehre defines contract types not as concepts
(Begriffen) with defined essentialia as markers, but rather as Typen with
characteristics which may be formulated more vaguely.t" These characteristics are
related to the end or purpose of the contract. 290 The "total impression" of the contract
(Gesamtbild) is taken into account in typifying the contract. This also means that the
legal rules applicable to a type of contract may be applied to a particular transaction to
a lesser or greater degree where this is possible and meaningful.i" The Typenlehre
emphasises that contractual norms are open and subject to change. Specific contract
types are not fixed immutable concepts - new types may develop and further
differentiation within a known contract type may be required for policy reasons and to
reflect commercial reality.
285 Larenz Methodenlehre der Reehtswissensehaft (1975) Ill.
286 Larenz Methodenlehre der Reehtswissensehaft (1975) 110.
287 Larenz Methodenlehre der Reehtswissensehaft (1975) Ill; Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der
Reehtswissensehaft (1995) 312; efBydlinski Juristisehe Methodenlehre 112.
288 hLeenen Typus und Ree tsfindung 96 et seq. I use the term "normal type" to refer to the type of
specific contract most commonly recognised, whose residual rules are regarded as the standard residual
rules for the contract type.
289 See the authorities in n 251 supra.
290 As such, they emphasise the centrality of the contractual end or purpose that initially gave rise to the
essentialia-naturalia model and from which the essentialia and naturalia of contracts is supposed to
flow.
291 Ibid.
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Types of legal relationships, including specific contract types, are described as "legal
structure types" which originated in legal reality, as these types concern the structure
of legal entities.i"
The typological approach is not unknown to South African contract law. South
African courts have correctly followed a typological approach to determine whether a
contract is a contract of service as opposed to a contract of services between a
principal and independent contractor.i" The only necessary requirements
(essentialia) for a contract of service are agreement on performance of some kind of
work and payment?" However, these criteria are not sufficient to distinguish the
relationship from that between a principal and independent contractor. A number of
additional factors indicate the existence of a contract of service in the context of
vicarious liability of an employer.?" There is no decisive criterion.?" The dominant
impression is important. Indicia for the contract of service include the degree of
control by one party over the other, the nature of the work, the freedom of action, the
manner of payment, the magnitude of the contract amount, the power of dismissal, the
obligation to perform the duties personally, ownership of the work facility, the place
of work, duration of employment and intention of the parties, amongst others.?"
Some of these indicia, such as the control of the one party over the other, are clearly
292 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 295; Leenen Typus und
Rechtsfindung 78.
293 Wicke Vicarious Liability 40 et seq; 248 et seq. This is especially clear from the decision in
Minister van Polisie en 'n Ander v Gamble en 'n Ander 19794 SA 759 (A) especially 765 ("Control is
not the sole indicium, but merely one of the indicia, albeit an important one"). See also Mtetwa v
Minister of Health 19893 SA 600 (D) 606; cfSmit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1)
SA 51(A) 53-54. See Wicke Vicarious Liability 41 for details oflater decisions which, in conflict with
previous decisions and wrongly in his view, still appear to posit control as a necessary requirement, and
not only as an important indicium. The contract of service is also usually mentioned as an example of a
type by German proponents of the Typenlehre. See for example, Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 148
et seq.
294 Wicke Vicarious Liability 40.
295 Wicke Vicarious Liability 248.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
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gradable characteristics, which can exist to a greater or lesser degree. Their
application requires a value judgment and benefits from comparison with earlier
decided cases (Typenvergleich).
The courts' approach towards simulated contracts also shows similarities with the
typological method. Courts often ignore the fact that ostensibly a contract contains the
essentialia of a certain type of contract, if the circumstances and exceptional
accidentalia of the contract show that they actually intended to conclude another type
of contract/" In such cases the court therefore considers the "total picture", the
Gesamtbild of the contract. In South African law, mixed contract forms are also
sometimes grouped under a specific contract type in terms of the rather vague
criterion of the intention of the parties (for which read contractual purpose) rather
than the existence of the essentialia of that contract type.i" Sometimes the courts
refuse to classify mixed contracts under the crystallised contract types, and rather
combine (some of) the naturalia of the different contract types at stake in order to
achieve a fair result which accords with the purpose of the parties, or are prepared to
recognise a distinct "new" contract type with its own set of residual rules."? A
Typenvergleich or comparison of types often occurs in decisions on open, vague
concepts, when courts compare the facts of the case before them with the facts of
other decided cases which have been held to fall under or outside the concept?"
298 Joubert "Die regsaard van finansiële huurkontrakte" 1989 TSAR 568 579.
299 Cf Wastie v Security Motors 1972 2 SA 129 (C) on the test for establishing whether a contract is one
of sale or exchange.
300 See for example Zulu v Van Rensburg 19964 SA 1236 (LeC) 1260-1262. In this case the court
refused to apply the "absorption theory" that would demand that the institution of labour tenancy be
classi fied as either a lease or a service contract, but preferred the "combination theory" in terms of
which the naturalia of the two contract types are combined. Alternatively it was prepared to accept the
"sui generis theory" in terms of which labour tenancy is a separate type of contract with its own
naturalia.
301 Cf for example, the case law on negligent driving. The important concept of "material breach" is
also approached typologically: no clear and definite markers are spelled out, but rather vague tests
such as "the breach goes to the root of the contract." Cf also Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v
Agromar Lineas Ltd 1986 3 SA 509 (D) 524-530 according to which the lex causae of a contract is
determined with reference to a number of factors such as the place of conclusion of the contract, of
performance thereof and the domicile to the parties. See Neels 1999 TSAR 256 263-264. Another
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The typological method is also applied in other areas of our law. The concept "real
right" is actually a type. A list of typical characteristics can be identified for a
"normal" or "ideal" type of real right, but not all real rights need necessarily display
all these characteristics.t" Categories of real rights have ciystallised, but they do not
constitute a numerus clausus?" The identification of new types of real right benefits
from a study of past case law.
Proponents of the Typenlehre in Germany also emphasise that the Typenlehre is not
an alternative methodological model to that used by the courts, but merely describes
what courts are already doing.'?' It is also the necessary result of contractual freedom
that legal traffic will not remain content with ideal types, but bring forth new types of
contract. However, supporters of the Typenlehre plead that courts must be aware
that they are proceeding typologically, so that in classifying, say, contracts, they do so
approach encountered in international private law is to designate a "default" rule as to the applicable
law, namely the lex loci solutionis, but allow deviation when a variety of circumstances show that there
is a closer connection with another legal system making it fair to apply that law (Neels 1999 TSAR 256
264-265).
302 See especially Van der Merwe Sakereg 2nd edition (1989) 63. Van der Merwe bases his idea that
there is an ideal or normal type of real right, but that not all real rights need display all the
characteristics of the real right, on the view of Meijers De Algemene Begrippen van het Burgerlijk
Recht (1948) 266-268. However, the list of characteristics mentioned by Van der Merwe are not in fact
the criteria generally used for recognition of new types of real rights in respect of land. In practice, two
broad criteria are used. First, the intention of the creator of the right must be to bind not only the
present owner of the land, but also her successors, and second, the nature of the right must be such that
registration would cause a "subtraction from the dominium" (Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v
Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SeA); Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds
and Others 1992 (1) SA 879 (A); Van der Merwe Sakereg 70 et seq). Besides the fact that it is vaguely
stated, this latter test is not very helpful as personal rights can also limit an owner's free capacity to use
and alienate his property.
303 Van der Merwe Sakereg 63.
304 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 192; Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre
550.
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on the basis of a justified purposive classification'" and not just on the basis of a
simple, logical, purely conceptual subsumption.?"
The Typenlehre has long been subjected to criticism in Germany?" The uncertainty
which it brings, "the unverifiability of its results", is the main objection.f" The
objection is that it is uncertain how to establish which are typical and which are
atypical cases?" In response, supporters of the Typenlehre point out that the actual
purpose of the parties is used to decide whether the contract falls under a specific
type. Moreover, a measure of certainty can be obtained by comparing the case under
consideration to other cases already decided on the basis of the type. This is the so-
called Typenvergleich or "comparison of types", which our courts often use. Each
decision elucidates or "concretises" the type, although the process is never at an
end."? As more cases are decided on the basis of the type, so it becomes easier for
later courts to compare a factual case with what has been decided before.'!'
Moreover, Joubert, who also criticises the Typenlehre on this basis, pleads for
differentiation within contract types on the basis of other markers than essentialia,
which arguably results in as much uncertainty as the Typenlehre, as he does not give
fixed rules for when further differentiation may be appropriate.?" In any event,
certainty in the law cannot be regarded as a higher goal than the appropriateness of
legal norms.!" Norms that are out of step with a complex commercial and legal
reality only create a false sense oflegal certainty?" If the conceptual approach cannot
adequately describe and provide for specific contract rules which are used and
305 See n 290 supra.
306 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) 192.
307 Joubert 1989 TSAR 568 578 and authorities there cited; Kuhlen Typuskonzeption 169. Cf also
Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 545.
308 Ibid; Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 73.
309 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 73.
310 Larenz Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1975) Ill, 181; Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung
184; Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 80.
311 CfBydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 548.
312 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak admits this at 80.
313 Leenen Typus und Rechtsfindung 133. See par 62 supra.
314 See the text after n 40 supra.
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necessary in practice, whereas a more flexible model like the Typenlehre can, there is
no point in keeping to the conceptual model only because it apparently provides legal
certainty.
Another criticism against the Typenlehre is that a focus on the "total picture" of a
specific contract type may lead to the application of inappropriate rules.!" The
argument is that, by reason of the Gesamtbild "test", a transaction may
inappropriately be classified as a certain type so that all the rules of that type applies
even though not all the essentialia of the contract type exist?" However, proponents
of the Typenlehre would respond that the emphasis on the teleological application of
law central to the typological approach would prevent the inappropriate application of
rules."? They do not state that as long as the total picture of a mixed contract
approximates a specific type of contract all the rules of that contract type should
automatically apply. They would not force all contracts into one specific type of
contract just because the contract complies with some of the essentialia of such a
contract type, nor necessarily combine existing categories?" Rather they would ask
in each and every case, whether it is sensible and appropriate to apply a specific rule
to a particular transaction or whether a new type with elements of other existing
contracts or new rules must be recognised in the specific case.!" This is very clear
from Leenen's example of contracts in terms of which an entrepeneur undertakes to
install and stock vending machines in a hotel. He does not ask whether the contract as
a whole can be seen as lease of a piece of ground to the entrepeneur, nor whether the
contract as a whole should be regarded as a partnership, but rather suggests that due to
the particular purpose of the parties, the contract should not be regarded as either
lease or partnership.?" Joubert's statement that the Typenlehre would only allow a
material deviation to result in the contract falling outside a specific type.?' is therefore
clearly wrong.
315 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak n 102 injine.
316 Ibid.
317 See for example Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindungl64.
318 Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 167, 188.
319 Larenz 189; Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 171 et seq.
320 Leenen Typus und Rechtsjindung 154.
321 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 70.
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Joubert's major argument for ultimately rejecting the Typenlehre for South African
contract law'" appears to be that the typological method allows the direct application
of existing legal rules to new contract types, on the basis that the "total picture" of the
contract requires this. This, says Joubert, may lead to more extensive and
unhampered legal development and leave more scope for a "manipulated application
of legal norms.'?" By contrast, he considers that the conceptual method (the
essentialia - naturalia model with futher differentiation within contract types as
necessary) leads to the indirect, analogous application of existing contract law rules to
new types, which amounts to overt development of law, which judges will therefore
necessarily do incrementally and with great circumspection and subject to the rules
for creating new law.?' With respect, this argument is not persuasive. As to the
possibility of manipulation, Joubert does not clearly show why an analogous
application of rules relating to a (different) type of contract would be less open to
manipulation than a "direct" application of rules. It is not clear at all that a so-called
"direct" application of appropriate norms in terms of the Typenlehre would differ at
all in practice from an "analogous" application of appropriate norms. What would be
appropriate is not clearer in the one case than in the other. Nor does Joubert clearly
explain why courts that apply norms by analogy would show more restraint than
judges who apply norms on the basis of the typological method. In any event, as new
forms of contract develop, coherence may make it desirable that courts consider what
residual rules would be suitable for that type of contract by considering the
construction of the contract in its entirety, whether the conceptual or typological
method is followed, which may indeed result in more than "incremental" change to
the law. It is also not clear why development of law under the conceptual approach
would be more overt than under the typological approach. The Typenlehre itself
pleads for an overt development of law taking into account the appropriateness of the
consequences of default rules in the light of the recurring economic purpose of the
contract type.
322 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 80.
323 Joubert Die Finansiële Huurkontrak 76-80.
324 Ibid.
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Some critics of the Typenlehre are of the opinion that contract "types" are simply
classificatory concepts that are vague or open, with their elements not connected
conjunctively.:" Such open-ended standards or concepts that confer a judicial
discretion have long been recognised.?" It has long been recognised that such
discretions must be exercised for the purpose for which they are conferred, in
accordance with relevant principles and with due regard to all relevant factors!"
Therefore they imply that the Typenlehre does not add anything to the methodology
of law.?" Some feel that the Typenlehre is largely a restatement of the need for the
teleological application of law, which can also apply to concepts.!" and a
confirmation of the usefulness of looking at previously decided cases when applying
open norms.!" They stress that there is nothing wrong with a system of concepts as
opposed to types, as long as judges are prepared to recognise new contract types and
fashion new rules for mixed types."! For them the choice lies not so much between
types and concepts as between overt and covert changes to the law?"
In my opinion the choice between treating all specific contract types as "types" rather
than "concepts" is not as important as heeding the warning of the Typenlehre against a
formalistic treatment of specific contract types, blind to the demands of the users of
these contract types, the complex results which they may intend and the need to
differentiate between different sub-types on the basis of policy considerations and
commercial reality. In a sense the essential point of the Typenlehre is not so much to
plead for the use of types rather than concepts, but to plead for typological thinking,
which amounts to teleological or purposive thinking, as opposed to purely conceptual,
formalistic thinking about contract types, and to emphasise the need for the use of
open concepts which require value judgments in addition to sharp, closed concepts in
325 Kuhlen Typuskonzeption 162, 168; cfBydslinski 545.
326 CfDe Vos & Kelbriek 2000 THRHR 537 540. See also at n 195 supra.
327 De Vos & Kelbrick 2000 THRHR 537 540.
328 Kuhlen Typuskonzeption 162; Joubert 1989 TSAR 568 578.
329 Bydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 546, 547. However, 8ydlinski clearly regards the Typenlehre
as a valuable contribution to the methodology of law (see for example at 549).
330 8ydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 548 on the value of Typenvergleich ("comparison of types").
331 Kuhlen Typuskonzeption 169; Joubert 578.
332 Kuhlen Typuskonzeption 169; cfBydlinski Juristische Methodenlehre 546.
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order to correctly reflect, explain and order the complexity of legal reality. The
Typenlehre correctly emphasises that one must be prepared to look beyond the
concept and the question whether a transaction displays the elements of that concept
(the essentialia), to the legal reality of the contract as used in practice and consider
carefully whether all the rules applicable to a specific contract type are appropriate to
that transaction, or whether there should be further differentiation justified by some
distinct characteristic.
This emphasis on teleological thinking and the usefulness of open concepts is
especially important in the context of specific contract types, where the ideal model is
held out as the essentialia-naturalia model, in terms of which the classificatory
characteristics are often understood to be the essentialia of a contract, which are
clearly all-or-nothing criteria. If one looks to the history of this model and its
application in practice, the truth is that the contractual purpose or end is the
paramount criterion for classification, with the essentialia simply stating the terms on
which agreement must be reached to reach that end through intervention of the courts.
In my opinion, the goal should remain to construct the classificatory characteristics of
model contracts as precisely as possible, in terms of essentialia or other clear markers
open to simple subsumption where this is possible. This is consistent with the goals
of efficiency through norm reduction and legal certainty?" However, where the
classificatory characteristics which prepare the way for the application of appropriate
default rules cannot be formulated as essentialia, this should not deter the recognition
of a new (sub-)type of contract formulated in terms of vaguer classificatory
characteristics where this is required to give effect to legitimate and real economic
goals. Whether one calls the resultant concept a "type" or an "open-ended concept" is
not the important issue. If this is the only option, a continuous attempt must be made
to clarify the indicative features of the type as much as possible in the interest of legal
certainty, which may perhaps only occur over the course of a number of court
decisions'" and academic contributions.
333 Larenz & Canaris Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995) 267.
334 So that, in the language of the Typenlehre, a list of examples develop of "typical" cases falling
within or without the concept, permitting a comparison of types (Typenvergleich).
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6 4 The different categories of consequential rules and their
interrelationship
The discussion so far has raised questions about the interrelationship of the various
conceptual devices used to regulate the consequences of contracts according to South
African law. For example, does Vorster's criticism of the officious bystander test
used by our courts to imply tacit terms demand that the reach of ex lege terms be
extended to cover situations that our courts would treat as the territory of tacit terms?
Is there another category of more peculiar or ad hoc ex lege terms apart from
naturalia and general residual provision that should cater for such situations, for
example, where the parties' contract is an innominate one, or the situation for which
the term caters is an unusual one? Where exactly is the borderline between tacit
terms, supposedly based on unexpressed intention, and ex lege terms anyway?
Although I have treated all residual consequential rules as identical in my discussion
of the determinants of these rules, many South African writers draw a distinction
between general residual provisions and naturalia. What is the relationship between
these two devices and this possible extra category of residual rules?
What is the relevance of these methodological questions to a proposal for the
treatment of preference contracts? The difficulty of ascertaining the parties' true
intention with respect to a host of issues, raises the question whether our courts should
be exhorted to do the best they can with interpretation and the implication of tacit
terms aimed at discovering the different possible interpretations that parties may place
on these contracts. Or should the approach rather be to combine interpretation with
the recognition of ad hoc legal incidents or ex lege terms so that clearer classificatory
markers and residual rules for the different types of preference contracts may
eventually crystallise? These two options seem to promise great sensitivity to the
actual purposes that preference contracts are required to fulfil in different economic
contexts, as well as a gradual and careful process of recognition of different types. A
third alternative approach would be to attempt a proposal of classificatory criteria and
default regimes for all the different types of preference contract I have identified.
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This appears difficult m VIew of the ambiguity of typical drafting formulations
resorted to in practice. A fourth alternative may be the proposal of a default type or
types that should apply when it is not clear which type is intended.
These options (which will be discussed in more detail below) raise questions about
the difference between "interpretation" and the implication of tacit terms, on the one
hand, and the overt implication of ex lege terms or recognition of residual rules on the
other, as well as about the different types of residual rules.
The interrelationship between these various conceptual devices used to regulate the
consequences of contracts merits a full study. I will only make some exploratory
remarks on this topic to the extent necessary for the purposes of this study.
I will use "implied terms" in this context in a very wide sense to refer to any
supplementation of the clear express terms of the contract.t" It therefore includes
general residual rules on matters such as the requirements for due performance and
breach that apply in the absence of specific regulation and can therefore be said to
supplement the parties' contract. Because these rules apply to these situations in the
absence of self-regulation, they can be described as terms implied by law. "Implied
terms" in this sense also include naturalia, other ex lege terms, tacit terms and terms
read into contracts to clarify ambiguous express terms.!" Of course, the idea of
"implication of terms into a contract" is metaphorical anyway, especially as far as ex
lege terms are concerned. As Corbett AJA said in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v
Transvaal Provincial Administration.ï" "implied terms" (which he equated with
naturalia) is a misnomer "in that in content it simply represents a legal duty (giving
rise to a correlative right) imposed by law, unless excluded by the parties, in the case
of a certain class of contracts.t''"
335 See also Vorster Implied Terms 123 who uses "implied term" in a generic sense to embrace all non-
express contractual terms.
336Examples of the latter type of term is given at n 396 and n 397.
33719743 SA 506 (A).
338531G_H. See also De Wet & Van Wyk 342-343; Christie Contract 182-183, who point out that
"term implied by law" is appropriate, because these residual rules have all the characteristics and
consequences of agreed terms, and are "folded into the contract by law."
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principles of contract law and policy considerations.?" These normative
The conclusion I draw is that the different categories of implied terms presently
recognised in South African case law and legal literature, constitute a continuum or
spectrum with fluid borders. In the terminology of the Typenlehre, the categories of
implied terms are types making up a Typenreihe, literally, a "row of types". They
each have characteristic features, which are gradeable and can be present to a greater
or lesser degree in a specific case. There are also mixed forms of implied terms
displaying the typical characteristics of tacit terms as well as those of ex lege terms to
a greater or lesser degree.
These categories of implied terms flow into each other (and are distinguished from
each other in a gradual manner) in three respects.
6 4 1 Fluid borders with respect to their determinants
Firstly, their borders are fluid with respect to their determinants or bases, that is, with
respect to their degree of reliance on empirical elements (namely the facts peculiar to
the transaction) as opposed to the extent to which they are determined normatively,
"by law." Tacit terms (at least in a strict sense) and words implied to augment
ambiguous express terms, are sometimes said to be terms implied from the facts.?" or
terms based on the actual but unexpressed (or ambiguously expressed) intention of the
parties.r" This is then distinguished from terms implied by law, that is, based on
normative considerations, such as reasonableness, fairness, other underlying
considerations can be fixed in case law, which then provides a binding precedent for
the situation at hand. Alternatively they could justify implication of a new or
339 Christie Contract 100.
340 See Kerr Contract 331 and authorities there cited.
341 That it is the law which imposes residual rules is widely accepted by our courts. See, for example,
Kroonstad Westelike Boere Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha 1964 3 561 (A) 571H-572A;
Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205 220-221. See also Roman-Dutch authorities such as Voet 23285 and
modem commentators such as Kerr Contract 345 and Van Jaarsveld (ed) Suid-Arikaanse Handelsreg
22.
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qualified ex lege term, arrived at through analogous reasomng based on rules,
underlying principles or policy goals identified in case law, old authorities or the
Constitution, or which are otherwise accepted as desirable societal objectives.
Implication of ex lege terms is not and should not, however, be totally divorced from
the facts of the transaction. Nor does or should the implication or "discovery" of
actual, but unexpressed or ambiguous terms take place without involvement of legal
norms or "objective standards." I have already shown that residual rules also have an
empirical element and must be related to the demands of life and therefore functional
and appropriate.'? One implication is that, when implying ex lege terms, courts
should be (and are) very much attuned to the facts of the case, in order to critically
evaluate whether the residual rule or proposed ex lege term is in fact suitable to the
peculiar situation, most importantly whether there is an appropriate connection
between the presupposed contractual end justifying the residual rule and the actual
contractual end of the parties.l" Residual rules should also not apply if they are, for
any reason, inconsistent with the parties' contract?" Express exclusion is therefore
not required.l" In this respect, interpreting the facts (the parties' true intention,
342 See par 6 2 supra.
343 Many of the naturalia find their justification in the contractual end used to define the specific
contract type. If this major premise is not matched in the transaction at hand, the naturalia of that
contract type are therefore not suitable to deal with it.
344 A Becker v Becker & Co supra 4l5E-F; Geldenhuys v Maree 19622 SA 511 (0) 514D-E; Poynton v
Cran supra 221, 235; Vorster Implied Terms 159.
345 Ibid. It is true that some cases and writers suggest that ex lege terms are implied unless they conflict
with the express provisions of the contract, in other words, in the absence of express agreement on the
matter (see for example, Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration supra
531; Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staal Industriële Korporasie Bpk 19872 SA
932 (A); cf Lubbe & Murray Contract 416-417). However, these statements in case law are mostly
obiter. See also Vorster 159 who criticise cases supporting this view and Kerr Contract 344 who
define residual provisions as provisions imposed in the absence of express or implied (tacit) agreement.
The reasoning underlying the exclusion of parol evidence to exclude an ex lege term from a contract in
writing is that "a term which is implied by law is as much a term of the contract as though it had been
embodied in the document itself' (Aymard v Webster 1910 TS 123 BI). As Vorster 159 points out,
this reasoning is fallacious "as a legal incident does not form a constituent part of a contract in the same
way as terms implied on the basis of unexpressed subjective consensus or the reasonable expectation
principle. Furthermore, this approach is no longer followed in the country of its origin [England]."
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insofar as it can be discovered) remains paramount to the process of implying ex lege
terms.
Interpretation, or the attempt to ascertain the true meaning of express terms or the
parties' actual but unexpressed intention, is also necessarily influenced by normative
elements, such as notions of reasonableness and good faith. Due to the limitations of
language and the influence of context and the addressee's subjective knowledge, all
interpretation involves a choice between different possible meanings?" That the
parties are in court disputing the proper interpretation of the contract in the first place,
shows the variability in meaning?" A choice between competing meanings often
involves policy choices. Even though the interpreter might think she is engaged in a
value neutral activity of following the "ordinary meaning of the language used"/48
policy considerations and her own sense of fairness and knowledge of the law and
factual context are bound to affect her choice of "ordinary meaning'V" This is
illustrated by the different possible meanings of "right of first refusal", "preference
contract" and standard pre-emption clauses despite some writers' insistence that one
interpretation is the only "logical" one. In the case of tacit terms, Kerr states that "it
is necessary to show, by a preponderance of probabilities, unequivocal conduct which
is capable of no other reasonable interpretation than that the parties intended to, and
did in fact, contract on the terms alleged.'?" "Reasonableness," an objective
standard, can and does therefore playa role in proving probable agreement on a tacit
term.
346 Van der Merwe & Lubbe 1991 Stell LR 91 99; Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 119 et seq.
347 Normative interpretation rests on a fundamental or basic assumption of interpretation, namely that
"if two parties subjectively attach two different subjective meanings to an expression, one meaning is
more reasonable than the other, and neither party knows the meaning attached by the other, the more
reasonable meaning prevails" (Eisenberg "The Theory of Contracts" 233).
348According to the so-called "golden rule" of interpretation, on which see, for example, Kerr Contract
233 et seq, Christie Contract 23 et seq.
349 On the difficulties of ascertaining the true intention of parties see Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht
125 et seq; Lubbe & Murray Contract 463.
350331 (my emphasis).
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In the case of express terms, this normative aspect of interpretation is more patent.
Courts will also take into account the clearly normative "secondary" or "tertiarty'?"
rules of interpretation, such as the contra proferentem rule'? and the presumption in
favour of the most equitable'" and the least burdensome interpretation.t" These rules
should actually also be applied to the implication of "tacit terms" insofar as courts
profess to base them on the actual intention of the parties.
The process of interpretation as presently practised by our courts has a normative
dimension for another reason. It is well known that an interpretation of a specific
clause often becomes a standard interpretation with normative power for subsequent
cases.?" A term initially implied on the basis of "actual but unexpressed" intention
may eventually be recognised as a naturale if recognised in a number of cases.!"
351 Lubbe & Murray Contract 466 use the term "secondary rules of interpretation" in reliance upon
Kliptown Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd vMarine and Trade Insurance Co ojSA Ltd 1961 1 SA 103 (A)
107; Fulton v Waksal Investments (Pty) Ltd 19862 SA 363 (T). Van der Merwe et al Contract 220,
223 prefer to call these rules the "tertiary rules of interpretation" (except for the presumption in favour
of an equitable interpretation which is apparently considered a "secondary rule").
352 Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co Ltd 19483 SA 99 (A) 121-122; D 21439; D 45 1 99; D 50179;
Kerr Contract 249 et seq; Van der Merwe et al Contract 223; Lubbe & Murray Contract 466. The
contra projerentem rule entails that if wording is ambiguous, its author should be the one to suffer
because he could have made his meaning plain.
353 Kerr Contract 249 et seq and authorities there cited; Van der Merwe et al Contract 222. The
justification for this "leaning towards an equitable construction" is based on the notion that all contracts
are bonae fidei (Kerr Contract 250). See also Kerr Contract 250 on the presumption in favour of
avoidance of inconvenience.
354 These explicitly normative rules of interpretation are not simply aids to arrive at the parties' true
intention (Lubbe & Murray Contract 466-469; Van der Merwe et al Contract 219; Van der Merwe &
Lubbe 1991 Stelt LR 91 100). See also Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 121 et seq. The court in
Transport and Crane Hire (Pvt) Ltd vHubert Davies & Co (Pvt) Ltd 1991 4 SA 150 (ZS) 1610-162A
clearly recognised the policy-based nature of the interpretation of exemption clauses in South Africa,
Zimbabwe and England when it stated that "A great deal of ingenuity is expended in trying to show
that these artificial interpretations are in fact true and natural interpretations. I do not think the effort is
worth the candle .... [These interpretations] can only be defended on the ground that they are accepted
and established policy-based interpretations." I admit that application of the secondary (or tertiary)
rules do in fact point to the likely intention of typical parties to typical contracts.
355 Cjfor example Roux v Schreuder 1968 3 SA 616 (0) 6200. See Vorster 1987 THRHR 450 452.
356 Vorster 1987 THRHR 450 451-452; Christie Contract 183.
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The many cases in which the courts add normative "tests" for tacit terms to the
traditional hypothetical bystander test, such as the perspective of reasonable persons
or the requirement that the term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract'? display the instinctive realisation that the implication of tacit terms is not a
value-neutral, non-normative exercise.?" When applied totally subjectively without
any such normative additives, the bystander test can hide the reality that any
interpretation of facts, also where it is aimed at implying tacit terms, involves a choice
between competing meanings as well as the policy or normative dimension of that
choice.
The spectrum of types of implied terms can therefore be described with reference to
the degree to which they are based on factual elements as opposed to the degree on
which they are based on normative elements. Tacit terms and interpretation are
obviously more factual than ex lege terms. If the extreme left of the spectrum
connotes purely factually based terms and the right connotes purely normative terms,
357 This requirement is problematic and has been heavily criticised by, amongst others, Kerr Contract
341-342 and Vorster Implied Terms 51 et seq. Inter alia, these authors show that the decisions relied
on for this supposed "requirement" (such as The Mooreock 1889 14 PD 64) did not imply that only
terms which are necessary to give business efficacy to a contract may be implied therein (Kerr
Contract 341-343). The way in which our courts apply it as a prerequisite for a term does not tally
with its use in English case law, whence it derives. For example, one group of English cases hold that
a term is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract if both parties would have agreed to it had
their attention been drawn to the situation at the time of contracting. This simply equates with the
bystander test itself (Vorster Implied Terms 51; cf Joel Melamed v Cleveland Estates 1984 3 SA ISS
(A) 165E-F). Other slightly stricter descriptions are that a contract has business efficacy if it "works
perfectly well" or if it constitutes "a perfectly plausible arrangement which the parties might very well
have deliberately made" without the proposed term (Vorster Implied Terms 51-52). Business efficacy
should rather be recognised as one indication that a tacit term exists. However, if one agrees with
Vorster's misgivings about the tacit bystander test, perhaps a strict business efficacy requirement is a
blessing in disguise: since it prevents many a tacit term to be implied, courts may feel obliged to resort
to the device of ex lege terms to reach a fair result. This they must do on a proper and full
consideration of existing authority, underlying principles and policy considerations, whereas the
bystander test may allow for unreasoned speculation on what parties would have answered.
358 fn Joel Melamed v Cleveland Estates 19843 SA 155 (A) 165E-F Corbett JA accepted that legal
policy is involved in the implication of a tacit term. See also Vorster Implied Terms 177 et seq.
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tacit terms which purport to mediate the unexpressed, but actual subjective consensus
of the parties are most to the left. An example would be the term implied in Janisch
v Hall.359 The term implied in that case comes close to an express term, as it is based
on the pointing out of an access road by the seller. The court held that this action and
the existence of an access road on a plan incorporated. in the contract, justified
implication of a term that the purchaser may use the road to gain access to the land.
Slightly more to the right are terms that only one party had in mind subjectively, but
that binds the other on the basis of the reasonable reliance principle. In other words,
one party reasonably relied thereon that the other party also had the term in mind.
The subjective intention of one party is therefore supplemented by notions of
reasonableness in order to hold both to the term.?" An example involves tacit
"renewal" of a lease. It is reasonable to assume that both parties intend that their
relationship continue on the same basis as before, which must necessarily include
terms that they did not specifically consider again on renewal.?" Implication of these
terms are not contrary to their subjective intention just because they did not
specifically think of them. They thought of all the terms in general. 362 Another
example is the situation in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v First National Bank. 363
359 1946 CPD 553. See the discussion of this case by Vorster Implied terms 127.
360 A term which is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, or which constitute the only
possible rational interpretation of the situation, can also be explained on this basis. Insofar as the term
was necessary to "give business efficacy to the contract" or to "place a rational construction" on the
contract, parties must have "intended" the term insofar as they clearly intended an efficacious and
rational contract. The specific term is therefore covered by the general actual intention of the parties.
As Kerr Contract 337 says, "the details [are] incorporated by reference." Gordiey's example of a
buyer of a car actually intending that the car must have whatever it must have to make it do what it is
supposed to do, which implies that he also wants a working camshaft, though he may never have heard
of one, throws some light on terms implied upon the basis of a more general actual intention. (Gordley
"Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition" 325. He uses the example in another context, see n 232
supra.)
361 Bowhay v Ward 1903 TS 772 779; Kerr Contract 534.
362 However, whether they intend the lease to become an indefinite lease or to apply the original
provisions as to the lease period, is open to different interpretations, and our law has now laid down a
residual rule that the new lease would be an indefinite one, terminable on reasonable notice.
363 1990 3 SA 641 (A) 652E-G.
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"that the parties must consciously have visualised the situation in which the term would come
into operation ... It does not matter. .. if the negotiating parties failed to think of the situation in
which the term would be required, provided that their common intention was such that a
reference to such a possible situation would have evoked from them a prompt and unanimous
assertion of the term which was to govern it.,,365
The court held that payment "under protest" to Inland Revenue clearly evinces a
"tacit" intention that if the amount is subsequently held to be non-payable, it would be
refunded. In fact, this "tacit" term is rather the only rational interpretation of the
express term of payment, namely that it is done "under protest." Therefore the court
will believe the party who alleges that he intended that to be the effect and that he
reasonably relied thereon that the other party intended the same.
More to the right on the spectrum are "tacit terms" which admit to seeking the
imputed intention of the parties based on more objective tests such as the terms that
reasonable parties would have agreed to.364 These terms are often regarded as "tacit
terms" in our law as the bystander test does not require
When based on the term which reasonable parties would have agreed to, this last
category of tacit terms comes closer to ex lege terms (if they are not indeed rather ex
lege termsj'" as they openly rely on standards of reasonableness that apply in the
absence of intention.
364See Vorster Implied Terms 161 et seq and case law there cited.
365 Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall supra, cited with approval in Van der Berg v Tenner 1975 2 SA
268 (A) 2770 and Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration supra
532A-B. See also Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 19784 SA
901 (N) 909A-F; Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 3 SA 130 (A) 1361 and the numerous cases cited by
Vorster Implied Terms 161.
366Vorster Implied Terms 191 point out that implication of terms based on the hypothetical consent of
the parties and legal incidents overlap. CfKerr Contract 340. A number of cases appear to support the
proposition that a tacit term can only be implied if the parties subjectively intended it to form part of
their contract. See Vorster Implied Terms 161 at n Il and cases cited there. For example, in South
African Mutual Society v Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 1962 1 SA 598 (A) 6068 the court stated
that '''n stilswyende bepaling alleen ... in 'n kontrak ingelees sal word wanneer die Hof oortuig is dat
daar inderdaad 'n bedoeling was dat die betrokke bepaling in die kontrak opgesluit lê en dat al die
partye tot die kontrak sodanige bedoeling gehad het." This suggests that any term implied on the
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basis of "imputed intention" is in fact a term implied by the court (by law) and not a tacit term. Cases
which hold that an imputed intention is sufficient for the implication of a tacit term include Wilkins NO
v Voges 19943 SA 130 (A) 1361; Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Halll968 3 SA 231 (W) 236-237; Van
den Berg v Tenner 1975 2 SA 268 (A) 2770.
367 Administrator (Transvaal) v Industrial & Commercial Timber & Supply Co Ltd 1932 AD 25 33;
Wilkins NO v Voges supra 139C-D.
368 Where one party did in fact contemplate the situation at hand, even if as part of a more general
intention regarding the effect of the contract, consideration of what reasonable persons would have
understood could be regarded as application of the "reasonable reliance" principle as one possible basis
for contractual liability. The term therefore remains an "actual, but unexpressed" term, in the sense
that at least one party had it in mind, and reasonably relied on concurrence thereto by the other.
369 In fact, the distinction between such ex lege terms and tacit terms which purport to take into account
what reasonable parties would have agreed in the circumstances is very fluid.
On the other hand, the mere fact that the court assumes that the parties are "typical
men of affairs, contracting on an equal and honest footing, without hidden motives
and reservations" does not mean that the court cannot be seeking to ascertain the
actual intention of the parties. The court may assume that in order to ascertain their
actual intention in the absence of contrary evidence.?" Especially where the court
takes into account "special knowledge on the part of one party which would probably
have a bearing on his state of mind", the term does remain factual, or "tacit", despite
the fact that the court applies the reasonableness standard as well. 368
As far as ex lege terms are concerned, terms which are openly implied on the basis of
policy considerations, underlying principles of contract law and ethical postulates, but
which also rely on the peculiar circumstances of the specific transaction (such as its
other terms, the specific knowledge and particular actions of the parties), are more to
the left than naturalia or general residual provisions.t" The latter lose their
dependence on these peculiarities due to their status as generally accepted implied
terms whose major premises, or criteria for application, can be more widely or
abstractly stated. Both naturalia and general residual rules are openly residual rules
- they are laid down by law to regulate the relationship between the parties in the
absence of contrary agreement.
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The first category of ex lege terms is a mixed type of term: it relies on the peculiar
circumstances of the transaction as well as objective standards. As such it overlaps
with "tacit terms" implied on the basis of the hypothetical consent of reasonable
persons in the parties' position, where it is admitted that the parties did not consider
such a term. Neels argues for recognition of such ad hoc ex lege implied terms,
which he distinguishes from naturalia and, apparently, from the general
consequential rules of general contract law.?" He would have courts read in terms
which he calls "other" ex lege terms (distinct from naturalia) on the basis of the
circumstances which may exist at conclusion, during the existence and at enforcement
of a contract, "and which are not peculiar to a specific type of contract," instead of
implying terms on the basis of hypothetical consent only?" Neels quotes Van der
Merwe et al in support of recognition of this sub-category of residual rules. In their
discussion of bona fides, these authors state that "stante contractu, conduct of a
particular kind and standard may be required of particular contractants because their
contract is of a certain type or because certain circumstances may arise.'?" Vorster
also appears to understand "legal incidents" in a wide sense. He has emphasised that
whether a residual rule should apply to a particular kind of contractual relationship
depends on the practical and policy considerations attending such a relationship and
not whether the relationship is of common occurrence.?' Vorster points out that "the
law would be in a sorry state if the fact that a judge is unable to classify a contract as
belonging to one or other of the well-known nominate classes, renders him powerless
to imply terms as legal incidents. "374 He also insists that a standard interpretation of
370 Neels 1999 TSAR 684 697-698.
371 Ibid.
372 Van der Merwe et al Contract 233 quoted by Neels 1999 TSAR 684 697 n 93.
373 Vorster Implied Terms 36, 106, 158.
374 Vorster Implied Terms 158. The same point is made at 36 and 106. Kerr Contract 123 confirms
that if a new kind of contract "becomes popular", a new class of specific contract can be formed (with
reference to Inst 3 24 3). The implied term recognised by the minority in Alfred McAlpine & Sons
(Ply) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration supra is perhaps an example of such an "uncommon"
term implied by law, which might not be regarded by all as a naturalia of construction contracts (in
fact the majority refused to imply the particular term). Corbett AJA, for the minority identified a term
implied by law that an engineer who is granted "full power and authority" to issue drawings and
instructions by a construction contract is in fact "obliged to issue such drawings and give such
instructions to the contractor as may be reasonably required by the contractor in order to enable him to
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an express term "is indistinguishable from a naturale. "375 This shows up his rather
wide conception of naturalia or residual rules.!"
A term could sometimes qualify as both a tacit and an ex lege term.!" In the locus
classicus on implied terms, Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial
Administration.t" Corbett AJA considered that the term he sought to imply would
qualify both as a tacit term and as an implied (ex lege) term, but preferred the latter
explanation as he relied heavily on underlying principles óf contract law to imply it.
This overlap is not surprising. As I have shown before, one ideal for residual rules
must be that they conform with the likely agreement of typical parties to the type of
contract in question.?"
6 4 2 Fluid borders with respect to their scope of application
Secondly, the different types of implied terms are on a continuum with respect to their
scope of application. Their scope of application depends on the commonness of the
execute the works, as defined in the general conditions of the contract. Each such drawing and
instruction shall be issued or given, as the case may be, within a reasonable time after the obligation
arises." (535E-G). The court relied on the wording of the contract itself as well as on underlying
principles oflaw to imply the term.
375 "Resolution of contractual disputes: Interpretation versus the recognition of novel naturalia" 1987
THRHR450.
376 Neels 1999 TSAR 684 697 therefore misunderstands Vorster by criticising him for only allowing the
implication of naturalia as opposed to other ad hoc ex lege terms implied on the basis of fairness. It is
true that Vorster's article to which Neels refers in this regard (Vorster 1988 TSAR 161) does not present
this wider definition oflegal incidents as clearly as his thesis. In the latter article Vorster criticises "the
ad hoc approach", but by that he means "discretionary justice in the guise of giving effect to the
intention of the parties" (182) and not an overt implication of ex lege terms.
377 See also Vorster Implied Terms 105 between n 118 and 119.
378 19743 SA 506 (A).
379 See par 6 2. Interpretation and supplying residual terms are therefore overlapping and
complementary exercises (Braucher 1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697733). As was stated
in par 6 3, the commentators and natural lawyers who developed the concept of naturalia considered
that the implication of naturalia was consistent with the parties' intention that their contractual purpose
be attained and that bonafides would be protected and promoted.
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type of contract into which the terms are implied, on the one hand, and on the other,
on the commonness of the situation or circumstances dealt with by the implied term.
The real difference between general residual provisions, naturalia and other ex lege
terms or legal incidents lies in their scope of application. General residual provisions
apply to all types of contract in principle. The general residual provisions, such as
those on breach deal with situations arising after conclusion of the contract which are
of common occurrence.t" Naturalia, by contrast, do not apply to all types of contract,
but only to specific types of contract. They may also relate to events of common
occurrence that are regulated by general residual provisions, but for which the
naturalia have a deviating or qualified solution that applies only in connection with
the specific type of contract. For example, naturalia can deal with breach, but may
deviate from the general residual rules on its consequences. Examples are the special
rules on the remedies of a buyer who has been evicted and the special rules on a
lessee's remedies for breach in the form of failure to maintain the leased premises.
This interface of general residual provisions and naturalia creates a tension where
they appear to conflict. How should this tension be accounted for
methodologically'r'"
380 It has been argued that breach amounts to a new delictual cause of action (Van der Merwe & Olivier
Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 6th edition (1989) 484-485). However, most
authors regard breach as resulting in a secondary contractual obligation that replaces or supplements
the primary obligation (Lubbe & Murray Contract 414 and authorities there cited). The rules
governing this obligation are therefore residual rules of contract law. They are also "implied into the
contract" in a manner of speaking.
381 There is not much explicit recognition of the obvious correlation between naturalia and general
residual rules in South African legal literature, let alone the ad hoc legal incidents that especially Neels
argues for. Nor is there any clear motivation for keeping these categories of residual rules well apart.
Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 65 is almost alone amongst South African textbook
writers in his express recognition of the link between naturalia and general residual rules. His
definition of "terms implied by law" encompasses both these categories. Cockrell 1997 Acta Juridica
26 n 69 appears to agree with Joubert, as he suggests that the "general rules of contract law" should be
regarded as naturalia attaching to contracts in general. Most other textbooks mention only naturalia,
and not general residual provisions, in their discussion of implied terms. See, for example, Kerr
Contract 346 et seq; Christie Contract 181-184; Van der Merwe et al Contract 196-197; Lubbe &
Murray Contract 416-419; 422-425; Van Jaarsveld (ed) Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg 22. For example,
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Firstly, one could acknowledge that naturalia may conflict with the general residual
provisions because of policy considerations that may require differentiation. The
naturalia could then be regarded as providing a necessary corrective to the general
principles of contract law that may be unsuitable or insufficient to achieve a fair
solution for a conflict of interests in a specific type of case. The special rules on the
liability of innocent sellers for latent defects and misrepresentations (dicta
promissave) on the quality of the merx could be taken as one example. Our law in
this arena could be defended as a fair balance of buyers' and sellers' interests.
Innocent sellers are only liable for price reduction or repayment of the purchase price,
but not for consequential loss caused by the defect, which is a normal consequence of
breach according to the general residual provisions. Where the seller has actually
warranted the quality of the merx, is guilty of a culpable misrepresentation, has
manufactured the goods herself or has held herself out as an expert trader in the
goods, different policy considerations require the seller to bear responsibility for
consequential loss as well. To simply argue that general principles of contract law
dictate that the normal remedies for breach of contract, including a damages claim,
Lubbe & Murray Contract 422 state that the need to supply "a set of normal terms that, in the absence
of a law of contract, the parties would have to negotiate expressly ... is satisfied [in South African law]
by the so-called naturalia of the various specific contracts." They do not expressly recognise that
general consequential rules also fulfil the same "need". Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 157 170-171 also
mentions only naturalia of sales, lease and bills of exchange contracts as examples of implied terms.
Vorster and Neels apparently accept that all ex lege implied terms fall under one category, namely legal
incidents. The definitions of "implied (ex lege) terms" by Corbett AlA in the locus classicus, Alfred
McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration supra 531E-F and 532G are wide
enough to encompass general residual provisions (for example he described an "implied term" as
"essentially a standardised one, amounting to a rule of law which the Court will apply unless validly
excluded by the contract itself' (532G)). However, Corbett AlA seems to have had only naturalia in
mind, as the examples he gives are all of naturalia and he uses the term "naturalium" synonymously
with "implied term" (631F-H). Van der Merwe et al Contract 200 n 196 state rather cryptically that
"The considerations which induce the development of particular ex lege terms for particular class of
contract may conceivably lead to the implication of those consequences into contracts in general, but it
is doubtful whether there would be any value in treating such general consequences as naturalia rather
than simply as rules of law." Whether they wish to convey that it is incorrect or dangerous to treat
naturalia and general residual rules alike as terms implied by law is unclear. Perhaps they wish to
convey that the nomenclature of "implied term" or "naturalia" is problematic in itself.
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should be available for latent defects, ignores the policy consideration that this may be
unfair to innocent, non-expert sellers.?" Similarly, a kneejerk reaction to the special
rules on the lessee's remedies for the lessor's failure to maintain the leased premises
as "conflicting with general contract law principles on breach" should be treated with
suspicion, where this argument does not consider and counter any policy
considerations that may favour the present approach.?" On this view naturalia and
general residual rules, although related, operate on two different levels so that
generalia (the general residual provisions) specialibus (the naturalia) non derogant.
Alternatively, one could require, III the name of consistency, coherency, norm
reduction and efficiency, that there be no direct conflict between general residual
provisions and naturalia, but only allow the naturalia to supplement or qualify the
general residual provisions. The argument would be that the basis of classification
for the importation of terms should be as wide as possible in the interest of norm
reduction and efficiency. On this view, any conflict between the general residual
rules and naturalia would indicate a systemic failure, requiring rectification by
adaptation of the naturale or general residual rule in question. For example, the
aedilitian actions may seem like an exception to the general scheme of remedies for
breach of contract, namely specific performance, the exceptio non adimpleti
contractus, cancellation or compensation for all foreseeable damage. Similarly, the
limitation on the lessee's entitlement to full compensation for consequential loss
caused by defective premises to instances of culpable conduct or a guarantee by the
lessor, has also been decried as an exception to general principles.ê" Perhaps the
general rules on remedies for breach need to be developed to make provision for these
exceptions, occurring as they do in two very common types of contract. This could
be done by recognising a general remedy of proportionate reduction in contract price
(or counter-performance) for defective performance in the absence of fault or a
382 This is not to say that opinions may differ on how best to balance the parties' interests.
383 CfKleyn "Die reg van die huurder op skadevergoeding vir skade gely weens 'n gebrek in die saak"
1982 De lure 197; Cooper The South African Law of Landlord & Tenant 2nd edition (1994) 108-110
who criticise the principle on this ground, but also maintain that it is too harsh and lacks authority. Cf
by contrast, Zimmermann The Law of Obligations 365-367; Kahn et al Principles of the Law of Sale
and Lease (1998) 57-58.
384 Kleyn 1982De lure 197; Cooper Landlord & Tenant 108-110.
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guarantee of proper performance. The aedilitian actions and remissio mercedis
(proportionate reduction of rent) could be regarded as instances of such a remedy?"
Liability for damages would have to be considered carefully to ascertain whether fault
(probably different degrees of fault depending on the type of obligationj'" should be a
general prerequisite, in the absence of a warranty.?"
Alternatively, one could combine these two all-or-nothing approaches. One could, on
the one hand, regard these categories of residual rules as operating on different
planes. This facilitates the correct approach of refusing to regard doctrinal fit with
general rules as a straitjacket for the development of new naturalia, and similarly to
snub arguments for the incorrectness of existing naturalia based only on their conflict
with general rules. On the other hand, consistency between the natura/ia and the
general principles could simultaneously be regarded as a worthy but not essential
ideal, due to the ethical postulate of treating like cases alike. Where policy
considerations point to a special solution for a specific type of contract that
apparently conflicts with the general residual provisions, it may prove beneficial to
re-examine the general provisions to see whether they should be developed to provide
for that exceptional natura/e.
Granted their different field of application, an emphasis on the common functions and
determinants of all residual rules or terms implied by law might lessen our courts'
reluctance to use terms implied by law to arrive at a fair solution for a situation that,
although not particularly common, may likely occur again. The link between
naturalia and general residual provisions demonstrates that if not courts, then at least,
"the law" does make contracts for parties by implying terms into contracts. Courts
385 The Supreme Court of Appeal i~ Thompson v Scholtz 1999 I SA 232 (SCA) 248 rejected the notion
that remissio mercedis simply amounts to application of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus with a
claim to a "quantum meruit", but rather saw it as a separate common law remedy.
386 CfStoop "Contractual liability in the Roman and modern South African law" in Van Wyk (ed) Nihil
Obstat: Feesbundel vir Wi Hosten/Essays in Honour of Wi Hosten (1996) 163 179 who pleads for the
retention of fault as a requirement for breach of contract, but on the basis of different degrees of care
depending on the nature or type of contract involved.
387 But see Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 551 (SCA) 559B-C per
Marais JA, Farlam JA and Brand AJA (par 8); Administrator, Natal v Edouard 19903 SA 581 (A) 597.
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already "make contracts for parties" by applying general dispositive contract law, and
they have modified and added to these rules over the years. If so, why should "the
law" (or courts) also not consider new or amended naturalia or "ad hoc ex lege
terms" where there is a clear need for it?388As Van der Merwe and Lubbe have said,
if it is not the court's function to create legal incidents, the question is who then is to
take the initiative.!" In any event, a refusal to recognise an ex lege term also has
policy implications."?
So much for the relationship between general residual provisions and naturalia.
"Other ex lege terms" which depend much on the particular circumstances of the
peculiar transaction are more uncommon than naturalia and therefore do not have
such a wide scope of application. Apart from naturalia that have already been
388Courts are reluctant to "make contracts for parties." See especially the locus classicus on implied
terms - the judgment of Corbett AJA in Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial
Administration supra 532H. Of course, Corbett AJA was ultimately prepared to imply an ex lege term
into the contract, although the majority disagreed. Cf Videtsky v Liberty Life Insurance Association of
Africa Limited 1990 1 SA 386 (W) 3900. The platitude that "courts do not make contracts for the
parties" may explain the courts' general reluctance to recognise a fair novel term implied by law,
whereas they would rather ground the term in the imputed intention of the parties. Ostensibly,
recognition of a tacit term does not amount to making a contract for the parties: their unexpressed
intention is merely interpreted. The benefits of explicit recognition of the normative features of
implying terms and the dangers of the traditional application of the officious bystander test have
already been discussed. In addition, the requirement that the officious bystander's question must evoke
"a prompt and unanimous assertion of the term" (see for example, Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Halt
supra 237A) would often deter courts from recognising a tacit term where justice demands some term
to be implied. If the court is also unwilling to imply an ex lege term, the law remains incapable of
providing a just solution. Sweets from Heaven (Pty) Ltd & another v Ster Kinekor Films (Pty) Ltd 1999
1 SA 796 (W) is arguably an example of such an injustice. Kerr "The need to use words with different
meanings to describe different categories of provisions of contracts" 1999 SALl711 and Hawthorne
"Sishen revisited: the decline and fall of the 'gemenereg'? 2000 THRHR 668 have also criticised the
court's refusal to imply a term into the contract.
3891991 Stell LR 91.
390 Cf ibid. For example, the result of the Sweets from Heaven case supra is uncertainty about the
precise limits of the rule laid down in Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staal
Industriële Korporasie Bpk supra.
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recognised in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, naturalia often achieve their status as
"automatically implied terms" through being recognised in a number of decisions as
terms that are fair and reasonable to balance the interests of the parties in the specific
case or indeed as actually intended tacit terms?" When a court implies a term to deal
with an uncommon or "new" situation relating to a nominate contract, it may initially
be regarded as a tacit or perhaps an ad hoc ex lege term, but when the same situation
is considered again, it will have normative force for that situation and often come to
be regarded as incidents of that contract type, in other words as naturalia. When
implied terms deal with innominate or new types of contract, they may also initially
be regarded as tacit terms, but if a similar contract is considered again, the contract
type may eventually acquire nominate status with its own set of naturalia based on
earlier decisions on similar situations. This process is due to the generally accepted
desirability of treating like cases alike. This is where the borders between tacit terms
and ex lege terms or naturalia are once again fluid. The difference between the
different categories of implied terms, is therefore the perception of each category's
normative power for future transactions, which perception may change over time.
The more decisions that follow an interpretation, the more that interpretation is
perceived as a residual rule.
The different types of implied terms therefore also flow into each other over time.
Is the present approach of our courts to implied terms satisfactory, given that it results
in a blurring of borders between tacit and ex lege terms?
6 4 3 Vorster's four categories of terms
Vorster argues that four separate categories of implied terms must rather be
recognised."? He groups the first three together as "terms inferred by construction."
First, he says, South African courts imply words or terms in contracts to give effect to
an unexpressed but actual subjective consensus. Such terms are proved by
391 Vorster 1987 THRHR 450 451-452.
392 Implied Terms 125; 1988 TSAR 161161 etseq.
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circumstantial evidence."? Secondly, Vorster identifies terms implied to protect the
reasonable (actual) belief of one contracting party that the term was tacitly agreed
upon. The reasonable reliance principle therefore "augments unexpressed subjective
consensus as a basis for the implication of terms in the same way that it augments
subjective consensus as the basis for the formation of contracts."?" Thirdly, Vorster
identifies terms which are implied in order to place a rational construction on the
contract. He says that these terms become relevant when the parties had no intention
regarding a matter which later turned out to be the subject of litigation between
them.?" Vorster argues that where the pleadings treat the dispute as turning on the
true construction of the contract, the court should usually choose the "most rational of
the competing constructions." This exercise involves the reading in of words "to give
effect to the inferences drawn from the meaning of the express words.'?" Often there
is more than one logically valid alternative way of resolving the dispute and the court
then chooses the more rational one in view of all the relevant propositions of law and
fact, including the openly normative secondary rules on interpretation.?" Fourthly,
3931988 TSAR 161 161.
3941988 TSAR 161 163.
395 Ibid.
396 The words read into the contract in Van den Berg v Tenner supra 276A is an example. The court
stated that: "Die enigste uitwerking van klousule 2 van die ooreenkoms ... op die verpligting van die
verweerder om die bedrag van RIO 000 aan die eiser te betaal, was om nakoming van daardie
verpligting uit te stel tot na die datum van afhandeling van die verkoper deur die verweerder van die
[maatskappy] ... of totdat dit duidelik geword het dat daardie [gebeurtenis] weens omstandighede nie
kon plaasvind nie." The last phrase was not expressed in the contract in question. The court read it
into the contract in determining the "true meaning" of clause 2, whilst conceding that the parties never
thought about the situation for which it caters (at 277C). For a full discussion see Vorster 1988 TSAR
161 164-165.
397 Other examples mentioned by Vorster 143 include Haak's Garages v Van Wyk 1933 TPD 370 in
which a hire-purchase agreement entitled the seller to recover instalments in arrear on cancellation.
Although there was no express provision to that effect, it followed as a necessary consequence that the
seller was entitled to retain instalments already paid. The court reasoned that "if this provision is not
implied there would be no inducement to the seller to claim instalments, until they are all in arrear; and
again assuming that all but one instalment has been paid, then on cancellation by the seller, he would
only be entitled to recover the last instalment, but would have to refund the other instalments." The
court therefore considered the read in words to be the only rational construction although strictly
281
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Vorster recognises legal incidents or naturalia of particular kinds of contractual
relationships.ï" He emphasises that courts can and do make law by recognising new
naturalia, for nominate as well as "new" or innominate contract types. The court then
evaluates policy considerations relevant to a contractual relation of the kind before the
court. However, in most cases there will be a precedent or custom that may be
applied directly or by analogy, so that the cases where courts could justify a rule
solely on a policy analysis will be rare.
Vorster argues that "the Mooreock doctrine", that is, the bystander test coupled with
the "business efficacy" test, should be jettisoned. On the one hand there is no
necessary connection between these two tests and the actual tacit intention of the
parties. On the other, these tests serve to mask policy choices in the implication of
terms, which should rather be made openly and in a reasonable manner.l" Unlike
English law which spawned these tests, South African law does not need such
fictions. English law did not receive the device of naturalia contractus (implied on
the basis of the contractual purpose and bona fides) from Roman law, and therefore
used the fiction of intention to evolve residual rules for specific contract types."? All
terms implied on the basis of the Mooreock doctrine can be explained by the four
bases which Vorster identifies.
Vorster also argues that where the words used do not bear directly on the dispute, one
should generally first determine whether the transaction belongs to a class of
speaking, two possible readings were logically possible. See also Marine and Trade Insurance v Van
Heerden 1977 3 SA 553 (A).
398 Vorster 1988 TSAR 161 166 et seq.
399 As Vorster 1988 TSAR 161 173 points out, the courts have accepted that it is artificial to base the
choice of applicable law on the imputed intention of the parties (as was customary under the approach
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Standard Bank v Efroiken 1924 AD 171). Decisions like
lmprovair v Establissements Neu 1983 2 SA 138 (C) and Laconian Maritime Enterprises vAgromar
Lineas 1986 3 SA 509 (D) have moved away trom this "imputed intention approach" towards an
approach seeking the legal system with the closest connection to the contract.
400 Vorster 1988 TSAR 161 178 and authorities there cited. See also CSIR v Fijen 1996 2 SA 1 (A) 9H-
lOA where the court stated that "It does seem to me that, in our law, it is not necessary to work with the
concept of an implied term. The duties referred to [that is, the reciprocal duties of trust and confidence
between employer and employee] simply flow from naturalia contractus."
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contracts to which a legal incident which may be decisive of the dispute usually
attaches.?' This averts the danger of using "orthodox construction" as a mask for
implying unclear and badly motivated legal incidents on the basis of non-existent
presumed intention alone.'?' If the contract cannot be classified as a nominate
contract, this does not mean that no legal incidents can be attached to it. If there is a
possibility that the type of contract may be concluded by other parties, it is helpful to
treat the implication of terms for situations not provided for by the parties not as mere
interpretation in the sense of identifying tacit terms, but as the determination of legal
incidents so that "an exasperating goose chase after non-existent contractual
meaning" and the resort to fictional intention is avoided.
6 4 4 Normative interpretation
An alternative approach to Vorster's is to treat all cases where there is no existing
naturale or general residual provision, as calling for normative interpretation. By
"normative interpretation" I mean an approach to interpretation that does not regard
"the intention of the parties" as the ultimate end of interpretation, but is premised on
the filling of gaps in a manner consistent with the terms of the agreement and in
accordance with business efficacy and fairness.?" Factual elements are therefore
openly combined with normative elements to reach a solution that is fair, and which
can then serve as a precedent for a similar situation. Policy considerations are openly
taken into account. Although the term eventually implied is based on an
interpretation of the specific transaction, it becomes a residual rule for such situations
401 Implied Terms lOS.
402 Ibid.
403 Normative interpretation is interpretation aimed not at establishing the subjective will of the parties,
but rather the legal meaning of a factual act. On normative interpretation see Van Dunné
Verbintenissenrecht 124 et seq; Lubbe & Murray Contract 463-464; Van der Merwe et al Contract
219. According to Van der Merwe et al Contract 219 the modem approach to interpretation is to
combine the "psychological-historical" approach aimed at ascertaining the parties' actual intention with
the "objective" approach, in terms of which the conduct of the parties is placed within the context of
legal policy, including the demands of good faith. At present, our law professes, in principle, to place
the focus on the intention of the contractants.
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should they ever arise in future. If a number of cases confirm the interpretation, it in
effect becomes a naturale of the kind of transaction before the court. On this
approach, the difference between terms implied on the basis of normative
interpretation and residual rules such as naturalia and general residual provisions, is
not that their determinants differ, as Vorster seems to suggest by his distinction
between terms implied by construction and terms implied by law.?" In fact, terms
implied on the basis of normative interpretation as well as residual rules are justified
by notions of fairness and policy considerations and both have empirical elements and
should be consistent with the parties' or typical parties' intention.?" As stated before,
the real difference is rather the perception of each category's normative power for
future transactions, which perception may change over time. Normative interpretation
does not, therefore, exhort courts to lay down abstractly stated legal incidents from
the start when faced with a new situation. It allows them to interpret the
particularities of the situation in the light of normative ideals and to imply a fair term,
which may later be regarded as a residual rule if more decisions confirm that
interpretation and show that the situation is a recurring one.
"Normative interpretation" is not foreign to South African legal practice. Our courts
have indeed at times used the implication of tacit terms to give expression to
communitarian standards such as the underlying principle of good faith.f" The
"objective application" of the bystander test approaches normative interpretation,
provided that the court gives reasons why it considers one interpretation as more
reasonable than another, instead of merely stating that reasonable persons in the
position of the parties would have answered that the term should apply.
404 Supra. However, Vorster's third category of terms, those implied to place a rational construction on
a contract, approximates terms implied through normative interpretation, in that Vorster considers that
the court chooses the more rational interpretation in view of all the relevant propositions of law and
fact. See at n 397 supra.
405 See par 6 2 supra.
406 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 4053; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 157 172; Neels 1999 TSAR 684695-696; cf
Neels "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel 2)" 257; Vorster
Implied Terms 167 et seq; Kerr Contract 335 et seq; Van der Merwe et al Contract 199 and cases there
cited.
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If normative interpretation is recognised, the distinction between the process of
interpretation as far as the recognition of tacit terms is concerned, and the implication
of ex lege terms remains blurred. In the Netherlands, the doctrine of normative
interpretation apparently entails that no rigid distinction is made between
interpretation and supplementation of the agreement with the aid of good faith.?"
The slogans of its proponents in the Netherlands are that "words are never clear" and
that "interpretation is supplementation. "408 They object to a separate treatment of
supplementation and interpretation of terms, as this implies that interpretation fulfils a
different function, namely ascertainment of the parties' actual intention, which they
consider to be generally impossible.?"
A detailed consideration of normative interpretation and especially its impact on the
traditional distinction between interpretation and supplementation of terms is beyond
the scope of this study. The benefits of calling all supplementation of a contract
"normative interpretation" instead of working with the two categories of tacit terms
and novel naturalia or ad hoc ex lege terms (in addition to recognised residual rules)
requires further consideration elsewhere.
What is certainly correct is that interpretation cannot be merely "factual" but is
instead always normative {thus a legal-cum-factual question),"? so that it allows no
place for unreasoned policy decisions behind pronouncements on the unexpressed
intention of parties in the implication of terms. A failure to openly consider the
policy considerations and ethical postulates at stake can therefore find no
407 Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 127, 143. In the words of Scholten: "iedere interpretasie tevens is
aanvulling en de tegenstelling eene is van meer of minder, niet van scherp te scheiden dingen."
(Scholten Uitlegging van testamenten 350 cited by Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 128).
408 CfVan Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 120, 124.
409 Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 119 et seq. CfGordley The philosophical origins 244.
410 Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 160 regards the distinctions interpretation - supplementation and
factual question - legal question as distinctions that are difficult, if not impossible, to uphold in
practice. He denies that interpretation of a contract is simply a factual question that can therefore not
be appealed against, although he agrees that the question of interpretation involves a consideration of
the facts.
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justification. In a sense, even interpretation therefore amounts to "making a contract
for the parties."
One dubious utilitarian advantage of an insistence that the implication of new terms
remains "normative interpretation" (as opposed to the creation of rules) is that it may
encourage courts to consider terms not actually intended, but required by fairness and
reasonableness in the light of the particular circumstances, and therefore consistent
with the reasonable expectation of the parties. In Cockrell's words, it allows courts to
achieve a communitarian standard whilst remaining true to the language of
individualism.'" Implication of the types of (ad hoc) "legal incidents" or "ex lege
terms" argued for by Vorster and Neels (and more cryptically, by Van der Merwe et
al) to be implied due to the special circumstances of the transaction even when it is
not of common occurrence, may be easier for courts to swallow.:" Regarding the
process as interpretation may lead to greater sensitivity to the particular realities of
each situation, coupled with more general notions on the demands of underlying
principles of contract law and policy goals.
One would then simply distinguish between three categories of implied terms
according to the generality of their application. General residual rules would prima
facie apply to all' contracts, naturalia to contracts falling within a certain class and
other implied terms to particular transactions and situations that may not be of
common occurrence, but which are implied due to the special circumstances
surrounding the transaction and the demands of fairness and justice. General residual
rules would then be triply residual: they could be excluded by contrary naturalia of a
specific contract type, or by ad hoc implied terms or by express agreement. Naturalia
could, in tum, be excluded by ad hoc implied terms or by express agreement.
On the other hand, although "normative interpretation" of contracts has been
recognised in many decisions of the highest court in the Netherlands,"? it apparently
411 Cockrell 1992 SALf 4054.
412 Supra at n 370 et seq and n 372 et seq.
413 The Hoge Raad. See Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 133 et seq and cases discussed by the author.
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remams somewhat controversial there.?' Use of the term "interpretation" with its
traditional connotation of decoding terms that already exist arguably obscures the true
nature of the implication of terms in cases where the parties did not even consider the
situation at hand.:" No wonder then that our courts profess to be declaring the
intention of the parties when implying tacit terms, yet generally do not call this
process "interpretation", a term limited to the elucidation of express terms.?"
When normative interpretation amounts to supplementing the contract, it is criticised
as a fiction by which an intention is ascribed to the parties that they never had."? On
the other hand, it creates the danger of ignoring the parties' actual intention, and
therefore the important value or principle of party autonomy, on the basis of other
policy goals. The distinction between interpretation and the implication of ex lege
terms is so firmly entrenched in our law that it is doubtful that South African courts
could be persuaded to regard all implication of novel terms as "interpretation'Y"
Nevertheless, further reflection on this controversial issue may perhaps persuade
courts to regard all implication of terms, including the implication of "tacit terms", as
a "normative" process. This may facilitate the recognition of suitable terms on the
basis of underlying principles such as good faith and other policy considerations or at
least promote reflection on the policy justifications and repercussions of the tacit and
ex lege terms that courts imply or refuse to imply.
414 Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 123, 125 et seq gives an overview of critical academic
contributions and contrary decisions. Although lately the flag of normative interpretation seems to be
flying at the top, to use his metaphor, some confusion still exists. On the latest decisions and academic
contributions as from 1985 see 159 et seq.
415 The famous Dutch jurist, Meijers, was a strong supporter of a distinction between interpretation and
supplementation of an agreement, and vehemently criticised cases following the "normative
interpretation" approach for this reason. CfVan Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 135-136.
416 Van der Merwe et al Contract 219.
417 Cf Houwing's criticism against the decision of rederij Koppe (1949) (1950 NJ 72) cited by Van
Dunné Verbintenissenrecht 140.
418 The distinction drawn between tacit and ex lege terms emphasised by Corbett AlA (as he then was)
in Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration supra has been quoted
with approval in numerous subsequent cases. Legal writers such as Kerr have also repeatedly criticised
decisions which have blurred this distinction. See n 8 supra.
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In my opinion, what courts should be exhorted to do when faced with a contractual
gap is to seek to ascertain the true intention of the parties. Giving effect to the
principle of party autonomy is an important aspect of the fairness ideal, where this
does not result in oppression of one of the parties, or clearly conflicts with other
communal goals. However, courts must also realise the limitations of language and of
unreasoned reliance on "logic" in seeking to ascertain the parties' intention.?" They
must realise that there is often a variety of logically valid interpretations that can be
placed on a situation, so that the choice between them should be done on normative or
fairness grounds. Courts must in addition not pretend to find an intention when none
exists. They must also realise the normative effect of their interpretation and the term
implied and therefore consider the decision's relationship with and effect on existing
authoritative rules and principles of law, whilst attempting to achieve coherency,
consistency and legal certainty. For the same reason, the policy implications of their
decisions must be taken into account. It is probably too presumptuous for legal
writers to prescribe, in addition, that courts must seek to rather imply ex lege terms or
naturalia than factual or tacit terms, or to state that these categories be kept strictly
apart. Courts should always be responsive to the facts (the actual intention of the
parties) and the requirements of the law and justice when implying terms and these
empirical and normative aspects of adjudication cannot be rigidly separated.
Ultimately, it is not so important for a court implying a novel term to categorise it as a
general residual provision, naturale, ad hoc ex lege term, standard interpretation or ad
hoc tacit term, as long as the court did follow all the guidelines mentioned above. The
new term's normative status will depend not so much on whether it is normative or
empirical in origin as on the commonness or level of abstraction of the situation
which led the court to imply it and the commonness of the type of contract into which
it was implied. The soundness and persuasiveness of the court's reasoning, and
therefore the reaction of later courts to the decision, will be of decisive importance.
419 The bystander test sanctions unreasoned reliance on logic ("of course" arguments) to some extent.
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6 5 Four possible approaches to the multiplicity of
preference contracts
The classification of preference arrangements resorted to in South African practice
into the different types identified in chapter 5 is problematic. The incidents of
preference agreements are often not negotiated to any great extent and the agreements
are mostly worded very cryptically indeed. Very often one party simply states that
she grants the other a right of pre-emption or first option. It is therefore often difficult
to establish the basic purpose or contractual end of a preference contract, which is of
course central to classification of contracts under both the conceptual and typological
approaches. As mentioned above, the arrangement could be used either to place a
mere obligatio non faciendi on the grantor, or, on the other hand, to grant the holder
an enforceable right to performance of the eventual contract (or at least to conclusion
thereof) upon the occurrence of any of a number of events.
The best solution for the problem is to prevent disputes by clear drafting. Drafters of
preference arrangements in contracts, wills and statutes should bear in mind that the
simple, one line formulations generally encountered in the case law may very well
lead to protracted disputes on their proper interpretation. The extra costs attendant
upon the careful drafting of preference contracts are justified by the prevention of
costly disputes resulting from the uncertain legal rules governing these contracts.?"
The typology of preference contracts set out in chapter 5 could serve as an aid to the
drafting process. That chapter contains a catalogue of possible constructions that
drafters may use in an attempt to reflect the actual intention of the parties before them.
It highlights certain aspects that are presently unclear and suggests solutions on these
matters. These include the exercise of the right by the holder, what constitutes breach
420 The problem of hasty drafting of rights of first refusal are not unique to South African practice.
Several writers in other jurisdictions urge practitioners to draft these clauses more carefully. See for
example, Platt "The right of first refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by operation of law" 1996
Baylor Law Review 1197 1210; Siviglia "Helpful Practice Hints: Rights of first refusal" 1994 New York
State Bar Journal 56.
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and what remedies are available on breach and on termination of the holder's right.
The choice of rules on these matters should be clearly provided for in the preference
contract if disputes are to be avoided.
A consideration of drafting proposals is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, I will
focus on the situation where the preference contract is not clearly drafted, resulting in
ambiguity as to the basic rights and duties of the parties. Four possible approaches for
dealing with the variants that might have been intended will be considered here.
Firstly, one could insist that the precise construction of a preference contract is always
a matter of interpretation, of teasing out the tacit agreement of the parties on the main
consequences intended by them. This could be called the ad hoc interpretation
approach.
Secondly, a set of guidelines for an ad hoc interpretation process could be developed,
together with a check list of relevant policy considerations for the formulation of legal
incidents in situations where the parties' consensus or reasonable reliance thereof
cannot be fathomed.
Thirdly, classificatory criteria for each type of preference contract could be
established, as well as a set of default terms (naturalia), which apply upon the
classification of a contract into a specific type. These classificatory criteria could be
either in the form of essentialia, that is, clear, all-or-nothing criteria, or in the form of
"symptomatic features" or "indicative factors" which point to a "total picture" based
on the contractual purpose, as sanctioned by the Typenlehre.
Fourthly, a default type or types that apply unless a court finds that a different type
was intended, could be recommended.
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In terms of the first approach, the ad hoc interpretation approach, the court must look
to the facts of each case to establish the parties' expectations. This approach may be
favoured for its flexibility, which allows courts to do justice in each particular case.
A typology of preference contracts, such as that suggested in chapter 5, is helpful in
this attempt as it should caution courts that parties may have very different
consequences in mind.
However, the ad hoc interpretation approach is unhelpful on its own, mainly because
reliable evidence of what the parties intended would often be lacking. This problem
is exacerbated by the typically sparse formulations of preference agreements. The
"interpretation" of a contract and the establishment of "tacit terms" would therefore
often amount to pure guesswork as to the parties' intentions under cover of the
"officious bystander" test."' As argued before, where the parties' actual intention
cannot in fact be ascertained, the law should rather aim for the rational development
of guidelines for solutions of particular problems which includes policy reasons and
thereby contribute to the predictability of law.?" This difficulty of establishing the
basic result intended, also means that simply formulating the classificatory
characteristics in terms of essentialia, which traditionally centre around the parties'
main contractual purpose, is not helpful. The only contractual purpose which is
common to all types of preference contracts is that the holder must be preferred
before others when the grantor contracts. However, there are still very different ways
in which the holder may be preferred, and it is often unclear whether the holder's
preference was intended to be a bare preference or rather an enforceable right to
contract on the occurrence of a certain event. Simply stating that the court must
ascertain on the facts which consequence was intended, would lead to too much
uncertainty in many cases.
421 The limitations and dangers of this test have been clearly set out by Vorster Implied Terms in the
Law of Contract in England and South Africa unpublished PhD thesis, St John's College, Cambridge
(1987) (see par 62 supra).
422 Par 6 2 supra.
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652 Normative interpretation, or, ad hoc interpretation and
formulation of legal incidents
The second approach attempts to meet the shortcomings of a purely ad hoc
interpretation approach, whilst still leaving scope for a multiplicity of types of
preference contracts and the gradual development of residual rules. In instances
where the parties' intention cannot be ascertained, the second approach enjoins courts
to formulate ad hoc legal incidents for each specific relationship on the basis of policy
considerations and in an effort to arrive at a fair solution in the specific case. This
flexible approach seems to correlate with the variation in purpose and economic
context in the use of preference contracts. Eventually rules and principles would
crystallise to assist courts in linking the transaction with the appropriate residual rules.
A list of relevant policy considerations, factors and guidelines for interpretation could
be given to assist the courts in arriving at a fair solution in"each case. The following
considerations could be relevant:
1. The desirability of the free alienability of property, III the interest of
maximisation of wealth.
11. The economic sector in which the preference contract is used and the actual or
typical bargaining position of the parties.
111. Whether the preference contract was concluded against consideration of any
kind.
IV. Who the most sophisticated party is, so that the burden of clear
communication should be placed on him.
v. Whether the preference contract predetermines the price at which the eventual
contract may be concluded.
VI. Whether the preference contract was granted at a time when the grantor had
already manifested an intention to conclude the eventual contract.
VII. Whether the holder was not interested in concluding the main contract, but
rather viewed the preferential right as a mechanism entitling her to ward off
third parties.
These considerations will briefly be discussed hereunder.
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The desirability of the free alienability of property is a policy consideration in favour
of the limited construction of preference contracts, which would leave the grantor as
free as possible to obtain the highest possible price for her property. Our courts have
often confirmed that preference contracts should be strictly construed as they amount
to restraints on alienation.'?' This consideration means that preference contracts
should not lightly be interpreted to mean that any manifestation of a desire to sell
would trigger a right to contract. It is also an argument in favour of an assumption
that a bare preference contract has been concluded. In cases where the court holds
that a conditional right to contract is intended, it is also an argument in favour of the
proposition that if the grantor no longer wishes to contract at all, he should not be
forced to do so, arguably even after the holder has exercised her right.?"
The economic sector in which the preference contract is used should be considered to
ascertain the typical bargaining positions of the grantor and holder. The need for
protection of either of the parties against exploitation of a disparity in bargaining
power must then be considered. For example, if the preference contract is used in the
publishing or recording industry, there are policy reasons for construing it as narrowly
as possible in the artist's favour as the artist is up against powerful publishing or
recording corporations and it is in the interest of the promotion of art that an artist be
as free as possible to have her works published or recorded as she chooses.
Moreover, in sectors where preference agreements are common, such as the
publishing industry, third parties would not be willing to negotiate at all should the
preference contract be construed as a right to contract upon the manifestation of a
desire to sell in the form of serious negotiations. Therefore a bare preference
construction, which does not force the author to contract with the holder publisher if
theirs is the highest offer, but simply restrains her from contracting with any other
423 See, for example, the majority decision in the Owsianick case at 321; Robinson v Randforntein
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 188; Edwards (Waaikraal) Gold Mining Co Ltd v
Mamogale NO & Bakwena Mines Ltd 1927 TPD 288; Ah Ling v Community Development Board &
Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E) 37G-38A.
424 In Wissekerke v Wissekerke 1970 2 SA 550 (A) it was common cause that the grantor could
withdraw a voluntary offer before acceptance thereof. The court decided that this could not be done
where the holder still intended to contract with a third party.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
294
publisher unless the holder has refused to publish at the price offered by a third party
publisher, would be most suitable to give effect to these considerations. The fact that
a publishing or recording contract involves a continuous, close relationship between
the parties may be a factor that could sway a court to rather hold that the preference
contract creates only an obligatio non faciendi enforceable by prohibitory interdict,
with breach only entitling the holder to damages or a prohibitory interdict. On the
other hand, where there is no possibility of exploitation, it should be taken into
account that grantors of rights of pre-emption in respect of property are generally in a
stronger bargaining position than the holders, and that rights of pre-emption are often
granted gratuitously to holders, without any oppression of the holders. In such cases,
it is therefore legitimate to argue for a default construction which limits the grantor's
freedom to deal with his property as little as possible, as this is what grantors would
most likely have agreed to and what holders would most likely have been forced to
accept, without this amounting to exploitation of holders.?'
If the preferential right was granted gratuitously, it is fair that the grantor's capacity
to alienate should be restricted as little as possible. This could be justified with
reference to the ideal of contract law of the "substantial equivalence of exchanges.v'"
The contract price is an indication of the risks deliberately imposed and accepted by
the parties.?" If you do not pay for a performance, you cannot demand too much.?"
425 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 305.
426 Vorster Implied Terms 20.
427 Vorster Implied Terms 158.
428 It is a venerable principle of contract law that one who acts for free should be set lower standards of
care than one who contracts for a counter-performance (Van Dunné Verbintenissenrecht Deel 1:
Contraetenrecht 2nd edition (1993) 21.) It could accordingly be argued that the policy goal of ïjustice-
in-exchange" would be promoted by a strict construction of preference contracts which leaves the
grantor as free as possible to deal with her property, and to give the minimum possible logical meaning
to the holder's preference. In the context of contractual powers, Cockrell "Second-guessing the
exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds" 1997 Acta Juridica 26 51 states that this policy
goal requires that "a contracting party should not, by the exercise of a unilateral power, be able to
destroy the reciprocity in consideration that formed part of the original bargain". "[T[he aim is ... to
prohibit one contractor from securing a distributive distortion by the unilateral exercise of a contractual
power". Applied to preference contracts, the fact that no consideration is often received by the grantor
in exchange for the right of first refusal, is a policy argument in favour of a default rule limiting the
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It is fair that the burden of full communication should be placed on the most
sophisticated party.
Predetermination of the price at which the mam contract may be concluded, for
example by providing for valuation by a third party, is a strong indication of a grant
to the holder of a right to contract should the grantor manifest an intention to
conclude the eventual contract. Agreeing to a price evidences that the grantor
eschews the opportunity of obtaining the best possible price by sounding out the
market.
If the preference contract was granted when the grantor had already manifested an
intention to conclude the main contract, negotiations with third parties should not
readily be held to trigger a right to contract. To hold that the manifestation of a
serious desire to conclude the main contract triggers the holder's right would be
ludicrous as there was already a clear desire to conclude the eventual contract at the
time of granting the preferential right to contract.
Whether the holder was not interested in obtaining a substantive contract with the
grantor, but viewed the preferential right merely as a mechanism to ward off third
parties, should perhaps also be taken into account. Some German, Austrian and
Swiss writers stress that the holder's principal interest may sometimes be only an
Abwehrinteresse, an interest to ward off unwanted third parties.'?" In other situations
she may have an Erwerbsinteresse, an interest in actually acquiring the object of the
right of pre-emtption.t" In the former case, the holder's interest could perhaps best
be reconciled with the grantor's interest to have his freedom of disposal impaired as
holder's right as much as is logically possible in order to prevent a "distributive distortion" by allowing
the holder too strong a right for no consideration.
429 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht (1975) 15-16. This interest is called a "prohibitive
purpose" by Swiss and Austrian writers. See for example the Swiss writer Allgauer Vorkaufs-,
Ruckkaufs- und Kaufsrecht nach dem schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuche (1918) 13 and the Austrian
writer Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht: Zum Vorkauf in Osterreichischen Biirgerlichen Recht (1967)
, 141.
430 Ibid.
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little as possible by treating the contract as a bare preference. This means that the
grantor's duty is a negative one, so that a breach would not entitle the holder to
contract with the grantor, but only to a prohibitory interdict or damages. Evidence to
the effect that the holder was not interested in acquiring the subject matter, but
desired only the power to prevent the rights from falling into the hands of a specific
competitor.?' could be an indication that the parties intended to create an obligatio
non faciendi only. Whether this is an acceptable guideline for interpretation will be
considered more fully below in the discussion of the third approach.
An approach along these lines would be more amenable to the "rational development
of guidelines for the resolution of disputes" than the first one. With the focus
remaining on interpretation and ad hoc implication of terms where necessary, this
approach will probably facilitate appropriate solutions sensitive to the needs of each
particular transaction. According to Martinek, the determination of the legal nature
of contract types and their legal consequences invariable entails an extended process
of development and pluralistic discursive communication.?" If courts are prepared to
consider the aforesaid guidelines for interpretation and the recognition of residual
rules and resist the temptation of prematurely laying down a default regime for all
preference contracts, the resultant development of preference contract types will
benefit from the sensitivity shown to differentiated contexts.?"
This manner of proceeding would, however, remain an ad hoc approach that, in
addition to interpretation, focuses on the policy considerations relevant to each
specific case to imply any legal incidents that may be necessary for a fair solution.
It is true that the application of some of the guidelines and policy considerations
431 See, for example, Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal1985 4 SA 615 (T) 621C-D.
43229.
433 Differentiation between different economic contexts may be a good idea in respect of other aspects
of first refusal transactions. For example, taking into account the typical importance of the identity of
third party contractants in the specific economic context may lead to appropriately differentiated
residual rules on the reach of transactions prohibited by the preference contract. In the context of close
corporations or small companies, for example, there is a more persuasive argument to be made for
extending the trigger event to involuntary sales than in the case of preference contracts in other
contexts. For such an argument see Platt 1996 Baylor Law Review 1197.
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indicated above would lead to the crystallisation of at least some types of preference
contracts with a predictable set of residual rules, such as "the preferential right to
conclude a publishing or recording contract", "the gratuitous preferential right to buy
land which does not predetermine the eventual price" and "the conditional right to
contract when the preference contract predetermines the eventual price". Such types
are likely to crystallise because the same policy considerations would apply to all
contracts within each of these types.
The proliferation of such idiosyncratic sub-types may be repugnant to South African
lawyers and judges trained in a predominantly civilian system of private law, who
because of a tendency to regard abstraction at the highest possible level as an
important goal of jurisprudence, may be inclined to lay down uniform rules for all
instances which appear to come within the parameters of an institution.t" In the case
of contracts, the typical approach would be to recognise or construct a uniform
contract model with one set of naturalia irrespective of the economic context.
However, such an attitude, which is essentially formalistic, IS precisely what
proponents of the Typenlehre object against, and with good reason.
A more concrete and weighty objection against this ad hoc approach is the
uncertainty and unpredictability that would result in the interim, that is, before the
eventual crystallisation of preference contract types (or the recognition by drafters of
the importance of a clear formulation of the contractual purpose). It is therefore
unlikely that courts would choose this route as a solution on its own.
6 5 3 Formulation of classificatory criteria for each type
A third alternative approach, aimed at giving more guidance to courts and parties,
would therefore be to spell out more definite classificatory criteria for each possible
type of preference contract, without specifically distinguishing amongst types
according to the economic sphere in which they are used. It would be very difficult,
if not impossible, to formulate classificatory characteristics in the form of essentialia
434 Cf also Hutchison "When rigs do roam: Relational Economic Loss in Table Bay Harbour" 2001
SALf 651.
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or similar definite, all or nothing criteria for all the main types of preference contracts
listed in the typology in Chapter five.
Definite classificatory markers can, however, be formulated for two types of
preference contracts.
Firstly, predetermination of the eventual price in the preference contract, either by
fixing a price or by establishing an external standard, is a clear indication that the
holder has a right to conclude the eventual contract upon any manifestation of a desire
to contract by the grantor, including the commencement of negotiations with third
parties.?" Only where the agreement clearly provides for a different trigger event, is
this classification excluded. Examples are agreements that refer to the market price,
the grantor's usual price, a reasonable price or a price to be determined by a third
party. The justification for treating such contracts as productive of rights to contract
conditional upon any manifestation of a desire to sell, is that a grantor who is prepared
to agree on a definite price or an external mechanism for ascertainment of the price,
has no interest in negotiating with third parties or sounding out the market in any
other manner. He has clearly agreed to grant the holder the right to contract at the
price provided for as soon as he manifests a desire to contract.
The desirability of free negotiation by the grantor means that doubts as to whether the
grantor has an interest in sounding out the market should be resolved in her favour.
For example, where the preference contract indicates that the price to be offered is in
the discretion of the grantor but that, after such an offer was made, any dispute as to
the applicable price should be settled by a third party, the grantor arguably still has an
interest in sounding out the market before she decides on the offer she wishes to
435 It is clear that this classificatory criterion is not in the form of an essentiale, as the contract would
not be invalid in the absence of a price provision. It would only make it a different form of preference
contract. By definition, essentialia indicate the essential terms on which the parties must agree for it to
be a valid contract.
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submit to the holder.?" Such preparatory steps should therefore not trigger the duty to
make an offer in such cases.
Also, where the parties refer to a price which the grantor is prepared to accept from a
third party or a bonafide price, one cannot draw the inference that the grantor has no
bona fide interest in first sounding out the market and negotiating with third parties to
establish the price at which he wishes to contract. Accordingly, the classificatory
criterion of a predetermined price does not encompass a reference to "the terms which
the grantor is prepared to accept from a third party" or "a bona fide price" or any
similar vague formulation.
Secondly, where the preference agreement does not prohibit a contract with a third
party, but simply entitles the holder to contract on the same terms as agreed with a
third party, the construction of the preference contract is also clear. It operates like
the BGB Vorkaufsrecht.437 It can be understood as an option to contract upon the
same terms as agreed with the third party which is conditional upon the grantor
actually contracting with a third party. In this case the classificatory criteria are
therefore the absence of an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii and an indication
that the holder has the right to contract upon the same terms as agreed with a third
party.
I tum now to the remaining types of preference contracts listed in chapter 5. Would it
be possible to formulate classificatory characteristics for these types in the form of a
"Gesamtbild" based on the contractual purpose of each type, together with
"symptomatic features" or "indicative factors" sanctioned by the Typenlehre?
436 Cf Ah Ling v Community Development Board & Others supra. The right of pre-emption in question
was created by art 15(5)(a) of the Community Development Act, 3 of 1966, which provided for a price
to be agreed between the Board and the owner concerned, and, failing agreement, to be fixed by
arbitration. The court held that not even an offer to the holder at a specific price should be regarded as
entitling the holder to insist on a price being fixed by arbitration, in spite of the reference to this
manner of resolving a dispute on the price in the statutory provision. It must be remembered that the
court had even more reason to construe the right of pre-emption restrictively as it involved a statutory
deprivation of an existing right (see at 37H-38A).
437 See par 4 1 1 supra.
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The problem is that the traditionally cryptic drafting of preference clauses does not
clearly reveal the parties' choice between the variable but related purposes that could
be served by preference contracts. The parties are likely to dispute their exact
contractual purpose when litigating over a preference contract and it would be
difficult to decide expost facto how they actually intended to structure the preferential
right, especially because preference contracts are traditionally not extensively
negotiated.
One hypothesis is that whether the preference contract amounts to a bare preference
contract or a conditional right to contract depends on the holder's primary interest in
obtaining the preferential right. On this view, an Abwehrinteresse or interest to ward
off unwanted third parties, is an indicative feature of the bare preference contract,
whereas an Erwerbsinteresse or desire to actually conclude the substantive contract is
a symptomatic feature of conditional rights to contract. The hypothesis could also be
formulated to the effect that a "dominant impression" that the preference contract
stems from the holder's interest in warding off undesirable third parties would
categorise the contract as a bare preference contract.?"
Evidence in Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd vErconovaal Ltd'" to the effect that the
holder was not interested in acquiring the mineral rights, but desired only to prevent
them from falling into the hands of a specific competitor.?" could therefore provide
the basis for a finding that parties intended an obligatio nonfaciendi only."'
438 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 76 et seq and Burkert "Die Reichweite des § 506 BOB"1987 NJW 3157
have argued for differentiation based on the holder's primary interest. For example, Burkert suggests
that an Abwehrinteresse should lead to a "teleological reduction" of § 506 BGB, so that it does not
apply where the holder has only an Abwehrinteresse. Article 506 BGB provides that an agreement with
a third party that the sale would be conditional upon non-exercise of the Vorkaufsrecht, is ineffective
against the holder, so that she may still exercise her right upon conclusion of such a sale.
43919854 SA 615 (T).
44°621C_D.
441 In Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd supra the grantor did not rely on this evidence in
support of such an interpretation, but rather to argue that the event triggering the holder's right to
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However, this hypothesis is problematic.
Several German writers have recently criticised attempts to argue for different sets of
default terms for the Vorkaufsrecht according to whether the holder's primary interest
is an Abwehr- or Erwerbsinteresseï" Many commentators have pointed out that the
motivation for obtaining a preferential right is often unclear.?" that both interests are
often present, and that a holder's interest may change between conclusion of the
contract and enforcement thereof.?" To some extent their objections are based on the
fact that the Vorkaufsrecht is regulated by statute. They argue that a judge may not
deviate from the statutory regulation of the Vorkaufsrecht on the basis of a mere guess
as to the holder's initial motive, whereas the parties could have specifically agreed on
a deviation, but did not.'" Nevertheless, these writers' objections ring true, even
where preference contracts are not regulated by statute. A resort to non-
communicated circumstances in interpretation has always been regarded as suspect.?"
Moreover, even where the holder's primary interest is clearly an Abwehrinteresse, she
has an interest in acquiring the thing upon breach of the preference contract to protect
contract had not occurred because the third party was a member of the same group of companies as the
grantor.
442 See for example, Westermann Erman: BGB Handkommentar io" edition (2000) § 504 RdNr 8;
Mader in Honsell (ed) J von Staundinger's Kommentar zum Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch mit
Einfohrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen 2: Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse §§ 433-534 13th edition (1995)
Vorbem zu §§ 504 ff RdNr 2; Huber in Mertens (ed) Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch mit Einfuhrungsgesetz
und Nebengesetzen Kohlhammer-Kommentar begrundei von Hs Th Soergel & W Siebert 3: Schuldrecht
II (§§ 433-515) AGB-Gesetz, AbzG, EAG, EKG, UN-KaufAbk iz" edition (1991) (hereafter cited as
Soergel & Siebert (Huber)) Vor § 504 RdNr 5; Westermann & Klingberg "Vorkaufsrechte im
Gesellschaftsrecht" in Westermann & Rosener (eds) Festschrift for Karlheinz Quack zum 65.
Geburtstag (1991) 545 547.
443 Ibid.
444 Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 5. This makes it more difficult to ascertain what the
initial interest was.
445 Ibid.
446 Cf Macneil "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law" 1978 Northwestern Law Review 854 893 cited by Braucher
"Contract versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law" 1990 Washington and Lee
Law Review 697.
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her interest, also against future cynical breaches. Concluding the main contract with
the grantor is the manner in which the holder wants to assert her prohibitive interest.
In Austria and Switzerland, commentators also recognise that preference contracts
often serve merely a prohibitive purpose, that is, where the holder intends to exclude a
specific unwanted person from contracting with the grantor."? Still, this does not
affect their view that the holder should always be able to obtain the thing upon breach
by the grantor.t" In fact, a Swiss writer has argued that a primarily prohibitive
interest should extend the reach of the Vorkauftrecht, so that it is also triggered by
exchange, donation and succession, as such transactions would also impair the interest
of the holder to ward off unwanted third parties.?"
Once a prohibitive purpose as a marker of the bare preference construction is rejected,
it is hard to imagine what other indicative feature could clearly distinguish bare
preference contracts from other preference contracts, apart from a provision in the
contract which limits the holder's remedies to damages and remedies aimed at
restoring the status quo ante.
6 5 4 Designating a default type or types of preference contracts
447 Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht (1967) 141 (on Austrian law); Allgauer Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und
Kaufsrecht nach dem schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch (1918) 13 (on Swiss law).
448 Ibid. These writers argue that the holder's purpose should affect other questions surrounding
preference contracts, such as whether the name of the third party should be disclosed to the holder, or
only the terms of the contract. See for example, Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht 141. Cfalso the
position in the US, where preferential rights to contract granted to allow exlusion of undesirable third
parties, are also "specifically enforceable" in the sense that transfer of the object may be claimed. For
clear recognition of these two main purposes of preference contracts, see Conine "Property provisions
of the operating agreement - interpretation, validity, and enforceability" 1988 Texas Tech Law Review
12631317.
449 Allgauer Vorkaufs-. Ruckkaufs- und Kaufsrecht 121-128. See also Platt 1996 Baylor Law Review
1197 1208 who discusses the argument in favour of extending the meaning of the trigger event that
"shareholders in a closely-held corporation, especially those corporations owned by a single family,
'are greatly concerned about the identity of their (business) associates. ",
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A fourth alternative approach would be to propose a default type or types to apply in
the absence of a finding by a court that, on a balance of probabilities, a different
construction was intended. Such a proposal amounts to coupling the ad hoc
interpretation approach (see par 6 5 1) with a default type or types chosen on the basis
of policy considerations. In addition, courts should keep in mind some of the
guidelines for interpretation and policy considerations mentioned in the second
approach (see par 652 above).
The extremely cryptic formulations of rights of pre-emption and the variety of ways
in which preference contracts may be construed, makes a default regime highly
desirable. A coherent default regime, justified by informed policy decisions and
consistent with other rules of contract law, will promote judicial economy and reduce
the costs of contracting.
The implicit approach of the current case law and academic writers on preference
contracts is that there is but a single default construction/" The reliance on historical
authority and case law by judges shows that they aim to find the terms implied by law
into preference contracts generally. The debates between the various judges in
Owsianick'" and Oryx452 and academic writers on the "correct" construction and the
fact that they all finally choose one set of rules reveal the supposition that only one
construction can be right, absent clear contrary provision by the parties. Designating
a default construction or constructions with reasonably clear markers for application
is therefore also the solution most likely to be followed by our courts.
The choice of default type or types should be made on the basis of justified policy
considerations, particularly on the basis of a fair balancing of typical parties' interests
and fairness towards the community's expectations as to its welfare as well as the
need to reflect legal reality balanced against the demand for legal certainty. The
450 See also eh 1 supra. Cffor example, Floyd "Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253 257 and Du
Plessis Die spesifieke nakoming van voorkoopregte en ander verwante regte in die Suid-Afrikaanse en
Franse Reg unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Stellenbosch (1997) 14.
451 Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres 19673 SA 310 (A).
452 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Báckereien (Pty) Ltd 19823 SA
893 (A).
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choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical authority or precedent
(which is in any event unclear in the present context) or unsubstantiated claims that
one set of default terms is more logical or commercially useful than another. When
rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as possible, be
reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law'? to prevent
contradictions and inconsistencies in the system.
66 Conclusion
Contract law rules on the consequences of contracts serve diverse and often
conflicting ideals, which are moreover vague and open-ended. An important ideal is
to balance the apparently conflicting aims of legal certainty and the necessary
flexibility that allows justice to be done in the particular case.
Courts must be prepared to give up the present position or solution when it is shown
to be out of step with applicable policy considerations and notions of justice, as well
as the typical purposes of typical parties to such contracts. Policy considerations need
to be unpacked when a rule is unclear or conflicts with others, as is the case with
preference contracts. Precedent plays a stabilising role in this endeavour, as the
existing legal position is regarded as provisionally fair. The need to connect a new
residual rule with the existing conceptual structure, or at least other rules and
underlying principles, also promotes legal certainty.
If there is a possibility that other parties may resort to a type of contract concluded in
a specific case, it is helpful to treat the implication of terms for aspects not provided
for by the parties not merely as part of the process of interpretation in the broad sense.
Courts should rather consider the policy implications of their willingness or refusal to
recognise a tacit term. This they could achieve through a process of openly
normative interpretation, or by laying down legal incidents, so that "an exasperating
goose chase after non-existent contractual meaning" and the resort to fictional
453 Either by translating and fitting the rules into the conceptual structure of the system or, where
necessary, to adapt the conceptual system to cater for the rule. See further par 6 2 supra.
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intention is avoided in favour of a reasoned consideration of all relevant policy
considerations and a fair balancing of any conflicting interests.
The essentialia-naturalia model of specific contract types is problematic. It creates
the illusion that the application of a set of default rules, the naturalia, depends
entirely on the existence of the criteria encompassed by the essentialia whereas this is
not true in practice. Legal incidents can also attach to a subgroup of a nominate
class. In such cases, other factors, based on policy considerations, influence which
default rules apply. The essentialia - naturalia model furthermore creates the
illusion that only nominate contracts should have residual rules. By contrast, Vorster
has correctly emphasised that whether a legal incident should apply to a particular
kind of contractual relationship depends on the practical and policy considerations
attending such a relationship and not whether the relationship is of common
occurrence.
The essential point of the Typenlehre is not so much to plead for the use of types
rather than concepts, but to plead for typological thinking, which amounts to
teleological or purposive thinking, as opposed to purely conceptual, formalist thinking
about contract types. It also emphasises the need for the use of open concepts which
require value judgments in addition to precisely defined, closed concepts in order to
correctly reflect, explain and order the complexity of legal reality. The Typenlehre
correctly proposes that one must be prepared to look beyond the concept and the
question whether a transaction displays its elements (the essentialia in the present
context), to the legal reality of the contract as used in practice. What must be
carefully considered is whether all the rules applicable to a specific contract type are
appropriate to that transaction, or whether there should be further differentiation
justified by some distinct characteristic. In my view, the goal should remain to
construct the classificatory characteristics of model contracts as precisely as possible,
in terms of essentialia or other clear markers open to simple subsumption. This is
consistent with the goals of efficiency through norm reduction and legal certainty.
However, where the classificatory characteristics which prepare the way for the
application of appropriate default rules cannot be formulated as essentialia, this
should not deter the recognition of a new (sub- )type of contract formulated in terms of
vaguer classificatory characteristics where this is required to give effect to legitimate
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The very cryptic way in which rights of pre-emption are normally drafted makes it
difficult to even identify the main purpose of the parties to the contract. It is
therefore not easy to classify preference contracts into the different types identified in
chapter 5, whether on the basis of ad hoc interpretation, or on the basis of measuring
each transaction against a set of essentialia or typological "symptomatic features" or a
"dominant impression". The development of a set of guidelines for interpretation and
a check list of relevant policy considerations for the formulation of ad hoc legal
incidents may be helpful, but still result in uncertainty before the eventual
crystallisation of preference contract types. It is therefore unlikely that courts will
choose this route as a solution on its own. A default regime is therefore highly
desirable in the interest oflegal certainty.
economic goals. Whether one calls the resultant notion a "type" or an "open concept"
is not the important issue. If this is the only option, a continuous attempt must be
made, with a view to legal certainty, to clarify the indicative features of the type as far
as possible in academic and judicial discourse.
I have already argued for two default regimes that should apply in cases where the
preference contract predetermines the price or contains no obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii, respectively. A default construction should therefore be chosen for
preference contracts not falling within these two categories. The latter type of
preference contract is the most common kind.
The choice of the default construction should be made on the basis of recognised
policy considerations, particularly on the basis of an equitable balancing of typical
parties interests and in view of communal interests balanced against the demand for
legal certainty. The choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical
authority or precedent (which is in any event unclear in the present context) or
unsubstantiated claims that one model is more logical or commercially useful than
another. When rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as
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possible, be reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law to prevent
contradictions and inconsistencies in the system.?"
454 Either by translating and fitting the rules into the conceptual structure of the system or, where
necessary, to adapt the conceptual system to cater for the rule. See further par 6 2 supra.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
308
7 Preference Contracts: Proposals for Reappraisal
In choosing a default type, two mam types of preference contracts should be
distinguished. The first is those rare preference contracts (rare in South Africa, in any
event) where the parties make their intention clear that no obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii is intended, but that the holder would be preferred if she can match the
terms agreed with the third party (7 1 below). The second is those preference
contracts creating an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii (7 2 below). I will argue
that the default rule should be that an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii exists.
Under this second type, I will show that two default types should be recognised, each
with a clearly delineated field of application. I
7 1 Preference contracts that allow the grantor to contract
with a third party
Typically such contracts provide for a right to match the terms agreed with a third
party. The grantor is therefore allowed to contract with a third party so that there is
no obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii. These contracts are preference contracts, as
the holder must be preferred above the third party if she matches the latter's terms.
Clearly, an enforceable right to contract is intended. The Vorkaufsrecht of the BGB
is constructed in this manner.
This type of preference contract can plausibly be regarded as a conditional option.
The holder has an option to contract upon the grantor concluding a contract with a
third party and on the same terms. The notion that a mere unilateral declaration by
the holder could bring the main contract into existence fits this explanation.
The price is sufficiently ascertainable to comply with the requirements for a valid
option. At fulfilment of the condition, the price is absolutely clear. The price at
I By default types I mean the body of rules which should apply in the absence of a contrary intention.
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which the contract may be enforced can therefore be determined without further
reference to the parties.'
As argued before, the condition ("conclusion of a contract with a third party") is also
not an objectionable potestative condition. Liability does not tum on the mere ipse
dixit of the grantor, but depends on an action of the grantor, namely the conclusion of
a third party contract. 3
Also unfounded is the related, but theoretical objection that an intention to be bound
is of the essence of an offer, so that the grantor, absent an intention at the conclusion
of the preference contract, cannot intend an option. Any condition added to an option
or a contract implies an intention not to be fully bound at that point, but only once the
condition is fulfilled. Such conditional options or contracts bind the party in whose
favour a suspensive condition is inserted pending fulfilment of the condition.
The normal rules on options apply.' A pre-emption contract in respect of land must
be in writing and signed by or on behalf of the grantor in order to comply with the
Alienation of Land Act, 68 of 1981. Upon fulfilment of the condition, the holder
may submit a valid acceptance of the option, which must also comply with the
prescribed formalities.
Rules umque to this type of conditional option might be required to cater for
situations where the third party contract embodies personal obligations. However, as
2 This is the test for determinability of the price laid down in Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 1 SA 669 (W) 670C. See further Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v
Enal Eiendomme BK & Andere 2002 3 SA 653 (N); Shell v Corbitt 1986 4 SA 523 (C) 526B;
Dharumpal Transport (Pty) Ltd v Dharumpal1964 (1) SA 707.
3 See par 5 2 2 2 and par 4 1 1 2 supra. Such an objection is raised by, inter alia, Van der Merwe et al
Contract: General Principles (1993) 67.
4 See further on this type of preference contract, par 52222 (I) supra.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 2 Preference contracts that do not allow the grantor to
contract with a third party first
this type of preference contract is so rare in South African practice, I will not consider
it in any further detail here.'
It is more difficult to choose a default type for the usual case where the preference
contract does contain an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, or where the holder is
simply granted "a right of pre-emption" or "right of first refusal" without indicating
whether the grantor may legitimately contract with a third party first.
Two default types should be recognised III such situations, each with a clearly
delineated field of application.
Firstly I will show that "preference contracts" that stipulate a price for the main
contract, or mechanism for ascertaining the price, should be construed as conditional
options to contract at a predetermined price. Thereafter, I shall consider a default
regime for all other preference contracts, that is, those preference contracts that do not
fix the main price nor provides for a mechanism for ascertaining it.
7 2 1 Conditional options to contract at a predetermined price
Where the preference contract predetermines the main price, either by fixing a price
or by establishing an external standard or mechanism for its determination, the
preference contract is in fact an option conditional upon any manifestation of a desire
to contract by the grantor. The commencement of negotiations with third parties is
therefore sufficient to trigger the right.
5 The implication of such personal obligations for exercise of the holder's right will be considered
further below in par 7 3 2 2 1 and the discussion there could be applied mutatis mutandis to the present
type of preference contract.
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Stipulation of a price clearly indicates that the grantor has no interest in sounding out
the market, for example by negotiating with third parties. It must therefore be the
parties' intention that, as soon as the grantor evinces an intention to contract, the
holder will have a right to contract with her on the terms determined in the preference
contract.
Once again, the price is sufficiently certain or ascertainable for such a contract to be
regarded as a conditional option." The condition, "any manifestation of a desire to
contract", is also not an objectionable potestative condition. Liability depends on the
actions of the grantor that manifest a desire or intention to contract and not on the
grantor's mere ipse dixit. This aspect has already been fully canvassed.'
6 See especially Shell v Corbitt supra 528A. The preference contract in question obliged the grantor to
buy all the petrol it needed from the holder at the holder's usual price, whereas the grantor could
terminate the agreement if the holder refused to match a lower price of a competitor. The court stated
that it was unnecessary to decide whether the agreement was a sale or option or more in the nature of a
pre-emption agreement or a contract known in English law as a solus agreement. "The important point
is that, even if it is to be regarded as an agreement of sale or an option agreement, the price aspect has
been agreed upon with sufficient certainty to save it from being void for vagueness." The conditional
option explanation has been supported by Reinecke & Otto "Voorkope en ander voorkeurkontrakte"
1986 TSAR 18 24 et seq and Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 137-138 in respect of all preference contracts.
Lubbe have also stated that "Grants specifying the pre-emptive price or, expressly or tacitly,
incorporating the price at which the grantor is prepared to sell to a third party, will have to be
recognized as more akin to option contracts than previously thought." See also Van der Merwe et al
Contract 67. The view that all preference contracts may be regarded as conditional options was
implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 3 SA 729 (A)
765F-G and Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A) 932E, but these decisions did not
specifically reject this juridical explanation in respect of the narrower category of preference contracts
which does predetermine the price, not including reference to a price which the holder is prepared to
accept from a third party.
7 See paragraphs 72 and 5 222 supra. Whether Wissekerke v Wissekerke 1970 SA 2 550 (A), which
did not deal with a similar contract, should allow the grantor to cure the breach, will be discussed
further in par 7 2 2 1 1 infra at n 29 et seq. Allowing the grantor to cure the breach, would contradict
the normal characteristic of an option that the grantor must keep the offer open.
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The normal rules on options apply." Upon fulfilment of the condition, the holder may
submit a valid acceptance of the option, which must comply with any formalities
prescribed for the main contract, for example those set by the Alienation of Land Act,
68 of 1981.
Preference contracts which provide for an offer at "a price which the grantor is
prepared to accept from third parties," do not fall under this category. This "price
criterion" does not establish that the grantor has no interest in sounding out the market
by negotiating with third parties. Therefore he should remain as free as possible to do
so. Negotiations should therefore not trigger the holder's right.
Reference to a "usual price" or a "reasonable price" is sufficient to bring the
preference contract under the present type." So are provisions that the holder will
have a right to buy at a price to be agreed, and failing agreement, to be ascertained by
a third party.
In view of this overlap of options and preference contracts, it is not too surprising that
the distinction between options and rights of pre-emption is not, as Christie points out,
always apparent to those who make contracts." The present type of "preference
contract" gives the holder a right to contract at a specified price despite a better offer
by a third party. The primary obligation of the grantor is therefore not merely to
8 See further on this type of preference contract, par 5 1 I supra.
9 Where no price, not even a price "which the grantor is willing to accept", is referred to whereas a
usual price exists, it will be a matter of interpretation whether the parties intend a right to contract at
the usual price. Uncertainty as to their intention should lead to a narrow interpretation, that is, in
favour of a true preference contract and not a conditional option to contract at the usual price.
Certainly, the courts' apparent readiness to depart from the established rule that a sale for a reasonable
price is invalid for uncertainty (cfGenac Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA
566 (A)) should not lead to implication of a reasonable price in pre-emption contracts which do not
refer to a price. For argument on these matters see par 7 2 2 1 1 infra.
10 The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th edition (2001) 61. Two of the cases to which Christie refers
do in fact concern conditional options to buy at a specified or predetermined price (Van Pletsen v
Henning 1916 AD 82 and Cohen v Behr 1947 CPD 942). Of course, there are other cases where
drafters have referred to a "first option" when they actually mean an outright option, such as Stewart v
Breytenbach 19863 SA 47 (N) 52-53.
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prefer the holder above third parties, all things being equal, as is the case in other
types of preference contract. If a "preference contract" to contract at a specified sum
when the grantor desires to contract should be included in the term "preference
contracts", any option is also a preference contract, as an option holder also has a
right to contract at a specified price, so that she has the "first refusal" to contract at
that price. Likewise, the option grantor may only contract with a third party after the
holder's failure to declare her intention to contract at that price. The only difference
is the condition suspending the right to contract. I I Therefore, "preference contracts"
or "first refusal contracts" could be an umbrella term for options and contracts
traditionally described as "first refusal" or "pre-emption" contracts.
Perhaps academic writers concerned for retention of the distinction between options
and rights of pre-emption" would criticise typifying certain rights of pre-emption as
options. However, there is of course no inherent virtue in retaining a dogmatic
distinction for its own sake.
7 2 2 Ordinary preference contracts
The second default type should provide for all other cases where there is an obligatio
non contrahendo cum tertii. This is the type of preference contract most widely used
in South Africa. The parties indicate that the holder should have the first chance to
contract with the grantor, but they do not specify a price or external standard for
ascertainment thereof, apart from perhaps a reference to the price that the grantor
would be prepared to accept from third parties.
II See also Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1833; Van der Merwe et al Contract 67. It is therefore not
surprising that the court in the English case of Pritchard v Briggs [1980] Ch 339 (CA) suggested that a
pre-emption agreement that specified the terms ofthe main contract is a conditional option contract.
12 CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 68 who suggest that maintaining the distinction between options
and rights of pre-emption is an advantage of regarding the Oryx mechanism as a power to create legal
relations or Gestaltungsrecht. Cf Janisch "Maintaining the distinction between options and pre-
emption agreements" 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434.
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To distinguish it from the two other main types discussed in the previous paragraphs,
I shall refer to such contracts as "ordinary preference contracts", as they are the type
most often encountered in modem South African practice. Such contracts only oblige
the grantor to "prefer" the holder above interested third parties if the holder matches
the terms offered by them, whereas at least the previous type which also incorporates
an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii actually gives the holder a right to contract at
a specified price despite a better offer by a third party.
The two most important issues that a default type for ordinary preference contracts
must settle are:
1. What manifestation of a desire to contract should be regarded as breach, which
would trigger the holder's remedies?
2. What remedies should be available on breach? Most importantly, may the
holder ultimately enforce performance of the main contract?
Proposals on these issues will be made after examination of the relevant policy
considerations. I will thereafter investigate whether the proposed solution has found
some recognition in South Africa or other legal systems.
Thereafter I will propose default rules on some other basic aspects of normal
preference contracts, such as exercise of the holder's right and termination thereof.
I will thereafter consider how these default rules could be fitted into the existing
conceptual structure of South African contract law. In this regard, I will consider
possible coherent juridical explanations of the proposed body of rules. As the validity
requirements, most notably the applicability of formalities legislation, could depend
on the juridical explanation of true preference contracts, these will be discussed in
conjunction with the choice of juridical explanation.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
315
7 2 2 1 Two central issues
722 1 1 Should any conduct short of a third party contract breach or trigger the
holder's right?
The default rule should be that nothing short of a valid offer to or contract with a third
party amounts to breach by the grantor. An offer by the grantor should be regarded as
breach, as it is also an undertaking to contract with a third party. An obligatio non
contrahendo cum tertii implies that the grantor's first offer should be made to the
holder, and not to a third party. No lesser manifestation of a desire to contract should
trigger any remedy for the holder (apart from a prohibitory interdict), not even where
the preference contract provides that "upon the grantor desiring to contract, he shall
offer to contract with the holder." Only if the parties make it clear that the holder
shall be entitled to enforce the preference contract at a lesser manifestation of a desire
to sell, should the default rule be excluded.
The policy reasons in favour of this default position have already been canvassed. 13
They are that the grantor should be left as free as possible to negotiate with third
parties in order to sound out the market and to ultimately obtain the best possible
price. This promotes maximisation of wealth and economic efficiency, to the benefit
of society as a whole." As noted by the court in Ah Ling v Community Development
Board" any lesser trigger than the conclusion of a contract (or a valid offer) would
cause the grantor to "always be acting at his peril in land deals", compelling him "to
move with clandestine caution" and to "constantly ... be on his guard against
statements or conduct on his part which could possibly provide evidential material
13 Paras 4 1 2 5 and 7 I 2 supra.
14 The respect for the policy goal of maximisation of wealth is justified in the present context. No
oppression or exploitation of the holder is involved and there are no other policy considerations at stake
justifying disregard of this policy goal, such as the demands of the environment or the landless poor.
15 1972 4 SA 35 (E).
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pointing to a desire to dispose of his property.'?" The grantor would not even be able
to conduct open and free negotiations with the holder as a result. 17
Grantors are typically most likely to agree to such a limited burden on their
contractual freedom; all the more so because preferential rights are often granted
gratuitously on the assumption that they do not make any real difference to the
grantor's position."
In sectors where preference agreements are common, such as the publishing industry,
third parties would not be willing to negotiate at all should serious negotiations trigger
a right to contract to the obvious detriment of the holder."
Furthermore, defining the trigger event as some earlier manifestation of a desire to
contract creates uncertainty. Efforts to narrow down the trigger event to "initiating
the execution of the decision to alienate?" or "the display of a willingness, here and
now, to contract with a specific person'?' or "entering into serious negotiations with
third parties" are insufficient to dispel this uncertainty in cases where the grantor has
not actually contracted or offered to contract with a third party.
1640A_D.
17 Ibid.
18 CfVan Dunné Verbintenissenrecht Deel 1: Contraetenrecht 21. In fact, the right of first refusal can
be costly for the grantor because it may reduce the amount that can be obtained from the sale of the
property. The existence of a preemptive right may deter potential buyers from making offers because it
reduces their expected return from the costs they incur in negotiating and making an offer (Mitchell
"Can a Right of First Refusal be Assigned?" 2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985).
19 See par 6 5 2 supra. The existence of rights of first refusal already tends to chill the interest of
potential third party contractants (Cross "The ties that bind: preemptive rights and restraints on
alienation that commonly burden oil and gas properties" 1999 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 193 195).
Therefore there is a good argument for a limited default construction to prevent a total disinteredness
from third parties.
20 In the words of Larenz "Die rechtliche Bedeutung von Optionsvereinbarungen" supra 210 (my
translation). See also Nipperdey "Uber Vorhand, Vorkaufsrecht und Einlësungsrecht" 1930 Zeitblatt
for Handelsrecht 300 301.
21 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (1965) 340.
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There would also be uncertainty regarding the contract price. A right to contract,
conditional upon a mere manifestation of a desire to contract, would be meaningless
unless the law lays down a standard for the contract price. Prior to an offer or a
contract, the grantor has not yet indicated clearly what terms he is prepared to accept
from third parties. The criterion cannot therefore be "the terms which the grantor is
prepared to accept from third parties.':" Ultimately, vague and disputable criteria
such as fairness and reasonableness, or "a good faith offer" will of necessity have to
be employed. However, the grantor never agreed to be limited to a fair or market
price." She has only agreed not to contract with a third party at a price that the holder
might be willing to pay. Clearly, some third party may be prepared to pay a higher
price than the fair or market price." It is also not in the interest of society as a whole
that she be limited to a fair price. Therefore the grantor should be allowed to freely
sound out the market to ascertain the highest price at which she could contract and to
refrain from contracting at all if it turns out that the market price is not high enough.
This proposed default interpretation of preference contracts is in accordance with the
quod minimum rule of interpretation that holds that words of doubtful meaning must
be construed so as to impose the least possible burden on the debtor."
I therefore submit that the approach in Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Ply) LtJ26 should
not be followed. The majority there held that '''refusal' imports an offer", and that,
22 Cf Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra 932H; 933F.
23 See also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 260.
24 CfSoergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 Rd Nr 4 who recognise the legitimate interest of the owner
to obtain as high a price as possible.
25 Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co Ltd 1948 3 SA 99 (A) 122 et seq; Kliptown Clothing Industries
(Pty) Ltd v Marine & Trade Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1961 1 SA 103 (A) 107; Van der Merwe et al
Contract 223; Lubbe & Murray Farlam & Hathaway's Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary
3rd edition (1988) 466-467. The rule is found in D 50 17 9: "semper in obscuris quod minimum est
sequimur." The rationale for the rule is that "we ought to be more inclined towards freeing from an
obligation than towards imposing a burden, and for that reason more ready to diminish than to increase
an obligation; it is consistent with humanity to favour rather the debtor than the creditor." (Averanius
Interpretatione Juris 4 17 3 cited by Wessels & Roberts The Law of Contract in South Africa I 2nd
edition (1951) par 1961).
26 932H, 933F.
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while the clause was silent as to the method of determining the rental to be stated in
the offer, the grantor was not free to fix any rental it pleased; it had to act bona fide.
The rental and conditions had to be those upon which the lessor would offer the
premises to other would-be lessees in the event of the holder not being willing to
exercise his right. In the absence of an actual third party contract showing at what
price the grantor was prepared to contract, these standards are too vague and unfairly
limit the grantor to a reasonable price. The grantor has a bona fide interest in
obtaining as high a price as possible, as opposed to merely a reasonable price, as long
as the holder is ultimately preferred above third parties. This means that the grantor
should be free to offer any price whatsoever to the holder if he so pleases, as long as
he does not contract on better terms with another before these terms have also been
submitted to the holder.
This approach is consistent with the accepted general principle that preference
contracts, as restraints on alienation, should be strictly construed."
A rule that a preference contract only terminates once the grantor actually contracts
with and performs to a third party on terms that the holder had an opportunity to
match, sufficiently protects the holder against a mala fide attempt to shake off the
holder by an outrageously high offer. This rule will be considered further below."
27 See, for example, the majority decision in the Owsianick case supra at 321; Robinson v Randforntein
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 188; Edwards (Waaikraal) Gold Mining Co Ltd v
Mamogale NO & Bakwena Mines Ltd 1927 TPD 288; Ah Ling v Community Development Board &
Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E) 37G-38A; Davids v Goodwood Municipality & Others 1969 3 SA 21 (C).
This principle is also followed in other jurisdictions. See for example, Roebuck v Edmunds 1992 Scots
Law Times 1055 1056; Platt 1996 Baylor Law Review 1197 1199 et seq (the latter in respect of the
position in the United States of America). Therefore the broad statement in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons
supra that "refusal imports an offer" and that the grantor is obliged to make a bona fide offer on terms
which he would be prepared to accept from a third party, should not mean that the grantor has an
enforceable duty to make such an offer upon any manifestation of a desire to sell. In any event, on the
facts of that case, the grantor had already concluded a contract with a third party. The remarks on the
position prior to conclusion of such a contract are, strictly speaking, obiter.
28 See par 7 2 2 2 3 infra. See also paragraphs 5 1 1 (II) and 5 2 2 1 1 (III) supra.
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Presumably, the main argument for a lesser manifestation as a trigger event, would be
the protection this affords against losing the benefit of the main contract to a bona fide
third party who has commenced negotiations with the grantor. However, society's
and the grantor's interest in the minimum possible limitation on his capacity to deal
freely with his property is not overridden by a need to protect the holder in this
regard. Prior to actual breach of the obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, the
holder's interests could be protected by prohibitory interdict, which could be served
on interested third parties and, where relevant, the Registrar of Deeds.
Therefore the default rule should be that nothing short of a valid contract or offer
should constitute breach of a preference contract or otherwise trigger a right to
contract.
An important question that arises concerns the possibility of curing the breach by
cancellation of the third party contract or withdrawal of an offer to her. If cure should
be allowed, does this also apply to the period after exercise of the holder's right?
A related question concerns the effect of a condition suspending the third party
contract until non-exercise of the holder's right. A similar aim is served by a lex
commissoria in the third party contract that arises upon exercise of the holder's right.
Should these mechanisms allow the grantor to restore the status quo ante the breach?
Wissekerke v Wissekerke" is often quoted as authority for a statement that the grantor
of a right of first refusal is not obliged to keep an offer open, but may withdraw an
offer to the holder as long as the grantor no longer wishes to contract at all."
However, the court in Wissekerke" was not required to decide on the revocability of
offers in respect of preference contracts generally. Firstly, it was common cause that
the grantor could withdraw the offer before acceptance thereof." Secondly, the
29 Supra.
30 Christie Contract62; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1833; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 259; Janisch 1990
Responsa Meridiana 434 444.
31 Supra.
32650D.
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grantor's offer was made voluntarily. Other considerations may apply when the
grantor has breached the preference contract by contracting with a third party.
The typical aspect of a preferential right to contract is that the grantor is totally free in
her decision whether to contract. There is therefore a strong case that the grantor who
does not want to contract anymore, is not obliged to contract with the holder. The
proposition laid down in Wissekerke v Wissekerke in respect of voluntary offers to the
holder should therefore certainly be accepted. 33 But should this also apply in the
case of a contract or offer made in breach of the preference contract?
The desirability of construing restraints on alienation as narrowly as possible could,
once again, be relied upon in favour of allowing the grantor to cure the breach. The
holder still retains a preferential right to transact after cure, and should be content
with restoration of the status quo ante the breach, at least as long as the holder has not
exercised the right."
On the other hand the holder may argue that withdrawal from the third party contract
enables the grantor, who has cynically breached the preference contract once, to
secretly contract with and give transfer to a bona fide third party and so thwart the
holder's right.
Interestingly, Van der Keessel" states that the law in Holland was initially that upon a
completed sale to a third party, the owner was bound to the ex lege naastingsreg and
that the holder's remedies remained in spite of a purported withdrawal from the sale.
However, later legislation allowed a bona fide withdrawal from the sale before
33 This is also the position in England and Scotland. See Smith v Wilson 1901 9 SLT 137 and
Stevenson v Wilson 1907 SC 445, accepted by the House of Lords in Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees;
Same v British Investment Trust Ltd 1959 AC 763 775 780 and Roebuck v Edmunds (OH) 1992 Scats
Law Times 1055.
34 This is the argument relied on by the Scottish Outer House in Roebuck v Edmunds (OH) 1992 Scots
Law Times 1055. The grantor conceded that the holder was entitled to have the transfer to the third
party set aside, and the court thereupon refused to allow an order that the holder is entitled to purchase
the object at the price agreed with the third party.
35 Theses Selectae 3 16 2.
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exercise of the naastingsreg. Floyd" seems to have overlooked this text by relying
solely on Voet 18 3 24 (on the ex lege naastingsreg) for his statement that the
intention to sell triggers the right even where the sale to the third party is later
cancelled or even where the third party sale is subject to non-exercise of the right of
pre-emption. Is there any reason why this legislation which applied to ex lege
naastingsregte should not also apply to contractual preferential rights? Perhaps it
could be argued that this provision was adopted to specifically limit the application of
ex lege naastingsregte, which came to be regarded as unfair limitations on contractual
freedom," rather than to arrive at a fair solution for all preferential rights to contract.
Turning to other jurisdictions, it appears that English law would allow the grantor to
cure the breach. In the English case of Lyle & Scott v Scott's Trustees; Same v British
Investment Trust Ltd,38 the grantor did not withdraw from the third party contract on
the facts. Yet the judges gave some indication that such a complete withdrawal would
save the grantor from an order which allows the holder to enforce the main contract.
For example Viscount Simonds stated that "I regard Scott's trustees as desirous of
transferring their ordinary shares unless and until their agreement with Mr Fraser has
been abrogated. Of this at least one acid test would be the return by them of the price
they have received.'?"
By contrast, the German code does not allow a withdrawal from the third party
contract to influence the holder's power to exercise the Vorkaufsrecht" It has been
361986 THRHR 253 258.
37 Van Bynkershoek Quaestionum Juris Privati 3 13 stated that "every form of retraction, which is
nowadays in use, ... savours of the utmost unfairness, inasmuch as it robs the purchaser of his honestly
acquired right in order to prop up a policy which is of far less importance than the enforcement of
contracts. "
38 1959 AC 763.
39 774 (my italics). Cf also Lord Reid's statement at 782 ("and the step ordered could only be undone
after that breach has ceased.") See also Roebuck v Edmunds 1992 Scots Law Times 1055 1056
(decision of the Scottish Outer House).
40 § 465 (previously § 506): "Eine Vereinbarung des Verptlichteten mit dem Dritten, durch we1che der
Kauf von der Nichtausubung des Vorkaufsrechts abhangig gemacht oder dem Verpflichteten fur den
Fall der Ausi.ibung des Vorkaufsrechts der Ri.icktritt vorbehalten wird, ist dem Vorkaufsberechtigten
gegeni.iber unwirksarn."
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argued, however, that this provision is unfair in cases where the holder only has a
prohibitive purpose and not also an interest in obtaining the object." If the grantor
cures the breach, the holder's prohibitive purpose is not thwarted.
It is submitted that breach should be curable, at least until a valid exercise of the
preferential right has taken place. This is consistent with the policy goal that
restraints on alienation should be restrictively construed. If the grantor is allowed to
cure even after exercise of the right, this effectively means that South African law
should regard the preferential right as only a negative one, as a grantor faced with the
possibility of an order to transfer the property to the holder, would inevitably rely on a
purported withdrawal from the third party contract. Whether the preferential right
should be regarded as only a negative right will be considered under the next rubric.
Certainly, allowing the holder to cure after exercise of the holder's right would cause
uncertainty and prejudice to the holder who may already have prepared for
performance under the substantive contract.
If the need to protect the holder against further cynical breaches should in fact favour
a remedy entitling the holder to obtain performance of the main contract, the law
should probably also disregard provisions in the third party contract allowing a
withdrawal upon exercise of the holder's right as far as the holder's rights are
concerned." These provisions arguably leave open the possibility that the grantor
would contract and perform to a bona fide third party the next time, so that the holder
is indeed not protected.
Another issue arising in the context of breach is whether preference contracts should
create an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii where this is neither specifically
provided for nor excluded. Should a simple grant of a "right of first refusal" or "right
of pre-emption" allow or prohibit the grantor to contract with a third party first?"
41 Burkert "Die Reichweite des § 506 BGB" 1987 NJW 3157.
42 Obviously, the grantor would be entitled to rely on such a clause vis-a-vis the third party.
43 It might be argued that the terms "pre-emption" and "first refusal" by themselves point to an
obligation to first allow the holder to contract. In Germany, however, rights of pre-emption or
Vorkaufsrechten do allow the grantor to contract with a third party first, but the holder thereafter has
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This issue has already been canvassed in the discussion of the advantages of the
normal Vorhand of German law above the Vorkaufsrecht" The Vorhand creates an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, whereas contracting with a third party is not
breach of a Vorkaufsrecht, but is instead the necessary neutral condition for
enforceability of the holder's right to contract.
The disadvantage of a preference contract with no obligatio non contrahendo cum
tertii is that the holder cannot be forced to decide whether to exercise the right until
after conclusion of a contract with a third party. Apart from the effort and costs of
concluding a formally valid contract with a third party, the third party must then wait
for the holder's decision, knowing that she might lose the opportunity to contract with
others, for example, to buy other suitable properties that might come onto the market
in the meantime. Many interested third parties might be scared off by this prospect.
In other words, the existence of a pre-emptive right is likely to deter potential
contractants from concluding a contract because it reduces their expected return from
the costs they incur in negotiating and concluding a contract." Owners who realise
this in advance are likely to prefer a right to force a decision by the holder before a
sale to a third party. Then the holder need merely be informed of the material terms
on which the owner is prepared to contract. It is therefore not surprising that a
number of German model contracts recommend the inclusion of both a Vorhand and
the preferential right or "first refusal" to contract on the terms agreed. For South African examples of
contracts which do not clearly state that the grantor should first give the holder a chance to contract, see
Cohen v Behr 1946 CPD 942 (the agreement provided that the holder shall have the first refusal to
purchase the thing for a certain period); Aronson v Sternberg (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 597 (A) and Soteriou
v Retco Poyntons 1985 2 SA 922 (A). In Skinner v Goldberg 1943 WLD 42 the court simply stated that
the holder's "request... for the right of pre-emption ... was granted .. ..". Cf Hartsrivier Boerderye
(Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T) (if the grantor would decide to sell the thing, the holder
shall have the first right of refusal to buy) and Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal supra, where a similar
clause was agreed upon.
44 Par 4 1 2 supra.
45 Mitchell 2001 University of Chicago Law Review 985 988. This consideration may deter third
parties despite an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertio, but the potentially wasted costs and efforts of
the third party increases when he first has to conclude a contract to oblige the holder to decide on
exercise.
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Vorkaufsrecht clause, so that an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii IS indeed
created."
Moreover, the policy concerns of the drafters of the BGB Vorkaufsrecht could largely
be accommodated within a construction encompassing an obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii. It will be recalled that the drafting commission felt, firstly, that before
conclusion of a contract with a third party, there is no certain basis for the decision of
the holder whether to exercise the right." In other words, the terms on which the
holder may acquire the object was considered to be too unclear if anything short of a
contract triggers the right." The drafting commission accordingly rejected proposals
that the grantor should be obliged to make an offer to the holder before she has
contracted with a third party." Their concern is sufficiently met by a default rule that
only a contract with (or offer to) a third party triggers the holder's right, and the
absence of an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii does not affect this concern.
Secondly, they argued that there is a danger of the grantor faking an offer that she
knows the holder would not accept if some circumstance short of a binding contract
could force a decision about exercise of the holder's right. This would force the
holder either to buy the property at such exorbitant terms or to waive the
Vorkaufsrecht by failing to exercise it." The drafters' concern about the
circumvention of the holder's right by a fake offer could be addressed by a default
rule that the holder's right does not terminate on the mere rejection of an offer, but
46 Par 4 1 2 supra.
47 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 16; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht im Privatrecht
(1975) 56 with reference to BGB Motive 11345 et seq.
48 That is, if a "manifestation of a desire to sell" would trigger the right, which does not amount to a
contract with or offer to a third party, it would be disputable on what terms the holder would be entitled
to contract with the grantor. Some vague standard such as "reasonable terms" would then be required,
which would invariably lead to disputes.
49 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 16-17; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 56; Soergel
& Siebert (Huber) § 504 RdNr 17 with reference to Protokolle 1196 et seq. See also 80HZ 115, 355
(decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of 11.10.1991) 338 in fine; Hueck "Erwerbsvorrechte im
Gesellschaftsrecht" in Paulus et al (eds) Festschrift for Karl Larenz (1973) 749 752, 755; Michalski
"Der Mietvorvertrag" 1999 Zeitschriftfor Miet- und Raumrecht 141 146.
50 Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 19; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 56; Weber
"Der Optionsvertrag" 1990 Juristische Schulung 249 251.
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only once the grantor subsequently contracts with a third party at the terms offered to
the holder."
In any event, it appears that the normal understanding of South African lawyers is that
preference contracts indeed generally require the grantor to give the holder a chance
to contract first before contracting with a third party.
To summanse, absent contrary agreement, preference contracts that do not
predetermine the main price are breached when the grantor concludes a contract with
a third party in breach of the preference contract, or validly offers to do so. The
grantor may cure this breach, at least until exercise of the holder's right.
72212 Should the holder be entitled to performance of the main contract on
breach?
There are compelling policy reasons both in favour and against allowing the holder to
ultimately enforce performance of the main contract upon breach.
First the policy considerations against allowing such a "positive" remedy will be
considered.
They centre on the now familiar argument that restraints on alienation should be
construed as narrowly as possible. 52 It has been shown that it is logically possible to
51 This matter is dealt with in par 7 3 2 3 infra. See also par 5 2 2 1 1 (II) supra. Henrich's proposal of
this default rule was discussed in more detail in par 4 I 2 1 5 supra. A third concern of the drafting
commission was that, as long as no binding contract with the third party has been concluded, the holder
is not in danger of losing his Vorkaufsrecht and should therefore not be forced to decide about the
exercise of his right before that point (Henrich 19, with reference to Protokolle II 96 et seq). However,
the grantor, holder and third parties' interests are most fairly balanced if the holder can be forced to
decide about the exercise of his right before conclusion of a third party contract, as long as the material
terms on which the grantor intends to contract with the third party and the identity of the third party is
disclosed to the holder.
52 See par 7 3 2 1 1 supra
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construe preference contracts as negative contracts only, which do not create a right to
contract, but only an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii terminating upon rejection
of an opportunity to match a third party offer." This is the narrowest possible
construction of these contracts. Such contracts afford a real preference for the holder,
and cannot be said to be economically useless. The quod minimum rule of
interpretation would have us place the least onerous obligation on the promissor.
Once the grantor's obligation is regarded as a negative one only, coherency and
consistency requires that specific performance thereof consists only of a prohibitory
interdict, coupled with an order setting aside any performance to a third party with
prior knowledge of the holder's right." If the holder wanted a stronger right, he
should have bargained for a conditional right to contract.
Furthermore, a prohibitory interdict or order setting aside performance to a mala fide
third party, restores the status quo ante, which the holder has been content with since
conclusion of the preference contract.
An argument that these remedies are ineffective because of the likelihood of another
cynical breach by the grantor, this time transferring real rights in the object to a bona
fide third party, can be met by three counter-arguments. Firstly, the holder could
adequately protect himself against that possibility in most cases, so that the "negative"
remedies would effectively protect the holder's right to be preferred. In the case of
land, the holder can register the right of pre-emption to prevent transfer to a bonafide
third party. 55 In the case of company shares, no alienation contrary to the right of pre-
emption in the registered statutes would be effective, not even to a bona fide third
party." In the case of publishing contracts, a third party publisher would probably be
found to have known of the holder's preferential right, as preference agreements are
widely used in that industry. A third party publisher would rarely be willing to
53 See par 5 1 supra.
54 The latter is of course available on the basis of the doctrine of notice. See Associated South African
Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereten (Pty) Ltd supra; Tschirpig & Another v Kohrs 1959
3 SA 287 (N).
55 Ex parte ZunckeI 1937 NPD 295; West "Pre-emptive rights proper and those in the form of
conditions" 1997 De Rebus 531.
56 Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SeA) 24 par 17.
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contract with a published author without confirming with the previous publisher that it
holds no preferential right. In other cases, the holder could stipulate a penalty to
dissuade the grantor from breaching the contract. In a number of economic contexts,
holders are sophisticated parties with sufficient bargaining power to be expected to
protect themselves in this manner. Franchisers, for example, often provide for rights
of pre-emption in their favour in franchise contracts. Secondly, grantors would in any
event very rarely contract with a third party in breach of the preferential right without
making the third party contract subject to non-exercise of the preferential right. In
most other cases where the grantor breaches the preference contract cynically, transfer
to a bona fide third party would already have taken place when the holder learns of
the breach, so that only damages could be claimed anyway. In other words, the
holder may lose the object through cynical breach and transfer to a bona fide third
party regardless of how the preference contract is construed and which remedies are
available.
Where the holder has sold but not yet transferred to a bonafide third party, it could be
questioned why the holder's interest in obtaining the object should be preferred above
the innocent third party's right under the contract of sale. 57 There are valid policy
arguments in favour of protecting the innocent third party above the holder. Inter
alia, it can again be pointed out that the holder could often have taken steps to inform
third parties of his right, such as registration in the deeds office in the case of
immovables.
Nevertheless, with some exceptions, South African courts, including the Supreme
Court of Appeal, have held that conflicting claims to the same asset based on personal
rights should be resolved by application of the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est
iure, provided there are no personal circumstances which affect the balance of
equities. 58 This means that the holder is entitled to an interdict prohibiting
57 This was an argument relied upon by the Austrian Supreme Court (Obersten Gerichtshof) as to why
only damages could be granted upon breach of a preference contract in its decision of 3 October 1972
reported in 1974 Juristische Blatter 204 206.
58 See, for example, Bates v Bates 1964 1 623 (0); Barnhoorn v Duvenhage 1964 2 SA 486 (A);
Krauze v Van Wyk 1986 1 SA 158 (A); Wahloo Sand BK en Andere v Trustees, Hambly Parker Trust
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performance of the conflicting contract between the grantor and third party, even in
terms of the negative or bare preference construction. 59 In other words, South
African law allows the third party's right to be trumped by the holder's in any event."
Therefore it could be argued that protection of the bona fide third party is irrelevant in
the choice between the negative or bare preference construction and the construction
which entitles the holder to specific performance of the main contract upon breach.
Neither construction protects the third party's interest to obtain performance of the
contract with the grantor.
The application of the maxim prior est tempore, potior est iure in this context has
been criticized, not only for lack of authority for the application of this maxim to
personal rights," but also because there is no theoretical foundation for the maxim in
en Andere 2002 2 SA 776 (HHA); Kerr Contract 594-597; Kerr Sale and Lease 411; Lubbe & Murray
Contract supra 94; Van der Merwe "Nemo plus iuris ... " 1964 THRHR 300 302-303. However, there
have been decisions where no preference was given to an earlier personal right, such as Gardner v
Executor of Jones (1899) 16 sc 206, Kohling v McKenzie (1902) 18 sc 287, Hofgaard v Registrar of
Mining Rights 1908 TS 650, Ex parte De Wet (1910) 20 CTR 305 and Ex parte Kruger 1936 (2) PH A
56 (C).
59 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 264. However, Floyd wrongly relies on Smitl: v Momberg 1895 SC 295 for
his general statement that the holder may prevent delivery to the third party by interdict. On the facts,
the third party was aware of the holder's prior right so that the doctrine of notice applied.
60 Some writers base this result on the view that the doctrine of notice operates against a third party
purchaser who may have been unaware of the prior right at conclusion of his contract, but became
aware thereof before transfer. Cf Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant 2nd ed (1994)
286-7 and authorities there cited and De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg vol 15th ed
(1992) 377-378 in the context of huur gaat voor koop. There is authority to the contrary (such as
Kessoopersadh v Essop 1968 4 SA 610 (D) 614, the minority in the appeal of that case reported in
1970 1 SA 265 (A) 274 (the majority left the question undecided), Total SA v Xypteras 1970 1 SA 592
(T) 598 and Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 5th edition (1956) 99), but the authority on
which the cases are based have been questioned (Cooper Landlord and Tenant 286).
61 Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 145 et seq; Mulligan "Double Sales and Frustrated Options" 1948 SALJ
564; Mulligan 1953 "Double Sales: A Rejoinder" 1953 SALJ 299 et seq; Mulligan "Double, Double
Toil and Trouble" 1954 SALJ 169. CfScholtens "Double Sales" 1953 SALJ22; Scholtens "Difficiles
Nugae - Once Again Double Sales" 1954 SALJ 71; Burchell "Successive Sales" 1974 SALJ 40; Van
Zyl "Dubbele Verkopings en die Kennisleer: Word Bona fides Vereis ten tye van sowel
this context," nor any persuasive argument based on fairness which favours the prior
right holder." It appears that supporters of the maxim in this context wrongly assume
that the grantor's capacity to contract or indeed her ownership is limited, even against
bona fide third parties, by a contract creating only personal rights." As the creation of
merely personal rights are not accompanied by publicity, so that the holder of the later
right could not have known of the earlier one, there is no clear equity in according
priority according to the chronological order of the claims." Accordingly, it has been
persuasively argued that a better approach is rather to insist on application of the
normal principles on specific performance (which also applies to the claim for a
prohibitory interdict, as it constitutes specific performance of an obligatio non
faciendiy'"
What are the policy reasons for not limiting the remedies for breach of a preference
contract to damages and restoration of the status quo ante?
Even where the holder is not primarily interested in obtaining the object, but rather in
the power to ward off unwanted third parties, the grantor should know that the holder
has an interest in concluding the main contract on breach. The preference contract
should fulfil this warding off function by allowing the holder the choice to contract
with the grantor rather than allowing a third party to do so.
Kontraksluiting as Lewering?" in Joubert (ed) EM Hamman - Gedenkbundel (1984); Lambiris Orders
of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Law (1989) 84-93.
62 Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 145 146-147;
63 Mulligan 1948 SAl.! 577.
64 Van der Merwe 1962 THRHR 300 302-303; 305-306. This is criticised by Lubbe 1986 Annual
Survey 145 147.
65 Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 145 147. Cfthe Oryx case where the court confirmed the publicizing ofa
proprietary interest in an asset as a pre-condition for its operation against third parties (910H, 913E-F),
and based the doctrine of notice on the satisfaction of this principle.
66 Lubbe 1986 Annual Survey 145 147. This is also the view of the minority (per Botha AJA) in
Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereten (Pty) Ltd supra 922. Cf
Crundall Brothers (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus NO 1991 3 SA 812 (ZH) 428H; Lubbe 1992 Annual Survey 100
106.
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Allowing the holder a right to conclusion and performance of the main contract upon
breach, enables the court to arrive at a concretely fair outcome on the special facts of
each case, which would not be the case if the holder is invariably limited to damages
or a prohibitory interdict upon conclusion of a contract with a bona fide third party.
The court's discretion to award or refuse specific performance means that fairness
towards the third party as well as towards the holder is the primary consideration in
deciding between their competing claims. For example, if there is evidence that the
holder of a right of pre-emption merely wants to obtain the object to resell it, whereas
the third party requires that specific object for a personal purpose, it would be fair to
refuse the holder specific performance and grant damages for loss of profit on the
resale." The situation would often be reversed, for example where the third party is a
trader whereas the holder has a sentimental (for example, familial) interest in
obtaining the object, so that damages to the third party and specific performance to
the holder would be the fairest outcome. If the court cannot enforce performance of
the main contract in favour of the holder in such a situation, justice is arguably not
done. The court should consider the following circumstances in exercising its
discretion. Which of the parties has a personal interest in obtaining the object that
cannot be compensated by damages? What could the holder have done to protect her
own interests and to warn the third party of the preferential right? Why did the holder
not do this? In the case of land, was the holder in occupation, for instance, under a
lease? What enquiries did the third party make in such a case? Should the
chronological order of the competing claims also be a factor if no other applies? This
has been said to be fair as the holder of the preferential right to contract dealt with a
bona fide seller, whereas the third party buyer "had the misfortune to deal with a mala
fide seller.?" In England, the court will not compel a defendant specifically to
perform an agreement when the result would be too compel him to commit a breach
of a prior agreement with another person." Although this cannot be equated with the
maxim of prior est tempore, potior est iure, it is based on the same principle. A
similar explanation is given by Cooper as to why knowledge by a purchaser of a prior
67 For a similar situation, see the American case of Miller v Le Sea Broadcasting Inc 87 F3d 2241 7th
Cir 1996.
68 Lambiris Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum 87.
69 Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96.
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personal right before transfer is sufficient for the operation of the doctrine of notice. 70
He states that
"The correct view is that by taking transfer the second purchaser assists the seller to
commit a breach of the first contract, whereby the second purchaser commits a delict,
namely inducement of breach of contract.':"
An alternative approach would be to grve priority to the party who initiated
proceedings for specific performance first. Perhaps this fall-back position could be
justified on the basis that the other party's delay indicates that specific performance is
not as important to him. Both this approach and the insistence on prior est tempore,
potior est iure as the fall-back position are in fact equally mechanical. In any event,
the point of departure should remain the application of the normal principles of
specific performance. This creates sufficient leeway to reach a fair solution in each
specific case.
In response, it can still be argued that the availability of merely a prohibitory interdict
is sufficient to achieve a fair result between the holder, the third party and the grantor
whilst also serving the public interest in leaving the grantor as free as possible to deal
with her property to her best advantage. Where the holder has a personal, for example
familial, interest in the object, it would still be fair towards all parties to prohibit
transfer to the third party, who would be awarded damages in compensation. As far
as the holder is concerned, the prohibitory interdict restores the status quo ante the
breach. It could only be regarded as unfair as between the holder and grantor if one
argues that the grantor should be punished more harshly for breaching the contract,
which is not generally regarded as a valid aim of contract law rules.
However, it could be argued that a prohibitory interdict or order setting aside a
transfer to a mala fide third party does not in fact adequately protect the holder's
interests by restoring the status quo ante. It must be remembered that the grantor's
breach would in most cases be deliberate. A grantor who has deliberately breached a
70287.
71 Ibid.
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non facere duty can be expected to flout this duty again in the future. There is
therefore a very great risk that the grantor may try the same with another bona fide
third party and give transfer before the holder is able to prevent that by interdict. In
this sense, a prohibitory interdict and setting aside of a mala fide transfer are
ineffective remedies to protect the status quo ante and therefore the holder's interests.
Granting a stronger remedy to the holder should also not be seen as "punishment", but
as discouraging breach as conduct detrimental to the interest of society, a policy
consideration which courts in South Africa have taken into account in the formulation
of default contract rules."
In response to the argument that the holder can often take steps to make the remedies
aimed at restoring the status quo ante effective, it should be noted that there is not
much a holder can do to protect his right against bona fide third parties in the case of
movables such as family heirlooms. A preferential right to conclude a transaction
other than sale can generally also not be safeguarded by registration. To expect the
holder to stipulate a penalty is often unrealistic due to ignorance of this possibility or
the balance of bargaining power. Proponents of the strictly bare preference
construction may reply that if the grantor has the greatest bargaining power, this is
even more reason to construe the preference agreement in a manner that the grantor
would most likely agree to, namely so as to restrict the grantor's freedom to deal with
her property as she pleases as little as possible. As such an interpretation does not
give rise to exploitation of the holder, there is no good reason for departing from the
likely consent of the grantor.
Proponents of the purely negative preference contract acknowledge, however, that the
holder may claim damages to place him in the position that he would have been in had
the grantor performed the main contract." This acknowledges the need to protect the
holder's interest in obtaining performance of the main contract. If there is not in fact
72 Vorster 157 et seq. See also at 30 et seq for examples from England. Even Posner states that
"conventional pieties" such as keeping promises reduce transaction costs ("Utilitarianism, Economics
and Legal Theory" 1979 Journal of Legal Studies 103 123).
73 See for example Henrich Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag 367-368.
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a duty on the grantor to conclude or perform the main contract with the holder at some
point, this manner of calculating damages is difficult to explain. Therefore it is
logical to allow an order that the grantor perform the main contract, subject to the
courts' discretion to refuse specific performance. As was mentioned before,
proponents of the bare preference construction could reply that the award of damages
is not inconsistent with the absence of an enforceable duty to contract with the
holder." The claim for damages aims to place the holder in the position it would have
been in had the contract not been breached. The grantor could have fulfilled the
preference contract in one of two ways. Firstly by not contracting with anybody and,
secondly, by contracting with the holder. As the first situation is unlikely because the
breach clearly shows the grantor's wish to contract with somebody, it is more logical
to compensate the holder on the basis of the second scenario. In other words, the
holder claiming damages can usually prove on a balance of probabilities that if the
grantor had obeyed the contract, the grantor would have contracted with the holder."
To the arguments in favour of a remedy aimed at performance of the main contract,
could be added the fact that Henrich's main authority for construing the "normal
Vorhand" as enforceable by negative remedies only is a decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof on a publishing contract." However, there are special reasons for
limiting a publisher to such negative remedies that do not apply in other contexts.
Firstly, it would normally be too late to grant the holder a remedy which ultimately
entails specific performance of the eventual publishing contract, as a transfer of the
intellectual property rights often takes place simultaneously with the conclusion of the
publishing contract with that third party." As these rights are analogous to real
rights, the bona fide third party is in a stronger position than the holder. It is therefore
no wonder that such a remedy was not even considered. Secondly, if the author could
be forced into a publishing contract with the holder this would jeopardise the very
close working relationship that such contracts require. This could explain the courts'
74 Paragraph 5 1 supra.
75 See paragraph 5 1 supra for Henrich's different explanation of this method of calculating damages in
the case of the normal (negative) Vorhand.
76 BOH 22, 347.
77 See Bappert & Maunz Verlagsrecht (1952) § 1 RdNr 45 with reference to BOH 1962 NJW 1197 and
ROZ 108,58.
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wariness to force the author into such a contract, instead of merely granting negative
remedies or damages. Thirdly, the courts could be swayed by the vulnerable
bargaining position of an author as grantor as against the publishing company to
construe the preferential right as narrowly as possible. This is often not a relevant
consideration in other contexts.
Accordingly, there are compelling policy reasons both in favour of and against
allowing enforcement of performance of the main contract upon the grantor
contracting with a third party.
In my VIew, all the interests and policy considerations at stake are most fairly
balanced by a default rule that the holder is allowed to enforce performance of the
main contract upon breach, subject to the court's usual discretion, as long as breach
refers to nothing less than a valid offer to contract with a third party. The grantor's
interest in the minimum possible curtailment of his freedom to deal with his property
and to obtain the best possible price for it, is sufficiently protected by this definition
of breach, as well as by the default rule that the grantor may cure that breach until
exercise of the preferential right by the holder. This default rule provides sufficient
scope for the grantor to sound out the market freely, which is the fundamental policy
justification of a limited interpretation of the holder's rights. However, once the
grantor has deliberately breached the preference contract, he has gone beyond
sounding out the market, and the justification for a limited interpretation falls away.
In such a situation, it is unfair to restrict the holder to a claim for damages or a
prohibitory interdict. Damages would often not sufficiently compensate the holder,
especially where she has a non-pecuniary interest in conclusion of the main contract."
A prohibitory interdict would also often be ineffective against a grantor who has
already wilfully breached the preference contract and who may be antagonised even
further by the preceding litigation. The innocent third party's interest in obtaining
performance of her contract could be balanced against the holder's interest on the
equities of each specific case under the equitable discretion of the court to refuse
specific performance. This equitable discretion is also sufficient to protect grantors
78 An example would be a strong sentimental interest in obtaining a family heirloom hitherto held by
the grantor on condition that family members have the first chance to buy it from him.
such as authors, who have a strong interest in not being forced into a contract with the
holder against their will due to the close working relationship which such a contract
requrres.
Even if the policy considerations relevant to the remedies for breach are in fact rather
on a par, this does not provide sufficient justification for deviating from the present
position of our law on this issue." Ever since the Oryx case," South African courts
have accepted that the holder may ultimately enforce performance of the main
contract upon breach of a preference contract. 81
However, South African law is not totally clear on what circumstances would trigger
such a remedy. Firstly, the Oryx case did not finally decide what would trigger the
Oryx mechanism, leaving open the possibility that a grant of an option would do so in
addition to a contract with a third party." Secondly, the Supreme Court of Appeal,
other courts and commentators have left open the possibility that an order for specific
performance of the duty to make an offer is still available." As noted before, many
of these commentators and courts do not specifically limit the trigger event for such a
79 CfNeels "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel 2)" 1999
TSAR 256 269 and "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel 3)"
1999 TSAR 484.
80 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereten (Pty) Ltd supra.
81See paragraph 1 1 supra.
82908F_G.
83This was assumed without deciding in Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 764G-H. However, this
assumption may have been made because the application was launched before the decision in Oryx.
See Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 139. See also Rogers v Philips 19853 SA 183 (E) 187D which held
that a right of pre-emption merely gives the holder a personal right to an offer by the owner.
Commentators who still see a need for a remedy of specific performance in the traditional sense
include Kerr The South African Law of Sale and Lease (1996) 410; Cooper Landlord and Tenant 144-
146 and Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 2. Cf also Van Rensburg & Treisman The Practitioner's
Guide to the Alienation of Land Act (1984) 70-71; Lubbe 1982 Annual Survey 128 130; Floyd 1986
THRHR 253 267; Lotz "Purchase and Sale" in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law
and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 386. EiseIen "Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1958 2
SA 922 (A)" 1986 THRHR 95 99 rejects the Oryx mechanism and advocates a remedy of specific
performance in the traditional sense only.
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remedy to the conclusion of a contract with or an offer to a third party." Some
specifically argue that a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell should be sufficient. 85
However, there is authority for a default construction in terms of which the holder is
allowed to enforce the main contract only upon breach in the form of an offer to or
contract with a third party.
The Oryx case itself foresees an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii." whereas the
holder may unilaterally create the main contract and pray for its performance on
conclusion of a contract with a third party, and perhaps on the granting of an option."
This clearly implies that a lesser manifestation of a desire is insufficient.
The majority in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 88 (per Botha
JA) did not unambiguously exclude the possibility of a positive remedy upon the
grantor actually contracting with a third party. In his discussion of the ius commune
texts on naastingsrechte, Botha JA emphasised that none of these texts grants the
holder the right to obtain the object before conclusion of a contract with a third
party." This suggests that Botha JA does not totally exclude the possibility of a
84See the writers mentioned in the previous footnote. See also Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434
442-443. Cf iot example Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra 932H et seq. By contrast, Reinecke & Otto
1986 TSAR 18 26 state that a lesser manifestation than a valid offer to the holder should not lightly be
regarded as a trigger event.
85See par 522 1 1 with reference to Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 258-259, 264; Wessels JA in Owsianick
v African Consolidated Theatres 327H: "Desire, like intention, resides in the mind, and its existence,
sometimes settled and sometimes ephemeral, is to be determined in the light of the available, relevant
evidential material, such as considered, or even unguarded confessions or other conduct which points
unequivocally to its existence." This definition is quoted with approval by Du Plessis Spesifieke
nakoming 16.
86904D. Cfpar 4 1 1 1 supra.
87The latter possibility was left open at 908F-G.
88 1967 3 SA 310 (A).
89 See Botha lA's statement at 321H that Van Zutphen and Berlichius state that the grantee of a
conventional ius retractus had under certain circumstances the right to retract the subject of his rights,
but that is clear that such a right only came into existence when a sale in breach of his right had in fact
been concluded with third party. This point is emphasised again at 322G-H.
alternative approaches." They also state that the Oryx mechanism should be
positive remedy upon a sale in breach of the preference contract." On the facts, the
court did not need to consider the effect of an actual option contract or sale to a third
party with immediate effect, because the grantor gave the third party an option which
would only take effect after termination of the lease. The majority of the court did not
find this indication of a desire to sell to be a breach of the obligation not to sell to
third parties during the lease period."
Interestingly, Van Rensburg & Treisman argue in effect that the Hartsrivier
construction (which does not force the grantor to contract on a mere manifestation of
a desire to contract) should be combined with the Oryx mechanism, as they mention
both in their discussion of the present legal position, without branding them as
available only upon conclusion of a contract with a third party."
Such a default regime furthermore reminds one of the combined voorcoop and nacoop
procedures of ex lege naastingsrechte in some areas in Roman-Dutch times." Under
the voorcoop procedure, the owner could announce his intention to sell in a public
place before the sale to a third party. This could be equated with a public invitation to
make an offer. A family member as holder of a naastingsrecht could then declare his
willingness to buy. This was the voorcoop procedure. However, if the owner failed
to follow this procedure and sold directly to a third party, a holder of a naastingsrecht
90 However, Botha JA also stated at 322D-E that it is not clear that the right under a conventional ius
retractus are in all respect similar to the right under an ordinary right of pre-emption. He also stated at
323B-C that Van Zutphen wrongly imported, in relation to a conventional "voorkoopsreg", the legal
position under the Dutch law of naesting or the ex lege ius retractus
91 323H-325C.
92 70-71.
93 Ibid. See also Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 18 26 who denies that a more informal indication of a
desire to sell should allow the holder to accept the offer which they regard as embedded in preference
contract. They advocate that a valid offer to a third party is required (It least. CfKerr Sale and Lease
411. Cf Skinner v Goldberg supra in which the court decided that the date for calculating the damages
is the date of conclusion of the contract with the third party (44). The implication could be that breach
only occurred at that point and that up to that point the grantor need not have made an offer. See also
Ah Ling v Community Development Board & Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E) 39C-G.
94 See par 3 4 supra.
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could still exercise the right in terms of the nacoop procedure, thereby stepping into
the contract concluded with the third party. This suggests a construction that the
owner was actually supposed to first offer the opportunity to contract to relatives
before contracting with a third party (an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii or
negative obligation). If the owner did not obey this duty, the holder of the
naastingsrecht could, only upon the owner contracting with a third party, obtain
performance of the main contract on the same terms.
That some contracts considered in German case law and some German model contract
handbooks contain a Vorhand and Vorkaufsrecht clause in one contract," shows a
need in practice for a type of preference contract which contains both an obligatio non
faciendi and a positive remedy which applies only upon conclusion of a contract with
a third party in breach of that obligation. The Vorhand clause adds the obligatio non
faciendi to the contract, whereas the Vorkaufsrecht clause adds the remedy by which
the holder can enforce the main contract upon conclusion of a valid contract with a
third party.
In Austria, some courts have in the last few decades allowed the holder of a
Vorkaufsrecht a remedy which ultimately leads to specific performance of the main
contract upon breach in the form of a contract concluded with a third party," whereas
they only awarded damages before." The reasons for this change of attitude is
therefore interesting for the present debate. The relevant provision of the code does
not provide for a Vorkaufsrecht in the sense in which this term is used in the BGB.98
Instead it provides that where somebody sells under the condition that the buyer must
offer the initial seller the "Einlësung" when he wants to sell, the initial seller has the
95 See par 4 1 2 supra.
96 See for example, 1986 Juristische Blatter 509-511 or SZ 59/54 (decision of the Obergerichtshof of
20.3.1986) in which the court ordered the grantor to offer the object for sale to the holder. See also for
example, SZ 36/128 in which the holder was held to be entitled to conclusion of the main contract with
the grantor as well as to performance of that contract. Cf 1977 Juristische Bliitter 94 95; 1983
Juristische Blatter 203205.
97 SZ 1/54 (2.9.1919); SZ 6/25 (22.1.1924); 1937 Juristische Blatter 387; SZ 23/356 (29.11.1950); SZ
38/148 (29.9.1965) = 1966 Evidenzblatt 69 (Nr 52).
98 § 1072 ABGB.
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Vorkaufsrecht" In German law, this figure would rather fall under the Vorhand
category."? Admittedly, the debate on whether the holder is entitled to a remedy
which would ultimately entail performance of the main contract on breach is centred
largely on the wording of § 1079 of the code, which only refers to damages upon
breach.'?' Academic writers have for a long time criticised the narrow interpretation
of § 1079.102 They feel it is unfair to limit the holder's remedies to no more than an
interdict or damages in the case of breach. However, some courts remain adamant
that damages should be the only remedy.!" Unfortunately, these court decisions and
writers do not thoroughly discuss the relevant policy considerations, although a few
are mentioned here and there.'?' A more formalistic or dogmatic argument that is
mentioned is the anomalous consequences of allowing specific performance if the
99 Ibid.
100 Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 53. However, a number of Austrian writers rely on the interpretation of
the BGB Vorkaufsrecht for their interpretation of the Austrian figure. See, for example, Gschnitzer
1966 Juristische BUitter 253. Cf also Aicher in Rummel (ed) Kommentar zum Allgemeinen
biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch Band I §§ 1-1174 ABGB 3rd ed (2000) § 1072. Schurig regards the equation
of the Austrian Vorkaufsrecht with its German counterpart as contra legem (53). One difference
between the Austrian and German Vorkaufsrecht according to the writers is that in Austria, the grantor
may not only make an offer to the holder immediately upon contracting with a third party (like in
Germany), but may also force a decision from the holder by making an offer before contracting with a
third party, as long as a binding offer from a third party exists at that stage. (See eg Ehrenzweig System
des ësterreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts 2. Band 2nd ed (1928) 419).
101 1986 Juristische Blatter 509510; 1974 Juristische Blatter 204205; 1966 Evidenzblatt 69 (Nr 52);
Rummel P 1974 Juristische Blatter 206-207; Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht: Zum Vorkauf in
Osterreichischen Burgerlichen Recht (1967) 160. § 1079 provides that if the owner had not offered the
holder the Einlásung (pre-emption), he is liable for all the holder's damages. By contrast, § 1079 also
provides that in the case of a real right of pre-emption, the alienated object may be claimed from the
third party and the third party is treated according to his reasonable or unreasonable possession.
102 Gschnitzer 1966 Juristische Blatter 254; Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht 159 et seq; Rummel 1974
Juristische Blatter 206-207. Although article 1072 defines a Vorkaufsrecht only as a pactum adiectum
to a sale between the buyer as grantor and the seller as holder, the courts have long extended the reach
of the ABGB rules to independent preference contracts. See eg 1974 Juristische Blatter 204; SZ 21,
247.
103 1974 Juristische Blatter 204 205 (decision of the OGH of 3.10.1972); 1986 Evidenzblatt 622 (Nr
148). See also Dittrich & Tades Das Allgemeine biirgerliche Gesetzbuch 35th edition (1999) § 1079 E
2.
104 See, for example, the decision of the OGH discussed in n 57 supra.
72221 Breach of the preference contract
grantor honours the preference contract by making an offer that the holder accepts,
but not if the grantor deliberately breaches the preference contract by not making an
offer to the holder.'?' In other words, the grantor who breaches to a lesser degree (by
failing to perform the contract resulting from her voluntary offer), would be better off
than the grantor who totally repudiates the preference contract by not making an offer.
Another argument is that in the case of a Vorkaufsrecht that creates a real right, it has
never been doubted that the holder may enforce performance against the grantor,
although the registration of the Vorkaufsrecht does not cause a change in the legal
relationship between the grantor and holder.!"
In any event, there is some recognition of the proposed default regime in South Africa
and other jurisdictions.
A juridical explanation of the holder's remedy will be considered later, for example,
whether it should be regarded as specific performance of a duty to make an offer or as
acceptance of an offer embedded in the preference contract. At this stage some
further basic default rules surrounding the holder's remedy will be considered which
should apply on the basis of policy considerations, regardless of the juridical
explanation of the remedy. These rules are discussed here as they may possibly
affect the cogency of the different juridical explanations.
7 2 2 2 Other default rules
105 Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht 159; 1986 Juristische Blatter 509 511.
106 1986 Juristische Blatter 509 511; Aicher J in Rummel ABGB supra § 1079 RdNr (Rdz) 3;
Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht 161. However, this is said to be the result of the wording of § 1079
ABGB (second sentence). An argument which is irrelevant to South African law is that in Austrian
law, a damages claim is always aimed primarily at Natura/ersatz, that is granting the holder the
opportunity of obtaining the object of the Vorkaufsrecht. See 1964 Evidenzb/att 239 (Nr 162) 240;
Faistenberger Das Vorkaufsrecht 161; Binder in Schwimann (ed) Praxiskommentar zum Allgemeinen
Burgertichen Gesetzbuch samt Nebengesetzen Band 41. Ha/bband §§859-1089 ABGB (1988) § 1079
RdNr 3.
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What type of contract if concluded by the grantor would constitute a breach is a
matter of interpretation. Parties to pre-emption contracts should preferably clearly
define the types of contract that may and may not be concluded with third parties.
Logically, a sale in execution should not be regarded as breach of a right of pre-
emption, as this is not a contract concluded by the grantor.!" Where the creditor or
sheriff is aware of the right of pre-emption, they would probably inform the holder of
the intended auction anyway, as it is likely that she would pay a good price for the
property.
Absent contrary agreement, South African case law accepts that a pre-emption
contract only prohibits a sale to a third party, and not a donation, testamentary
disposition or exchange.'?" Pre-emption contracts are therefore not understood as
107 Bodasing v Christie 1961 3 SA 553 (A) 56IA-B. In this case, the contract of pre-emption
predetermined the price as £2000, whereas the court held that the curator of an insolvent estate has a
duty to sell to the highest bidder at an auction sale. Cf by contrast Van Wyk v Posemann & Another
1915 CPO 672 (although the court described the provision in the will as a "restraint on alienation", it
amounted to a right of pre-emption); The Trustees of the Estate of AAJ Jonker v The Executor Dative of
Adolf Jonker Deceased IR 334. In Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 4 SA 78
(Tk) the sale in execution was held to be conditional upon the right of pre-emption. On the issues
surrounding involuntary sales and transfers by operation of law see further Platt "The right of first
refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by operation of law" 1996 Baylor Law Review 1197 and Tew
"Rights of First Refusal: The 'Options' That Are Not Options, But May Become Options" 1989
Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-67 et seq. The majority of American decisions do not
consider a right of pre-emption triggered by such an involuntary sale.
108 Edwards (Waaikraal) GM Co Ltd v Mamogale and Bakwena Mines Ltd 1927 TPO 288 294-295,
with reference to Voet 18 3 10;Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal supra 6260- E. In the latter case the
third party contract expressed the price in money, but provided that the "purchase consideration" was
to be "satisfied" by the allotment and issue of shares in the first respondent to the second respondent.
The court regarded the contract as a sale and, as the holder was prepared to pay the monetary
consideration expressed in the contract, he was entitled to enforce performance. The same should
apply where the third party contract is a so-called "trade-in" contract, and a value had been placed on
the property traded in (Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 266). The statutory Vorkaufsrecht in Germany is also
not triggered by donation or exchange, although mixed exchanges have been regarded as sales where
there is some indication that non-monetary consideration was added simply to evade the Vorkaufsrecht.
See RGZ 101,101; BGHZ 49,8; BGH WM 57,1164; Erman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 8; Soergel &
If application of these principles shows that the third party contract breaches the right
of pre-emption, the question remains whether the holder's inability to perform a
subsidiary obligation personal to the third party, disqualifies him from exercising his
granting the holder a right to contract, which the grantor may not thwart by agreeing
to donate or exchange the property, but rather as a mere undertaking that the holder
would be preferred above others if the grantor should sell. These decisions are
consistent with the general principle that pre-emption contracts should be strictly
construed. That the grantor is under no obligation to ensure that the holder is able to
"exercise his right" in the sense of obtaining the property, appears from the fact that
the grantor may alter, damage or destroy the object as she pleases as long as it has not
been sold to a third party.
Where the third party undertakes to deliver goods and money, general principles
dictate that the contract is a sale where this was the overriding intention of the parties,
or, where their intention is unclear, when the money component is the most valuable
of the twO.I09 The same principle should apply where the consideration consists partly
of a service to be rendered. If the intention of the parties is unclear, one should
therefore consider whether the preponderant part of the third party's obligations
consists in the supply of goods or services. IlO
Siebert (Huber) § 504 RdNr 5; Munchener Kommentar (Westermann) § 504 RdNr 18. By contrast, an
English court has regarded a donation as breach of a pre-emption contract. See Gardner v Coutts & Co
1968 1 WLR 179. This shows that our law generally has a narrower view of preference contracts than
English law. In any event, in Gardner v Coutts the holder was given a conditional option to buy at a
specified price. Such a right creates a stronger right than a normal preference contract, which perhaps
influenced the court's refusal to allow the holder's right to be terminated by a donation. In addition,
the German law Vorkaufsrecht is not triggered when the object becomes part of partnership assets
(Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 131 and authorities there cited).
109 Wastie v Security Motors 1972 2 SA 129 (C); Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahomed 1989
1 SA 172 (D); Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C); Voet 18 1 22; De Wet 314.
On German law, see for example, NJW 96, 2321, where the object was "exchanged" for a large sum of
money, an inexpensive piece of land and a worthless right to use another property. The court regarded
this agreement as a trigger event. Under South African law, the agreement would in any event be
regarded as a sales contract and not an exchange
IlO Cf Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 1 SA 195 (RA).
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right. Where a monetary value can be placed on the goods or services, the holder
should be able to exercise his right of pre-emption if he is willing and able to pay that
amount. This would not prejudice the grantor."! In such a case, the parties can be
said to have intended a sale. Even where no monetary value can be placed on the
goods or services, the holder should be entitled to performance where the grantor
would have concluded the third party contract without that personal obligation
anyway.'" This would be the case where it has simply been added in an effort to
evade the holder's right, or where it is an immaterial part of the contract. In the latter
situation, it may be fair to increase the price to be paid somewhat.'!' These rules
would minimise the risk of the grantor deliberately circumventing the preferential
right. They should also apply to other rights of first refusal, such as a preferential
right to lease where the grantor argues that the third party lessee has undertaken a
personal obligation in addition to the payment of rent.
What if no monetary value could be placed on the "personal obligation" and the
grantor would not have concluded the contract without that obligation? An example
is an undertaking by the third party, a close relative, to allow the grantor to stay on his
property and to nurse the grantor in addition to payment of the purchase price, which
the relative is only prepared to do against transfer of the object of the right of pre-
emption.!" The grantor may show that he would not possibly consider being nursed
by anyone else in other surroundings. Another example is where the third party
undertakes to transfer a unique object with great sentimental value for the grantor
along with monetary compensation, which the third party is only prepared to do
III This is also the position in Germany. § 466 (previously §507) of the German code provides that a
Vorkaufsrecht may still be exercised where the third party undertook a subsidiary personal performance
(Nebenleistung) which the holder cannot fulfill, as long as a monetary value can be placed on that
performance, which the holder must then pay to the grantor. If a monetary value cannot be placed on
the subsidiary performance, the Vorkaufsrecht cannot be exercised, unless the contract with the third
party would also have been concluded without it.
l12/bid.
113 This is contentious in Germany. Erman (Grunewald) § 507 RdNr 3 (now § 466) is in favour of
adaptation if the contract would only have been concluded at a higher price without that obligation,
contra Soergel (Huber) § 507 RdNr 2 (now § 466).
114 The Supreme Court of Germany (Reichsgericht) regarded this as too personal an obligation to place
a monetary value thereon (RGZ 121, 139).
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against transfer of the object of the right. A sportsman who granted a preferential
right to conclude a new employment contract on termination of his fixed term contract
may argue that, although the holder offers the same monetary compensation as a rival
club, the holder, as an inland club, cannot offer a house or training by the sea which
the rival club can do and that no monetary compensation can be placed thereon.!" In
the case of a right of first refusal to conclude a new lease at the end of a lease
contract, the grantor may argue that the holder is unable to use the premises for the
same purpose undertaken by the third party and therefore cannot exercise his right.
This could be used in an attempt to shake off the holder where the latter has operated
a book shop in the premises, whereas the third party contract states that the lessee may
only conduct a gift shop on the premises.
Conceivably, application of the rules mentioned so far would provide an answer for
many such cases. For example, if the obligation to provide services or the transfer of
the unique property which money could not compensate for is the only or most
important reason why the grantor decided to alienate, one could argue that the most
important, or preponderant part of the obligation comprises the supply of services or
property, so that the intention of the parties is not to conclude a sale. This means that
the contract rather amounts to an exchange despite the consideration comprising a
considerable amount of money, as the sentimental value that the grantor attaches to
the services or property is worth even more to her. The holder is not prejudiced as he
can only reasonably expect to be preferred above third parties in respect of sales.
Perhaps it can even be argued that he can only reasonably expect to be preferred
above third parties who would provide the same consideration as him in respect of the
type of contract foreseen by the preference contract. A counter-argument that the
115 Cfthe unreported decision by Swart J of the Transvaal Provincial Division in Golden Lions Rugby
Union v Venter & Others TPD 2000-02-11 case no 2007/2000, in which the court held that the holder
club (Golden Lions Rugby Union) could not match the terms offered by the third party (Natal Rugby
Union) in respect of the living, training and working environment of the player. Inter alia, the court
held that an exercise programme which includes training on the beach and swimming in the sea could
not be matched by the Golden Lions Rugby Union. This case is discussed by Prinsloo "Enkele
opmerkings oor spelerskontrakte in professionele spansport" 2000 TSAR 229 242-243 and Loubser
"Sport and competition law" in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Service Issue 2
(August 2001) eh 8-39 et seq.
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grantor created a reasonable reliance that only a higher monetary consideration would
let him prefer a third party above the holder, is also worthy of consideration. On the
other hand, if that argument should disallow the grantor to rely on personal
obligations in the third party contract, consistency requires that all exchange contracts
should also be regarded as a breach of the preference contract. As there is something
to be said for the contrary view, there is no good reason to depart from the existing
rule that the grantor is free to conclude an exchange contract with a third party.
In the case of the sportsman, one should first ask whether the preference agreement is
an unreasonable limitation on the sportsman's freedom to trade that is unenforceable
on the ground of public policy. Loubser has suggested that such an agreement should
normally be regarded as an unreasonable and unenforceable restraint of trade which
unduly restricts an employee's freedom to work where he pleases.'" If he is correct,
that settles the question."? If not, one should probably not allow a non-material
116 Loubser "Sport and competition law" in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa
Service Issue 2 (August 2001) Ch 8-39, Ch 8-40, Ch 8-45. Cf Prinsloo "Enkele opmerkings oor
spelerskontrakte in professionele spansport" 2000 TSAR 229 242-243.
117 Loubser argues that the right of first refusal in Venter's case is a restraint of trade "that arguably
operates while the player is still under contract with a club or union" (Ch 8-40). This is a restraint of
trade designed to limit the player's capacity to be employed by another after termination of the
employment contract. Loubser is therefore correct in stating that the general principles applicable to
the enforceability of restraints of trade should be considered. He argues that the employer's interest in
retaining the services of the player or preventing the player from playing for a competing sports body,
is not, in itself, a proprietary interest worthy of protection (Ch 8-45). "Contract clauses purporting to
restrict the player from freely offering his services in the employment market after termination of an
employment contract are therefore regarded as unreasonable, contrary to public interest and
unenforceable." (Ch 8-39). He leaves the question open "whether the Supreme Court of Appeal and
the Constitutional Court would enforce such a right of renewal or right of first refusal, if it is worded to
relate specifically to the financial terms offered by a third party, given that the effect is to prevent a
sport professional from freely offering his services in the employment market after termination of the
initial term of the employment contract." (Ch 8-40). On the other hand, the grantor of a right of first
refusal is or should be free to sound out the market and to negotiate with other prospective employers
and need only contract with the holder if the holder can match any offer he can find in the open market.
As such, the right of first refusal does not "prevent a sport professional from freely offering his
services." As long as he does not contract with another club before the holder had a chance to match
that other club's offer, he is free to negotiate with other clubs. It is true that other clubs' interest in
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personal obligation undertaken by the third party, which the grantor could never have
equalled, to destroy the holder's right. Otherwise the preference contract would be a
dead letter. For example, to allow an argument that the holder, an inland rugby club,
cannot exercise its right as it cannot offer a lifestyle close to the beach as the rival
third party club can do, would mean that the preference contract is a dead letter. The
sportsman created a reasonable reliance that the better financial content of the third
party offer and other terms integral to his working conditions were all that would
sway him not to contract with the holder. Certainly he created a reasonable reliance
that the mere fact that another club is situated in a different area would not have an
effect on his decision whether to contract with the holder or the third party. As each
club is situated in a different area with unique advantages of living there, the
preferential right would never otherwise bind the sportsman, as he could always point
to some unique advantage of relocating to escape the preferential right which has
nothing to do with the advantages integral to the employment contract itself, such as
the monetary compensation, housing offered and undertakings on the prominence to
be given to the player (for example, that he would play at least 3 out of every 4
matches or would be the first choice player in his position).ll8 Countless opportunities
to evade the right would therefore be opened if such aspects are considered.!" Such a
result could not have been intended, as the parties clearly foresaw a binding contract.
Similar non-material extraneous benefits of contracting with another club should
rather play a role when the reasonableness and enforceability of the right of first
negotiating with the player may be dampened by the right of first refusal, which might not make it
worthwhile to invest time and money in negotiations. This would prejudice the player's freedom to
trade. However, in the case of a valued or talented player, this is unlikely to be an obstacle to a third
party club's interest, as is clear from the Venter case. The employer's interest is not the only factor to
be considered in evaluating a restraint of trade. The effect on the player's freedom is also crucial. In
this regard, a right of first refusal is markedly less onerous than a normal restraint of trade which
prohibits an employee from working for a competitor. On the other hand, the non-financial benefits of
working for another club could sometimes be relevant to the question whether the holder club did
match the conditions offered.
118 For example, the undertaking by Natal Rugby Union that Venter would be the first choice no 8
player for Natal (p 13 of the judgment) is an integral and material part of the third party's offer relating
to the working conditions themselves which should be matched by Golden Lions to exercise its right of
first refusal.
119 CfErman (Grunewald) § 504 RdNr 8 (now § 463).
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refusal as a restraint of trade is considered, or if it passes that test, when the court
exercises its discretion to award specific performance or damages."? The unreported
judgment of Swart J of the Transvaal Provincial Division in Golden Lions Rugby
Union v Venter & Others cannot therefore be supported insofar as it found that the
holder of the right of first refusal, Golden Lions Rugby Union, could not exercise its
right as it did not match the third party club's offer which included an exercise
programme on the beach and as it could not supply coaching by the same coaches
employed by the third party club.!"
A similar argument could be raised against an author who argues that the atmosphere
at a rival publisher's office is superior to that in the grantor firm and that therefore the
holder cannot equal the rival's offer. If this matter was Important to the author, it
should have been stipulated as an exception to the holder's right on granting the
preferential right. The grantor should therefore not easily be entitled to rely on such
unique, intangible advantages of contracting with a third party to escape, when the
contract with the third party remains of the type foreseen in the preference contract
and when it is not regarded as contrary to public interest to enforce such a right. Such
non-tangible advantages of contracting with a third party should rather be taken into
account when the court considers the legality of the right of first refusal or exercises
its discretion on the choice between specific performance and damages. It has already
been suggested that the close working relationship which a publishing contract
requires and the generally inferior bargaining position of the author within that
relationship is an important factor which the court should take into account when
exercising its discretion on whether specific performance or damages should be
awarded. The same generally holds true for an employer-employee relationship.!"
120 A breakdown in the relationships between the player and the holder club or its other employees
should also be taken into account when the effect of the right of first refusal on the player is
considered. CfTroskie v Van der Walt 19943 SA 545 (0).
121 Cf Prinsloo 243 who questions the correctness of the court's decision that exercise by the sea and
the opportunity to work with the coaches employed by Natal are of material importance in contracts
with rugby players.
122 Depending on the degree of control by the employer and the closeness of the relationship called for
by the employment contract as well as the circumstances surrounding the breach and the parties'
relationship. Cf the many South African writers who state that employment contracts would not
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In the case of a right of first refusal to lease, the majority in Souteriou v Retco
Poyntons (Pty) Ltd123 stated that, to use the Oryx mechanism, the holder must be able
to "step in the third party's shoes", and suggested that this applies even in respect of
the use to which the premises may be pUt.124 This is apparently consistent with the
reference in the Oryx case to Gluck's statement that the holder must be willing to
perform all the terms undertaken by the third party.!" although this was not relevant
to the facts of Oryx. The approach of the minority in Souteriou on this point is
preferable - the holder must declare unequivocally and unqualifiedly that he intended
to step into the shoes of the third party on the terms and conditions of that lease, "in
so far as they were not inconsistent with his continued use of the premises as
before. "126 One should accept that the grantor would not have granted the right of
first refusal to lease if he intended to prefer a third party solely on the basis of the use
to which the third party intends to put the premises. By granting the right of first
refusal, the grantor indicated that he is satisfied with the use of the premises for the
current purpose, and that, if he decides to lease again, he would allow the holder to
enter into a lease for that same purpose, as long as the holder is prepared to match any
other terms offered by a third party. Otherwise the grantor would always be able to
evade the right of first refusal, as chances are that interested third parties intend
running different business from the premises than the holder. By necessary
implication, the parties tacitly agreed that the grantor may not evade the holder's right
generally be specifically enforced against an employee, such as Christie Contract 613; Kerr Contract
602; Rycroft & Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd edition (1992) 102; Brassey
"Specific Performance: Labour's Lost Love" (1981) 2 IL! 57 69.
1231985 2 SA 922 (A) 935C.
124935B. This statement was not applied by the court, as the terms of the third party contract was
unknown, so that the court merely ordered that the lessee may not be ejected as he had undertaken to
fulfil the terms of the third party contract (935B-E).
125906H. See also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 266. This aspect of Oryx is also what swayed the court in
Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter supra to insist upon exact matching of the third party's offer, even
as far as the living conditions of the employee is concerned.
126937H.
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on the basis that he cannot use the premises for the same purpose as that undertaken
by a third party."?
What about cases not covered by these rules? An example would be a sale of the
grantor's house, worth around R600 000 to R700 000, to her cousin for R600 000 plus
delivery of an antique table and chairs once belonging to their grandmother to which
the grantor attaches tremendous sentimental value. The third party states that she
would not have sold the table and chairs unless she could buy the house. The grantor,
on the other hand, acknowledges that obtaining the table and chairs was an important
factor, but not the dominant motivation for her decision to sell. However, she would
not have sold for merely R600 000 without the table and chairs. She argues that the
contract does not trigger the holder's right, as the holder is unable to fulfil the
cousin's obligations. Even on the assumption that the right is triggered, she maintains
that she is not prepared to put a price on her house for the benefit of the holder, as she
should in that case be prepared to withdraw from the contract with her cousin and first
sound out the market.
Does this constitute a breach of the preference contract? If so, should this entitle the
holder to buy, or only to restoration of the status quo ante, so that the grantor could
indeed sound out the market for a better price? If the holder is entitled to buy, what
value is to be placed on the non-monetary componenr/'"
It is submitted that an acknowledgement that the grantor would have wanted to sell
even without the personal obligation, shows that the grantor should have realised that
127 The minority's view is consistent with a decision by a California Court, Arden Group Inc v Burk 53
Cal Rptr 2d 492 (Cal App 2 Dist 1996). The court distinguished the acceptance of a contract offer and
the exercise of a right of first refusal. An acceptance must meet exactly the terms of an offer contract.
But no such matching is required for the exercise of a first refusal right. Because the party exercising
the first refusal right is "stepping into a contract made by a third party," the court must consider
commercial realities and allow modifications consistent with the intent of the parties whose contract
created the right of first refusal. For a discussion of the case, see "Leases: Right of first refusal
properly exercised" January 1998 Real Estate Law Report 5.
128 American case law is not unanimous on these issues. See especially Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-79 et seq.
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she was concluding a sale, a type of transaction in respect of which the holder had a
preference. She should therefore have realised that she was expected to invite the
holder to match any third party offer, and to indicate what compensation she would
have accepted in lieu of the personal obligation. As this personal obligation was not
fundamentally important to her, she should have been able to place a money value on
the property as a whole. Contracting with a third party without doing so should
therefore be regarded as breach.
Logically, the normal remedies for breach should apply with the court being able to
decide the price that the grantor would have accepted for the non-monetary
obligation. The grantor's ipse dixit should be accorded due weight herein, and ifthere
is no reason to disbelieve her due to an approximation between her stated price and
the market value, that should be the price which the holder should be allowed to
match.
Alternatively, the grantor could be allowed to withdraw from the third party contract
once it is established that it constitutes breach so that the status quo ante is restored.
The grantor then has a chance to sound out the market again and decide on a monetary
value that she is willing to accept for the property. However, as the grantor should
have known that she should have given the holder a chance to submit an offer, she
should probably be held to have had her chance of sounding out the market.
Therefore the holder should not be deprived of a remedy allowing him to enforce
performance. Allowing the grantor to gather evidence on the true monetary value of
the property in the course of the dispute or litigation with the holder protects the
grantor's interest to obtain the best possible price to some extent.
A related issue is whether a contract to sell only apart of the object or to sell it
together with other properties amounts to breach. Clearly, where the grantor sells
only part of the object, the holder should be allowed the opportunity to buy that
portion and failure to give the holder a chance to match a third party offer is breach.!"
129 This is also the position in the United States of America according to Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-75.
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It is unfair to force the grantor to sell the whole object to the holder. 130 The rest of the
object should remain subject to the holder's right.
The position is more complex when the object is sold as part of a package deal.
In this instance the grantor could argue that the third party is the only person prepared
to buy all the properties involved and that the third party is not interested in the other
properties without inclusion of the object of the right. Therefore the grantor has a
legitimate interest in selling the object as part of the deal to enable her to sell her other
properties at a fair price.
As was stated above, controversy rages over this issue in the US.I31
On the one hand, many US courts hold that the grantor cannot be compelled to sell
one of the lots of land if she desires to sell the land as a whole. Therefore the holder
is not entitled to an order for specific performance to the effect that the object of the
right of first refusal be conveyed to the holder.!"
Some courts do not regard a "package deal" with a third party as a breach at all.!"
They argue that the grantor is only prohibited from selling that piece of land alone.!"
Others see the package deal as a violation of the right of first refusal as opposed to a
triggering event and therefore hold that the holder is only entitled to an injunction,
reconveyance to the grantor where the third party knew of the right, or damages.!"
These decisions place the interest of the grantor to remain as free as possible above
130 CfTew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-76.
131 Par 43 supra.
132 For details see par 4 3 supra.
133 For example, Sautkulis v Conklin (1956 2d Dept) 1 App Div 2d 96i
134 For all details, see Daskal 1995 Fordham Urban Law Journal 461; Flannigan March-June 1997
Canadian Bar Review 1, Stutzman & Day 1983 Idaho Law Review 277; Tew 1989 Eastern Mineral
Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-69 et seq and decisions there cited.
135 Ibid.
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the interest of the holder to obtain the property, but still recognise the need to protect
the holder's interest.
One policy argument in favour of this approach is that there is no way to establish the
price at which the holder would be entitled to purchase the property.
The opponents of this approach equate the holder's purpose to obtain the property as
the purpose of the contract as a whole. They argue also that remedies aimed at
preventing the owner from making a sale to someone else are "worthless and illusory"
as they give no "immediate, positive benefit" to the holder, so that the holder is
unlikely to enter into litigation to obtain this "pyrrhic result."!" The possibility of a
deliberate circumvention of the holder's right is a major consideration for these
writers. Less persuasive is the argument that transactions like a package deal,
dissolution of the grantor company, or a sale for considerations which is partly in cash
should entitle the holder to buy at market value because "this price standard is implicit
in the nature of a right of first refusal."!"
The BGB also provides for package deals. It provides that the holder of a
Vorkaufsrecht may exercise his right on payment of a proportionate part of the total
price.!" The grantor may require that the pre-emption apply to all the property that
cannot be divided without prejudice to him.!" The grantor may not require this if the
holder is prepared to compensate for the prejudice by payment of a sum of money.!"
In my opinion, the package deal should be regarded as breach of the holder's right.
The grantor must have known that the transaction conflicts with his prior undertaking
to allow the holder to buy the property should he ever sell. Owners should not lightly
conclude preference contracts and then be allowed to escape these contracts.
However, the grantor should not be limited to the market value only. The court
136 Flannigan March-June 1997 Canadian Bar Review I 34.
137 Flannigan 31-32.
138 § 508 BGB.
139 Ibid.
140 Erman (Grunewald) § 508 RdNr 3.
should establish the price that the grantor would have accepted for the object separate
from the package. The grantor's ipse dixit, the structure of the package deal and the
market value are all factors that the court should consider in this endeavour. The
equitable discretion to award or refuse specific performance will enable courts to
arrive at an equitable solution for each case. The holder should, however, not be
entitled to insist on the benefit of the entire package deal.
The German writer Schurig has proposed a general principle to deal with all the
aforesaid problematic cases where it is disputable whether a trigger event has
occurred. He argues that the category of contracts or dispositions that trigger the
Vorkaufsrecht should be determined by the grantor's interest or purpose in concluding
that contract."! If the grantor can also achieve his immediate purpose with a specific
disposition through contracting with the holder, that type of disposition should trigger
the holder's right of pre-emption, even if it does not amount to a "sale". If, however,
the grantor's immediate purpose can only be fulfilled through contracting with a third
party, the holder's right should not be triggered by the third party contract.
The upshot is that even an exchange could trigger the holder's right as long as the
holder can supply the same object agreed to by the third party, or if the grantor is
actually only interested in the monetary value of the object to be delivered by the third
party.'? Similarly, transfer of the object in lieu of payment of a debt (a datio in
solutum) should also trigger the holder's right, even though this is not strictly
speaking a sale.!" Where the third party contract cannot be classified as a sale,
Schurig would have the holder bear the onus to establish that the grantor's purpose
could be satisfied by a contract with the holder.!"
On the other hand, a sale to a family member for sentimental reasons, or a transfer to
a daughter company due to a company restructuring would not breach the holder's
right, as the grantor would not be able to achieve his immediate purpose by
141 Supra 130 et seq.
142 134-135.
143 136.
144 136.
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145 137.
146Ibid.
147 136.
148 Hees S Die vertragstypologische Bestimmung des Vorkaufsfalls und die Wirkungen einzelner
Vereinbarungen und Storungen des Drittvertragesfiir das Vorkaufsverhiiltnis (1991). For a summary
of his views, see 210 et seq.
149 § 162 BGB.
contracting with the holder.!" As the third party contract can be classified as a sale,
Schurig would have the grantor prove that the supposed sale is actually a mixed
donation which should not trigger the holder's right.!" This analysis also allows for a
differentiated approach to cases where the grantor causes the object to become part of
a partnership's assets upon entering into a partnership. Ifhis purpose is merely to add
value to the assets of the partnership whereas the precise nature of the asset to be
added is not important, the grantor's purpose is accomplished if the holder pays for
the object insofar as the value payable to the partnership is precisely determinable.!"
Schurig's differentiated approach has been criticised. In a doctoral thesis on this
issue, Hees has argued that Schurig's approach flouts the clear provision of the BGB,
which states that only a sale could trigger the holder's right.!" In cases where the
juristic act in question could (also) be regarded as another type of contract than sale,
he argues that this contract should not trigger the holder's right unless the elements of
sale could also be identified in that transaction. Therefore, transfer in fulfilment of a
money debt would trigger the right, but not a mixed donation or exchange, not even
where the holder is able to perform in terms of the exchange contract. However, if the
holder can show that the grantor actually intends to conclude a sale whereas he merely
seeks to evade the Vorkaufsrecht by agreeing upon non-monetary consideration, the
holder should be able to exercise his right on the basis of a separate provision of the
BGB,149 which essentially provides for fictional fulfilment' of conditions in the same
instances as this would be allowed under South African law. This approach probably
makes it more difficult for the holder to exercise his right than Schurig's approach, as
Hees would require the holder to prove an unconscionable effort to evade the right of
pre-emption.
354
355
The early South African case of Fane v Armstrong." supports Schurig's differentiated
approach as far as filtering out certain sales are concerned. A sale to the grantor's
uncle providing for a right of repurchase in certain contingencies was held not to
breach the holder's right of pre-emption. It appeared that the uncle had informed the
grantor that the transfer was virtually a trust deed, entered into merely for the benefit
of the grantor, who was a prodigal and spendthrift. For this reason, the court held
that, though nominally referring to a sale, the documents must be taken to constitute a
trust and therefore placed the holder in no worse position than he might have been.
In Schurig's terminology, the grantor's purpose in "selling" to his uncle, could not be
achieved through a sale to the holder.
Bel/airs v Hodnett, lSI also lends some support to this approach. The court was not
persuaded that a sale at cost value to a company that the grantor considered to be his
alter ego, breached the right of pre-emption. The court assumed without deciding that
this was the case, but still dismissed the holder's claim for damages.!" as the holder
was definitely not entitled to buy at cost price, but rather at the true value of the
shares."? The court emphasised that rights of pre-emption normally envisage only
arm's length transactions in which the grantor is desirous of selling the object at its
true value, or at least at a rate bearing some relation to the true value.!"
On the other hand, the court in Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal'" refused to allow
evidence that the parties' purpose in granting mutual rights of pre-emption was simply
to prevent the rights from falling into the hands of a specific competitor, which was
not the effect of the transaction complained of.156 It is submitted that courts should
not refuse such evidence on the true purpose of the parties. In such a case, neither
party's interest justifies a finding of breach.
150 1899 (XVI) CL.! 120.
151 Supra.
152 I 137H.
153 1140A-G.
154 1140G-H. The court suggested that, on the assumption that the contract breached the holder's right,
remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante would be more appropriate (l140H-1141A).
155 Supra.
156621 C et seq.
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To summarise, at least two broad approaches are possible to determine whether a
specific third party contract breaches or triggers the holder's right. The traditional
approach is to consider only whether the contract in question displays the
characteristics of the main contract foreseen by the preference contract, for example, a
sales contract in the case of a right of pre-emption. Only such contracts and all such
contracts would therefore breach the holder's right. The parties' actual purpose
should, as always, playa role in the classification of the contract. Therefore a sale
disguised as an exchange or donation would also breach the holder's right.
The second approach is a more differentiated one. The holder need not necessarily
prove that the third party contract constitutes a sale, but only that the grantor could
have achieved her immediate purpose by contracting with the holder. This would
firstly allow contracts and juristic acts that do not really amount to sales to trigger the
holder's right. It also allows the grantor to escape the right of pre-emption where she
can prove that the sale to the third party serves some special interest which
performance by the holder could not accomplish. The second approach, especially its
first-mentioned consequence, could be criticised for ignoring the reference to "sale" in
pre-emption contracts. On the other hand, it allows for a more differentiated and
therefore just approach, without undue impairment of legal certainty, as it involves
one coherent principle to be applied in all cases. Although widening the ambit of the
right of pre-emption on this basis may unfairly surprise the grantor, and should
therefore not be accepted in our law, the narrowing of the net which this approach
achieves in some cases is clearly in accordance with the true purpose of the parties,
and achieves a fair balance of their interests.
The first approach has overtones of the conceptual approach criticised by proponents
of the Typenlehre, whereas the second is indeed a typological, purposive approach. IS?
72222 Exercise of the holder's right upon breach
IS? Cfthe title ofHees's thesis on this topic (n 148 supra) that refers to the "typological" determination
of the trigger event.
claim damages only or whether to enforce performance. The normal rules on
Upon breach, the holder must elect whether to cancel the preference contract and
election between remedies for breach apply. This election can be equated with
"exercise" of the right of first refusal, a term often used in this context. 158 It is fair to
require that the holder must, on request by the grantor, prove that she is willing and
able to perform the terms agreed with the third party and comply with any applicable
formalities in her declaration of willingness to perform.!" The juridical explanation
for preference contracts should reflect the need to have the holder bound to the
decision to exercise her right. This requirement protects the grantor against losing the
benefit of the third party contract in favour of a holder who is not bound or able to
perform.!" Good faith requires that the onus be on the grantor who disputes
compliance with these prerequisites to point this out to the holder, and to give the
holder a chance to prove the contrary or to comply with any formalities. It would be
bad faith for the grantor to simply ignore the holder's indication of willingness to
contract, and to argue later that the holder has lost the right to enforce performance
due to non-satisfaction of these requirements.
Where the terms agreed with the third party are unknown, the holder should be
entitled to an order that the grantor disclose the terms of the third party contract, to
enable the holder to decide whether to exercise her right. 161 It would be dangerous for
a holder ignorant of the terms of that contract to exercise the right. Whether this
would mean that the holder is entitled to an order that the grantor "make an offer to
the holder" will be considered more fully hereunder when the juridical explanation of
preference contracts will be considered. Even if exercise of the right is explained
rather as acceptance of an offer already embedded in the preference contract or as
158 See, for example, Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 255; Reinecke & Otto 1986 TSAR 1829.
159 Cf Hartsrivier Boerderye v Van Niekerk supra 706H. The juridical nature of the holder's
declaration of will be considered later when a juridical explanation of the normal preference contract is
proposed. Whether it is regarded, for example, as an acceptance of an offer embedded in the
preference contract, or as a contractual power to create a contract, policy considerations require that it
should bind the holder.
160 Cf Hartsrivier Boerderye v Van Niekerk supra 706H.
161 CfTew 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute Procedures 7-1 7-64.
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exercise of a contractual power to create a contract by unilateral declaration upon
breach, the holder should be entitled to an order that the grantor supply information
on the third party contract which has been concluded in breach of her right. 162 The
holder needs this information to decide what remedy to elect.
72223 Termination of the holder's right
The general rule should be that before the grantor is free to contract with a third party
on certain terms, these terms must be disclosed to the holder and the holder must be
invited to make an offer at those terms within a reasonable time. The preference
contract only terminates upon the grantor subsequently contracting with and
performing to a third party on terms that the holder has failed to match within a
reasonable time thereafter.!" Otherwise, the preferential right continues to exist and
the grantor would once more have to invite the holder to match terms on which the
grantor is prepared to contract at a later stage, even if these terms are exactly the same
as the ones originally offered to the holder.
Where the holder of a right of pre-emption submits an offer of R5000 in response to
the grantor's invitation without knowing of a competing third party offer of R6000,
the grantor would therefore not be free to contract with the third party at R6000 unless
the holder has been given a chance to match that offer. Furthermore, when the
grantor has disclosed the offer of R6000, a failure to match that offer does not ipso
facto release the grantor. Only if the grantor indeed contracts with and performs to a
third party on those terms within a reasonable time, does the preferential right
terminate. Therefore, if the holder has failed to offer R6000, the grantor may not
after a year contract with a third party at R6000 or more without again inviting the
holder to match the offer. This rule discounts the effects of inflation and prevents the
grantor from ridding himself of the holder through a fake offer by the third party.
162 Therefore I disagree with Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 268 who argues that situations where the terms
of the third party contract is unknown to the holder shows the need for a "normal order" for specific
performance to force the making of an offer. A mere order that the grantor disclose such terms may
suffice, depending on the juridical explanation of the holder's remedy.
163 It is conceded that the "reasonable time" requirement may lead to uncertainties.
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Where the interested third party's identity was enquired about or disclosed to the
holder, the grantor would moreover only be released by contracting with a third party
whose identity and offer has been disclosed. This protects the holder's interest in
warding off unwanted third parties, which is often an important consideration in the
conclusion of preference contracts. If the holder did not request this information, the
grantor may assume that the identity of the third party is not important to the holder.
However, where the holder requested this or where the grantor voluntarily disclosed
the third party's identity, the grantor may not lawfully contract with anybody else
upon the holder's failure to make or accept an offer, unless the holder has been
informed of the new third party's identity.!"
Any other conduct that evidences a warver of the right should, of course, also
terminate the right. For example, where the grantor simply invited the holder to make
an offer without any additional information, the holder's outright failure or refusal to
respond would normally amount to a waiver of the right. This conduct normally
indicates that the holder is not at all interested in contracting with the grantor, and that
the grantor is free to contract with any third party on any terms.
These rules do not imply an enforceable duty to inform the holder of each and every
offer received. Neither can a holder force a grantor who has simply invited an offer
by the holder to disclose the terms of third party offers received. The holder may
request that information upon the invitation to make an offer and may remind the
grantor that without such disclosure the grantor may not lawfully contract with a third
party. The holder may not, however, force the grantor to make such disclosure.l"
The rule argued for is that failure to disclose such a third party offer prevents the
grantor from lawfully contracting on those terms with a third party. It does not
164 Austrian law requires the grantor to inform the holder of the third party's identity before the time
limit within which the Vorkaufsrecht must be exercised begins to run. See 1957 Evidenzblatt 547 (Nr
349) 548. However, where the holder comes to know of the third party's identity during the course of
negotiations with the grantor, the failure to include these particulars in the grantor's notice is irrelevant
(SZ 22/34 (16.3.1949)).
165 In any event, such a remedy would be rather toothless against a recalcitrant grantor.
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express the grantor's duty, but merely amounts to a qualification of the method by
which the grantor may be released from the preference contract.
An inflexible rule that only rejection of the grantor's offer would release the grantor is
also unnecessary. A rejected invitation to match a sufficiently disclosed third party
offer shows that the holder has waived the right to contract with the grantor on those
terms. In other words, even if an offer is formally required, this will not make much
difference in practice as a failure to respond to the grantor's invitation may
nevertheless amount to a waiver of the holder's right. This means that the grantor
would be released without an offer being made. The rule argued for also protects the
grantor's ability to sound out the market to gain the highest possible price. If only a
rejected offer could release the grantor, this would constitute a risk for the grantor, as
in the meantime a better third party offer may materialise before the grantor is able to
withdraw the offer to the holder.!"
If the holder does make an offer, the grantor is not obliged to accept it. However, a
valid offer matching any disclosed third party offer ensures the continuation of the
preferential right.
All of these rules fairly balance the grantor's interest in obtaining as high a price as
possible, with the need to protect the holder against losing the opportunity to contract
to a third party."?
7 2 2 3 Juridical explanation or construction of the default type
The rules proposed above could of course simply be lumped together as the default
rules of true preference contracts. However, I will now consider whether there is not
perhaps a coherent juridical explanation of these rules consistent with the conceptual
156 Under Roman-Dutch law, only a notice to the holder, and not an offer, was required to force the
holder to make a decision. See Voet 18 1 2; Sande DF 344. See also Floyd 1986 THRHR 253256,
257 infine et seq.
157 The policy considerations at stake have been extensively canvassed in chapter 5. See especially
paras 5 2 1 1 and 5 1 2 1 2 supra.
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structure of South African contract law, which might facilitate their understanding and
application.
I will critically consider four possible explanations of the default type just proposed.
They are all consistent with the point of departure that the holder should ultimately be
able to enforce performance of the main contract, but only when the first refusal
contract is breached by a contract with or offer to a third party. I will consider
whether they also sufficiently explain the other default rules proposed here. I will
also consider the different practical implications of each of these explanations.
The first, rather contrived, explanation is that a preference contract amounts to an
obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii coupled with an option, conditional upon breach
of the right of first refusal. In the absence of breach, the preference contract
terminates when the grantor contracts with and performs to a third party within a
reasonable time after the holder's failure to match that third party offer, provided
there was sufficient disclosure to the holder (par 7 2 2 3 1 below).
The second, perhaps also contrived, but simpler explanation is that the grantor has an
enforceable duty to make an offer the moment before the grantor contracts with a
third party. Once again, in the absence of breach, the holder's right terminates when
the grantor contracts with a third party within a reasonable time after the holder's
failure to match that third party offer (par 72232 below).
The third explanation is a variation on the second and will be discussed under the
same rubric. It is that the duty to make an offer the moment before the grantor
contracts with a third party is not (only) enforceable by a court order that an offer be
made, but that the holder has a contractual power to create the main contract by
unilateral, extra-judicial declaration upon breach of this duty. This can be understood
as "self-help" specific performance.
The fourth explanation is that the grantor's obligation is simply an obligatio non
contrahendo cum tertii which terminates when the grantor contracts with a third party
within a reasonable time after the holder's failure to offer the same terms. Upon
breach of this negative obligation, the holder has a contractual power to create a
7 2 2 3 1 Option conditional upon breach
contract with the grantor by unilateral declaration on the same terms as agreed with or
offered to the third party (par 7 2 2 3 3 below).
The default true preference contract can be described as an option conditional upon
breach. The condition triggering the option must be equated with breach in order to
accommodate two features of the default type. The first is that only breach in the
form of a contract with or offer to a third party should trigger the holder's right to
enforce performance. The second is the obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii, which
prevents a contract with a third party being labelled as a neutral trigger event. The
conditional option construction was fully discussed in par 5 1 2 1 1 above.
This juristic construction precludes the need for an order that the grantor make an
offer. Regarding the preference contract as an option contract explains the extra-
judicial creation of the main contract, by the holder's unilateral declaration. This
results in an efficient and cost-effective remedy for the holder, in line with the leading
case of Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Biickereien
(Pty) Ltd.168
The conditional option construction has the further advantage that exercise of the
holder's right is regarded as an acceptance, so that the holder is bound to perform his
side of the main contract. This protects the grantor against the risk of losing the
interest of the third party due to the holder's exercise of the right, without the holder
herself being bound to perform.!"
Moreover, an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii IS III any event an implicit
component of options.
168 Supra. CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 68.
169 This would be the case if a non-binding indication that the holder wishes to contract is regarded as
sufficient exercise of the right. This would leave the holder free to change his mind, after the third
party had probably also lost interest due to exercise of the right of first refusal.
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If the conditional option explanation is followed, the formalities prescribed in the
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 would apply to a pre-emption contract in respect
of land. As this explanation regards the grant of a right of pre-emption as an offer to
alienate, such grant must be in writing and signed by the grantor. As exercise by the
holder amounts to an acceptance of the offer, the formalities requirements apply
equally to the holder's declaration.
A problematic aspect of this juridical explanation is that it is rather contrived and
strained, and arguably amounts to a fiction. Parties are unlikely to agree on an option
that only becomes operative on breach."? On the other hand, this objection could be
countered by the reminder that many parties do in fact provide for remedies for
breach, and it is very conceivable that parties could agree that the holder would have a
power to unilaterally create the main contract should the grantor breach his obligation,
similar to an option. In any event, the default rules of a contract are not determined
merely by the likely consensus of parties to such contracts, but also by policy
considerations. Moreover, there is support for this explanation in South Africa and
other jurisdictions. It has been championed by South African writers such as
Reinecke & Otto.17I It is also effectively the explanation accepted in the USA, where
170 It is not as strained to regard a preference contract which creates no obligatio non contrahendo cum
tertii, such as the BGB Vorkaufsrecht, as a conditional option. What makes the option construction
unusual in the present context is that one must accept that the parties prohibit fulfilment of the
condition as it would in fact breach their contract. This is not the case under the BGB Vorkaufsrecht,
where contracting with a third party is allowed and in fact required to force a decision on the exercise
of the right by the holder. On the other hand, an option usually implies that the grantor may not
contract with anybody else. Therefore the Vorkaufsrecht is also an unusual type of option.
171 "Voorkope en ander voorkeurkontrakte" 1986 TSAR 18 especially at 24 in fine et seq. See also
Flack "The pre-emption agreement: is it a viable option?" 2001 SAL.! 831 who first appear to argue
that pre-emption agreements amount to options (see, for example, at 832) but later argues that courts
should compel the grantor to make an offer (843). Lubbe 1985 Annual Survey 137-138 has also stated
that "Grants specifying the pre-emptive price or, expressly or tacitly, incorporating the price at which
the grantor is prepared to sell to a third party, will have to be recognized as more akin to option
contracts than previously thought." See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 67. The view that all
preference contracts may be regarded as conditional options was implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Hirschowitz v Moolman supra 765F-G and Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra 932E.
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the right of pre-emption is said to ripen into an option upon breach.!" There is also
support for it in English law.!" The combined Vorhand and Vorkaufsrecht clauses
suggested by some German model contract handbooks amount to the same
construction.!" The Vorhand clause confirms the obligatio non contrahendo cum
tertii, so that contracting with a third party without granting the holder an opportunity
to contract would be breach. The Vorkaufsrecht clause provides for the situation
where the grantor does breach the contract in that manner, and is indeed regarded as a
conditional option by some German commentators.!"
Another likely criticism of this explanation is that the terms on which the holder may
exercise the option are not mentioned in the option contract. 176 However, where
nothing is said as to the terms of the main contract, the holder is clearly entitled to
contract on the terms agreed with the third party. As the only condition which
triggers the option is a contract concluded with or a valid offer to a third party, the
terms at which the holder may contract are always certain when the option may be
exercised. There is no speculation involved as to the terms to which the grantor
would be prepared to contract with third parties, as is the case where the trigger event
is a lesser manifestation to sell. There is therefore no basis to reject this construction
for lack of certainty.
However, the courts did not specifically consider the conditional option construction when they made
these comments. Cf Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 261, who strongly opposes the view that preference
contracts amount to options, but largely on the basis of those preference contracts which allows (and
forces) the grantor to make an offer upon a lesser manifestation of a desire to sell at a price which is not
predetermined in any way.
172 See par 4 3 supra.
173 Cf Barnsley's Land Options supra 178: "At the point where the power to compel a disposal arises,
the right of pre-emption mutates into an option". English cases such as Pritchard v Briggs [1980] Ch
339 (CA) that also speaks of the right of pre-emption changing into an option on breach, rather fall
under the category of conditional options to buy at a specified or predetermined price and do not
support the present explanation where no price is specified.
174 See par 4 I 2 supra.
175 See par 4 1 I 2 supra.
176 Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 442-443. That is, in the type of preference contract under
consideration.
An objection that the condition to which the alleged option is subject is a potestative
one and therefore inconsistent with a serious intention to be bound to contract is also
unfounded. As was argued above, the condition in question is not an objectionable
potestative condition that causes liability to be dependant on the mere ipse dixit of a
party.!" In the present case, liability is dependant on an action by the grantor, namely
the conclusion of a third party contract or the submission of a valid offer to a third
party. A court could enforce the contract against a grantor who insists that she does
not want to be bound by simply pointing to the conclusion of a third party contract or
offer.
That this construction allows the extra-judicial creation of a contract by the holder
also does not mean that the court loses its discretion to refuse specific performance.!"
When the holder seeks specific performance of the main contract created extra-
judicially, the court has the power to refuse specific performance. It makes no
practical difference whether specific performance is refused only at that stage, or
earlier. In both cases, damages would be granted on the basis of what the holder's
position would have been had he obtained performance of the main contract.
A problematic aspect of this juridical explanation is that it is difficult to reconcile with
the view that the grantor may cure the breach, in other words withdraw from the third
party contract, as long as the holder has not exercised her right yet.!" Reinecke &
Otto simply state that the offer may not be revoked after fulfilment of the condition,
unless the grantor decides not to contract at all anymore."? Other commentators have
formulated the suspensive condition qualifying the grantor's offer as a sustained
177 See further par 7 1 supra, but especially paras 5 1 2 I and 4 1 1 2 where this aspect was discussed in
more detail.
178 Eiseien 1986 THRHR 95 99 has criticised the Oryx mechanism for depriving the court of its
equitable power to refuse specific performance of the preference contract. CfFloyd 1986 THRHR 253
267,265 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 68 who appear to propose that exercise of the right take
place by unilateral declaration under supervision of a court.
179 On which see further par 7 2 2 1 1 supra. For criticism against the conditional option construction
on this point see Janisch 1990 Responsa Meridiana 434 444.
1801986 TSAR 1825.
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existence.!"
desire to contract.!" A more precise, but rather complicated, explanation is that once
the suspensive condition has been fulfilled, the option becomes subject to a resolutive
condition, namely that the grantor withdraws from the third party contract and no
longer wishes to contract at all. The conditional option explanation is also
inconsistent with a rule that the grantor may cure the breach after the holder has
exercised her right. This is because exercise of the right brings the main contract into
Options are also generally regarded as cedable, whereas this may be regarded as
undesirable and unfair in the case of rights of pre-emption.!" However, both options
and rights of pre-emption should not be cedable in any situation where the holder's
identity is of material importance.!" This sufficiently provides for the discomfort
commentators have expressed with the general principle of cedability.!"
The conditional option construction is somewhat problematic when the third party
contract creates personal obligations or where it involves a package deal. If the third
party contract does in fact breach the preference contract.!" it has been suggested that
the holder should be entitled to buy at the monetary value of the personal obligation.
In the case of a package deal, it was suggested that the holder may buy at the price
that the grantor would have accepted for the object on its own, taking into account the
structure of the entire deal. These cases could, of course, be forced rather
uncomfortably into the conditional option mould if courts consider it the best
explanation for true preference contracts. The holder should then proceed to exercise
his right unilaterally at the monetary value that he considers appropriate. If the
181 See, for example, Flack 2001 SAL.! 831 835.
182 It would not help to regard the preference contract as simply a conditional offer, as that would not
explain why the grantor cannot unilaterally withdraw from the preference contract at any stage.
183 CfFlack 2001 SAL.! 831 837; Hersch v Nel1947 3 SA 365 (0) 373; Mitchell 2001 University of
Chicago Law Review 985.
184 Lubbe & Murray Contract 76; Flack 2001 SAL.! 831 837. Mitchell 2001 University of Chicago Law
Review 985 argues for a residual rule that rights of first refusal are personal and therefore not
assignable.
185 CfKerr Sale and Lease 50.
186 As to how this is established see par 7 2 2 2 1 supra.
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grantor disputes the value placed on the personal obligation, he could simply refuse to
perform, forcing the holder to approach the court to obtain an order for specific
performance. In the course of those court proceedings, the grantor should raise the
issue of the price at which the holder was entitled to contract.
However, in these cases it is probably advantageous to force involvement of a court to
ascertain the price at which the holder may contract before the main contract may be
created, in any event where the grantor disputes the sum value placed on the
performance by the holder. A conditional option, by contrast, allows the holder to
create the main contract even where the grantor disputes the terms on which she may
do so.
Moreover, the conditional option construction is perhaps not overly helpful as one
simple, coherent explanation of all the default rules, as it does not explain the special
rules on termination of the default preference contract that I have argued for. One
could, however, argue that compliance with those rules indicates the only
circumstances under which the holder could be regarded to have waived the option, so
that they fit the conditional option explanation. It could be argued that the holder
would not be prepared to waive her right if she realised that the grantor invited her to
match a third party offer without a serious intention to contract with and perform to
the third party. Neither could a failure to match a third party offer be seen as a waiver
in the absence of sufficient information on the identity of and terms offered by the
third party. An invitation to make an offer or to match the terms of a third party offer
is therefore what is expected from a grantor who wishes to contract, although the
holder cannot force him to do so at any stage before breach.
However, this remains a rather strained juridical explanation and courts may therefore
be unwilling to apply it to true preference contracts.
7 2 2 3 2 Duty to make an offer just before the grantor contracts with a third party
A simpler explanation of the proposed default type is that the grantor has an
enforceable duty to make an offer to the holder at a specific point in time. This is
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how many courts and writers have understood preference contracts."? The proposed
default preference contract denies such a duty upon any manifestation of a desire to
sell. Can such a duty be identified at any other point whilst adhering to the policy
decision that the holder's right is not triggered in the absence of a third party offer or
contract? It could be argued that the default construction still affirms the duty to
make an offer immediately before the grantor agrees to contract with a third party.!"
Up to that point there is only an obligatio non faciendi. However, immediately before
the grantor actually contracts with a third party, a duty to make an offer has arisen.
The exact time and date upon which the grantor must make an offer is therefore only
determinable once the grantor has contracted with a third party or made an offer to
contract with the third party. Only at that point can one say at what time the grantor
had to make the offer - namely the moment before. Therefore the grantor is only in
breach upon contracting with or making an offer to the third party and can only be
forced to make an offer at that point.
Conceivably, an objection may be raised that specific performance of the duty to
make an offer before conclusion of a third party contract becomes impossible upon
the grantor contracting with a third party, so that damages or setting aside a transfer to
a mala fide third party are the only available remedies. This argument relies on the
apparent absurdity of an ex post facto identification of a duty to make an offer. It
amounts to classifying the type of breach as prevention of performance or repudiation
where performance is impossible, and not merely as mora debitoris.
IB7 See for example, the minority decision by Ogilvie Thompson JA in Owsianick v African
Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd, the majority decision in Soteriou v Retco Poyntons supra, Rogers v
Phillips 19853 SA 183 (E) 187D; Floyd 1986 THRHR 253267; Flack 2001 SAl..! 831 843; EiseIen
1986 THRHR 9597,99.
IBB CfFloyd 1986 THRHR 253259. (However, Floyd also regards a lesser manifestation of a desire to
contract as a trigger event. He specifically mentions advertising the property for sale at 264. He also
lays down that where there is no offer by a third party, the terms of the main contract must be
established with reference to the terms which the grantor would require if he would have made an offer
to the third party (260).)
193 Supra.
However, the grantor can still make an offer to or contract with the holder even
though he has contracted with a third party.!" Performance of the duty would merely
be late. The prerequisites for mora debitoris exist.!" There is an obligatio faciendi
and late performance still serves the contractual purpose. To say that breach of the
obligation to make the offer in time renders the obligation impossible to enforce
would mean that the stipulation of any date for performance would make performance
after that date impossible, which is of course absurd and unacceptable. If the breach
does amount to repudiation (which it most likely does)!" it is of the kind where the
innocent party can still obtain specific performance. If it can in fact be described as
prevention of performance, then it is of the kind where substantial performance is still
possible."?
Although an enforceable duty to make an offer the moment before the grantor agrees
to contract with a third party may appear to be a strained construction, it is submitted
that it is a logically sound construction and should be regarded as one of the possible
juridical explanations of the default true preference contract.
Specific performance of this duty may be structured in various ways. Firstly, two
separate actions could be required to enforce performance of the main contract. In
terms of this construction, the court must first order the grantor to make an offer.
Once this is obtained and accepted, the holder would have to approach the court in a
separate action for specific performance of the main contract. This was the approach
of the minority in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd.193
189 Cf 1964 Evidenzblatt 239 240 where Austria's highest court followed Klang's and Ehrenzweig's
opinion that the offer to the holder can be made before or after conclusion of the contract with the third
party. (The court's statement is actually based on the view that making the offer after conclusion of the
third party contract is not breach).
190 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253264 regards the breach as mora ex re.
191 Floyd 1986 THRHR 253 264.
192 Cf Wireohms SA (Pty) Ltd v Greenblatt 19596 SA 909 (C) 912; Lubbe & Murray Contract supra
483.
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Alternatively, the court may be prepared to immediately order specific performance of
the main contract and bypass or short-circuit an order that an offer be made.
Alternatively, it may give such an order simultaneously with the order for specific
performance of the main contract. In the latter case, the judgment is deemed
equivalent to the action required of the grantor.!"
As was noted in par 24 above, the decisions in Dithaha Platinum v Erconovaal'" and
Malan v Schalkwyk & Odendaal'" support the possibility of such a short-circuited
form of specific performance of the duty to make an offer. Both courts granted
specific performance of the main contract. Both also confirmed the grantor's duty to
make an offer."? An order that the grantor be ordered to do what he had agreed to do,
namely to make an offer, was therefore bypassed or short-circuited.
However, as was noted before, the Malan case cited no authority in favour of such a
remedy.!" The decision in Dithaha was based on an apparently mistaken
understanding of the Oryx mechanism as amounting to specific performance of the
duty to make an offer, whereas the court in Oryx did not clearly regard it as such.!"
On the other hand, Van Heerden JA in Oryx did give some indication that he might
possibly consider the Oryx mechanism to be "specific performance in the wide sense"
when he stated that
194 Authority for such an approach can be found in Pothier Treatise on the Contract of Sale 6 1 1-6 1 3.
He states that the act which is the fulfilment of an obligation to conclude a contract of sale may be
supplied by a judgment decreeing that, in default of the debtor's being willing to pass a contract of sale,
the judgment itself shall be equivalent to one. His comment relates not to preference contracts
specifically, but rather to bilaterally binding agreements to conclude a contract in future. However, the
principle is the same in both contexts.
195 Supra.
196 I S 225 (decided in 1852). The clause provided that should the grantor (the buyer) incline to part
with the land, he would "give" same to the holder (the seller) for the original purchase price plus the
value of the improvements.
197 Dithaba Platinum case at 623E-F.
198 For details, see par 2 4 supra.
199 Cf627D.
"indien ek 'n wye diskresie sou hê om nie 'n bevel gemik op spesifieke nakoming, in die breë
sin, te verleen nie, ek ... dit nie ten gunste van die respondente sou uitoefen nie.,,2oo
In any event, it is practically expedient to recognise such a short-circuited remedy, not
only in this context, but in all cases where a party is required to make a declaration of
will before the other party is entitled to further relief. It is submitted that South
African civil procedure should, like some overseas jurisdictions, recognise a rule that
if a court considers a party bound to make a certain declaration of will, that
declaration of will should be deemed to be made on the court's decision to that effect.
This should enable the court to order the party to give effect to that declaration of will
in the same action or application. The advantages hereof are obvious.
For example, in Germany, article 894 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) creates a fiction
that a declaration of will prayed for (such as an offer) is regarded as made upon the
judgment granting the prayer. This procedural provision enables the holder of an
Angebotsvorhand to sue in one action for both an order that an offer be made and an
order that the contract created by acceptance of that offer, be performed."
Whereas the High Court has the power to recognise such a rule by reason of its
inherent power to regulate its own procedure.i" the Magistrate's Court Act or rules
would probably need to be amended in this respect.?" Amendment of the High Court
Act or rules would be desirable in any event to remind courts of this power.
200919A (my emphasis). However, at 913F-G Van Heerden JA stated rather vaguely that: "Daar is nog
ander oorwegings wat my laat twyfel of die regsposisie met betrekking to 'n diskresie wat in sake soos
die Haynes-saak supra geformuleer is, wel in 'n geval soos die onderhawige toepassing vind. Vanweë
die gevolgtrekking waartoe ek hieronder kom, veronderstel ek egter ten gunste van die respondente dat
sodanige wye diskresie wel in casu uitgeoefen kan word."
201See further par 4 1 3 I 2 supra.
202See, for example, the Dithaba Platinum case supra.
203The Magistrate's Court has no jurisdiction to grant specific performance in the form of an order that
an offer be made, unless damages is claimed as an alternative. If the order prayed for is for delivery or
transfer of property up to RIOD 000, specific performance may be ordered (section 46(2)(b) of the
Magistrate's Court Act 32 of 1944). Suppose damages is claimed as an alternative, then the
Magistrate's Court would have no procedural power to short-circuit the order to make an offer, as its
enabling legislation does not authorize this. Pothier Treatise on the Contract of Sale 6 1 1-6 1 3 states
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Floyd also argues that exercise of the right of first refusal by unilateral declaration
should be regarded as a "shortened form of specific performance" and should only be
countenanced if it occurs by involvement of a court.i" What this involvement entails
and how it should be structured is not spelt out.
Involving a court in the decision whether the holder is entitled to exercise his right
and, if so, at what price, is advantageous where the offending third party contract
contains some personal obligations, which the holder is prepared to compensate for by
payment of a monetary sum. The court could then determine the terms of the "offer"
to be made to the holder and grant an order that the grantor perform the ensuing
contract in one action. The same advantage applies where the third party contract is a
"package deal".
Another explanation of the holder's entitlement to approach the court for specific
performance of the main contract, is that contract law recognises a form of self-help
specific performance in this context. This means that breach of the duty to make an
offer before contracting with a third party entitles the holder to create the main
contract extra-judicially upon the occurrence of breach. In a sense, the holder may
perform on behalf of the grantor. The power to unilaterally create the contract derives
from an ex lege (contract law) rule that specific performance is available in this
form?" As such no special procedural power is required to enable the court to
that the act which is the fulfilment of an obligation to conclude a contract of sale may be supplied by a
judgment decreeing that, in default of the debtor's being willing to pass a contract of sale, the judgment
itself shall be equivalent to one. However, it is likely that this power of the court will be regarded as a
procedural one which therefore requires a procedural mandate in the Magistrate's Court Act.
204 Especially at 267 et seq. (He calls this the "verkorte vorm van spesifieke nakoming").
205 CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 68 who argue that the Oryx mechanism could be understood as a
power or capacity to create the main contract by unilateral declaration, and then state that "The rules
regarding specific performance would, of course, have to be developed to accommodate such
situations." Although they then proceed to compare the holder's power with the power of an option
holder to create the legal bond without agreement and the irrevocable authority given as security, both
of which are not generally regarded as instances of extra-judicial specific performance, their reference
to a development of the rules on specific performance suggest that they may regard the holder's power
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directly order performance of the main contract. The extra-judicial nature of this
remedy is comparable to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. Both are self-help
extra-judicial contractual remedies aimed at enforcing specific performance. Of
course, the remedy that I describe goes beyond the exceptio non adimpleti contractus
as it does not simply allow withholding of performance to persuade the grantor to
make an offer as promised, but amounts to the holder making the offer on the
grantor's behalf. In this respect it is comparable to a remedy available to a lessee
aggrieved by the lessor's failure to adequately maintain the leased premises. The
lessee may effect the necessary repairs herself and claim these costs directly from the
Iessor.t" This is not merely an application of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus,
as the lessee is not only entitled to withhold the rental until the grantor repairs the
defect, or indeed to withhold the rental to cover her repair costs. She may directly
claim the costs from the lessor even if they exceed the outstanding rental. In a sense,
the lessee is allowed to perform on the lessor's behalf. Similarly, the holder of the
preference contract may be allowed to perform on the grantor's behalf.
Both remedies make economic and practical sense in the specific context, as orders
that the breaching party should perform would often be ineffective and appear
unnecessary and wasteful.?" Continued refusal to perform is likely, and would
require further, costly interventions by the court to persuade the breaching party to
perform, such as a charge of contempt of court. The introduction of a rule that a
penalty is payable for each day in which a party refuses to perform a court order'" is
probably valuable to deal with such cases, but has its own administrative demands. It
to create the contract as a special form of specific performance. This is also how their view was
interpreted (and endorsed) by Du Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 58.
206 Cooper Landlord and Tenant 90; De Wet & Van Wyk 359; Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205217,226;
Bowell v Daverin 1914 AD 632; Lester Investments v Narshi 1951 2 SA 464 (C) 468; Harlin
Properties v Los Angeles Hotel 1962 3 SA 143 (A) 150H. De Wet's comment on this remedy suggests
the link with specific performance: "Volgens ons howe kan die huurder die verhuurder nie dwing om in
forma specifica herstelwerk te doen ... nie. Die huurder kan egter onregstreeks dieselfde resultaat
bereik en wel deur self die herstelwerk te doen en die koste daarvan op die verhuurder te verhaal. ... "
207 CfVan der Merwe et al Contract 68; Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 53.
208 Such a rule is recognised in Germany and the Netherlands. See par 5 2 2 1 1 (II) for details.
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is more expedient that the innocent party be allowed to sort the problem out extra-
judicially, without any court intervention being required.
In both contexts, the interests of the breaching party are sufficiently protected, so that
intervention of the court is not required at the time of exercise of the power, or
performance on the breaching party's behalf. The lessor must first be given a chance
to effect the repairs herself, and could dispute the reasonableness of the repairs in
court when the lessee claims these. In the vast majority of cases, breach of preference
contracts would be cynical and the contents of the offer to be made would also almost
always be absolutely clear.ê" If the grantor denies that breach had occurred or
disputes the terms to which the holder is entitled to contract, he is still protected. He
could simply withhold performance of the alleged main contract, forcing the holder to
approach a court and to prove the lawful exercise of her right. The court would
therefore still have the opportunity to hold that there was in fact no breach, that the
breach was cured, that equities demand that the holder should only be entitled to
damages or that the value placed by the holder on the subsidiary personal obligations
undertaken by the third party was too low.
It therefore appears that our law recognises the need for a remedy of extra-judicial
specific performance which goes beyond the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in
specific contexts where policy considerations make this expedient, where the nature
of the performance allows this and where the breaching party's interests are
sufficiently protected.
209 It will be the terms agreed with or offered to the third party. Uncertainty on the terms on which the
holder may contract may be caused where the third party has undertaken subsidiary personal
obligations or when the object of a right of pre-emption has been sold as part of a package deal. There
would also be uncertainty where the parties depart from the proposed default position by clearly
providing for a lesser manifestation of a desire to contract as a trigger event to the holder's right to an
offer or to contract. If the holder seeks to enforce this right before a contract with or offer to a third
party, her right must necessarily relate to fair, reasonable or bonafide terms (if there is no usual price
or other price determination). Perhaps holders should in such cases only be entitled to specific
performance in the ordinary or short-circuited sense, so that a court determines the terms on which the
offer is to be made. On the other hand, even in such a case, unilateral extra-judicial creation of the
main contract would not really prejudice the grantor as his refusal to perform would force the holder to
seek specific performance, and therefore, to prove that the power was exercised legitimately.
To object to such a remedy on the basis that it deviates from the normal scheme of
contractual remedies, is not persuasive."? Legal concepts do not have a life of their
own. An objection based on a present scheme of legal concepts should not be
afforded too much persuasive force, especially not when the objection is based on the
view that the default rules of specific contracts should be in absolute harmony with
the principles (or default rules) of general contract law. As noted before,
differentiation in the default rules or naturalia of specific contract types should be
recognised in our law as a vehicle for mediating a fair balancing of the unique typical
interests of parties to such contracts and the special policy considerations arising in
that sphere. Recognition of a special remedy in the context of only one or two
specific types of contracts is therefore not dogmatically suspect in itself.
If courts are uncomfortable with this extra-judicial version of specific performance,
the shortened form of specific performance argued for above, with the necessary
amendments to the Magistrate's Court Act, should be accepted as a suitable
alternative. There is not much practical difference between these two conceptions of
the holder's remedy. In both instances, the holder would have to approach the court
once anyway when faced with an unrelentingly stubborn grantor, whereas under both
systems the holder does not have to approach a court at all if the grantor could be
persuaded that the holder is entitled to performance.
The default rules on termination that I have argued for also fit the present explanation
of default true preference contracts. A failure to match terms offered by a third party
amounts to waiver of the holder's right, as long as the grantor does in fact contract
with and performs to the third party within a reasonable time. This latter qualification
is consistent with the principles on waiver. It could be argued that the holder would
not be prepared to waive his right if he realised that the grantor is making the offer
without a serious intention to contract with and perform to the third party. Neither
210 Although writers like De Wet 358-359 argue that breach of the lessor's duty to maintain the
premises should give rise to the normal remedies for breach, they do not criticise the availability of the
special remedy referred to above.
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could a failure to make an offer be seen as a waiver in the absence of sufficient
information on the identity and terms offered by the competing third party.
The present juridical explanation also presents no logical obstacle to a cure of the
breach after exercise of the holder's right. Insofar as the holder must approach a
court before the main contract comes into existence, or may make the offer on the
grantor's behalf, the grantor is not prevented from curing his breach before that point.
If the holder's unilateral declaration of exercise is, by contrast, seen as acceptance of
an offer embedded in the preference contract, resulting in a binding contract, it
appears illogical to allow a cure that could destroy that contract. Therefore the
present explanation leaves conceptual room for a policy decision that the holder is
sufficiently protected by restoration of the status quo ante through a cure of the
grantor's breach, even after the holder has indicated that he wishes to exercise the
right."!
One conceivable objection against typifying the holder's right as an entitlement to an
offer is that it does not logically force the holder to submit a binding undertaking that
he would perform his side of the main contract upon exercising the right. The logical
implication of the duty to make an offer is that the holder is only bound to perform
once he accepts an offer by the grantor, and not already on his indication that he
insists on such an offer. The grantor may therefore ultimately be left without
anybody to contract with, having lost the interest of the third party on the holder's
exercise of his right."?
211 The counter-argument against such an approach is the possibility of a further cynical breach by the
grantor, which gives the holder a real interest in protecting his interest through enforcing performance
of the main contract despite an avowal to cure.
212 This danger is possibly what led the minority in Soteriou vRetco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 935C to require
that the holder should at least have declared "unequivocally and unqualifiedly" that he wishes to step
into the shoes of the third party to avail himself of the Oryx remedy (937E-938D; cf Kerr Sale and
Lease 298 n 31). This, the court said, should be done even where the holder is unsure of the contents of
the third party contract, whereas he may then add to his unequivocal and unqualified declaration of
intent that he would step into the third party's shoes insofar as they were not inconsistent with his
continued use of the premises as before.
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However, in the majority of cases this is not a well-founded objection against the
present construction. If the grantor wants to know whether the holder is in fact
serious about contracting, he should simply comply with the preference contract by
making a voluntary offer to the holder to match the third party terms. A failure by the
holder to accept this offer within a reasonable time, amounts to an election not to
exercise the right, so that the grantor is free to continue with the third party contract.
The same reasoning applies if the grantor can prove that the holder is unable to
perform the contract. On the other hand, it may be argued that such a voluntary offer
does not provide a solution for the grantor's predicament when he disputes an alleged
breach on his part on the basis that the contract concluded with a third party entails
personal obligations not susceptible to monetary valuation. Ultimately a court may
find that there is breach and that he must make an offer, by which stage the third party
may have lost interest, whereas the holder is not bound to accept the offer. In such a
case, recognition that the holder might get extra-judicial, self-help specific
performance would solve the problem?" The holder should not wait for an offer, but
must bring the contract into being extra-judicially by a proper acceptance.
Alternatively, if our courts should be unwilling to recognise extra-judicial specific
performance as a remedy, one should accept that the juridical explanation considered
here does not account for each and every implied term of preference contract. What
needs to be added is a specific rule that the exercise of the holder's right should be
unqualified and unequivocal and bind the holder even if it does not amount to
acceptance of an offer still to be made.
What are the implications of the present construction for formalities requirements,
most importantly, those of the Alienation of Land Act, 68 of 1981? As the preference
contract does not itself contain an offer to sell the land, and as indication by the holder
that she wishes to exercise her right does not amount to acceptance of such an offer, it
is arguable that these declarations of will need not comply with the formalities
requirements. That Rogers v Philips, 214 in conflict with the Oryx case, held that a right
of pre-emption does not entail an offer, but merely gives the holder a personal right to
213 However, if such self-help specific performance is regarded as merely an alternative to normal
specific performance of the default true preference contract, the problem remains.
214 1985 3 SA 183 (E).
7 2 2 3 3 Contractual power to create the main contract upon breach
an offer, explains why the court considered the formalities requirements inapplicable
to the preference contract itself. The contrary decision in Hirschowitz vMoolman'"
is, however, also defensible on the basis that the purpose of the legislation would be
thwarted if an oral preference contract could entitle the holder to a court order which
effectively forces the grantor to transfer to the holder?" If that is the real reason why
the formalities legislation should also apply to preference contracts, applicability of
these requirements is not affected by the juridical explanation of the holder's remedy.
To regard a preference contract as creating an enforceable duty to make an offer the
moment before the grantor makes an offer to or contracts with a third party, is on the
whole a helpful and coherent way of understanding and explaining the default rules
proposed. However, as there is still a possibility that courts may consider it too
strained and contrived an explanation, I will consider one further possible
explanation.
This juridical explanation VIews the grantor's obligation as a negative one only,
namely a duty not to contract with a third party unless the holder has failed to match
the third party offer. Upon breach of this obligation, the law grants the holder a
power to create the main contract."? In German legal terminology, the holder has a
Gestaltungsrecht?" Added to this basic construction are the further default rules set
out above. This construction therefore regards a preference contract as a sui generis
contract with a set of default rules that aims to achieve a fair balance of the different
21519853 SA 729 (A) 767.
216 The "anomalous situation" which would otherwise ensue, namely that the grantee could become a
purchaser on the strength of a verbal contract, was an important reason for the court's decision. This
view is approved by Lotz 386 and Van Rensburg "Forrnaliteitsvoorskrifte, Voorkoopregte en Opsies"
1986 THRHR 208 215.
217 Breach logically only occurs once the grantor has concluded a contract with or made a valid offer to
a third party.
218 See par 4 I I 2 supra.
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interests and policy considerations involved. It refuses to provide a grand scheme
explanation of all the default rules involved.
The implied power of the holder is justified by the policy considerations favouring a
remedy by which the main contract can be enforced upon breach, and the inefficiency
of an order that the grantor must contract with the holder. That the main contract is
created by the holder's unilateral declaration is not unfair to the grantor as she has
clearly promised this at the conclusion of the preference contract. Therefore the
requirements for contractual liability are satisfied. Of course, no continuing
consensus is required for contractual liability. An objection that the main contract as
a separate agreement requires a new meeting of the minds or new grounds for
reasonable reliance.!" is overly dogmatic. If policy considerations do in fact
command that the holder should be entitled to performance of the main contract upon
breach, it makes no real difference to the grantor whether she is induced to conclude
that contract by court order or whether the holder need not even approach a court to
bring the main contract into being. The court's discretion to refuse specific
performance where equity demands this still comes into play when the holder seeks
enforcement of the main contract, regardless of whether the latter came into existence
by court order or extra-judicially.
Various German writers and courts are content with explaining the Vorkaufsrecht as a
contract granting the holder a Gestaltungsrecht or power to create the main contract
by unilateral declaration upon conclusion of a third party contract.?" Many others,
however, insist on an explanation of the origin of the Gestaltungsrecht, for example,
that there is an offer embedded in the preference contract, which, like all offers, grants
219 CfDu Plessis Spesifieke nakoming 46-47.
220 See par 4 I I 2. Schurig Das Vorkaufsrecht 60 points out that, as the Vorkaufsrecht is based on the
Germanic ius retractus, it remains difficult to fit this institution into an essentially Romanistic system
of obligations. This is why even the first commission tasked with drafting the BGB merely listed a
number of possible juridical explanations for this figure, and why many writers are content with the
Gestaltungsrecht explanation which simply refers to the nature of the holder's remedy without
explaining the origin of that right.
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the addressee a power to create a contract by unilateral declaration in the form of an
acceptance.?"
As indicated above.f" South African law knows the concept of contractual powers to
unilaterally terminate or amend the contents of a contract or to bring a new contract
into existence, which equates with the Gestaltungsrecht in German law. The power to
cancel a contract for breach and the power to accept an offer are two examples.?"
No additional explanation of the origin of the power to cancel for breach is required.
The law has simply decided, in view of the policy considerations and reasonable party
expectations involved, that a party should in some circumstances have the power to
unilaterally terminate the contract. Moreover, the power to withhold performance
under the exceptio non adimpleti contractus could also be described as an ex lege
contractual power which is used to induce specific performance of a contract, even
though it possibly does not fall under the Gestaltungsrecht concept of German law, as
it does not entitle the repository of the power to create, amend or terminate an existing
contract. As there is no need to explain the origins of these ex lege powers in terms of
the consensus between the parties, this should also not be necessary in the case of the
power to unilaterally create the main contract upon breach of the preference contract.
It is a power recognised on the basis of policy considerations, which is consistent with
the parties' typical intentions. It does not prejudice the grantor in any way. If he
disputes the occurrence of breach, the terms on which the holder is entitled to create
the contract or the equity of enforcing performance to the holder, he should simply
refrain from performing the contract allegedly created by the holder's declaration.
This forces the holder to seek a court order for specific performance, which gives the
grantor an opportunity to lay his concerns before a court. The court therefore retains
221 See par 4 1 1 2.
222 See par 4 1 1 2.
223 See Cockrell "Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds" 1997 Acta
Juridica 26. The Supreme Court of Appeal has also recognised that parties may agree on a power to
unilaterally amend the contents of the contract in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC 19994
SA 928 (SCA). See also Lubbe "Kontraktuele diskresies, potestatiewe voorwaardes en die
bepaaldheidsvereiste" 1989 TSAR 159 and Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd 2001 3
1013 (W). Cockrell 33 et seq gives examples of contractual powers created by express agreement.
Van der Merwe et al has supported the view that breach immediately vests the holder
with a power or capacity to create a substantive contract by unilateral conduct?" Like
the court in Oryx, they refer to the German concept of Gestaltungsrechte in support of
their view?"
the power to decide whether the holder has exercised the power in a legitimate way'"
and also retains its power to order damages instead of performance of the main
contract to the holder. It could be pointed out again that refusal of specific
performance of the preference contract itself has exactly the same effect as and would
be based on exactly the same factors as refusal of specific performance of the main
contract. The holder is granted damages to place him in the position he would have
been in had the main contract been concluded. Objection to the holder's power to
create the main contract on the basis that it strips the court of its equitable discretion
to refuse specific performance is therefore unfounded.
As was indicated before, another explanation of the holder's power is that it is not
only an ex lege contractual power, classed along with any contractual power whether
ex lege or consensual, but also a particular form of specific performance which our
law of contract needs to recognise, at least in certain contexts.
In my opinion the best juridical explanation of the default true preference contract is
that the grantor has a duty to make an offer to the holder immediately before
contracting with a third party, which is enforceable upon breach by a contractual
power to create the main contract by unilateral declaration and extra-judicially. This
power can be understood as a form of self-help specific performance which is
sanctioned in this context as the other party (the grantor) remains sufficiently
protected by the court's discretion to refuse specific performance of the main contract
created in this manner, and as an ordinary order for specific performance is
superfluous, wasteful and likely to be disobeyed.
224 CfCockrell "Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds" 28.
22568.
226 68.
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7 3 Exclusion of default rules
Under what circumstances would the proposed default rules be excluded?
This is obviously a matter of interpretation. In this process, courts should keep in
mind the variety of preference contracts identified in previous chapters, and not just
assume that there is only one logical and economically sensible construction. I have
already argued that courts should generally not exclude evidence on prior negotiations
by the parties, as the typical, brief formulations used by South African drafters are
inherently ambiguous and wide enough to cover a whole spectrum of very different
types of preference contracts.?" Owing to this ambiguity, the admission of "parol
evidence" would not generally result in the "amendment" of their contract, but rather
only shed light on its proper interpretation.?" In those rare cases where there is
evidence that the parties have actually discussed the purpose, ambit or meaning of the
preference agreernent.i" courts should carefully consider this evidence in an attempt
to reflect the true agreement.
If the parties provide for a right to contract at a specified price should the grantor
desire to contract, unless the grantor has obtained a better offer from a third party, the
question arises whether the first or second default type should apply. It would be a
matter of interpretation whether the parties intend that any manifestation of a desire to
contract would allow the holder to enforce his right to contract, on condition that no
227 See further chapters 5 and 6 supra.
228 On the admissibility of evidence to establish the proper interpretation of express provisions, see
Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) 454H-455B; Richter v Bloemfontein Town
Council 1922 AD 57 70; Consolidated Diamond Mines of South Africa Ltd v Administrator, SWA 1958
4 SA 572 (A) 609E-F, 632 G-H; Pritchard Properties (Pty) Ltd v Koulis 19862 SA 1 (A) 10C-D; Kerr
328,383; Vorster Implied Terms 13. Cf List v Jungers 19793 SA 106 (A).
229 See, for example, Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal supra 621C-D where the court was not prepared
to hear evidence that the right of pre-emption was intended to prevent a specific competitor from
obtaining the mineral rights in question, and not to prevent an internal restructuring of the grantor
company, which resulted in the mineral rights being transferred from an external company to its
wholly-owned subsidiary at a nominal price.
1. The grantor shall not have the right to sell the said property, until she has first
offered it for sale to the holder.?"
2. The grantor shall be obliged not to sell the thing except to the holder.!"
3. The grantor shall not be entitled to sell the thing to others, but shall be obliged
to give the holder the exclusive preference to buy.i"
4. The holder shall have the first refusal to purchase the thing.i"
better offer exists. It is submitted, however, that a preference contract providing for
the possibility of a price offered by a third party, reflects an interest on the part of the
grantor to negotiate with third parties, so that the holder should not easily be allowed
to force him to contract with her upon a mere manifestation of a desire to sell. The
presumption should be in favour of the second default type. Parties with a contrary
intention should clearly provide that any manifestation of a desire to contract should
entitle the holder to contract on the predetermined terms, unless the grantor can point
to a better third party offer when the holder exercises the right, in which case the
holder only has a right to buy at the terms offered by the third party.
The effect of formulations typically employed by South African drafters should also
be considered. The question arises whether they are in themselves sufficient to
exclude the main default rules that I have proposed for true preference contracts.
The following formulations have been considered in our case law:
230 As in Wissekerke v Wissekerke supra and the Oryx case supra. CfCrous NO v Utilitas Belville 1994
3 SA 720 (C). Cf Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox 1891 4 SAR 116: in case the land
came to be sold, it had first to be offered to the holder at the same price (presumably referring to the
same price at which the remainder of the farm was sold to the holder).
231 As inMeyer, Smuts' Executrix v Meyer 3 S 75.
232 As in Van Pletsen vHenning 1913 AD 82.
233 As in Cohen v Behr 1946 CPD 942 (coupled with a description of the period in which the holder
will have such right). Cf Aronson v Sternberg (Pty) Ltd 1985 I SA 597 (A) and Soteriou v Retco
Poyntons 1985 2 SA 922 (A). In Skinner v Goldberg 1943 WLD 42 the court simply states that the
holder's "request... for the right of pre-emption ... was granted .... ". Cf Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms)
Bpk v Van Niekerk 19643 SA 702 (T): if the grantor would decide to sell the thing, the holder shall
have the first right of refusal to buy. Cf Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal supra.
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5. If the grantor desires to sell, he shall, before the conclusion of a sale, offer the
object to the holder on the same price as he is prepared to sell to a bona fide
purchaser. 234
6. If the grantor desires to sell the object, he shall first offer it to the holder.i"
7. The grantor agrees to (or shall) give the holder the first option to purchase the
thing, should he desire to sell the thing.i"
8. The grantor hereby gives the holder the first right and option to purchase the
thing, should she decide to sell the thing."?
9. Any shareholder desirous of transferring his shares, shall give a notice to the
directors (or secretary) of the company, stating the number of shares that he
wishes to transfer and the price which he is willing to accept. The directors
shall thereupon send to each of the other members of the company a circular
containing these particulars and naming a day on or before which offers to
purchase the shares will be received. If such offers are received at the price
mentioned, the directors shall cause a contract to be concluded as the agent of
the parties.... If the selling shareholder should not have received notice that
his offer to sell has been accepted, he may within ... months sell or dispose of
them at a price not less than that named in the notice of sale.?"
10. Should the grantor desire to sell the object, he shall offer it to the holder?"
234 Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd supra.
235 Le Roux vOdendaal & Os 1954 4 SA 432 (N). The clause added "at the highest price offered to
him" to this formulation.
236 Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137; Hirschowitz v Moolman 19853 SA 729 (A)
237 As in Hattingh v Van Rensburg 1964 1 SA 578 (T) and Krauze v Van Wyk 19861 SA 158 (A).
238 Cf Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (C); Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v
Booyens 20014 SA IS (SCA). The similar clause in the statutes of the first respondent in Associated
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Báckereien (Pty) Ltd supra was not the right of
pre-emption in issue. The dispute involved a later agreement worded like the one at n 230 infra.
239 As in Smith & Os v Momberg & Os 1895 SC 295, where the contract specified a price. A similar
clause is found in Joseph's Executor v Peacock 1868 Buch 247, where the price was specified as the
original selling price plus the value of further improvements, which would be determined by
agreement, or failing agreement, by arbitration. See also Ah Ling v Community Development Board &
Os 1972 4 SA 35 (E) where the statute provided that an owner who desires to dispose of the property,
shall offer to the Board and the Board shall thereupon have a preferential right to purchase at a price to
be agreed, or failing agreement, to be fixed by arbitration.
11. The grantor agrees to (or shall) give the holder the option to purchase the
thing, should he desire to sell the thing.!"
The first three formulations are clearly not inconsistent with the proposed default
construction. They do not contain any suggestion whatsoever that the grantor has an
enforceable duty to make an offer upon a mere manifestation of a desire to sell. The
negative formulation in these clauses is consistent with the default construction that
the only enforceable obligation which exists prior to a contract with or offer to a third
party, is a negative one, an obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii. I have already
shown that there are indeed strong policy considerations why the holder should
perhaps be limited to damages and remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante
upon breach of this negative obligation. It is possible that á court may wish to follow
this route, especially in cases like these where the grantor's duty is merely expressed
as a negative one. However, it is my submission that, on balance of the relevant
policy considerations, courts should follow the default rule which I have proposed,
namely that the holder should be entitled to performance of the main contract upon
breach of the negative obligation.
The fourth clause is also not sufficient to exclude the default construction. I have
already argued that the words "first refusal" do not logically force the conclusion that
the grantor has an enforceable duty to make an offer upon a lesser manifestation of a
desire to sell."! It can merely indicate that the grantor is supposed to give the holder
the first chance to match (or refuse to match) any third party offer which the grantor
considers accepting, whereas this is not an enforceable duty, and breach only occurs
upon an offer to or contract with a third party.
The fifth formulation also makes it clear that as long as the grantor makes the offer
before conclusion of a sale, he is not in breach of his contract, so that the holder
240 McGregor v Jordaan 1921 CPD 301, where the price was stated to be "at a price not exceeding
£500". CfCrossroads Properties (Priv) Ltd v Al Taxi Service Co (Priv) Ltd 19544 SA 514 (SR): in
the event of the grantor desiring to dispose the thing, he shall give the right to the holder to purchase
the thing at such terms and conditions as the grantor shall, bonafide, obtain from any other person.
241 See par 2 1 1 supra, especially with reference to the minority judgment of Botha JA in Soteriou v
Retco Poyntons supra at 936B-C on this point, approved of by Radesich 408-410.
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cannot insist that she may "exercise" her right until he has actually concluded a sale.
This is consistent with the default rules argued for here.
Neither do the sixth and seventh clauses exclude the default consequences proposed.
They indicate that as long as the grantor makes the first offer or grants the first option
to the holder and not to a third party, there is no breach or "trigger event". This
cannot therefore by itself import that the grantor has an enforceable duty to make an
offer upon the manifestation of a desire to sell. As long as he does not first offer to
contract with a third party, he is not in breach.
Similarly, the word "first" in the eighth formulation prevents an interpretation that the
holder has already been granted an option to buy, which comes into operation the
moment that the grantor desires to sell. It indicates that the holder must merely be
preferred above third parties.
Provisions like the ninth clause, common in private company statutes, do not by
themselves mean that the grantor could be forced to comply with the prescribed
procedure when he informally expresses some desire to sell. Therefore this wording
does not exclude the default construction that only a voluntary compliance with the
procedure, or a sale in breach thereof, would entitle the holder to the remedies
provided for.
The last two formulations are, in my view, the only ones open to an interpretation that
the grantor has an enforceable duty to make an offer upon a lesser manifestation of a
desire to sell, and not just on a sale in breach of the holder's right. They do not
qualify the duty to make an offer by the word "first". It is not surprising that most
such clauses considered in our case law, predetermined the price at which "the offer"
was to be made. This was done either by reference to a fixed price or by a mechanism
for fixing the price, for example by a third party. As I have indicated, if the price is
predetermined in this manner, the parties do not intend a true preference contract but
rather an option conditional upon the manifestation of a desire to contract.t" In such
cases, the holder should indeed have a right to contract upon any manifestation of a
242 This type of contract was discussed in par 7 2 1.
desire to sell. This should definitely be the case in those instances where the price
determination is so clear that the holder has no interest in sounding out the market to
establish the highest price obtainable.
What about the cases where the pre-emption clause accords with the last two clauses,
but does not fall under the category just mentioned, as it does not predetermine the
price, or refers only to "a price which the grantor would be prepared to accept from a
third party." In Crossroads Properties (Priv) Ltd v AI Taxi Service Co (Priv) Ltd,243
for example, the lease provided that if the lessor desires to dispose of the property, he
shall give the lessee the right to purchase it on the price and conditions that the lessor
"shall, bona fide, obtain from any other person." Should the lessee not buy the
property within one month of such offer, the lessor would have the right to sell the
property to anybody else. Does such a clause also mean that any manifestation of a
desire to sell should "trigger" the holder's right to buy at a bona fide price? It is
submitted that the preference contract remains ambiguous, and could also mean that
the grantor is expected, but cannot be forced, to submit any third party offers to the
holder upon a manifestation of a desire to sell. The wording could mean that the
making of the offer is the only method by which the grantor could be released from
the duty to prefer the holder, whereas he cannot be forced to make such an offer, not
even where he did obtain an offer from another person. In any event, the grantor
cannot be said to have a "sustained and unqualified" desire to sell until he actually
makes a voluntary offer to the holder or a third party.t" The policy considerations in
favour of a strict interpretation of preference contracts support such an interpretation,
which remains in line with the proposed default type?" Therefore any lesser
manifestation of a desire to contract should not entitle the holder to a bona fide offer.
However, once the grantor has made a voluntary offer, does a preference clause that
refers to a bona fide offer entitle the holder to insist upon better terms if the holder
can prove that the offer is not bona fide? As I have indicated before, this will be
difficult to prove in the absence of a more advantageous offer to or contract with a
24319544 SA 514 (SR).
244 See Ah Ling v Community Development Board & Others supra 390.
245 See also par 6 5 2 supra.
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third party. An outrageously high offer by the grantor is not necessarily mala fide.
Setting a very high price may simply be due to optimism or stupidity on the part of
the grantor and not to a devious attempt to circumvent the holder's right.
It is therefore my submission that courts should not lightly hold that the holder is
entitled to contract with the grantor upon a manifestation of a desire to sell in the
absence of an offer to or contract with a third party. The first characteristic element
of the default type should therefore not lightly be excluded.
What should justify a departure from the second basic characteristic of the proposed
default type, namely the availability of a remedy by which the holder could enforce
performance of the main contract? In other words, under which circumstances should
the court hold that, apart from damages, only remedies aimed at restoring the status
quo ante were intended by the parties?
Would evidence suffice that the holder's main contractual objective was the power to
ward off unwanted third parties, whereas the holder had no desire to obtain the
property for herself for any other reason? Could one argue that the parties therefore
implicitly agreed that the holder should be content with remedies aimed at restoring
the status quo ante the offending contract, especially where the grantor indicates that
he is prepared to withdraw from the third party contract, even after exercise of the
right? This differentiation between parties with different contractual purposes is
certainly worthy of consideration. As indicated before.i" the primary problem would
be the difficulty of proving that the holder indeed had only a prohibitive purpose in
concluding the contract, especially since the holder is likely to deny this during the
trial. If it can be proved on a balance of probabilities, there is much to be said for
allowing a cure of the breach even after "exercise" of the right by the holder. The
argument by some German writers that this would be unfair to a holder who later
developed a desire to obtain the object.i" is not very convincing. If this change in
contractual purpose was not communicated to the grantor, it should not also play a
246 This issue, including the views of German, Swiss and Austrian commentators, was discussed in par
642 supra.
247 Soergel & Siebert (Huber) Vor § 504 RdNr 5.
7 4 The relationship between options and preference
contracts
role in the interpretation of the contract. Perhaps if this changed contractual purpose
was communicated to the grantor who saw no reason to object thereto, the grantor
was arguably not set against allowing the holder the benefit of the main contract upon
breach. This would imply that he could not insist on cure after exercise of the right.
A more weighty argument against exclusion of the proposed default rule is that even
holders with a mere prohibitive purpose would wish to be protected against the
possibility of further cynical breaches by enforcing performance. This issue will
benefit from further debate by commentators and courts.
The term "preference contracts" refers to those contracts where the grantor is unsure
whether to contract at all or of the contract price that she would accept, but
nevertheless promises to prefer the holder above third parties should she decide to
contract or negotiate.
Option contracts, on the other hand, are contracts to keep an offer open. Therefore the
decision to contract on the part of the grantor is already made. They can be
conditional or unconditional.
Preference contracts and options are pacta de contrahendo, that is, "contracts aimed at
the conclusion of another contract.'?" Preference contracts and options overlap in
respect of those preference contracts which predetermine the main contract price and
those which allow the grantor to contract with a third party first, but grants the holder
the preferential right to contract on the terms agreed with the third party. These
preference contracts can be understood as conditional options. All such preference
contracts are conditional upon the grantor manifesting a desire to conclude the main
contract. This condition is what simultaneously places them in the "preference
contract" category.
248 In the words of Van der Merwe et al Contract 56.
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7 5 Conclusion
Ordinary preference contracts that do not predetermine the pnce and contain an
obligatio de non contrahendo cum tertii, differ from unconditional options, firstly, in
that a similar condition is added to the holder's right, namely that it only becomes
enforceable upon a manifestation of a desire to sell. I have argued that the default
rule should be that only a contract with or offer to a third party should be sufficient to
trigger the holder's right to performance of the main contract. They could be
described as options conditional upon breach of the obligatio de non contrahendo cum
tertii, but that juridical explanation is somewhat forced in the case of ordinary
preference contracts,. as it is strained to say that a right is contingent upon conduct
which is prohibited by the contract creating the right.
The abovementioned overlap between options and preference contracts shows that
these categories of pacta de contrahendo are types that are part of a Typenreihe (row
of types) with fluid borders. The one end of the spectrum consists of unconditional
options comprising an offer granting an immediate power of acceptance to the holder.
In a sense, these options also grant the option holder the "preferential" right to
conclude the main contract, and they are therefore related to preference contracts.
They are not, however, preference contracts. Preference contracts refer to those
contracts where the grantor has not yet made an operative offer to the holder, but has
promised to prefer the holder above anyone else when concluding, negotiating or
performing the main contract. The other end of the spectrum consists of "first
negotiation rights", which merely grant the holder the right to negotiate with the
grantor first should the latter decide to contract. They are not options as they do not
comprise an offer to contract, whether conditional or unconditional. Conditional
options linked to some other condition than the desire to contract, for example, the
grantor's son's marriage to the holder, are not preference contracts either, but remain
options even though they do not comprise an immediately operative offer. The
borders start to blur in respect of preference contracts with a predetermined price and
preference contracts with no obligatio non contrahendo cum tertii.
Three default types of preference contract should be recognised, each with a clearly
delineated field of application.
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Where the parties to a preference contract would allow the grantor to contract with a
third party first, the holder has an option to contract at the terms agreed with the third
party. The preference contract can therefore be regarded as an option conditional
upon conclusion of a contract with a third party. Although commonly used in some
European countries, such contracts are rare in South Africa.
In other cases, the default rule should be that the grantor must first give the holder a
chance to contract before he contracts with a third party.
The default construction of these types of preference contracts depends on whether
the preference contract itself predetermines the main contract price. If this is the
case, the holder has a right or option to contract at that price upon any manifestation
of a desire to conclude the relevant type of contract. Once again this type of
preference contract can be understood as an option conditional upon the grantor
manifesting a desire to sell. However, a reference to a price that the grantor would be
prepared to accept from third parties or to a bona fide price, is not sufficient to place
the preference contract in this category.
Where the preference contract does not predetermine the price, or refers to a price that
the grantor would accept from third parties, any manifestation of a desire to sell
should not be sufficient to trigger the holder's right. The grantor and society has a
legitimate interest in having her freedom to negotiate with third parties to obtain the
best possible price curtailed as little as possible. In such cases, the default rule should
be that only a contract with or offer to a third party in breach of the holder's right
constitutes breach, and the holder should only be entitled to the benefit of the main
contract upon such breach. To distinguish this default type of preference contract
from the previous one, I refer to it as the default ordinary preference contract, as it is
the type most often encountered in modem South African practice. Such contracts
only oblige the grantor to "prefer" the holder above interested third parties if the
holder matches the terms offered by them, whereas the previous type actually gives
the holder a right to contract at a specified price despite a better offer by a third party.
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The default rule should be that ordinary preference contracts only terminate (in
principle) upon the grantor actually contracting with and performing to a third party
within a reasonable time after the holder declined the opportunity to match those
terms, and provided the identity of the third party was disclosed to the holder on
request. The holder therefore cannot lose his preferential right by rejection of an
outrageously high offer by the grantor.
The holder's remedy upon breach of a true preference contract could be understood in
a number of ways. Regardless of such juridical explanation, it is practically
expedient that the holder faced with a recalcitrant grantor, should only be required to
approach a court once after breach to obtain an order for specific performance of the
main contract. This means that the holder's remedy should not merely be an order
that the grantor make an offer. Such an order is difficult to enforce and, even where it
is ultimately obeyed, may require the holder to approach the court again to enforce the
main contract. The court's equitable discretion to refuse specific performance to the
holder need only be exercised once, and refusal to enforce the main contract has
exactly the same practical effect as refusal to make an order that an offer be made, or
an order that the holder may not create the main contract by unilateral declaration.
Concern for retention of the court's equitable discretion is therefore not a valid
ground for insisting on a separate order that an offer be made.
One juridical explanation of the default ordinary preference contract is that the holder
is entitled to an offer the moment before the grantor contracts with a third party, or
offers to do so. This moment can therefore only be established once breach has in
fact occurred, which therefore leaves the grantor free to negotiate without fear of
action by the holder upon a lesser manifestation of a desire to contract. This
explanation links up with the traditional understanding of preference contracts and
allows for the fairest balancing of the typical party interests and policy considerations
involved. In the interests of efficiency, breach should entitle the holder to obtain both
an order that an offer be made and an order that the grantor perform the main contract
in one action. The efficiency of the holder's remedy therefore depends on a rule of
civil procedure that such a combined order may be made. Such a combined order is
sanctioned by the procedural law of a number of overseas jurisdictions in cases where
a party seeks both a declaration of will by another, and an order that this declaration
393
be enforced. Although the High Court has an inherent power to grant such an order,
amendment to the Magistrate's Court Act is called for to allow such orders.
Moreover, the South African High Court has been willing, on at least two occasions,
to skip or short-circuit an order that an offer be made by directly ordering the grantor
to perform the main contract upon breach, even though the court identified the
obligation of the grantor as a duty to make an offer. Ifthe holder's remedy is indeed
regarded as specific performance of the duty to make an offer, the Magistrate's Court
Act may need to be amended to recognise the possibility of such a short-circuited
order, as it involves a procedural power.
There are also three alternative juridical explanations of the holder's ability to claim
directly for specific performance of the main contract, which do not involve exercise
of a special procedural power by the court. These explanations accept that the
preference contract itself entitles the holder to unilaterally create the main contract
upon breach.
The first is merely a variation on the explanation that the grantor has an enforceable
duty to make an offer the moment before breach occurs. Instead of requiring an
approach to court to obtain a short-circuited order for performance of the duty to
make an offer against a recalcitrant grantor, our law can be said to recognise a self-
help remedy of specific performance in this context, which allows the holder to create
the main contract extra-judicially. As an extra-judicial remedy aimed at obtaining
specific performance, this remedy is comparable to the exceptio non adimpleti
contractus. However, it goes beyond the latter remedy as it effectively allows the
holder to perform on the grantor's behalf. In this respect it is comparable to a remedy
available to a lessee aggrieved by the lessor's failure to adequately maintain the
leased premises. The lessee may effect the necessary repairs herself and claim these
costs directly from the lessor if they exceed the outstanding rental. This remedy also
goes beyond the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, as the lessee is allowed to perform
on the lessor's behalf. Both remedies make economic and practical sense in the
specific context, as orders that the breaching party should perform would often be
ineffective and wasteful. In both contexts, the interests of the breaching party are
sufficiently protected.
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The second view is that the default true preference contract is an option conditional
upon breach, which entitles the holder to contract on the terms agreed with or offered
to the third party. Although there cannot be any objections to this juridical
explanation on the basis of the supposed potestative nature of the condition or
uncertainty of the price, it remains a rather strained and contrived construction, as it is
not very likely that parties would agree that an option should only arise upon conduct
that is actually prohibited. If the grantor is allowed to cure the breach when he no
longer wants to contract at all, this construction is also not helpful.
The third view is that the preference contract creates an obligatio non contrahendo
cum tertii and that breach thereof vests the holder with an ex lege contractual power
or capacity to create the main contract by unilateral declaration. This power is
recognised on the basis of policy considerations and the reasonable reliance created
by the grantor that the holder would be entitled to contract upon breach. Our law
knows the concept of contractual powers to unilaterally amend, terminate or create a
new contract, such as the power to cancel upon breach or the power of an optionee to
create the contract even against the wishes of the offeror. All these powers to
unilaterally create, amend or terminate contracts are grouped together in German law
under the concept of Gestaltungsrechte. The power of the holder of a Vorkauftrecht
to unilaterally create the main contract is also regarded as a Gestaltungsrecht by a
number of German commentators and courts, and this explanation was also referred to
in the Oryx case.
However, opponents of this juridical explanation of the Vorkauftrecht argue that a
mere description or classification of the holder's power is not a sufficient explanation
thereof, and that the origin of the power must also be explained, for example, by
labeling the preference contract as a conditional option contract.
Ultimately, the choice between these different juridical explanations does not make
much practical difference. Courts should consider whether they deem such dogmatic
explanations necessary to facilitate understanding and consistent and coherent
application of the proposed body of default rules. In my opinion, such constructions
would indeed be helpful for these reasons. The current uncertainty surrounding
preference contracts is caused, to a large extent, by the absence of a coherent legal
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explanation of the default rules on preference contracts, especially of the holder's
ability to unilaterally conjure up the main contract by way of the Oryx mechanism. I
prefer the explanation that the grantor has a duty to make an offer to the holder the
moment before he contracts with a third party, which is enforceable upon breach by a
contractual power to create the main contract by unilateral declaration and extra-
judicially. This is consistent with the widespread view that the grantor has a duty to
make an offer at some point as well as with the Oryx mechanism which provides a
more efficient remedy than an order to make an offer. It could be explained as self-
help specific performance analogous to the power of a lessee to perform the
maintenance duties of a lessor on the latter's behalf and then claim compensation.
The grantor remains sufficiently protected by the court's discretion to refuse specific
performance of the main contract that the holder has created and by the court's
scrutiny of the holder's right to have created the main contract when it is asked to
enforce such contract. Where a voluntary offer or invitation to make an offer was
rejected by the holder, the preference contract should only terminate once the grantor
has contracted with and performed to a third party within a reasonable time after the
holder was invited and failed to match her offer. This prevents circumvention of the
holder's right through conclusion of a fake agreement with a third party. Where
breach has occurred, the holder may request the court to order disclosure of the terms
agreed with the third party to enable her to exercise her right.
It is a matter of interpretation whether the parties' agreement is sufficiently clear to
exclude the proposed default rules. In interpreting the contract, courts should keep in
mind the variety of preference contracts identified in previous chapters, as well as the
policy considerations supporting the proposed default rules. Evidence on prior
negotiations by the parties should not lightly be excluded as the typical, brief
formulations used by South African drafters are frequently ambiguous. Often they are
wide enough to cover very different types of preference contracts. Evidence on the
purpose of a specific preference contract and the effect on that purpose of the
transaction objected to is also relevant to establish whether the transaction indeed
breaches the preference contract, and perhaps also, what the holder's remedies should
be if it does.
Bibliography
Allerkamp K "Vorvertrag, Option und Vorhand" 1981 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen
Notarkammer 55.
Allgauer 0 Vorkaufs-, Riickkaufs- und Kaufsrecht nach dem schwe izerisch en
Zivilgesetzbuche (1918).
Atiyah PS An Introduction to the Law of Contract s" edition (1995).
Bappert W & Wagner E Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 2nd edition (1958).
Bappert W & Maunz T Verlagsrecht: Kommentar zum Gesetz iiber das Verlagsrecht vom
19.6.1901 (1952).
Bappert W & Wagner E Rechtsfragen des Buchhandels 2nd edition (Frankfurt am Main
1958).
Barnett R "A Consent Theory of Contract" 1986 Columbia Law Review 269-321,
reproduced in Alexander L Contract Law Vol I (1991) 3-55.
Baur & Sturner Sachenrecht 1ih edition (1999).
Bassenge P et al (eds) Palandt Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch 60th edition (2001).
Basson "Beware of those pre-emptive rights" Finance Week 2001-06-01 43.
Beater A "Generalklauseln und Fallgruppen" 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 82.
Belcher Cl Norman's Law of Purchase and Sale in South Africa 3rd edition (1961).
Belcher Cl Norman's Law of Purchase and Sale in South Africa 4th edition (1972).
Bell J Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983).
Boberg PQR The Law of Delict: Vol I Aquilian Liability (1984).
Bork R (ed) J von Staundinger 's Kommentar zum Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch Buch I
Allgemeiner Teil §134-163 13th edition (1996).
Brandi-Dohm M Der urheberrechtliche Optionsvertrag: Urheberrechtliche Abhandlung
des MPL Heft 6 (1967).
Braucher J "Contract versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law"
1990 Washington and Lee Law Review 697.
Brassey M "Specific Performance: Labour's Lost Love" (1981) 2 ILJ 57.
Buckland WW A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3rd edition (1963).
Burchell EM "Successive Sales" 1974 SALJ 40.
396
Corbin AL Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of
Contract Law lA Sections 152-274 (1963).
Corbin AL Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of
Contract Law 5A Sections 1122-1251 (1964 & 2001 Fall Cumulative Supplement).
Corder H & Davis D "Law and social practice: an introduction" in Corder H (ed) Essays
on law and social practice in South Africa (1988) 1.
Burkert T "Die Reichweite des § 506 BGB" 1987 NJW3157.
Bydlinski F Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff T': edition (1991).
Canaris C-W Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz (1969).
Castle R Barnsley's Land Options 2nd edition (1992).
Chambers GW & Consalvi MS "Patent and High Technology Licensing" Practising Law
Institute PLI Order No. GO-OOSGSan Francisco 2001-05-16, New York City 2001-
06-11 Patent & High Technology Licensing 652 PLIIPat 457.
Chaskalson M et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (Revision Service 5, 1999).
Christie RH The Law of Contract in South Africa 4th edition (2001).
Cockrell A "Substance and form in the South African law of contract" 1992 SALJ 40.
Cockrell A "Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on rationality grounds"
1997 Acta Juridica 26.
Coetzee J "Total demp Sasol/Engen-transaksie" Finansies & Tegniek 1995-07-21 13.
Conine GB "Property provisions of the operating agreement - interpretation, validity,
and enforceability" 1988 Texas Tech Law Review 1263.
Cooper CW The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant 2nd edition (1994).
Corbett MM "Aspects of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of our Common Law" 1987
SALJ52.
Cross TI "The ties that bind: preemptive rights and restraints on alienation that
commonly burden oil and gas properties" 1999 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 193.
Currie I "Law of Lease" 1994 Annual Survey of South African Law 190.
Daskal B "Rights of first refusal and the package deal" 1995 Fordham Urban Law
Journal 461.
397
398
De Blécourt AS & Fischer HFWD Kort Begrip van het Oud- Vaderlands Burgerlijke Reg
ih edition (1967).
De Groot H Inleidinge tot de hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd (1631).
De Jager T Vervreemding van Grond = Alienation of Land (1982).
De Vos W & Kelbrick R "Discretionary powers of the judge in South Africa" 2000
THRHR 537.
De Vos W & Van Loggerenberg DE "The activism of the judge in South Africa" 1991
TSAR 594.
De Wet JC & Van Wyk AH Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg vol t s"
edition (1992).
De Wet JC Die Ou Skrywers in Perspektief (1988).
De Zulueta F The Roman Law of Sale.· introduction and selected texts (1945).
Decker CW (ed) Commentaries of Roman-Dutch Law 2nd edition (1923).
Delp L Der Verlagsvertrag: Handbuch for die Praxis des Urhebervertragsrechts mit
Vertragsmustern, Erliiuterungen und den Gesetzen iiber das Urheberrecht und das
Verlagsrecht sowie sonstigen vertragsrechtlichen· Bestimmungen 6th edition
(1994).
Dietl C-E et al Wërterbuch fiir Recht, Wirtschaft und Politik II (1983).
Dittrich R & Tades H Das Allgemeine burgerliebe Gesetzbuch 35th edition (1999).
Du Plessis F "Die remedies van die huurder by omskepping van huurgeboue ill
deeltitelskemas" 1996 Stell LR 329-341.
Du Plessis FJ Die spesifieke nakoming van voorkoopregte en ander verwante regte in die
Suid-Afrikaanse en Franse Reg unpublished LLM dissertation, University of
Stellenbosch (1997).
Du Plessis JJ "Spesifieke nakoming: 'n Regshistoriese herwaardering" 1988 THRHR 353.
Dumoulin KR "Das Vorkaufsrecht im Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch" 1967 Mittel-Rheinische
Notarkammer 740.
Dworkin R A Matter of Principle (1985).
Dworkin R Taking Rights Seriously (1978).
Ehrenzweig A System des ësterreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts 2. Band 2nd edition
(1928).
399
Eiseien GTS "Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Voorkoopreg -
regte en verpligtinge van partye" 1986 THRHR 95.
Eisenberg MA "The Theory of Contracts" in Benson P (ed) The Theory of Contract Law:
New Essays (2001) 206.
Eisenberg, MA "The Bargain Principle and its Limits" 1982 (vol 95) Harvard Law
Review 741-801, reproduced in Alexander, Larry Contract Law Volume I (1991)
323-383.
Erasmus HJ, Farlam PBJ & Van Loggerenberg DE Superior Court Practice (Review
Service 18-2002).
Esser J "Dogmatischen Denken im Zivilrecht" 1972 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 97.
Faistenberger C Das Vorkaufsrecht: Zum Vorkauf in Osterreichischen Biirgerlichen
Recht (1967).
Faistenberger C et al Gschnitzer: Osterreichisches Schuldrecht: Besonderer Teil und
Schadenersatz 2nd edition (1988).
Fikentscher W Schuldrecht 8th edition (1992).
Findlay G & Kirk-Cohen FL "On Fictitious Interpretation" 1953 SAL! 145.
Flack L "The pre-emption agreement: is it a viable option?" 2001 SAL! 831.
Flannigan R "The Legal Construction of Rights of First Refusal" March-June 1997
Canadian Bar Review 1.
Floyd TB "Die Voorkoopreg" 1986 THRHR 253.
Fockema Andreae SJ & Van Appeldoom LJ Inleidinge tot de Hol/andsche
rechtsgeleerdheid beschreven bij Hugo de Groot met Aanteekeningen II3rd edition
(1926).
Fuller LL The Morality of Law revised edition (1969).
Gail A Practicarum Observationum (1626).
Gane P The Selective Voet being the Commentaries on the Pandects (1956).
Gordley J "Natural Law Origins of the Common Law of Contract" in Barton J (ed)
Towards a General Law of Contract (1990) 367.
Gordley J The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991).
Gordley J "Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition" in Benson P (ed) The Theory of
Contract Law: New Essays (2001) 265.
400
Gretton GL "Feudal System" in Reid KGC The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) 50.
Grotius De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, in quibus ius naturae et gentium item juris
publici (1913-1928).
Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (1910)
Guest AG et al (eds) Chitty on Contracts I General Principles zs" edition (London
1999).
Guthrie D et al New Bible Commentary 3rd edition (1970).
HaberstumpfH & Hintermeier J Einfiihrung in das Verlagsrecht (1985).
Hackwill GRJ Mackeurtan 's Sale of Goods in South Africa 5th edition (1984).
Hahlo HR & Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background (1968).
Hahn C "Rechtsgeschaftliche Vorkaufsrechte im Rahmen von
Grundstuckskaufvertragen" 1994 Mitteilungen der Rheinischen Notarkammer 193.
Hart HLA The Concept of Law 2nd edition (1994).
Hartkamp AS Asser-Hartkamp 4 I Verbintenissenrecht: Die Verbintenis in het algemeen
11th ed (2000).
Hawthorne L "Sishen revisited: the decline and fall of the "gemenereg" 2000 THRHR
668.
Hees S Die vertragstypologische Bestimmung des Vorkaufsfalls und die Wirkungen
einzelner Vereinbarungen und Stërungen des Drittvertrages for das
Vorkaufsverhiiltnis (1991).
Heidenhain M & Meister BW (eds) Munchener Vertragshandbuch Band 1:
Gesellschaftsrecht s" edition (2000).
Henrich D Vorvertrag, Optionsvertrag, Vorrechtsvertrag (Band 32 in Zweigert K (editor)
Beitrage zum Ausliindisches und Internationales Privatrecht) (1965).
Hense F "Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des OGHBrZ betreffende Ankaufsrecht" 1951
Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 124-129.
Hertel K-A "Rechtsgeschafte im Vorfeld eines Projektes" 1983 Betriebs-Berater 1824
1825.
Hlophe J "The Role of Judges in a transformed South Africa - Problems, Challenges and
Prospects" 1995 SAL! 22.
Isakow LE "Law of Landlord and Tenant" 1985 Annual Survey of South African Law
151.
Hoffmann-Becking M and Schippel H (eds) Beck'sches Formularbuch zum Biirgerlichen,
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht s" edition (1991).
Holmes EM Corbin on Contracts: a comprehensive treatise on the working rules of
contract law Vol 3: Formation of Contracts revised edition (1996).
Holmes GN Mackeurtan 's The Sale of Goods in South Africa: being a handbook of the
law relating to the purchase and sale of corporate movables in South Africa 2nd
edition (1935).
Holmes GN Mackeurtan 's The Sale of Goods in South Africa: being a handbook of the
law relating to the purchase and sale of corporate movables in South Africa 3rd
edition (1949).
Hondius EH (ed) Verbintenissenrecht 3 Suppl84 (Feb 2001).
Honsell H (editor) J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen 2: Recht der Schuldverhiiltnisse §§ 433-534
13th edition (1995).
Hueck G "Erwerbsvorrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" in Paulus G et al (eds) Festschriftfor
Karl Larenz (1973) 749.
Hutchison D "Non-Variation Clauses m Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren
Straitjacket?" 2001 SALJ 720.
Hutchison D "When rigs do roam: Relational Economic Loss in Table Bay Harbour"
2001 SALJ651.
Janisch M "Maintaining the Distinction between Options and Pre-emption Agreements"
1990 Responsa Meridiana 434.
Joubert DJ General Principles of the Law of Contract (1987).
Joubert N "Die regsaard van die finansiële huurkontrak" 1989 TSAR 568.
Joubert NL Die Finansiële Huurkontrak (1991).
Kahn et al Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (1998).
Karen JLM (ed) American Jurisprudence vol18A 2d Corporation 2nd edition (1985).
Karen JLM (ed) American Jurisprudence vol47 2d Judicial Sales 2nd edition (1995).
Karen JLM et al (ed) 49 American Jurisprudence 2d Landlord and Tenant (1995).
401
Karen JLM (ed) American Jurisprudence vol 71 2d Specific Performance 2nd edition
(1973).
Karen JLM (ed) American Jurisprudence vol 77 2d Vendor and Purchaser 2nd edition
(1997)
Kaser M Das Rëmische Privatrecht I 2nd edition (1971).
Kaser M Das Riimische Zivilprozessrecht (1966).
Kaser M Roman Private Law: a translation by Rolf Dannenbring 3rd edition (1980).
Kerr AJ "Dangers in the use of synonyms to describe different categories of contractual
terms" 1994 THRHR 279.
Kerr AJ "Judges and academic lawyers on the relative values of justice and certainty
should they conflict, and on the hierarchy of authority" 1985 SAU 403.
Kerr AJ "Offers, Offers said to be Irrevocable, Options, Rights of Pre-emption and
Double Sales" 1981 SAU 6.
Kerr AJ "Some problems concernmg implied (tacit) provisions of contracts" 1993
THRHR 114.
Kerr AJ "The need to use words with different meanings to describe different categories
of provisions of contracts" 1999 SAU 711.
Kerr AJ The Law of Lease (1969).
Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease 1st edition (1984).
Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease 2nd edition (1996).
Kerr AJ The Principles of the Law of Contract s" edition (1998).
Kleyn "Die reg van die huurder op skadevergoeding vir skade gely weens 'n gebrek in
die saak" 1982 De lure 197.
Kramer EA "Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Vorvertrag, Festofferte and Optionsvertrag-
Formbedurftigkeit" 1991 Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht 547.
Krueger P (ed) Corpus Iuris Civilis (1954).
Kruger (ed) Milnehener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 2 Schuldrecht
Allgemeiner Teil (§§ 241-432) 4th edition (2001).
Kuhlen L Typuskonzeption in der Rechtstheorie (Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Heft 66)
(1977).
402
403
Lambiris MA Orders of Specific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South
African Law (1989).
Larenz K & Canaris C-W Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1995).
Larenz K Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts I Allgemeiner Tei/14th edition (1987).
Larenz K Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts III Besonderer Tei/13th edition (1986).
Larenz K Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 2nd edition (1992).
Laue F Begriffund Wesen des Vorkaufsrechts nach BGB (1905).
"Leases: Right of first refusal properly exercised" January 1988 Real Estate Law Report
5.
Leenen D Typus und Rechtsfindung (1977).
Linnebom W Das Optionsrecht (1936).
Litvinoff S "Consent revisited: Offer Acceptance Right of First Refusal and Contracts of
Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of Obligations" 1987 Louisiana
Law Review 699 .
Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone Halsbury 's Laws of England Vol 8(1) 4th edition (1996).
Lorenz W "Vorzugsrechte beim Vertragabschluss" in FS Dolle Vom deutschen zum
europaischen Recht I (1963) 103.
Lotz J "Purchase and Sale" in Zimmermann R&D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civi/
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996).
Loubser MM "Sport and competition law" in Basson JAA & Loubser MM Sport and the
Law in South Africa Service Issue 2 (August 2001) Ch 8-35.
Lubbe GF & Murray CM Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials and
Commentary 3rd edition (1988).
Lubbe GF "A doctrine in search of a theory: reflections on the so-called doctrine of
notice in South African law" 1997 Acta Juridica 246.
Lubbe GF "Bona fides, billikheid en die openbare belang III die Suid-Afrikaanse
kontraktereg" 1990 Stell LR 7.
Lubbe GF "Die oordrag van toekomstige regte" 1980 THRHR 117-140.
Lubbe GF "Die verpanding van vorderingsregte en die regsdogmatiek - quo vadis?" 1991
Stell LR 131.
Lubbe GF "Estoppel, vertrouensbeskerming en die struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse
privaatreg" 1991 TSAR 1.
Lubbe GF "Kontraktuele diskresies, potestatiewe voorwaardes en die
bepaaldheidsvereiste" 1989 TSAR 159-176.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1982 Annual Survey of South African Law 127.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1984 Annual Survey of South African Law 156.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1985 Annual Survey of South African Law 133.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1986 Annual Survey of South African Law 141.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1987 Annual Survey of South African Law 136.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1991 Annual Survey of South African Law 79.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1992 Annual Survey of South African Law 100.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1994 Annual Survey of South African Law 173.
Lubbe GF "Law of Purchase and Sale" 1995 Annual Survey of South African Law 181.
Lubbe GF "Mortgage and Pledge" in Joubert WA (ed) The Law of South Africa XIV
(1983).
Lubbe GF "Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang"
1989 THRHR 485.
Lubbe GF "The Law of Contract in South Africa by RH Christie" 1981 Acta Juridica
177.
Mackeurtan HG The Sale of Goods in South Africa: being a handbook of the law relating
to the purchase and sale of corporate movables in South Africa (1921).
Mackintosh J The Roman Law of Sale (with modern illustrations): Digest XVIII1 and
XIX translated with notes and references to cases and the 'Sale of Goods Bill'
(1892).
Martinek M Moderne Vertragstypen Band I: Leasing und Factoring (1991).
McCauliff C Corbin on Contracts Vo18: Conditions revised edition (1999).
Medicus D Grundwissen zum Biirgerlichen Recht (2000).
Medicus D Schuldrecht II Besonderer Teil9th edition (1999).
Mertens H-J (ed) Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch mit Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen
Kohlhammer-Kommentar begriindet von Hs Th Soergel & W Siebert 3: Schuldrecht
II (§§ 433-515) AGB-Gesetz, AbzG, EAG, EKG, UN-KaufAbk (1991).
404
Michalski L "Der Mietvorvertrag" 1999 Zeitschrift fur Miet- und Raumrecht 141.
Milner M "Ajax spreads its wings" Mail & Guardian 1999-01-15 54.
Mitchell JF "Can a Right of First Refusal be Assigned?" 2001 University of Chicago Law
Review 985.
Mommsen T, Krueger P & Watson A (eds) The Digest of Justinian (1985).
Moorman van Kappen 0 "Voorkeurs- of voorkoopsrecht" 1976 NJB 831.
Moorman van Kappen 0Met open buydel en in de baren gelde (1973).
Mostert DF, Joubert DJ & Viljoen G Die Koopkontrak (1972).
Moyle JB The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law (1892).
Mulligan GA "Double Sales: A Rejoinder" 1953 SALJ 299
Mulligan GA "Double Sales and Frustrated Options" 1948 SALJ 564.
Mulligan GA "Double, Double Toil and Trouble" 1954 SALJ 169.
Mureinik E "Dworkin and Apartheid" in Corder H (ed) "Essays on law and social
practice in South Africa" (1988) 181.
Naudé T & Lubbe GF "Cancellation for 'Material' or 'Fundamental' Breach: A
Comparative Analysis of South African Law, the UN Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts" 2001 Stell LR 371.
Naudé T "The value of life: a note on Christian Lawyers Association of SA and others v
Minister of Health and others 1998 4 SA 1113 (T)" 1999 SAJHR 541.
Neels J "Die aanvullende en beperkende werking van redelikheid en billikheid in die
kontraktereg" 1999 TSAR 684.
Neels J "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel
1)" 1998 TSAR 702.
Neels J "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel
2)" 1999 TSAR 256.
Neels J "Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid (deel
3)" 1999 TSAR 484.
Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Delict 4th edition (translated and edited by Knobel
JC) (2001).
405
406
Newman E and McQuoid-Mason DJ (eds) Lee & Honore's South African Law of
Obligations 2nd edition (1950).
Nienaber PM "Formaliteite by Koop en Sessie tov Grond: die Jongste Beslissings" 1964
THRHR44.
Nieuwenhuis JH Drie Beginselen van Contraetenrecht (1979).
Nipperdey HE "Uber Vorhand, Vorkaufsrecht und Einlësungsrecht" 1930 Zeitblatt for
Handelsrecht 300.
Nordemann W et al Fromm FK & Nordemann W: Urheberrecht: Kommentar zum
Urheberrechtsgesetz und zum Urheberrechtswahrehmungsgesetz 9th edition (1998)
Norman R Purchase and Sale in South Africa: a treatise on the Roman-Dutch law of the
purchase and sale of movables and immovables as administered in the union of
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 1st edition (1919).
Norman R Purchase and Sale in South Africa: a treatise on the Roman-Dutch law of the
purchase and sale of movables and immovables as administered in the union of
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 2nd edition (1939).
0' Donovan B Mackeurtan 's Sale of Goods in South Africa 4th edition (1972).
Olivier PJJ Legal Fictions: An Analysis and Evaluation (1973).
Pearsall J (ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary io" edition (2001).
PerelI PM "Options, rights of repurchase and rights of first refusal as contracts and as
interests in land" March 1991 The Canadian Bar Review 1.
Peters F Die Riicktrittsvorbehalte des Romischen Kaufrechts (1973).
Phang A "The Concept of Law revisited" 1995 TSAR 403.
Pikart H "Die neuere Rechtsprechung des BGH zum Vorkaufsrecht" 1971 Wertpapier
Mitteilungen 490.
Platt CA "The right of first refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by operation of law"
1996 Baylor Law Review 1197.
Posner R "Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory" 1979 Journal of Legal Studies
103.
Posner R Economic Analysis of Law 2nd edition (1977).
Pothier RJ A Treatise on the Law of Obligations translated by Evans D (1806).
Pothier RJ Treatise on the contract of sale translated by Cushing LS (1839).
407
Prinsloo MW "Enkele opmerkings oor spelerskontrakte in professionele spansport" 2000
TSAR 229.
Quack F (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 6: Sachenrecht (§§
854-1296, WEG, ErbbauVO, SachenRBerG, SchuldRJ4"ndG)3rd edition (1997).
Radesich G "Souteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A): Landlord and
tenant-lease-right of first refusal" 1985 De Jure 407.
Rehbinder M Urheberrecht: ein Studienbucb 10th edition (1998).
Reid KGC The Law of Property in Scotland (1996).
Reinecke MFB & Otto JM "Voorkope en ander voorkeurkontrakte" 1986 TSAR 18.
Romain et al Wërterbuch. der Rechts- und Wirtschaftssprache Teil II Deutsch- Englisch
3rd edition (1994).
Rosenoer J "Acquiring Rights in Tomorrow's Software: First Refusal and First
Negotiation Rights Under Californian Law" 1990 Computer Lawyer 13.
Raser F Ankaufsrecht, Vorhand, Einlosungsrecht und Option: Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von
den gesetzlich nicht geregelten Anrechten zum Kauf(1938).
Rummel P (ed) Kommentar zum Allgemeinen biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch Band I §§ 1-1174
ABGB 3rd edition (2000).
Rycroft A & Jordaan B A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd edition (1992).
Sacker FJ (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1 Allgemeiner Teil
(§§ 1-240) ABG-Gesetz 4th edition (2001).
Sacker FJ (ed) Miinchener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1Allgemeiner Teil
(§§ 1-240) AGB-Gesetz 3rd edition (Munchen 1993).
Sande J "A treatise upon restraints upon the alienation of things" translated by Webber
WS (1892).
Schack H Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht 2nd edition (2001).
Schermaier MJ "Bona fides in Roman contract law" in Zimmermann R & Whittaker S
(eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 63.
Schmitt AG Die Schaffensfreiheit der Kunstiers in Vertragen iiber kiinftige Geisteswerke
(1978).
Scholtens JE "Diffici!es Nugae - Once Again Double Sales" 1954 SALJ71.
Scholtens JE "Double Sales" 1953 SALJ 22.
408
Schrassert Practicae Observationes (1736).
Schricker G Bappert &Maunz: Verlagsrecht 3rd edition (2001).
Schurig, K Das Vorkaufsrecht im privatrecht-Geshichte, dogmatik. ausgewahlte fragen
(1975).
Schwimann M (ed) Praxiskommentar zum Allgemeinen Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch samt
Nebengesetzen Band 41. Halbband §§859-1089 ABGB (1988).
Simpson DP Cassell's Latin-English English-Latin Dictionary s" edition (1968).
Siviglia P "Helpful Practice Hints: Rights of first refusal" 1994 New York State Bar
Journal 56.
Smits JM Het vertrouwensbeginsel en de contractuele gebondenheid (1995).
Steyn LC "Oor die taak van regbank en regsfakulteit" 1967 THRHR 101.
Stoop PJ "Contractual liability in the Roman and modem South African law" in Van
Wyk CW (ed) Nihil Obstat: Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour of WJ
Hosten (1996) 163.
Stutzman WB & Day DE " Protecting the Preemptor: Real Property Rights of First
Refusal in light of Gyurkey v Babler" 1983 Idaho Law Review 277.
Tew RM "Rights of First Refusal: the 'options' that are not options, but may become
options" 1989 Eastern Mineral Law Institute 7-1.
Tiedtke K "Vorkaufsrecht und Fehlen der Geschaftsgrundlage des Kaufvertrages" 1987
NJW874-877.
Tillotson J Contract Law in Perspective 3rd edition (1995).
Ulmer E Urheber- und Verlagsrecht 3rd edition (1980).
Van Aswegen A "Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict" 1993 THRHR 171.
Van Blerk A "American Realism Revisited" in Van Wyk CW (ed) Nihil Obstat:
Feesbundel vir WJ Hosten/Essays in Honour ofWJ Hosten 191.
Van Bynkershoek C Quaestionum juris privati libri quatuor (1744).
Van der Keeseel D Praelectiones iuris hodierni ad H Grotii Introductionem (1939).
Van der Keessel D Theses Selectae translated by Lorenz CA (1855).
Van der Keessel D Theses Selectae juris Hollandici et Zelandici (1860).
409
Van der Merwe CG "Enkele praktyksprobleme in verband met die statutêre voorkoopsreg
van huurders by die omskepping van 'n huurwoonstelblok in 'n deeltitelskema"
1991 TSAR 372.
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 2nd edition (1989).
Van der Merwe D "Judicis est ius dicere, non dare: Judicial law-making by institutional
development of the common law" in Van Wyk & Van Oosten (eds) Nihil Obstat:
Feesbundel vir WJ Hasten/Essays in honour ofWJ Hasten (1996) 225.
Van der Merwe D "Ramus, Mental Habits and Legal Science" in Visser (ed) Essays on
the History of Law (1989) 32.
Van der Merwe D "The Roman-Dutch law: From Virtual Reality to Constitutional
Resource" 1998 TSAR 1.
Van der Merwe NJ & Olivier PJJ Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 6th
edition (1989).
Van der Merwe NJ "Die Aard en Grondslag van die Sogenaamde Kennisleer in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Privaatreg" 1962 THRHR 155.
Van der Merwe NJ "Nemo plus iuris ... " 1964 THRHR 300.
Van der Merwe NJ & Rowland CJ Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg s" edition (1990).
Van der Merwe S & Lubbe G "Bona fides and public policy in contract" 1991 Stel! LR
91.
Van der Merwe SWJ, Lubbe GF & Van Huyssteen LF "The exceptio dali generalis:
requiescat in pace - vivat aequitas" 1989 SALJ 235.
Van der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB, Lubbe GF & Lotz JG Contract:
General Principles (1993).
Van der Walt AJ & Kleyn D "Duplex Dominium: The History and Significance of the
Concept of Divided Ownership" in Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law
(1989).
Van der Walt CFC "Die huidige posisie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg met betrekking tot
onbillike kontraksbedinge" 1986 SALJ 646.
Van der Walt CFC & Midgley JRDelict: Principles and Cases (1997).
Van Dunné JM Verbintenissenrecht Deel1: Contraetenrecht 2nd edition (1993).
410
Van Huyssteen LF & Van der Merwe S "Good faith in contract: proper behaviour amidst
changing circumstances" 1990 Stell LR 244.
Van Jaarsveld SJ (ed) Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg Vol I 3rd edition (1988).
Van Leeuwen S Censura Forensis (1741).
Van Leeuwen S Het Rooms-Hollands-regt (1678).
Van Rensburg ADJ, Lotz JG and Van Rhijn TAR LAWSA Vol 5 Part 1: Contract First
Reissue (1994).
Van Rensburg ADJ & Treisman SH The Practitioner's Guide to the Alienation of Land
Act 1st edition (1982).
Van Rensburg ADJ & Treisman SH The Practitioner's Guide to the Alienation of Land
Act 2nd edition (1984).
Van Rensburg ADJ "Formaliteitsvoorskrifte, Voorkoopregte en Opsies" 1986 THRHR
208.
Van Zurk E Codex Batavus 3rd edition (1738).
Van Zutphen B Praktycke der Nederlandsche Rechten van de Daghelijcksche soa Civile
as Criminele questien (1645).
Van Zyl DH "Aspekte van billikheid in die reg en regspleging" 1986 De Jure 110.
Van Zyl DH "Dubbele Verkopings en die Kennisleer: Word Bona fides Vereis ten tye
van sowel Kontraksluiting as Lewering?" in Joubert DJ (ed) EM Hamman -
Gedenkbundel (1984) 71.
Voet J Commentarius ad Pandectas (1698-1704).
Percival Gane The Selective Voet: being the Commentary on the Pandects [Paris edition
of 1829J by Johannes Voet and the Supplement to that work by Johannes van der
Linden; translated with explanatory notes and notes of all South African reported
cases (1955-1958).
"Vorhand: Verhandlungsvorhand; Angebotsvorhand; Beurkundungsbediirftigkeit" 1999
D Notl-Report 25.
Vorster JP Implied Terms in the Law of Contract in England and South Africa
unpublished PhD thesis, St John's College, Cambridge (1987).
Vorster JP "The bases for the implication of contractual terms" 1988 TSAR 161.
411
Vorster JP "The Influence of English Law on the implications of terms in the South
African Law of Contract" 1987 SAL! 588.
Vorster JP "The resolution of contractual disputes: interpretation versus the recognition
of novel naturalia" 1987 THRHR 450.
Wagner M "Gestaltungen im Vorfeld des endgiiltigen Vertragsabschluss" 2000 NotBZ
69.
Walter G Kaufrecht (1987).
Weber M "Der Optionsvertrag" 1990 Juristische Schulung 249.
Weber R "Einige Gedanken zur Konkretisierung von Generalklauseln durch
Fallgruppen" 1992 Archiv des civilistische Praxis 516.
Welser R "Das Vorkaufsrecht. Zum Vorkauf im Ósterreichischen Biirgerlichen Recht.
Von Christoph Faistenberger (Buchbesprechung)" 1971 Zeitschrift for
Rechtsvergleichung 313.
Wessels lW History of the Roman Dutch Law (1908).
Wessels lW & Roberts AA The Law of Contract in South Africa I 2nd edition (1951).
West A "Pre-emptive rights proper and those in the form of conditions" 1997 De Rebus
531.
Westerman HP (ed) Milnehener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 3./
Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil (§§ 433-606) 3rd edition (1995).
Westermann (ed) Milnehener Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 3./ Schuldrecht
Besonderer Teil (§§ 433-606), VerbrKG, HausTWG, MHG 3rd edition (1995).
Westermann HP & Klingberg D "Vorkaufsrechte im Gesellschaftsrecht" in Westermann
HP & Rosener W (eds) Festschriftfor Karlheinz Quack zum 65. Geburtstag (1991).
Westermann HP (ed) Erman: Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch loth edition (2000).
Westermann HP (editor) Handkommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch II ih edition
(1981).
Wheat RD "Clarifying the nature of Louisiana's Right of First Refusal in the Transfer of
Immovables" 1987 Louisiana Law Review 899-905.
Wicke H Vicarious Liability in Modern South African Law unpublished LLM thesis,
University of Stellenbosch (1997).
Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa s" edition (1956).
412
Windscheid B Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts II 8th edition by Kipp T (1900).
Wolf M "Rechtsgeschaften im Vorfeld von Grtïndstucksubertragungen und ihre
eingeschranckte Berkundungsbediirftigkeit" 1995 DNotZ 179.
Wonnell CT "The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees" 1993 Stanford Law
Review 87.
Zimmermann R "Kaufvertrag" in Feenstra R & Zimmermann R (eds) Das riimisch-
holliindische Recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992)
144.
Zimmermann R "Roman Law in a Mixed Legal System: The South African Experience"
in Evans-Jones R (ed) The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (1995).
Zimmermann R "Synthesis in South African Private Law: Civil Law, Common Law and
Usus Hodiernus Pandectarum" 1986 SALJ 103.
Zimmermann R The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition
(1990).
Zweigert K & Këtz H Introduction to Comparative Law 3rd edition translated by Weir T
(1998)
413
Table of Cases
Southern Africa
A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A).
Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 1972 3 SA 663 (T).
Administrator (Transvaal) v Industrial & Commercial Timber & Supply Co Ltd 1932
AD25.
Ah Ling v Community Development Board & Others 1972 4 SA 35 (E).
Alfred McAlpine & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA
506 (A).
Alpha Trust (Edms) Bpk v Van der Watt 1975 3 SA 734 (A).
Anglo Carpets (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 1978 3 SA 582 (T).
Aronson v Sternberg Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 613 (A).
Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Backereien (Pty)
Ltd & Andere 1982 3 SA 893 (A).
Aymard v Webster 1910 TS 123.
BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391
(A).
Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas 19883 SA 580 (A).
Bellairs v Hodnett & Another 1978 1 SA 1109 (C).
Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890.
Bodasing v Christie NO 1961 3 SA 553 (A).
Botes vBotes 1964 1 SA 623 (0).
Bowen v Daverin 1914 AD 632.
Bowhay v Ward 1903 TS 772.
Boyd v Nell922 AD 414.
Brand v Spies 19604 SA 14 (E).
Breytenbach v Stewart 1985 1 SA 167 (T).
Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 1 SA 669 (W)
Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co Ltd 1948 3 SA 99 AD.
Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 3 SA 569
(SCA).
Cohen v Behr 1946 CPD 942.
414
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South Africa Ltd v Administrator, SWA 19584 SA
572 (A).
Crundall Brothers (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus NO and Another 1992 2 SA 423 (ZSC).
Crossroads Properties (Private) Ltd v AI Taxi Service Co (Private) Ltd 19544 SA 514
(SR).
Crous NO v Utilitas Belville 1994 3 SA 720 (K).
CSIR v Fijen 1996 2 SA 1 (A).
Cussons en andere v Kroon 20014 SA 833 (HHA).
Davids v Goodwood Municipality & Others 19693 SA 21 (C).
De Lange v Smuts NO 19983 SA 785 (CC).
Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A).
Dharumpal Transport (Pty) Ltd v Dharumpal1964 1 SA 707.
Dithaba Platinum v Erconovaal Ltd & Another 1985 4 SA 615 (T).
Doll House Refreshments (Pty) Ltd v O'Shea & Others 1957 1 SA 345 (T).
Edouard v Administrator Natal 1989 2 SA 368 (D).
Edwards (Waaikraal) Gold Mining Co Ltd v Mamogale NO & Bakwena Mines Ltd
1927 TPD 288.
Eerste Nasionale Bank v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (A).
Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 1 SA 195 (RA).
Engelbrecht v Mundell's Trustee 1934 OPD 111.
Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd 2001 3 1013 (W).
Erasmus v Arcade Electric 19623 SA 418 (T).
Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds and Others 1992 (1) SA 879 (A).
Ex Parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd 1995 1 SA 218 (W).
Ex parte Zunckel1937 NPD 295.
Falch v Wessels 19834 SA 172 (T).
Fane v Armstrong 1899 (XVI) CU 120.
Fichardts Motors (Prop) Ltd v Nienaber 1936 OPD 221.
Fulton v Waksal Investments (Pty) Ltd 19862 SA 363 (T).
Geldenhuys v Maree 1962 2 SA 511 (0).
Genae Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC (previously NBC
Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1992 1 SA 566 (A).
Globe Electrical Transvaal (Pty) Ltd v Brunhuber 1970 3 SA 99 (E).
415
Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter & Others, unreported decision by Swart J, TPD
2000-02-11, case no 2007/2000.
Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA
901 (N).
Haak's Garages v Van Wyk 1933 TPD 370.
Harlin Properties v Los Angeles Hotel 1962 3 SA 143 (A).
Harris & Others v Minister of the Interior & another 19522 SA 428 (A)
Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK & Andere 2002 3 SA 653
(N).
Hartsrivier Boerderye (Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 3 SA 702 (T).
Hattingh v Van Rensburg 1964 1 SA 578 (T).
Hersch v Nel 1948 3 SA 686 (A)
Hirschowitz v Moolman & Others 1983 4 SA 1 (T).
Hirschowitz v Moolman & Others 1985 3 SA 739 (A).
Holmdene Brickworks v Roberts Construction 1977 3 SA 670 (A).
Improvair v Establissements Neu 19832 SA 138 (C).
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537.
Janisch v Hall 1946 CPD 553.
Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust 2000 1 SA 315 (C).
Joel Melamed v Cleveland Estates 1984 3 SA 155 (A).
Joseph's Executor v Peacock 1868 Buch 247.
Katzeffv City Car Sales 1998 2 SA 644 (C).
Kimberley Waterworks Co v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 1897 AC 515.
Kliptown Clothing Industries (Pty) Ltd v Marine and Trade Insurance Co of SA Ltd
1961 1 SA 103 (A).
Krauze v Van Wyk & Andere 19842 SA 702 (NK).
Krauze v Van Wyk & Andere 1986 1 SA 158 (A).
Kroonstad Westelike Boere Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha 1964 3 SA 561
(A).
Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd 19863 SA 509 (D).
Langeberg Voedsel Bpk v Sarculum Boerderye Bpk 19962 SA 656 (A)
Le Roux v Odendaal & Others 19544 SA 432 (N).
Lester Investments v Narshi 1951 2 SA 464 (C) 468.
Lindner v National Bakery & Another 1961 1 SA 372 (0).
416
List v Jungers 19793 SA 106 (A).
Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd 19634 SA 119 (D).
Longhorn Group (Pty) Ltd v The Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd & Another 1995 3 SA 836
(W).
Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 19844 SA 874 (A).
Malan v Schalkwyk & Odendaal l S 225.
Marine and Trade Insurance v Van Heerden 1977 3 SA 553 (A).
McAdams v Fiander's Trustees & Bell NO 1919 AD 207.
McGregor v Jordaan & Another 1921 CPD 209.
McMurray v HL & H (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 887 (N).
Mdakane v Standard Bank 1999 1 SA 127 (W)
Meyer, Executrix of Smuts v Meyer 3 S 75.
Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A).
Minister van Polisie en 'n Ander v Gamble en 'n Ander 19794 SA 759 (A).
Minter v Robinson DM Co Ltd 1879 CU 205.
Mountbatten Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahomed 1989 1 SA 172 (D).
Mtetwa v Minister of Health 19893 SA 600 (D).
NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC 1999 4 SA 928 (SCA).
Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1948 2 SA 656
(0).
Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 3 SA 310 (A).
Par Excellence Colour Printing (Pty) Ltd v Ronnie Cox Graphic Supplies (Pty) Ltd
1983 1 SA 295 (A).
Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 1994 2 SA 464 (W).
Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government 1934 AD 560.
Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 19733 SA 397 (A).
Poynton v Cran 1910 AD 205.
Pritchard Properties (Pty) Ltd v Koulis 1986 2 SA 1 (A).
Ramburan v Minister of Housing (House of Delegates) & Others 1995 1 SA 353 (W).
Rand Bank v Rubenstein 1981 2 SA 207 (W).
Richter v Bloemfontein Town Council 1922 AD 57.
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168.
Rogers v Philips 1985 3 SA 183 (E).
Roux v Schreuder 1968 3 SA 616 (0).
417
S v Graham 19753 SA 569 (A).
S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC).
S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC).
SA Breweries v Francis & Sons 27 NLR 648.
Sasfin v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A).
Savage & Pugh v Knox 1955 3 SA 149 (N).
Shakinovsky v Lawson & Smulowitz 1904 TS 326.
Schoeman v Rossouw & Others 1915 CPD 446.
Seaville v Colley 9 Juta 39.
Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt & Another 19864 SA 523 (C).
Sher v Allen 1929 OPD 137.
Sishen Hotel (Edms) Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster en Staal Industriële Korporasie
Bpk 1987 2 SA 932 (A).
Skinner v Goldberg 1943 WLD 42.
Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A).
Smith & Others v Momberg & Others 1895 SC 295.
Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15
(SCA).
Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A).
South African Mutual Society v Cape Town Chamber of Commerce 1962 1 SA 598
(A).
Standard Bank v Efroiken 1924 AD 171.
Stewart v Breytenbach 19863 SA 47 (A).
Sweets from Heaven (Pty) Ltd & another v Ster Kinekor Films (Pty) Ltd 1999 1 SA
796 (W).
Taylor & Claridge v Van Jaarsveld & Nellmapius 1887 TS 137.
Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 3 SA 231 (W).
The Trustees of the Estate of AAJ Jonker v The Executor Dative of Adolf Jonker
Deceased 1 R 334.
Thompson v Scholtz 1999 1 SA 232 (SCA).
Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 20014 SA 551 (SCA).
Transport and Crane Hire (Pvt) Ltd v Hubert Davies & Co (Pvt) Ltd 1991 4 SA 150
(ZS).
Transvaal Silver Mines v Jacobs, Le Grange & Fox 1891 4 SAR 116.
418
Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (0).
Tschirpig & Another v Kohrs 1959 3 SA 287 (N).
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A).
Van der Berg v Tenner 1975 2 SA 268 (A).
Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 4 SA 78 (Tk).
Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299.
Van Pletsen v Henning 1913 AD 82.
Van Rensburg v City Credit (Natal) (Pty) Ltd 19804 SA 500 (N).
Van Wyk v Posemann & Another 1915 CPD 672.
Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 1 SA 603 (A).
Venter v Birchholtz 1972 1 SA 276 (A).
Videtsky v Liberty Life Insurance Association of Africa Limited 1990 1 SA 386 (W).
Vrystaat Motors v Henry Blignaut Motors 19962 SA 448 (A).
Wahloo Sand BK en Andere v Trustees Hambly Parker Trust en Andere 2002 SA 776
(HHA).
Wastie v Security Motors 1972 2 SA 129 (C).
Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 1992 4 SA 202
(A).
Wireohms SA (Pty) Ltd v Greenblatt 19596 SA 909 (C).
Wissekerke & 'n Ander v Wissekerke 1970 2 SA 550 (A).
Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd v Chawanda 1991 2 SA 825 (ZSC).
Zulu v Van Rensburg 1996 (4) SA 1236 (LCC).
Germany
BFG BB 1993,2222.
BGH NJW 1986, 2820.
BGH WM 57,1164.
BGH WM 1988, 92.
BGHZ 9, 237.
BGHZ 22,347.
BGHZ49,8.
BGHZ 72, 385.
BGHZ 98, 130.
BGHZ 115, 355.
BGHZ 126, 226.
BGHZ 131,348.
EFG 1991, 103.
EFG 1999,619.
HRR 1942, 345.
RG JW 1930,3766.
KG DR 1939, 170.
NJW 96, 2321.
LG Dusseldorf 1994 GRUR 53.
LG Offenburg 1989 Die AG 134.
OLG Karlsruhe, NJW-RR 90,935 = 1990 WM 725.
OLG Munchen, JW 1919,257.
OLG Hamburg 33, 288.
OLG 17, 26 Am 1.
OLGR-Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig 1997,66.
Ol.Gk-Munchen 1997, 134.
OVG Nordrhein-Westphalen 1993 BB 2367-2370.
RG HRR 1933,913.
RG JW 1930,3766.
RG Recht 1907, 827, Nr 1807.
RG Seuff A 74, 232.
RG Seuff A 81, 360.
RG Wam Rspr 1919,241 = RG Seuff74, 159.
RGZ 16, 155.
RGZ 79,156.
RGZ 101,101.
RGZ 110, 184.
RGZ 121, 139.
RGZ 126, 123.
RGZ 154,355.
RGZ 169,65.
RGZ 169, 71.
419
420
England
Banstead Urban District Council v Wilkinson 1962 182 EG 155.
Birmingham Channel Co v Cartwright 1879 Il Ch D 421.
Denetower Ltd v Toop 1991 1 WLR 945.
Du Sautoy v Symes 1967 1 All ER 25.
Fraser v Thames Television 1984 1 QB 44.
Gardner v Coutts & Co 19673 All ER 1064, 1968 1 WLR 173.
Gregory v Saddiq 1991 1 EG LR 237.
Kling v Keston Properties 198349 P&CR 212.
Lord Carington v Wycombe Rail Co 1868 3 Ch App 377.
Lyle & Scott Ltd v Scott's Trustees; Same v British Investment Trust Ltd 1959 AC
763.
Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester Racecourse Company 19002 Ch 352.
Manchester Ship Canal Company v Manchester Racecourse Company 1901 2 Ch 37
(CA).
Miller v Lakefield Estates Limited 1989 1 EGLR 212.
The Mooreock 1889 14 PD 64.
Murray v Two Strokes Ltd 1973 3 All ER 357.
Pritchard v Briggs 1980 1 All ER 294.
Ryan v Thomas 1911 55 Sol Jo 364.
Smith v Morgan 1971 2 All ER 1500.
Wilmott v Barber 1880 15 ChD 96.
United States of America
Abdallah v Abdallah 17 ALR3d 967.
Abraham Investment Co v Payne Ranch Inc 968 SW 2d 518 (Tex App Amarillo
1998).
Anderson v Stewart 149 Neb 616, 32 NW 2d 140.
Arden Group Inc v Burk 53 Cal Rptr 2d 492 (Cal App 2 Dist 1996).
Barling v Hom 1956, Mo 296 SW 2d 94.
Brenner v Duncan 1947318 Mich 127 NW 2d 320.
Dalton v Balum 76 ALR 3d 1134.
Daniels v Anderson 162 Ill2d 47,204 III Dec 666, 642 NE 2d 128 (1994).
First National Exchange Bank v Roanoke Oil Co 1938 169 VA 99,192 SE 76.
Gyurkey v Babler 34 ALR 4th 1199.
Henderson v Nitschke 46 ALR 3d 1369.
Langer v Stegerwald Lumber Company 36 ALR2d 679.
Long v Waybie 48 Or App 851, 618 P2d 22.
Mercer v Lemmens 230 Cal App 2d 167.
Miller v Le Sea Broadcasting Inc 87 F3d 2241 7th Cir 1996.
Mobil Exploration & Producing North America Inc v Graham Royalty Ltd 910 F 2d
504 (8th Cir 1990).
Ohio Oil Co v Yacktman (1st Dist) 36 III App 3d 255,343 NE 2d 544.
Robinson v Drew 144 A67, 83 NH 459 (1928).
Sager v Rogers 1987 WL 6718 at 2 (Tenn Ct App 1987).
Sautkulis v Conklin (1956 2d Dept) 1 App Div 2d 962.
Sessel Holdings Inc v Fleming Companies Inc 949 F Supp 572 (WD Tenn 1996).
Westpark Inc v Seaton Land Co 171 A 2d 756, 225 Md 433.
Wilson v Brown 19365 Cal2d 425.
Austria
SZ 1/54.
SZ 6/25.
SZ 22/34.
SZ 23/356.
SZ 38/148. = 1966 Evidenzblatt 69 (Nr 52);
SZ 59/54 = 1986 Juristische Bliitter 509 (20.3.1986).
SZ 36/128.
1957 Evidenzblatt 547 (Nr 349).
1964 Evidenzblatt 239 (Nr 162).
1937 Juristische Bliitter 387.
1977 Juristische Blatter 94.
1983 Juristische Blatter 203.
421
422
Scotland
Matheson v Tinney (OH) 1989 Scots Law Times 535.
Roebuck v Edmunds (OH) 1992 Scots Law Times 1055.
Smith v Wilson 190 1 Scots Law Times 137.
Canada
Budget Car Rentals Toronto Ltd v Petro-Canada Inc 198960 DLR 4th 751 (Ont Ct).
Table of Legislation
South Africa
Alienation of Land Act, 68 of 1981.
Companies Act, 46 of 1926.
Companies Act, 61 of 1973.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996.
Magistrates' Court Act, 32 of 1944.
Share Titles Act, 95 of 1986.
Germany
Baugesetzbuch (BauG).
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).
Austria
Allgemeines Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch (ABGB).
England
Landlord and Tenant Act 1987.
423
and
section / paragraph
Second Series (USA)
Third Series (USA)
Appellate Division
Atlantic Reporter (USA)
Allgemeines Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch (Austria)
Appeal Court (England)
South African Supreme Court Appellate Division Reports
Aktiengesellschaft (Germany)
All England Law Reports (England)
American Law Reports Annotated
American Law Reports Annotated Second Series
American Law Reports Annotated Third Series
American Law Reports Annotated Fourth Series
Appeal Court (USA)
Appellate Division (USA)
article
Betriebs-Berater (Germany)
Bundesfinanzhof (Germany)
Bundesgesetzbuch (Germany)
Bundesgerichthof (Germany)
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichthofs in Zivilsachen (Germany)
Buchanan's Law Reports
Cape Provincial Division
Codex (of Justinian)
Court of Appeal (England)
California Appeal Court (USA)
California Reporter (USA)
compare
Abbreviations
&
§
2d
3d
A
A
ABGB
AC
AD
AG
AllER
ALR
ALR2d
ALR3d
ALR4th
App
App Div
art
BB
BFH
BGB
BGH
BGHZ
Buch
C
C
CA
Cal App
Cal Rptr
cf
424
CF
ChApp
ChO
Ch
Cir
CLl
CLl
Co
CPO
D
D&C
Censura Forensis
Chancery Appeal Court
Chancery Division (England)
Chancery Division (England)
Circuit (USA)
Cape Law Journal
The Cape Law Journal
Company
South African Supreme Court Law Reports, Cape Provincial Division
Digesta (Digest of Justinian)
Durban and Coast Local Division
DLR Dominion Law Reports
DNotl-Report Deutsche Notarial Report (Germany)
DNotZ Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift (Germany)
E Eastern Cape Provincial Division
ed editor
eds
EFG
EG
EGLR
et seq
EWiR
F
Gr
GRUR
HHA
HRR
ILl
III
Inl
JW
K
LG
Ltd
editors
Entscheidungen des Finanzgerichts (Germany)
Estates Gazette (England)
Estates Gazette Law Reports (England)
et sequitur (and following)
Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht
Federal Reporter (USA)
Grotius
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (Germany)
Hoogste Hof van Appel
Hëchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung (Germany)
Industrial Law Journal
Illinois (USA)
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid
Juristische Wochenschrift (Germany)
Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling
Landesgericht (Germany)
Limited
425
Md
Mich
Mo
N
n
NC
NE
Neb
NH
NJ Super
NIB
NJW
NK
NLR
Nr
NYS
o
OGH
OrApp
OH
OLG
OLGR
OLGR
OntCt
OPD
OVG
Pa
par
paras
PCR
P&CR
Pty
Maryland (USA)
Michigan (USA)
Missouri (USA)
Natal Provincial Division
note / footnote
Northern Cape Provincial Division
Northeastern Reporter (USA)
Nebraska (USA)
New Hampshire Supreme Court Reports (USA)
New Jersey Superior Court Reports (USA)
Nederlands Juristenblad (Netherlands)
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (Germany)
Noord-Kaapse Provinsiale Afdeling
Natal Law Reports
Number
New York Supreme Court (USA)
Orange Free State Provincial Division
Oberste Gerichtshof (Austria)
Oregon Appeal Court (USA)
Outer House (Scotland)
Oberlandesgericht (Germany)
Oberlandesgericht Report (Germany)
Oberlandesgericht Report (Germany)
Ontario Court (USA)
South African Supreme Court Law Reports, Orange Free State
Provincial Division
Oberverwaltungsgericht (Germany)
Pennsylvania (USA)
paragraph
paragraphs
Planning and Compensation Reports (England)
Property and Compensation Reports (previously Planning and
Compensation Reports) (England)
Proprietary
426
RdNr
RG SeuffA
RGZ
RHR
S
SA
SAJHR
SALJ
SAR
SC
SCA
SE
SEC
SLT
SolJo
SR
Stell LR
SW
SWA
SZ
T
Rand Nummer (German)
Reichsgericht Seuff Archiv (Germany)
Entscheidungen des Reichgerichthofs in Zivilsachen (Germany)
Het Rooms-Hollands Regt
Searle's Cases in the Supreme Court
Juta's South African Law Reports
South African Journal of Human Rights
South African Law Journal
South African Law Reports
Supreme Court Law Reports
Supreme Court of Appeal
Southeastern Reporter (USA)
South Eastern Cape Local Division
Scots Law Times (Scotland)
Solicitor's Journal and Reporter (England)
Southern Rhodesia
Stellenbosch Law Review
Southwestern Reporter (USA)
Reports of the High Court of South West Africa
Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofs in Zivil- und
Justizverwaltungsachen (Austria)
Transvaal Provincial Division
Transvaal Provincial Division Law Reports
Transvaal Supreme Court Reports
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg
Volume
Vorbemerkung (German)
Vorbemerkung (German)
Witwatersrand Local Division
Tenn Ct App Tennessee Court of Appeal (USA)
Tex App Texas Appeal Court (USA)
Th Theses Selectae
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (Journal of
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law)
TPD
TS
TSAR
Vol
Vor
Vorbem
W
427
Weekly Digest Tennessee (USA)
Westlaw (USA)
South African Supreme Court Law Reports, Witwatersrand Local
Division
WLR Weekly Law Reports (England)
WDTenn
WL
WLD
WM Wertpapier Mitteilungen (Germany)
ZPO Zivilprozessordnung (Germany)
ZSC Zimbabwe Supreme Court
428
